2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
28 tls1_generate_master_secret,
29 tls1_change_cipher_state,
30 tls1_final_finish_mac,
31 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
32 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
34 tls1_export_keying_material,
36 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
37 tls_close_construct_packet,
41 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
45 tls1_generate_master_secret,
46 tls1_change_cipher_state,
47 tls1_final_finish_mac,
48 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
49 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
51 tls1_export_keying_material,
52 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
53 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
54 tls_close_construct_packet,
58 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
62 tls1_generate_master_secret,
63 tls1_change_cipher_state,
64 tls1_final_finish_mac,
65 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
66 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
68 tls1_export_keying_material,
69 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
70 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
71 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
72 tls_close_construct_packet,
76 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
79 tls13_setup_key_block,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
86 tls13_export_keying_material,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
89 tls_close_construct_packet,
93 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
106 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
112 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
114 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
118 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
123 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
124 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
126 s->version = s->method->version;
132 * Table of group information.
134 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
135 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
136 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
137 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0001}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
138 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0002}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
139 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0003}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
140 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0004}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
141 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0005}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
142 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0006}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
143 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0007}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
144 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0008}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
145 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0009}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
146 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000A}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
147 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000B}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
148 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000C}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
149 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000D}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
150 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000E}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
151 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x000F}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
152 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0010}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
153 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0011}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
154 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0012}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
155 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0013}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
156 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0014}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
157 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0015}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
158 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0016}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
159 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0017}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
160 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0018}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
161 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0019}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
162 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001A}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001B}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001C}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
165 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001D}, /* X25519 (29) */
166 {EVP_PKEY_X448, 224, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001E}, /* X448 (30) */
167 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
168 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
169 /* Security bit values for FFDHE groups are updated as per RFC 7919 */
170 {NID_ffdhe2048, 103, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0100}, /* ffdhe2048 (0x0100) */
171 {NID_ffdhe3072, 125, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0101}, /* ffdhe3072 (0x0101) */
172 {NID_ffdhe4096, 150, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0102}, /* ffdhe4096 (0x0102) */
173 {NID_ffdhe6144, 175, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0103}, /* ffdhe6144 (0x0103) */
174 {NID_ffdhe8192, 192, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0104}, /* ffdhe8192 (0x0104) */
175 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
179 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
180 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
181 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
182 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
183 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
185 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
187 /* The default curves */
188 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
189 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
190 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
191 29, /* X25519 (29) */
192 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
194 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
195 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
197 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
198 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
199 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
200 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
201 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
202 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
205 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
208 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
214 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id)
216 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
219 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 FFDHE group from RFC 8446 */
220 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
221 if (nid_list[i].group_id == group_id)
224 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) */
228 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
229 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id)
231 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id);
233 return ginf == NULL ? NID_undef : ginf->nid;
236 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
240 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
241 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
242 return nid_list[i].group_id;
246 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
249 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
250 * the number of groups supported.
252 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
255 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
256 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
257 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
258 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
259 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
260 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
261 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
264 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
265 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
269 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
270 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
276 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
277 *pgroups = supported_groups_default;
278 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default);
280 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
281 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
288 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
291 int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int version)
293 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id);
295 if (version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
296 if ((ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_ONLY_FOR_TLS1_3) != 0)
302 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
303 int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
305 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(group);
306 unsigned char gtmp[2];
310 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
311 if (ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2)
315 if (ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_FFDHE)
318 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
319 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
320 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits, ginfo->nid, (void *)gtmp);
323 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
324 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
327 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
334 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
335 * if there is no match.
336 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
337 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
338 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
340 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
342 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
343 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
346 /* Can't do anything on client side */
350 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
352 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
353 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
355 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
357 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
358 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
359 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
360 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
361 /* Should never happen */
364 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
368 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
369 * otherwise peer decides.
371 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
372 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
373 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
375 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
376 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
379 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
380 uint16_t id = pref[i];
382 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
383 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
391 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
395 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
396 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
398 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
402 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
403 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
405 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
406 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
407 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
410 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
413 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
417 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
418 unsigned long idmask;
420 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
421 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
423 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
424 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
425 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
439 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
442 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
443 # define MAX_GROUPLIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
447 int nid_arr[MAX_GROUPLIST];
450 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
452 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
458 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_GROUPLIST)
460 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
462 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
464 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
465 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
467 if (nid == NID_undef)
468 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
469 if (nid == NID_undef)
470 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
471 if (nid == NID_undef)
473 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
474 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
476 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
479 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
481 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
482 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
484 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
487 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
491 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
497 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
498 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
500 const uint16_t *groups;
506 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
507 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
508 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
510 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
511 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
513 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
514 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
517 /* Should never happen */
522 if (check_own_groups) {
523 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
524 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
525 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
529 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
532 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
536 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
537 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
540 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
541 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
542 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
543 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
547 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
551 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
555 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
557 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
558 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
559 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
561 *pformats = ecformats_default;
562 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
564 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
566 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
570 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
571 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
575 unsigned char comp_id;
578 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
579 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
581 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
582 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
584 /* Get required compression id */
585 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
586 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
587 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
589 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
594 int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
596 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
597 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
598 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
599 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
604 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
605 * supported (see RFC4492).
607 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
610 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
611 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
617 /* Return group id of a key */
618 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
620 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
625 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
626 return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp));
630 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
631 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
633 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
637 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
640 /* If not EC nothing to do */
641 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
643 /* Check compression */
644 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
646 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
648 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
651 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
654 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
657 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
661 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
662 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
663 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
664 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
665 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
667 return 0; /* Should never happen */
668 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
669 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
678 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
680 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
682 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
683 * is compatible with the client extensions.
685 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
687 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
689 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
691 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
693 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
696 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
697 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
698 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
699 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
706 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
711 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
713 /* Default sigalg schemes */
714 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
716 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
717 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
718 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
719 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
723 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
724 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
725 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
726 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
727 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
728 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
730 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
731 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
732 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
734 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
735 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
736 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
738 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
739 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
741 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
742 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
744 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
745 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
746 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
749 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
750 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
751 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
756 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
757 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
758 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
762 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
764 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
765 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
766 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
767 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
768 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
769 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
770 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
771 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
772 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
773 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
774 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
775 NID_undef, NID_undef},
776 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
777 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
778 NID_undef, NID_undef},
779 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
780 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
781 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
782 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
783 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
784 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
786 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
787 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
788 NID_undef, NID_undef},
789 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
790 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
791 NID_undef, NID_undef},
792 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
793 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
794 NID_undef, NID_undef},
795 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
796 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
797 NID_undef, NID_undef},
798 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
799 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
800 NID_undef, NID_undef},
801 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
802 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
803 NID_undef, NID_undef},
804 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
805 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
806 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
807 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
808 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
809 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
810 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
811 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
812 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
813 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
814 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
815 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
816 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
817 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
818 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
820 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
821 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
822 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
823 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
824 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
825 NID_undef, NID_undef},
826 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
827 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
828 NID_undef, NID_undef},
829 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
830 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
831 NID_undef, NID_undef},
832 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
833 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
834 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
837 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
838 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
839 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
840 NID_undef, NID_undef},
841 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
842 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
843 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
844 NID_undef, NID_undef},
845 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
846 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
847 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
848 NID_undef, NID_undef}
851 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
852 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
853 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
854 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
855 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
860 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
861 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
863 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
864 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
865 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
866 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
867 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
868 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
869 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
870 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
871 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
872 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
875 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
876 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
879 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
881 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
883 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
888 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
889 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
894 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
895 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
898 md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
908 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
910 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
911 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
912 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
914 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
915 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA *rsa, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
921 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md) || md == NULL)
923 if (RSA_size(rsa) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
929 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
930 * is fixed by the certificate type.
932 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
938 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
939 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
940 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
942 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
949 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
951 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
954 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
956 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
963 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
966 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
968 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
969 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
971 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
975 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
977 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
978 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
981 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
983 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
985 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
988 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
992 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
995 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
999 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1000 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1001 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1002 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1004 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1005 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1008 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1009 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1014 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1015 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1016 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1018 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1019 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1020 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1021 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1022 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1023 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1025 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1026 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1032 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1033 * specified EC curve.
1035 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
1037 const uint16_t *sigs;
1040 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1041 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1042 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1044 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1045 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1048 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1049 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs[i]);
1053 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1054 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1055 && curve == lu->curve)
1064 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1065 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1068 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1070 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1071 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1073 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1074 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
1075 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1077 /* Should never happen */
1080 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1081 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1082 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1083 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1084 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1087 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1088 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1089 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1091 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
1093 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1094 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1097 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1098 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1099 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1100 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1101 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1104 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1105 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx)
1106 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1107 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1108 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1112 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1113 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1115 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1116 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1117 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1118 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1119 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1123 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1124 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1125 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
1126 int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
1128 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1129 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1130 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1134 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1135 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1136 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1137 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1138 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1141 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1142 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1143 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1144 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1145 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1146 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1147 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1152 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1153 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1154 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1159 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1160 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1161 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1162 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1165 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1166 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1167 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1168 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1169 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1172 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
1173 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1174 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1179 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1180 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1182 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1183 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1184 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1185 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
1186 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1187 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1188 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1192 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1193 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1197 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1199 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1201 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1205 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1207 if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1209 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1214 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1215 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1216 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1218 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1221 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1223 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1225 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1226 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1227 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1228 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1229 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1232 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1233 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1234 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1235 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1237 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1239 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1240 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1241 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1248 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1249 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1250 * @c: cipher to check
1251 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1252 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1254 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1256 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1258 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1259 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1261 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1263 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1264 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1267 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1268 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1270 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1271 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1272 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1274 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1277 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1278 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1281 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1284 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1286 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1288 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1291 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1295 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1296 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1297 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1298 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1299 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1300 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1301 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1303 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1304 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1306 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1307 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1308 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1309 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1311 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1312 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1317 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1318 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1319 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1320 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1328 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1330 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1333 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1336 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1337 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1338 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1343 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1345 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1346 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1347 * point to the resulting session.
1349 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1353 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1356 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1359 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1360 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1363 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1364 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1366 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1367 if (!ticketext->present)
1368 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1370 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1372 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1373 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1377 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1379 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1380 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1381 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1382 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1385 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1386 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1387 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1388 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1389 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1390 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1392 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1393 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1394 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1395 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1396 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1397 * point to the resulting session.
1399 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1400 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1401 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1403 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1404 unsigned char *sdec;
1405 const unsigned char *p;
1406 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1407 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1409 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1410 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1411 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1412 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1414 if (eticklen == 0) {
1416 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1417 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1419 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1422 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1424 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1425 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1426 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1427 * calculate the master secret later.
1429 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1433 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1434 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1435 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1439 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1440 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1442 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1445 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1447 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1450 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1451 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1452 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1453 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1456 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1460 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1466 /* Check key name matches */
1467 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1468 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1469 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1472 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1473 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1474 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1475 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1476 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1477 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1478 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1481 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1485 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1488 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1490 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1494 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1496 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1497 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1501 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1502 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1503 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1504 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1508 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1509 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1512 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1513 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1514 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1515 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1516 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1517 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1518 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1520 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1523 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1525 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1531 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1535 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1537 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1539 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1543 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1544 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1545 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1549 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1550 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1553 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1555 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1560 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1562 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1565 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1566 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1569 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1570 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1571 * performs any action
1573 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1574 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1575 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1576 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1577 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
1578 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
1581 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
1582 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
1583 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
1585 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
1587 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
1588 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1591 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
1592 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1593 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1597 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
1598 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1599 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1600 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1601 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1605 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
1606 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
1607 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1608 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
1609 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1610 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
1611 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1613 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1617 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1621 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1623 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1624 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1625 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
1626 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1635 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1636 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1638 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1641 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1642 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
1644 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1645 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1647 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1648 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1649 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1650 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1651 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1654 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1655 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1658 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
1659 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
1660 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
1661 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
1662 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1665 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1666 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1668 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1671 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
1672 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
1673 * ciphersuites enabled.
1676 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
1679 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1680 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
1681 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
1682 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1684 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1685 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
1686 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
1689 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kGOST) != 0)
1697 if (lu->hash == NID_undef)
1699 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1700 secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
1701 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1702 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1703 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1704 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1708 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1709 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1713 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1715 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1716 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1717 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
1719 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1722 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1723 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
1724 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1725 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1730 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1734 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1735 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1736 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1737 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1739 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
1742 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1743 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1748 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1749 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1751 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1753 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1756 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1757 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1759 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1760 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1761 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1762 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1770 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1771 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1772 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1773 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1775 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1776 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1777 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1778 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1780 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1781 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1783 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1784 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1795 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1796 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1798 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1799 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1801 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1803 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1805 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1806 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1807 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1808 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1809 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1810 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1811 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1812 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1813 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1814 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1816 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1817 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1820 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1821 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1825 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1826 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1828 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1830 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
1831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1834 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1838 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1839 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1843 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
1849 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1851 /* Invalid data length */
1852 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1857 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
1858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1861 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1869 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
1876 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
1878 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1879 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1881 /* Should never happen */
1882 if (s->cert == NULL)
1886 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
1887 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
1889 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
1890 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
1894 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1896 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1899 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
1901 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1904 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1907 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1908 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
1909 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1911 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1912 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1914 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1915 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
1916 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1921 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1922 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1923 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1925 uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1926 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1927 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1930 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1932 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1936 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1938 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1939 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1941 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1943 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1944 if (psignhash != NULL)
1945 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1947 return (int)numsigalgs;
1950 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1951 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1952 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1954 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1955 if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1957 || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
1958 || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1960 shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1962 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1964 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1965 if (psignhash != NULL)
1966 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1968 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1970 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1971 return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
1974 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1975 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1979 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
1980 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1983 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1985 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1986 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1987 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1988 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1989 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1990 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1991 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1992 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1994 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1995 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1996 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1999 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2000 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2002 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2004 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2006 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2007 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2008 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2011 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2013 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2015 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2017 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2019 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2020 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2021 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2022 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2023 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2024 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2028 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2030 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2031 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2035 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2042 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2043 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2044 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2046 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2048 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2049 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2053 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2057 /* Reject duplicates */
2058 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2059 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2068 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2069 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2071 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2075 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2079 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2082 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2087 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2088 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2091 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2094 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2095 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2096 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2098 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2099 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2100 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2106 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2108 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2113 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2114 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2117 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2119 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2120 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2121 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2123 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2125 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2126 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2131 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2136 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2137 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2138 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2140 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2141 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2142 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2148 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2152 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2156 if (default_nid == -1)
2158 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2160 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2161 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
2162 if (sig_nid == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
2167 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2168 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2172 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2173 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2174 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2181 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2182 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2183 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2184 * attempting to use them.
2187 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2189 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2190 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2191 /* Strict mode flags */
2192 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2193 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2194 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2196 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2201 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2202 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2205 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2206 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2208 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2211 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2213 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2214 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2216 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2218 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2219 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2228 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2231 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2233 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2234 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2236 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2243 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2244 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2245 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2246 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2247 else if (!check_flags)
2252 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2253 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2255 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2258 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2259 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2261 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2265 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2266 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2269 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2270 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2271 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2275 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2276 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2279 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2280 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2281 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2284 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2285 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2286 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2289 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2290 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2291 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2300 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2301 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2303 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2305 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2306 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2307 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
2309 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2312 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2319 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2320 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2324 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2325 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2326 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2327 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2329 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2336 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2337 else if (check_flags)
2338 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2340 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2341 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2342 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2343 else if (!check_flags)
2346 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2347 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2348 else if (strict_mode) {
2349 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2350 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2351 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2352 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2354 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2361 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2362 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2364 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2366 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2369 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2372 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2376 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2379 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2380 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2381 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2385 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2388 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2391 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2393 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2394 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2396 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2397 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2398 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2400 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2401 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2402 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2403 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2404 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2409 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2412 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2414 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2415 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2419 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2420 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2422 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2425 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2429 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2432 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2433 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2440 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2441 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2443 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2444 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2445 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2446 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2447 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2448 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2449 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2450 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2451 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2454 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2455 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2457 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2461 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2463 int dh_secbits = 80;
2464 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2465 return DH_get_1024_160();
2466 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2467 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2472 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2474 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2477 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2483 if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
2488 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2489 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2491 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2492 if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2500 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2501 return DH_get_2048_224();
2502 return DH_get_1024_160();
2506 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2509 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2512 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2513 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2514 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2515 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2517 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2520 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2522 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2525 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2527 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2528 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2529 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2530 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2532 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2534 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2535 if (nid == NID_undef)
2538 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2540 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2543 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2546 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2548 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2549 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2551 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2552 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2554 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2555 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2560 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2561 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2562 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2565 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2567 int rv, start_idx, i;
2569 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2574 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2578 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2579 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2580 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2588 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2589 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2592 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2594 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2595 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2597 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2599 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
2600 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
2601 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
2604 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2608 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
2609 * with signature scheme |sig|.
2610 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2611 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2612 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2614 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
2616 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2617 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
2620 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override lu->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2623 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2625 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2626 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
2627 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
2629 || !X509_get_signature_info(s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509, &mdnid,
2632 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
2633 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2634 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2635 * signing certificate.
2637 || mdnid != lu->hash
2638 || pknid != lu->sig)
2642 supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey,
2646 else if (supported < 0)
2648 /* If it didn't report a mandatory NID, for whatever reasons,
2649 * just clear the error and allow all hashes to be used. */
2656 supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey,
2660 else if (supported < 0)
2667 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2668 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2670 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2671 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2673 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2674 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2675 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2677 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
2679 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2682 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
2683 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2685 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2691 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2692 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2693 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2696 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2697 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2698 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2699 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2700 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2702 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2703 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL) || !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
2705 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2708 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2710 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2712 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
2717 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2718 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2721 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
2722 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
2727 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
2730 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2731 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2735 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2736 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2738 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2741 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2743 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2747 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2748 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2749 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2750 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2757 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2760 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2761 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2764 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
2767 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2769 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2770 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
2773 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2774 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
2776 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2777 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2778 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
2780 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
2783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2784 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
2788 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
2791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2792 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2793 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2798 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2800 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2801 size_t sent_sigslen;
2803 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2806 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2807 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2811 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2812 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2813 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2814 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
2815 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
2818 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2821 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2822 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2823 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2828 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2831 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2832 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2838 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2839 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
2840 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
2841 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
2845 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
2847 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2848 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2850 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2854 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2858 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
2860 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2861 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2863 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2867 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2871 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
2873 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;