2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/nelem.h"
24 #include "internal/sizes.h"
25 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
30 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
32 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
36 tls1_generate_master_secret,
37 tls1_change_cipher_state,
38 tls1_final_finish_mac,
39 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
42 tls1_export_keying_material,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
59 tls1_export_keying_material,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
62 tls_close_construct_packet,
66 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
70 tls1_generate_master_secret,
71 tls1_change_cipher_state,
72 tls1_final_finish_mac,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
76 tls1_export_keying_material,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
79 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
80 tls_close_construct_packet,
84 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
87 tls13_setup_key_block,
88 tls13_generate_master_secret,
89 tls13_change_cipher_state,
90 tls13_final_finish_mac,
91 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
92 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
94 tls13_export_keying_material,
95 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
96 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
97 tls_close_construct_packet,
101 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
104 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
105 * http, the cache would over fill
107 return (60 * 60 * 2);
114 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
120 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
122 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
126 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
131 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
132 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
134 s->version = s->method->version;
139 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
144 {NID_sect163k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1},
145 {NID_sect163r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1},
146 {NID_sect163r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2},
147 {NID_sect193r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1},
148 {NID_sect193r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2},
149 {NID_sect233k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1},
150 {NID_sect233r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1},
151 {NID_sect239k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1},
152 {NID_sect283k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1},
153 {NID_sect283r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1},
154 {NID_sect409k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1},
155 {NID_sect409r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1},
156 {NID_sect571k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1},
157 {NID_sect571r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1},
158 {NID_secp160k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1},
159 {NID_secp160r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1},
160 {NID_secp160r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2},
161 {NID_secp192k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1},
162 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1},
163 {NID_secp224k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1},
164 {NID_secp224r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1},
165 {NID_secp256k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1},
166 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1},
167 {NID_secp384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1},
168 {NID_secp521r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1},
169 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1},
170 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1},
171 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1},
172 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519},
173 {EVP_PKEY_X448, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448},
174 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A},
175 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B},
176 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C},
177 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D},
178 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A},
179 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C},
181 {NID_ffdhe2048, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048},
182 {NID_ffdhe3072, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072},
183 {NID_ffdhe4096, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096},
184 {NID_ffdhe6144, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144},
185 {NID_ffdhe8192, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192}
188 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
189 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
190 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
191 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
194 /* The default curves */
195 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
196 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519, /* X25519 (29) */
197 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
198 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448, /* X448 (30) */
199 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
200 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
201 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A, /* GC256A (34) */
202 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B, /* GC256B (35) */
203 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C, /* GC256C (36) */
204 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D, /* GC256D (37) */
205 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A, /* GC512A (38) */
206 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B, /* GC512B (39) */
207 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C, /* GC512C (40) */
208 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
209 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
210 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
211 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
212 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
215 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
216 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1,
217 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1,
220 struct provider_group_data_st {
222 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
225 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
226 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
227 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
229 struct provider_group_data_st *pgd = data;
230 SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
231 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
233 TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
234 EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
236 unsigned int is_kem = 0;
239 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == ctx->group_list_len) {
240 TLS_GROUP_INFO *tmp = NULL;
242 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == 0)
243 tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO)
244 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
246 tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->group_list,
247 (ctx->group_list_max_len
248 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
249 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
251 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
254 ctx->group_list = tmp;
255 memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
257 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
258 ctx->group_list_max_len += TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
261 ginf = &ctx->group_list[ctx->group_list_len];
263 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME);
264 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
265 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
268 ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
269 if (ginf->tlsname == NULL) {
270 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
274 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
275 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
276 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
279 ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
280 if (ginf->realname == NULL) {
281 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
285 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
286 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) || gid > UINT16_MAX) {
287 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
290 ginf->group_id = (uint16_t)gid;
292 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG);
293 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
294 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
297 ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
298 if (ginf->algorithm == NULL) {
299 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
303 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
304 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
305 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
309 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM);
310 if (p != NULL && (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &is_kem) || is_kem > 1)) {
311 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
314 ginf->is_kem = 1 & is_kem;
316 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS);
317 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mintls)) {
318 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
322 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS);
323 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxtls)) {
324 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
328 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS);
329 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mindtls)) {
330 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
334 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS);
335 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxdtls)) {
336 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
340 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
341 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
342 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
346 keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, ginf->algorithm, ctx->propq);
347 if (keymgmt != NULL) {
349 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
350 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
352 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
353 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
354 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
355 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
356 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
357 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
360 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
361 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
362 ctx->group_list_len++;
365 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
369 OPENSSL_free(ginf->tlsname);
370 OPENSSL_free(ginf->realname);
371 OPENSSL_free(ginf->algorithm);
372 ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
377 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
379 struct provider_group_data_st pgd;
382 pgd.provider = provider;
383 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-GROUP",
384 add_provider_groups, &pgd);
387 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX *ctx)
389 size_t i, j, num_deflt_grps = 0;
390 uint16_t tmp_supp_groups[OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default)];
392 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_groups, ctx))
395 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default); i++) {
396 for (j = 0; j < ctx->group_list_len; j++) {
397 if (ctx->group_list[j].group_id == supported_groups_default[i]) {
398 tmp_supp_groups[num_deflt_grps++] = ctx->group_list[j].group_id;
404 if (num_deflt_grps == 0)
407 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default
408 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps);
410 if (ctx->ext.supported_groups_default == NULL) {
411 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
415 memcpy(ctx->ext.supported_groups_default,
417 num_deflt_grps * sizeof(tmp_supp_groups[0]));
418 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len = num_deflt_grps;
423 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
427 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
428 if (strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].tlsname, name) == 0
429 || strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].realname, name) == 0)
430 return ctx->group_list[i].group_id;
436 uint16_t ssl_group_id_internal_to_tls13(uint16_t curve_id)
439 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1:
440 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13;
441 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1:
442 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13;
443 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1:
444 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13;
445 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13:
446 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13:
447 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13:
454 uint16_t ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(uint16_t curve_id)
457 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1:
458 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1:
459 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1:
461 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13:
462 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1;
463 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13:
464 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1;
465 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13:
466 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1;
472 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
476 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
477 if (ctx->group_list[i].group_id == group_id)
478 return &ctx->group_list[i];
484 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id, int include_unknown)
492 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
493 * work for groups we don't know about.
495 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
497 if (nid_to_group[i].group_id == group_id)
498 return nid_to_group[i].nid;
500 if (!include_unknown)
502 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown | (int)group_id;
505 uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
510 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
511 * work for groups we don't know about.
513 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
515 if (nid_to_group[i].nid == nid)
516 return nid_to_group[i].group_id;
523 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
524 * the number of groups supported.
526 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
529 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
530 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
531 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
532 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
533 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
536 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
537 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
541 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
542 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
547 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
548 *pgroups = s->ctx->ext.supported_groups_default;
549 *pgroupslen = s->ctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len;
551 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
552 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
558 int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int minversion, int maxversion,
559 int isec, int *okfortls13)
561 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group_id);
564 if (okfortls13 != NULL)
570 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
571 if (ginfo->mindtls < 0 || ginfo->maxdtls < 0)
573 if (ginfo->maxdtls == 0)
576 ret = DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion, ginfo->maxdtls);
577 if (ginfo->mindtls > 0)
578 ret &= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion, ginfo->mindtls);
580 if (ginfo->mintls < 0 || ginfo->maxtls < 0)
582 if (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
585 ret = (minversion <= ginfo->maxtls);
586 if (ginfo->mintls > 0)
587 ret &= (maxversion >= ginfo->mintls);
588 if (ret && okfortls13 != NULL && maxversion == TLS1_3_VERSION)
589 *okfortls13 = (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
590 || (ginfo->maxtls >= TLS1_3_VERSION);
593 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "EC") == 0
594 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X25519") == 0
595 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X448") == 0;
600 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
601 int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
603 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group);
604 unsigned char gtmp[2];
609 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
610 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
611 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits,
612 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo->group_id, 0), (void *)gtmp);
615 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
616 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
619 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
626 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
627 * if there is no match.
628 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
629 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
630 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
632 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
634 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
635 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
638 /* Can't do anything on client side */
642 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
644 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
645 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
647 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
649 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
650 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1;
651 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
652 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1;
653 /* Should never happen */
656 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
660 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
661 * otherwise peer decides.
663 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
664 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
665 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
667 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
668 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
671 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
672 uint16_t id = pref[i];
675 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
676 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
677 cid = ssl_group_id_internal_to_tls13(id);
679 cid = id = ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(id);
681 if (!tls1_in_list(cid, supp, num_supp)
682 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
690 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
694 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
695 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
700 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
701 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
703 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
704 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
705 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
708 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
711 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
712 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
715 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
716 unsigned long idmask;
718 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
719 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
721 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
722 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
723 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
737 # define GROUPLIST_INCREMENT 40
738 # define GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH 64
746 static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
748 gid_cb_st *garg = arg;
751 char etmp[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH];
755 if (garg->gidcnt == garg->gidmax) {
757 OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr, garg->gidmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT);
760 garg->gidmax += GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
763 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
765 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
768 gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
771 for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
772 if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
774 garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
778 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
779 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
787 gcb.gidmax = GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
788 gcb.gid_arr = OPENSSL_malloc(gcb.gidmax * sizeof(*gcb.gid_arr));
789 if (gcb.gid_arr == NULL)
792 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
800 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
803 tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
807 *pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
810 OPENSSL_free(gcb.gid_arr);
814 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
815 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
817 const uint16_t *groups;
823 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
824 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
825 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
827 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
828 if (group_id != OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1)
830 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
831 if (group_id != OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
834 /* Should never happen */
839 if (check_own_groups) {
840 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
841 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
842 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
846 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
849 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
853 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
854 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
857 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
858 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
859 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
860 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
864 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
867 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
871 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
873 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
874 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
875 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
877 *pformats = ecformats_default;
878 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
880 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
882 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
886 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
887 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
889 unsigned char comp_id;
893 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
894 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
898 /* Get required compression id */
899 point_conv = EVP_PKEY_get_ec_point_conv_form(pkey);
902 if (point_conv == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
903 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
904 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
906 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
911 int field_type = EVP_PKEY_get_field_type(pkey);
913 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
914 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
915 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
916 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
921 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
922 * supported (see RFC4492).
924 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
927 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
928 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
934 /* Return group id of a key */
935 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
937 int curve_nid = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
939 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
941 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
945 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
946 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
948 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
952 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
955 /* If not EC nothing to do */
956 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
958 /* Check compression */
959 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
961 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
963 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
966 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
969 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
972 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
976 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
977 if (group_id == OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1)
978 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
979 else if (group_id == OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
980 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
982 return 0; /* Should never happen */
983 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
984 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
993 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
995 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
997 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
998 * is compatible with the client extensions.
1000 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
1002 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
1004 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
1005 if (!tls1_suiteb(s))
1006 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
1008 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
1011 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
1012 return tls1_check_group_id(s, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1, 1);
1013 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
1014 return tls1_check_group_id(s, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1, 1);
1019 /* Default sigalg schemes */
1020 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
1021 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1022 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1023 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1024 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1025 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1026 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256,
1027 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384,
1028 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512,
1030 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1031 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1032 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1033 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1034 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1035 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1037 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1038 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1039 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1041 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1042 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1044 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1045 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1047 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1048 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1050 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1051 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1052 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1054 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1055 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1056 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1057 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1058 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1059 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1064 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1065 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1066 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1069 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
1070 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1071 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1072 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1},
1073 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1074 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1075 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1, 1},
1076 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1077 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1078 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1, 1},
1079 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1080 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
1081 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1082 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1083 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
1084 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1085 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1086 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1087 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef, 1},
1088 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1089 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1090 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1091 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256,
1092 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1093 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_brainpoolP256r1, 1},
1094 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384,
1095 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1096 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_brainpoolP384r1, 1},
1097 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512,
1098 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1099 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_brainpoolP512r1, 1},
1100 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1101 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1102 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1103 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1104 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1105 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1106 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1107 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1108 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1109 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1110 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1111 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1112 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1113 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1114 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1115 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1116 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1117 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1118 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1119 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1120 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1121 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1122 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1123 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1124 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1125 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1126 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1127 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1128 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1129 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1130 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1131 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1132 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1133 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1134 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1135 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef, 1},
1136 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1137 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1138 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1139 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1140 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1141 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1142 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1143 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1144 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1145 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1146 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1147 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1149 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1150 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1151 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1152 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1153 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1154 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1155 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1156 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1157 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1158 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1159 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1160 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1161 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1162 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1163 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1164 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1165 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1166 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
1167 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
1168 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1}
1171 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1172 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
1173 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1174 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
1175 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1176 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1
1180 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1181 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1183 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
1184 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1185 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1186 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1187 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1188 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1189 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1190 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1191 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1192 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1195 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
1198 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1199 SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache
1200 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
1201 EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1204 if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
1208 for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1209 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
1215 * Check hash is available.
1216 * This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1217 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1218 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1219 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1220 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1222 if (lu->hash != NID_undef
1223 && ctx->ssl_digest_methods[lu->hash_idx] == NULL) {
1224 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1228 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
1229 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1232 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx->libctx, tmpkey, ctx->propq);
1233 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1235 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1236 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1239 ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
1244 OPENSSL_free(cache);
1245 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
1249 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1250 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL *s, uint16_t sigalg)
1253 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1255 for (i = 0, lu = s->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache;
1256 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1257 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1259 if (lu->sigalg == sigalg) {
1267 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1268 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
1273 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1274 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
1277 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
1287 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1289 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1290 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1291 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1293 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_get_size(md) + 2)
1294 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
1295 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1301 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
1303 if (EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
1309 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1310 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1311 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1312 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1313 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1315 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
1321 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1322 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1323 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
1327 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
1334 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1336 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
1339 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1341 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1348 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1349 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1351 else if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256) {
1354 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1356 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1363 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
1366 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
1368 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
1369 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
1373 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
1375 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1379 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
1381 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
1383 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1384 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1387 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1389 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
1391 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1394 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1398 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1401 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1404 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1405 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1406 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1407 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1409 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1410 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1414 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1418 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1419 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1420 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1422 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1423 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1424 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1425 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1426 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1427 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1429 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1430 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1435 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1436 * specified EC curve.
1438 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
1440 const uint16_t *sigs;
1443 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1444 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1445 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1447 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1448 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1451 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1452 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sigs[i]);
1456 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1457 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1458 && curve == lu->curve)
1466 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1469 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1471 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1474 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1478 int md_type = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
1480 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1481 secbits = EVP_MD_get_size(md) * 4;
1483 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1484 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1485 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1487 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1488 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1489 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1490 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1492 if (md_type == NID_sha1)
1494 else if (md_type == NID_md5_sha1)
1496 else if (md_type == NID_md5)
1499 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1500 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1502 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1509 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1510 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1513 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1515 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1516 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1518 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1520 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1523 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
1524 /* Should never happen */
1527 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1528 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1529 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1530 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1533 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1534 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1535 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1537 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sig);
1539 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1540 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1543 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1544 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1545 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1546 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1549 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1550 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey), &cidx)
1551 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1556 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1558 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1559 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1560 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1561 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1565 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1566 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1567 int curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
1569 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1570 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1574 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1575 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1576 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1577 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1580 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1581 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1582 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1583 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1584 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1585 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1590 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1591 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1595 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1596 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1597 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1598 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1601 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1602 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1603 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1604 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1607 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
1608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1612 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1613 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1615 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1616 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1617 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
1619 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1620 md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
1621 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1622 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1625 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1626 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1630 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1632 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1634 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1638 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1640 if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1642 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1647 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1648 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1649 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1651 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1654 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1656 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1658 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1659 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1660 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1661 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1662 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1665 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1666 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1667 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1668 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1670 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1672 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1673 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1674 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1681 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1682 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1683 * @c: cipher to check
1684 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1685 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1687 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1689 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1691 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1692 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1694 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1696 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1697 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1700 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1701 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1703 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1704 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1705 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1707 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1710 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1711 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1714 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1717 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1719 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1721 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1724 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1728 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1729 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1730 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1731 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1732 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1733 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1734 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1736 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1737 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1739 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1740 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1741 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1742 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1744 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1745 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1750 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1751 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1752 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1753 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1761 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1762 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1765 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1768 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1769 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1770 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1775 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1777 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1778 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1779 * point to the resulting session.
1781 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1785 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1788 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1791 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1792 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1795 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1796 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1798 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1799 if (!ticketext->present)
1800 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1802 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1804 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1805 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1809 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1811 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1812 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1813 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1814 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1817 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1818 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1819 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1820 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1821 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1822 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1824 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1825 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1826 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1827 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1828 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1829 * point to the resulting session.
1831 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1832 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1833 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1835 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1836 unsigned char *sdec;
1837 const unsigned char *p;
1838 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1839 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1841 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1842 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
1843 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1844 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1846 if (eticklen == 0) {
1848 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1849 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1851 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1854 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1856 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1857 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1858 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1859 * calculate the master secret later.
1861 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1865 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1866 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1867 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1871 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1872 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
1874 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1877 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1879 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1883 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1885 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1888 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1891 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1892 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, nctick,
1893 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1895 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1898 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1899 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1900 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1901 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1902 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
1905 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1909 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1915 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
1917 /* Check key name matches */
1918 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1919 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1920 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1924 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
1926 if (aes256cbc == NULL
1927 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1928 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1930 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
1931 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1932 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1933 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1934 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1937 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1938 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1942 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1945 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
1947 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1951 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1953 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1954 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1958 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1959 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1960 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
1961 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1965 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1966 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1969 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1970 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1971 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
1972 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
1973 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1974 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1975 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1977 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1980 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1982 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1988 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1992 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1994 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1996 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2000 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
2001 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
2002 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
2006 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2007 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2010 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2012 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2017 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
2019 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2022 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2023 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
2026 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
2027 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
2028 * performs any action
2030 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
2031 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
2032 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
2033 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2034 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
2035 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
2038 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
2039 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
2040 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
2042 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
2044 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
2045 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2048 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
2049 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
2050 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2054 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
2055 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
2056 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2057 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2058 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2062 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
2063 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
2064 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2065 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
2066 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2067 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
2068 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2070 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2074 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2078 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2080 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
2081 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
2082 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
2083 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
2092 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2093 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2095 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
2098 if (lu == NULL || !lu->enabled)
2100 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2101 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2104 * At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
2107 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
2108 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2109 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2110 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
2113 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2114 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(s->ctx, lu->sig_idx))
2117 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2118 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2119 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2120 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2121 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
2124 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
2125 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2127 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
2130 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2131 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2132 * ciphersuites enabled.
2135 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
2138 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
2139 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
2140 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
2141 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2143 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2144 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2145 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
2148 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kGOST | SSL_kGOST18)) != 0)
2156 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2157 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
2158 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
2159 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
2160 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
2164 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2165 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2169 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
2171 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
2172 size_t i, sigalgslen;
2173 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
2175 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2178 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
2179 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
2180 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *sigalgs);
2181 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2186 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
2190 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2191 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
2192 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
2193 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
2195 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
2198 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
2199 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
2204 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
2205 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2208 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
2210 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
2213 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2214 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2216 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2217 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
2218 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
2219 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
2223 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2227 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2228 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
2229 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
2230 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
2232 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
2233 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
2234 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
2235 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *ptmp);
2237 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2239 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
2241 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
2242 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
2253 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2254 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2256 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
2257 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
2259 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
2261 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
2263 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
2264 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2265 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2266 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2267 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2268 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
2269 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
2270 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2271 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
2272 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
2274 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
2275 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
2278 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2279 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2283 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2284 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2286 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2288 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
2289 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2292 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2296 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
2297 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
2301 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
2307 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2309 /* Invalid data length */
2310 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
2315 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
2316 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2319 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
2327 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
2334 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
2336 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2337 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2339 /* Should never happen */
2340 if (s->cert == NULL)
2344 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
2345 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
2347 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
2348 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
2352 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2354 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2357 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
2359 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
2362 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2365 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2366 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2367 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
2369 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2370 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2372 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2373 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(s->ctx, idx))
2374 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2379 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2380 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2381 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2383 uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2384 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2385 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2388 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2390 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2394 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2396 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
2397 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2399 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2401 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2402 if (psignhash != NULL)
2403 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2405 return (int)numsigalgs;
2408 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2409 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2410 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2412 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2413 if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2415 || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
2416 || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2418 shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2420 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2422 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2423 if (psignhash != NULL)
2424 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2426 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2428 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2429 return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
2432 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2433 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2437 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2438 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2441 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2443 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2444 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2445 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2446 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2447 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2448 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2449 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2450 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2452 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2453 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2454 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2457 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2458 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2460 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2462 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2464 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2465 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2466 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2469 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2471 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2473 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2475 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2477 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2478 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2479 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2480 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2481 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2482 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2486 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2488 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2489 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2493 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2500 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2501 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2502 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2504 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2506 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2507 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2511 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2515 /* Reject duplicates */
2516 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2517 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2526 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2527 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2529 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2533 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2537 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2540 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2545 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2546 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2549 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2552 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2553 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2554 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2556 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2557 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2558 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2564 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2566 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2571 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2572 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2575 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2577 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2578 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2579 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2581 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2583 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2584 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2589 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2594 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2595 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2596 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2598 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2599 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2600 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2606 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2610 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2612 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2614 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2616 if (default_nid == -1)
2618 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2620 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2622 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2624 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2625 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2626 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2628 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2631 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2633 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2634 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2635 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2636 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2637 if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2643 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2644 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2646 const X509_NAME *nm;
2648 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2649 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2650 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2657 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2658 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2659 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2660 * attempting to use them.
2663 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2665 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2666 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2667 /* Strict mode flags */
2668 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2669 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2670 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2672 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2677 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2678 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2681 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2682 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2684 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2687 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2689 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2690 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2692 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2694 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2695 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2704 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2707 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2709 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2710 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2712 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2719 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2720 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2721 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2722 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2723 else if (!check_flags)
2728 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2729 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2731 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2734 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2735 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2737 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2741 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2742 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2745 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2746 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2747 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2751 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2752 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2755 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2756 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2757 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2760 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2761 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2762 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2765 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2766 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2767 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2776 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2777 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2779 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2781 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2782 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2783 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *p);
2785 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2788 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2795 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2796 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2798 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2799 * so check_flags is always set.
2801 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2802 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2803 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2807 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2808 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2809 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2810 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2812 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2819 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2820 else if (check_flags)
2821 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2823 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2824 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2825 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2826 else if (!check_flags)
2829 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2830 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2831 else if (strict_mode) {
2832 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2833 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2834 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2835 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2837 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2844 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2845 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2848 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
2849 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2850 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
2851 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2852 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
2853 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2856 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2859 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2860 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2861 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2865 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2868 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2871 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2874 || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn) == 0
2875 || ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2876 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2878 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2879 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2881 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2882 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2887 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2890 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2892 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2893 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2897 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2898 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2900 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2903 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2907 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2910 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2911 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2918 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2919 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2921 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2922 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2923 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2924 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2925 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2926 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2927 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2928 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2929 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2932 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2933 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2935 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2938 EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2940 EVP_PKEY *dhp = NULL;
2942 int dh_secbits = 80, sec_level_bits;
2943 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2944 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2945 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2947 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
2948 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2949 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2954 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2956 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2960 /* Do not pick a prime that is too weak for the current security level */
2961 sec_level_bits = ssl_get_security_level_bits(s, NULL, NULL);
2962 if (dh_secbits < sec_level_bits)
2963 dh_secbits = sec_level_bits;
2965 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2966 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2967 else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
2968 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
2969 else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
2970 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2971 else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2972 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
2974 p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
2978 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(s->ctx->libctx, "DH", s->ctx->propq);
2980 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) != 1)
2983 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2985 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2986 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, 2))
2989 params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl);
2991 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &dhp, EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1)
2995 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
2996 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
2997 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3002 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
3005 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
3008 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3009 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3010 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
3011 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
3013 secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey);
3016 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
3018 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
3021 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
3023 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3024 int secbits, nid, pknid;
3025 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
3026 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
3028 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
3030 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
3031 if (nid == NID_undef)
3034 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
3036 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
3039 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
3042 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
3044 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
3045 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3047 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
3048 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3050 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
3051 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
3056 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
3057 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
3058 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3061 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
3063 int rv, start_idx, i;
3065 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
3067 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3072 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
3076 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
3077 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
3078 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
3086 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3087 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3090 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
3092 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3093 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
3095 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3097 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
3098 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3099 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
3102 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
3106 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3107 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3109 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3111 static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3114 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
3115 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
3117 const char *mdname = NULL;
3120 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot support signing with this digest,
3121 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3123 if (sig->hash != NID_undef)
3124 mdname = OBJ_nid2sn(sig->hash);
3125 supported = EVP_PKEY_digestsign_supports_digest(pkey, s->ctx->libctx,
3132 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3133 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3135 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
3136 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
3138 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
3139 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
3144 * This does not differentiate between the
3145 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3146 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3147 * signing certificate.
3149 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
3156 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3157 * a viable public key is permitted.
3163 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3164 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3165 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3166 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3167 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3169 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
3171 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3174 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
3177 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
3178 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
3182 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3183 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3185 static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3190 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
3193 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3194 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
3197 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
3201 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3202 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3203 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3205 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3207 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3212 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3213 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3214 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3216 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3217 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
3218 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
3219 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
3220 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3222 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3223 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
3225 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
3226 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
3229 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
3230 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
3232 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3234 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey);
3235 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
3237 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3238 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3239 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, tmppkey, lu))
3245 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
3252 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3253 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3255 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3256 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3258 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3259 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3260 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3262 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
3264 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3267 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
3268 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
3270 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3271 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
3275 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3276 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3280 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3281 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
3283 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
3286 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3288 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
3291 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3293 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
3297 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3300 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3301 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3304 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
3307 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
3309 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3310 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
3313 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3314 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
3316 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3317 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3318 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
3320 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, pkey, lu))
3323 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
3326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3328 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3329 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3330 * we have to assume GOST support.
3332 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
3333 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3337 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3341 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3345 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
3348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3349 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3354 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3356 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
3357 size_t sent_sigslen;
3359 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3362 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3363 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3367 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3368 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
3369 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
3370 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
3371 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
3374 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
3377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3378 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3383 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3387 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3393 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3394 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3395 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3396 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3400 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3402 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3403 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3404 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3408 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3412 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3414 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3415 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3416 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3420 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3424 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3426 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3430 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3432 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
3434 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
3435 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3440 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3441 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3442 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret))
3447 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", ctx->propq);
3448 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
3453 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
3459 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3462 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
3463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3464 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx);
3470 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3475 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
3477 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
3479 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3480 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3481 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3482 if (EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx, key, len, params))
3485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3486 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3487 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx, key, len, md);
3492 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
3494 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3495 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3497 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3498 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx, data, len);
3503 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
3506 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3507 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3509 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3510 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx, md, len);
3515 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3517 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3518 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx);
3519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3520 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3521 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx);
3526 int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3528 char gname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
3530 if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey, gname, sizeof(gname), NULL) > 0)
3531 return OBJ_txt2nid(gname);
3536 __owur int tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
3537 const unsigned char *enckey,
3540 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "DH")) {
3541 int bits = EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pkey);
3543 if (bits <= 0 || enckeylen != (size_t)bits / 8)
3544 /* the encoded key must be padded to the length of the p */
3546 } else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC")) {
3547 if (enckeylen < 3 /* point format and at least 1 byte for x and y */
3548 || enckey[0] != 0x04)
3552 return EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(pkey, enckey, enckeylen);