2 * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/nelem.h"
24 #include "internal/sizes.h"
25 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
30 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
32 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
36 tls1_generate_master_secret,
37 tls1_change_cipher_state,
38 tls1_final_finish_mac,
39 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
42 tls1_export_keying_material,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
59 tls1_export_keying_material,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
62 tls_close_construct_packet,
66 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
70 tls1_generate_master_secret,
71 tls1_change_cipher_state,
72 tls1_final_finish_mac,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
76 tls1_export_keying_material,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
79 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
80 tls_close_construct_packet,
84 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
87 tls13_setup_key_block,
88 tls13_generate_master_secret,
89 tls13_change_cipher_state,
90 tls13_final_finish_mac,
91 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
92 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
94 tls13_export_keying_material,
95 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
96 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
97 tls_close_construct_packet,
101 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
104 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
105 * http, the cache would over fill
107 return (60 * 60 * 2);
114 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
120 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
122 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
126 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
131 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
132 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
134 s->version = s->method->version;
139 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
144 {NID_sect163k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1},
145 {NID_sect163r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1},
146 {NID_sect163r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2},
147 {NID_sect193r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1},
148 {NID_sect193r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2},
149 {NID_sect233k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1},
150 {NID_sect233r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1},
151 {NID_sect239k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1},
152 {NID_sect283k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1},
153 {NID_sect283r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1},
154 {NID_sect409k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1},
155 {NID_sect409r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1},
156 {NID_sect571k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1},
157 {NID_sect571r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1},
158 {NID_secp160k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1},
159 {NID_secp160r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1},
160 {NID_secp160r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2},
161 {NID_secp192k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1},
162 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1},
163 {NID_secp224k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1},
164 {NID_secp224r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1},
165 {NID_secp256k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1},
166 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1},
167 {NID_secp384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1},
168 {NID_secp521r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1},
169 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1},
170 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1},
171 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1},
172 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519},
173 {EVP_PKEY_X448, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448},
174 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, 0x0022},
175 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, 0x0023},
176 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, 0x0024},
177 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, 0x0025},
178 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, 0x0026},
179 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, 0x0027},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, 0x0028},
181 {NID_ffdhe2048, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048},
182 {NID_ffdhe3072, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072},
183 {NID_ffdhe4096, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096},
184 {NID_ffdhe6144, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144},
185 {NID_ffdhe8192, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192}
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
189 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
190 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
191 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
192 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
194 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) */
196 /* The default curves */
197 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
198 29, /* X25519 (29) */
199 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
202 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
203 34, /* GC256A (34) */
204 35, /* GC256B (35) */
205 36, /* GC256C (36) */
206 37, /* GC256D (37) */
207 38, /* GC512A (38) */
208 39, /* GC512B (39) */
209 40, /* GC512C (40) */
210 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
211 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
212 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
213 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
214 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
218 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
224 struct provider_group_data_st {
226 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
229 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
230 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
231 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
233 struct provider_group_data_st *pgd = data;
234 SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
235 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
237 TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
238 EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
240 unsigned int is_kem = 0;
243 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == ctx->group_list_len) {
244 TLS_GROUP_INFO *tmp = NULL;
246 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == 0)
247 tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO)
248 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
250 tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->group_list,
251 (ctx->group_list_max_len
252 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
253 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
255 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
258 ctx->group_list = tmp;
259 memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
261 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
262 ctx->group_list_max_len += TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
265 ginf = &ctx->group_list[ctx->group_list_len];
267 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME);
268 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
269 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
272 ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
273 if (ginf->tlsname == NULL) {
274 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
278 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
279 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
280 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
283 ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
284 if (ginf->realname == NULL) {
285 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
289 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
290 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) || gid > UINT16_MAX) {
291 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
294 ginf->group_id = (uint16_t)gid;
296 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG);
297 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
298 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
301 ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
302 if (ginf->algorithm == NULL) {
303 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
307 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
308 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
309 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
313 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM);
314 if (p != NULL && (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &is_kem) || is_kem > 1)) {
315 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
318 ginf->is_kem = 1 & is_kem;
320 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS);
321 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mintls)) {
322 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
326 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS);
327 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxtls)) {
328 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
332 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS);
333 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mindtls)) {
334 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
338 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS);
339 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxdtls)) {
340 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
344 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
345 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
346 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
350 keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, ginf->algorithm, ctx->propq);
351 if (keymgmt != NULL) {
353 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
354 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
356 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
357 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
358 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
359 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
360 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
361 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
364 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
365 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
366 ctx->group_list_len++;
369 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
373 OPENSSL_free(ginf->tlsname);
374 OPENSSL_free(ginf->realname);
375 OPENSSL_free(ginf->algorithm);
376 ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
381 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
383 struct provider_group_data_st pgd;
386 pgd.provider = provider;
387 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-GROUP",
388 add_provider_groups, &pgd);
391 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX *ctx)
393 size_t i, j, num_deflt_grps = 0;
394 uint16_t tmp_supp_groups[OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default)];
396 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_groups, ctx))
399 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default); i++) {
400 for (j = 0; j < ctx->group_list_len; j++) {
401 if (ctx->group_list[j].group_id == supported_groups_default[i]) {
402 tmp_supp_groups[num_deflt_grps++] = ctx->group_list[j].group_id;
408 if (num_deflt_grps == 0)
411 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default
412 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps);
414 if (ctx->ext.supported_groups_default == NULL) {
415 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
419 memcpy(ctx->ext.supported_groups_default,
421 num_deflt_grps * sizeof(tmp_supp_groups[0]));
422 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len = num_deflt_grps;
427 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
432 /* See if we can identify a nid for this name */
433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
434 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(name);
436 if (nid == NID_undef)
437 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(name);
438 if (nid == NID_undef)
439 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(name);
441 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
442 if (strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].tlsname, name) == 0
443 || strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].realname, name) == 0)
444 return ctx->group_list[i].group_id;
450 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
454 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
455 if (ctx->group_list[i].group_id == group_id)
456 return &ctx->group_list[i];
462 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id, int include_unknown)
470 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
471 * work for groups we don't know about.
473 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
475 if (nid_to_group[i].group_id == group_id)
476 return nid_to_group[i].nid;
478 if (!include_unknown)
480 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown | (int)group_id;
483 uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
488 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
489 * work for groups we don't know about.
491 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
493 if (nid_to_group[i].nid == nid)
494 return nid_to_group[i].group_id;
501 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
502 * the number of groups supported.
504 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
507 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
508 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
509 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
510 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
511 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
512 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
515 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
516 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
520 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
521 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
527 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
528 *pgroups = s->ctx->ext.supported_groups_default;
529 *pgroupslen = s->ctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len;
531 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
532 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
538 int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int minversion, int maxversion,
539 int isec, int *okfortls13)
541 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group_id);
544 if (okfortls13 != NULL)
550 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
551 if (ginfo->mindtls < 0 || ginfo->maxdtls < 0)
553 if (ginfo->maxdtls == 0)
556 ret = DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion, ginfo->maxdtls);
557 if (ginfo->mindtls > 0)
558 ret &= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion, ginfo->mindtls);
560 if (ginfo->mintls < 0 || ginfo->maxtls < 0)
562 if (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
565 ret = (minversion <= ginfo->maxtls);
566 if (ginfo->mintls > 0)
567 ret &= (maxversion >= ginfo->mintls);
568 if (ret && okfortls13 != NULL && maxversion == TLS1_3_VERSION)
569 *okfortls13 = (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
570 || (ginfo->maxtls >= TLS1_3_VERSION);
573 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "EC") == 0
574 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X25519") == 0
575 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X448") == 0;
580 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
581 int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
583 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group);
584 unsigned char gtmp[2];
589 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
590 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
591 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits,
592 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo->group_id, 0), (void *)gtmp);
595 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
596 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
599 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
606 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
607 * if there is no match.
608 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
609 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
610 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
612 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
614 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
615 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
618 /* Can't do anything on client side */
622 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
624 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
625 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
627 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
629 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
630 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
631 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
632 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
633 /* Should never happen */
636 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
640 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
641 * otherwise peer decides.
643 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
644 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
645 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
647 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
648 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
651 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
652 uint16_t id = pref[i];
654 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
655 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
663 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
667 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
668 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
673 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
674 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
676 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
677 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
678 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
681 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
684 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
685 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
688 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
689 unsigned long idmask;
691 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
692 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
694 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
695 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
696 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
710 /* TODO(3.0): An arbitrary amount for now. Take another look at this */
711 # define MAX_GROUPLIST 40
716 uint16_t gid_arr[MAX_GROUPLIST];
719 static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
721 gid_cb_st *garg = arg;
728 if (garg->gidcnt == MAX_GROUPLIST)
730 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
732 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
735 gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
738 for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
739 if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
741 garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
745 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
746 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
754 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
760 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
763 tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
767 *pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
771 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
772 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
774 const uint16_t *groups;
780 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
781 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
782 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
784 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
785 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
787 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
788 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
791 /* Should never happen */
796 if (check_own_groups) {
797 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
798 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
799 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
803 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
806 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
810 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
811 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
814 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
815 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
816 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
817 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
821 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
825 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
829 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
831 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
832 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
833 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
835 *pformats = ecformats_default;
836 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
838 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
840 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
844 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
845 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
847 unsigned char comp_id;
851 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
852 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
856 /* Get required compression id */
857 point_conv = EVP_PKEY_get_ec_point_conv_form(pkey);
860 if (point_conv == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
861 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
862 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
864 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
869 int field_type = EVP_PKEY_get_field_type(pkey);
871 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
872 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
873 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
874 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
879 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
880 * supported (see RFC4492).
882 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
885 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
886 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
892 /* Return group id of a key */
893 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
895 int curve_nid = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
897 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
899 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
903 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
904 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
906 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
910 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
913 /* If not EC nothing to do */
914 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
916 /* Check compression */
917 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
919 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
921 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
924 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
927 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
930 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
934 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
935 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
936 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
937 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
938 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
940 return 0; /* Should never happen */
941 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
942 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
951 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
953 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
955 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
956 * is compatible with the client extensions.
958 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
960 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
962 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
964 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
966 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
969 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
970 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
971 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
972 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
979 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
984 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
986 /* Default sigalg schemes */
987 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
989 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
990 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
991 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
992 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
996 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
997 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
998 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
999 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1000 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1001 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1003 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1004 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1005 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1008 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1009 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1011 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1012 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1014 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1015 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1017 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1018 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1019 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1021 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1022 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1023 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1024 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1025 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1026 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1031 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1032 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1033 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1037 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
1038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1039 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1040 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1041 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1},
1042 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1043 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1044 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1, 1},
1045 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1046 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1047 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1, 1},
1048 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1049 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
1050 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1051 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1052 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
1053 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1054 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1055 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1056 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef, 1},
1057 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1058 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1059 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1061 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1062 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1063 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1064 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1065 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1066 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1067 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1068 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1069 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1070 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1071 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1072 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1073 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1074 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1075 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1076 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1077 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1078 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1079 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1080 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1081 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1082 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1083 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1084 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1085 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1086 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1087 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1088 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1089 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1090 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1091 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1092 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1093 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1095 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1096 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1097 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef, 1},
1098 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1099 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1100 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1101 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1102 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1103 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1104 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1105 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1106 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1107 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1108 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1109 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1112 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1113 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1114 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1115 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1116 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1117 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1118 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1119 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1120 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1121 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1122 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1123 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1124 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1125 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1126 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1127 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1128 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1129 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
1130 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
1131 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1}
1134 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1135 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
1136 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1137 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
1138 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1139 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1
1143 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1144 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1146 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
1147 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1148 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1149 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1150 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1151 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1152 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1153 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1154 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1155 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1158 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
1161 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1162 SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache
1163 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
1164 EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1167 if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
1171 for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1172 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
1178 * Check hash is available.
1179 * TODO(3.0): This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1180 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1181 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1182 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1183 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1185 if (lu->hash != NID_undef
1186 && ctx->ssl_digest_methods[lu->hash_idx] == NULL) {
1187 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1191 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
1192 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1195 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx->libctx, tmpkey, ctx->propq);
1196 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1198 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1199 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1202 ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
1207 OPENSSL_free(cache);
1208 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
1212 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1213 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL *s, uint16_t sigalg)
1216 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1218 for (i = 0, lu = s->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache;
1219 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1220 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1222 if (lu->sigalg == sigalg) {
1230 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1231 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
1236 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1237 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
1240 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
1250 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1252 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1253 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1254 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1256 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
1257 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
1258 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1264 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
1266 if (EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
1272 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1273 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1274 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1275 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1276 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1278 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
1284 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1285 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1286 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
1288 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
1295 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1297 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
1300 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1302 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1309 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1310 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1312 else if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256) {
1315 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1317 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1324 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
1327 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
1329 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
1330 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
1334 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
1336 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1340 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
1342 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
1344 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1345 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1348 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1350 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
1352 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1355 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1359 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1362 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1366 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1367 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1368 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1369 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1371 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1372 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1375 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1376 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1381 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1382 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1383 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1385 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1386 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1387 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1388 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1389 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1390 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1392 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1393 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1399 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1400 * specified EC curve.
1402 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
1404 const uint16_t *sigs;
1407 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1408 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1409 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1411 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1412 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1415 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1416 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sigs[i]);
1420 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1421 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1422 && curve == lu->curve)
1431 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1434 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1436 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1439 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1443 int md_type = EVP_MD_type(md);
1445 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1446 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
1448 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1449 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1450 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1452 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1453 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1454 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1455 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1457 if (md_type == NID_sha1)
1459 else if (md_type == NID_md5_sha1)
1461 else if (md_type == NID_md5)
1464 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1465 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1467 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1474 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1475 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1478 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1480 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1481 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1483 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1485 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1488 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
1489 /* Should never happen */
1492 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1493 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1494 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1495 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1498 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1499 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1500 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1502 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sig);
1504 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1505 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1508 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1509 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1510 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1511 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1514 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1515 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx)
1516 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1517 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1522 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1524 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1525 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1526 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1527 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1531 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1532 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1533 int curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
1535 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1536 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1540 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1541 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1542 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1543 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1546 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1547 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1548 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1549 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1550 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1551 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1556 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1562 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1563 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1564 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1565 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1568 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1569 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1570 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1571 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1574 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
1575 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1579 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1580 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1582 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1583 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1584 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
1586 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1587 md != NULL ? EVP_MD_type(md) : NID_undef,
1588 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1592 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1593 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1597 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1599 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1601 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1605 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1607 if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1609 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1614 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1615 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1616 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1618 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1621 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1623 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1625 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1626 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1627 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1628 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1629 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1632 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1633 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1634 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1635 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1637 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1639 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1640 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1641 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1648 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1649 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1650 * @c: cipher to check
1651 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1652 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1654 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1656 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1658 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1659 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1661 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1663 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1664 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1667 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1668 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1670 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1671 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1672 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1674 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1677 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1678 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1681 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1684 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1686 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1688 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1691 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1695 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1696 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1697 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1698 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1699 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1700 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1701 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1703 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1704 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1706 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1707 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1708 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1709 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1711 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1712 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1717 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1718 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1719 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1720 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1728 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1729 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1732 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1735 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1736 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1737 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1742 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1744 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1745 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1746 * point to the resulting session.
1748 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1752 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1755 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1758 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1759 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1762 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1763 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1765 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1766 if (!ticketext->present)
1767 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1769 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1771 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1772 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1776 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1778 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1779 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1780 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1781 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1784 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1785 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1786 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1787 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1788 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1789 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1791 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1792 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1793 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1794 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1795 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1796 * point to the resulting session.
1798 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1799 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1800 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1802 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1803 unsigned char *sdec;
1804 const unsigned char *p;
1805 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1806 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1808 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1809 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
1810 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1811 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1813 if (eticklen == 0) {
1815 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1816 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1818 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1821 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1823 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1824 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1825 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1826 * calculate the master secret later.
1828 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1832 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1833 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1834 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1838 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1839 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
1841 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1844 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1846 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1849 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1850 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1852 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1855 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1858 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1859 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, nctick,
1860 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1862 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1865 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1866 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1867 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1868 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1869 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
1872 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1876 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1882 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
1884 /* Check key name matches */
1885 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1886 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1887 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1891 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
1893 if (aes256cbc == NULL
1894 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1895 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1897 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
1898 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1899 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1900 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1901 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1904 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1905 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1909 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1912 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
1914 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1918 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1920 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1921 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1925 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1926 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1927 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
1928 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1932 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1933 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1936 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1937 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1938 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1939 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1940 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1941 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1942 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1944 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1947 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1949 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1955 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1959 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1961 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1963 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1967 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1968 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1969 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1973 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1974 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1977 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1979 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1984 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1986 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1989 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1990 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
1993 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1994 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1995 * performs any action
1997 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1998 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1999 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
2000 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2001 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
2002 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
2005 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
2006 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
2007 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
2009 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
2011 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
2012 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2015 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
2016 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
2017 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2021 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
2022 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
2023 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2024 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2025 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2029 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
2030 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
2031 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2032 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
2033 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2034 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
2035 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2037 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2041 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2045 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2047 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
2048 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
2049 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
2050 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
2059 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2060 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2062 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
2065 if (lu == NULL || !lu->enabled)
2067 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2068 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2071 * At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
2074 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
2075 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2076 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2077 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
2080 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2081 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(s->ctx, lu->sig_idx))
2084 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2085 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2086 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2087 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2088 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
2091 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
2092 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2094 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
2097 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2098 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2099 * ciphersuites enabled.
2102 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
2105 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
2106 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
2107 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
2108 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2110 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2111 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2112 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
2115 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kGOST | SSL_kGOST18)) != 0)
2123 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2124 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
2125 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
2126 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
2127 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
2131 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2132 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2136 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
2138 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
2139 size_t i, sigalgslen;
2140 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
2142 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2145 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
2146 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
2147 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *sigalgs);
2148 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2153 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
2157 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2158 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
2159 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
2160 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
2162 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
2165 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
2166 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
2171 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
2172 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2175 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
2177 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
2180 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2181 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2183 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2184 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
2185 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
2186 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
2190 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2194 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2195 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
2196 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
2197 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
2199 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
2200 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
2201 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
2202 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *ptmp);
2204 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2206 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
2208 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
2209 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
2220 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2221 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2223 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
2224 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
2226 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
2228 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
2230 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
2231 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2232 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2233 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2234 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2235 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
2236 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
2237 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2238 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
2239 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
2241 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
2242 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
2245 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2246 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2250 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2251 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2253 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2255 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
2256 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2259 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2263 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
2264 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
2268 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
2274 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2276 /* Invalid data length */
2277 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
2282 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
2283 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2286 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
2294 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
2301 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
2303 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2304 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2306 /* Should never happen */
2307 if (s->cert == NULL)
2311 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
2312 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
2314 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
2315 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
2319 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2321 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2324 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
2326 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
2329 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2332 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2333 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2334 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
2336 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2337 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2339 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2340 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(s->ctx, idx))
2341 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2346 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2347 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2348 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2350 uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2351 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2352 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2355 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2357 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2361 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2363 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
2364 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2366 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2368 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2369 if (psignhash != NULL)
2370 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2372 return (int)numsigalgs;
2375 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2376 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2377 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2379 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2380 if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2382 || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
2383 || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2385 shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2387 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2389 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2390 if (psignhash != NULL)
2391 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2393 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2395 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2396 return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
2399 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2400 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2404 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2405 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2408 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2410 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2411 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2412 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2413 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2414 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2415 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2416 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2417 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2419 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2420 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2421 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2424 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2425 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2427 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2429 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2431 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2432 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2433 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2436 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2438 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2440 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2442 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2444 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2445 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2446 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2447 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2448 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2449 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2453 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2455 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2456 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2460 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2467 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2468 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2469 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2471 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2473 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2474 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2478 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2482 /* Reject duplicates */
2483 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2484 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2493 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2494 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2496 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2500 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2504 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2507 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2512 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2513 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2516 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2519 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2520 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2521 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2523 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2524 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2525 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2531 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2533 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2538 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2539 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2542 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2544 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2545 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2546 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2548 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2550 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2551 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2556 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2561 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2562 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2563 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2565 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2566 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2567 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2573 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2577 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2579 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2581 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2583 if (default_nid == -1)
2585 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2587 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2589 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2591 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2592 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2593 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2595 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2598 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2600 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2601 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2602 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2603 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2604 if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2610 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2611 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2613 const X509_NAME *nm;
2615 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2616 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2617 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2624 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2625 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2626 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2627 * attempting to use them.
2630 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2632 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2633 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2634 /* Strict mode flags */
2635 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2636 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2637 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2639 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2644 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2645 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2648 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2649 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2651 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2654 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2656 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2657 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2659 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2661 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2662 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2671 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2674 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2676 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2677 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2679 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2686 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2687 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2688 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2689 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2690 else if (!check_flags)
2695 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2696 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2698 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2701 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2702 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2704 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2708 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2709 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2712 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2713 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2714 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2718 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2719 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2722 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2723 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2724 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2727 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2728 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2729 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2732 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2733 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2734 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2743 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2744 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2746 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2748 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2749 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2750 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *p);
2752 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2755 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2762 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2763 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2765 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2766 * so check_flags is always set.
2768 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2769 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2770 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2774 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2775 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2776 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2777 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2779 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2786 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2787 else if (check_flags)
2788 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2790 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2791 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2792 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2793 else if (!check_flags)
2796 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2797 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2798 else if (strict_mode) {
2799 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2800 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2801 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2802 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2804 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2811 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2812 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2815 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
2816 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2817 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
2818 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2819 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
2820 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2823 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2826 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2827 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2828 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2832 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2835 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2838 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2840 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2841 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2843 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2844 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2845 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2847 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2848 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2849 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2850 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2851 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2856 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2859 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2861 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2862 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2866 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2867 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2869 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2872 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2876 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2879 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2880 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2887 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2888 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2890 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2891 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2892 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2893 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2894 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2895 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2896 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2897 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2898 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2901 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2902 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2904 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2907 EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2909 EVP_PKEY *dhp = NULL;
2911 int dh_secbits = 80;
2912 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2913 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2914 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2916 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
2917 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2918 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2923 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2925 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2929 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2930 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2931 else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
2932 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
2933 else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
2934 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2935 else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2936 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
2938 p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
2942 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(s->ctx->libctx, "DH", s->ctx->propq);
2944 || EVP_PKEY_key_fromdata_init(pctx) != 1)
2947 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2949 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2950 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, 2))
2953 params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl);
2954 if (params == NULL || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &dhp, params) != 1)
2958 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free_params(params);
2959 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
2960 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2965 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2968 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2971 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2972 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2973 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2974 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2976 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2979 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2981 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2984 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2986 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2987 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2988 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2989 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2991 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2993 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2994 if (nid == NID_undef)
2997 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2999 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
3002 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
3005 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
3007 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
3008 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3010 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
3011 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3013 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
3014 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
3019 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
3020 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
3021 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3024 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
3026 int rv, start_idx, i;
3028 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
3033 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
3037 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
3038 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
3039 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
3047 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3048 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3051 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
3053 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3054 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
3056 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3058 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
3059 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3060 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
3063 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
3067 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3068 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3070 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3072 static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3075 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
3076 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
3080 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
3081 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3084 supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey, sig->hash);
3090 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3091 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3093 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
3094 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
3096 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
3097 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
3102 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
3103 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3104 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3105 * signing certificate.
3107 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
3114 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3115 * a viable public key is permitted.
3121 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3122 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3123 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3124 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3125 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3127 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
3129 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3132 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
3135 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
3136 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
3140 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3141 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3143 static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3148 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
3151 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3152 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
3155 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
3159 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3160 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3161 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3163 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3165 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3170 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3171 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3172 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3174 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3175 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
3176 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
3177 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
3178 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3180 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3181 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
3183 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
3184 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
3187 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
3188 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
3190 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3192 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey);
3193 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
3195 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3196 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3197 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, tmppkey, lu))
3203 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
3210 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3211 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3213 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3214 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3216 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3217 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3218 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3220 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
3222 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3225 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
3226 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
3228 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3229 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
3233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3234 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3238 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3239 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
3241 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
3244 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3246 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
3249 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3251 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
3255 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3258 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3259 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3262 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
3265 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
3267 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3268 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
3271 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3272 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
3274 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3275 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3276 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
3278 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, pkey, lu))
3281 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
3284 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3286 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3287 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3288 * we have to assume GOST support.
3290 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
3291 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3295 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3299 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3303 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
3306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3307 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3312 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3314 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
3315 size_t sent_sigslen;
3317 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3320 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3321 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3325 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3326 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
3327 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
3328 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
3329 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
3332 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
3335 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
3336 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3341 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3344 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3345 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3351 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3352 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3353 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3354 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3358 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3360 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3361 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3362 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3366 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3370 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3372 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3373 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3374 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3378 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3382 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3384 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3388 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3390 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
3392 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
3393 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3398 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3399 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3400 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret))
3405 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", ctx->propq);
3406 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
3411 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
3417 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3420 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
3421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3422 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx);
3428 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3433 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
3435 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
3437 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3438 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3439 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, key, len);
3440 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3441 if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx->ctx, params) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx))
3444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3445 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3446 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx, key, len, md);
3451 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
3453 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3454 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3456 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3457 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx, data, len);
3462 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
3465 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3466 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3468 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3469 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx, md, len);
3474 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3476 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3477 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx);
3478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3479 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3480 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx);
3485 int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3487 char gname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
3489 if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey, gname, sizeof(gname), NULL) > 0)
3490 return OBJ_txt2nid(gname);