2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/nelem.h"
24 #include "internal/sizes.h"
25 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
30 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
32 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
36 tls1_generate_master_secret,
37 tls1_change_cipher_state,
38 tls1_final_finish_mac,
39 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
42 tls1_export_keying_material,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
59 tls1_export_keying_material,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
62 tls_close_construct_packet,
66 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
70 tls1_generate_master_secret,
71 tls1_change_cipher_state,
72 tls1_final_finish_mac,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
76 tls1_export_keying_material,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
79 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
80 tls_close_construct_packet,
84 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
87 tls13_setup_key_block,
88 tls13_generate_master_secret,
89 tls13_change_cipher_state,
90 tls13_final_finish_mac,
91 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
92 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
94 tls13_export_keying_material,
95 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
96 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
97 tls_close_construct_packet,
101 OSSL_TIME tls1_default_timeout(void)
104 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
105 * http, the cache would over fill
107 return ossl_seconds2time(60 * 60 * 2);
114 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
120 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
122 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
127 OPENSSL_free(sc->ext.session_ticket);
131 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
133 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
141 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
142 sc->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
144 sc->version = s->method->version;
149 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
154 {NID_sect163k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1},
155 {NID_sect163r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1},
156 {NID_sect163r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2},
157 {NID_sect193r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1},
158 {NID_sect193r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2},
159 {NID_sect233k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1},
160 {NID_sect233r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1},
161 {NID_sect239k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1},
162 {NID_sect283k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1},
163 {NID_sect283r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1},
164 {NID_sect409k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1},
165 {NID_sect409r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1},
166 {NID_sect571k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1},
167 {NID_sect571r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1},
168 {NID_secp160k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1},
169 {NID_secp160r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1},
170 {NID_secp160r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2},
171 {NID_secp192k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1},
172 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1},
173 {NID_secp224k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1},
174 {NID_secp224r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1},
175 {NID_secp256k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1},
176 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1},
177 {NID_secp384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1},
178 {NID_secp521r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1},
179 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1},
180 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1},
181 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1},
182 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519},
183 {EVP_PKEY_X448, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448},
184 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A},
185 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B},
186 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C},
187 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D},
188 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A},
189 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B},
190 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C},
191 {NID_ffdhe2048, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048},
192 {NID_ffdhe3072, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072},
193 {NID_ffdhe4096, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096},
194 {NID_ffdhe6144, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144},
195 {NID_ffdhe8192, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192}
198 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
199 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
200 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
201 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
204 /* The default curves */
205 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
206 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519, /* X25519 (29) */
207 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
208 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448, /* X448 (30) */
209 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
210 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
211 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A, /* GC256A (34) */
212 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B, /* GC256B (35) */
213 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C, /* GC256C (36) */
214 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D, /* GC256D (37) */
215 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A, /* GC512A (38) */
216 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B, /* GC512B (39) */
217 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C, /* GC512C (40) */
218 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
219 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
220 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
221 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
222 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
225 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
226 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1,
227 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1,
230 struct provider_group_data_st {
232 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
235 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
236 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
237 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
239 struct provider_group_data_st *pgd = data;
240 SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
241 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
243 TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
244 EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
246 unsigned int is_kem = 0;
249 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == ctx->group_list_len) {
250 TLS_GROUP_INFO *tmp = NULL;
252 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == 0)
253 tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO)
254 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
256 tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->group_list,
257 (ctx->group_list_max_len
258 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
259 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
262 ctx->group_list = tmp;
263 memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
265 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
266 ctx->group_list_max_len += TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
269 ginf = &ctx->group_list[ctx->group_list_len];
271 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME);
272 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
273 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
276 ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
277 if (ginf->tlsname == NULL)
280 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
281 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
282 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
285 ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
286 if (ginf->realname == NULL)
289 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
290 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) || gid > UINT16_MAX) {
291 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
294 ginf->group_id = (uint16_t)gid;
296 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG);
297 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
298 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
301 ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
302 if (ginf->algorithm == NULL)
305 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
306 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
307 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
311 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM);
312 if (p != NULL && (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &is_kem) || is_kem > 1)) {
313 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
316 ginf->is_kem = 1 & is_kem;
318 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS);
319 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mintls)) {
320 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
324 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS);
325 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxtls)) {
326 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
330 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS);
331 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mindtls)) {
332 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
336 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS);
337 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxdtls)) {
338 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
342 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
343 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
344 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
349 keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, ginf->algorithm, ctx->propq);
350 if (keymgmt != NULL) {
352 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
353 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
355 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
356 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
357 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
358 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
359 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
360 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
363 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
364 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
365 ctx->group_list_len++;
368 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
373 OPENSSL_free(ginf->tlsname);
374 OPENSSL_free(ginf->realname);
375 OPENSSL_free(ginf->algorithm);
376 ginf->algorithm = ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
381 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
383 struct provider_group_data_st pgd;
386 pgd.provider = provider;
387 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-GROUP",
388 add_provider_groups, &pgd);
391 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX *ctx)
393 size_t i, j, num_deflt_grps = 0;
394 uint16_t tmp_supp_groups[OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default)];
396 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_groups, ctx))
399 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default); i++) {
400 for (j = 0; j < ctx->group_list_len; j++) {
401 if (ctx->group_list[j].group_id == supported_groups_default[i]) {
402 tmp_supp_groups[num_deflt_grps++] = ctx->group_list[j].group_id;
408 if (num_deflt_grps == 0)
411 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default
412 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps);
414 if (ctx->ext.supported_groups_default == NULL)
417 memcpy(ctx->ext.supported_groups_default,
419 num_deflt_grps * sizeof(tmp_supp_groups[0]));
420 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len = num_deflt_grps;
425 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
429 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
430 if (strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].tlsname, name) == 0
431 || strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].realname, name) == 0)
432 return ctx->group_list[i].group_id;
438 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
442 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
443 if (ctx->group_list[i].group_id == group_id)
444 return &ctx->group_list[i];
450 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id, int include_unknown)
458 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
459 * work for groups we don't know about.
461 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
463 if (nid_to_group[i].group_id == group_id)
464 return nid_to_group[i].nid;
466 if (!include_unknown)
468 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown | (int)group_id;
471 uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
476 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
477 * work for groups we don't know about.
479 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
481 if (nid_to_group[i].nid == nid)
482 return nid_to_group[i].group_id;
489 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
490 * the number of groups supported.
492 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
495 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
497 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
498 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
499 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
500 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
501 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
504 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
505 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
509 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
510 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
515 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
516 *pgroups = sctx->ext.supported_groups_default;
517 *pgroupslen = sctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len;
519 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
520 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
526 int tls_valid_group(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id,
527 int minversion, int maxversion,
528 int isec, int *okfortls13)
530 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
534 if (okfortls13 != NULL)
540 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
541 if (ginfo->mindtls < 0 || ginfo->maxdtls < 0)
543 if (ginfo->maxdtls == 0)
546 ret = DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion, ginfo->maxdtls);
547 if (ginfo->mindtls > 0)
548 ret &= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion, ginfo->mindtls);
550 if (ginfo->mintls < 0 || ginfo->maxtls < 0)
552 if (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
555 ret = (minversion <= ginfo->maxtls);
556 if (ginfo->mintls > 0)
557 ret &= (maxversion >= ginfo->mintls);
558 if (ret && okfortls13 != NULL && maxversion == TLS1_3_VERSION)
559 *okfortls13 = (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
560 || (ginfo->maxtls >= TLS1_3_VERSION);
563 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "EC") == 0
564 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X25519") == 0
565 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X448") == 0;
570 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
571 int tls_group_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group, int op)
573 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
575 unsigned char gtmp[2];
580 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
581 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
582 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits,
583 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo->group_id, 0), (void *)gtmp);
586 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
587 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
590 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
597 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
598 * if there is no match.
599 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
600 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
601 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
603 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int nmatch)
605 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
606 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
609 /* Can't do anything on client side */
613 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
615 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
616 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
618 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
620 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
621 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1;
622 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
623 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1;
624 /* Should never happen */
627 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
631 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
632 * otherwise peer decides.
634 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
635 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
636 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
638 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
639 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
642 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
643 uint16_t id = pref[i];
645 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
646 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
654 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
658 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
659 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
664 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
665 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
667 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
668 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
669 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
672 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
675 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL)
677 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
678 unsigned long idmask;
680 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
681 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
683 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
684 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
685 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
699 # define GROUPLIST_INCREMENT 40
700 # define GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH 64
708 static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
710 gid_cb_st *garg = arg;
713 char etmp[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH];
717 if (garg->gidcnt == garg->gidmax) {
719 OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr, garg->gidmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT);
722 garg->gidmax += GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
725 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
727 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
730 gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
732 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
733 "group '%s' cannot be set", etmp);
736 for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
737 if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
739 garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
743 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
744 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
752 gcb.gidmax = GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
753 gcb.gid_arr = OPENSSL_malloc(gcb.gidmax * sizeof(*gcb.gid_arr));
754 if (gcb.gid_arr == NULL)
757 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
765 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
768 tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
772 *pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
775 OPENSSL_free(gcb.gid_arr);
779 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
780 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id,
781 int check_own_groups)
783 const uint16_t *groups;
789 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
790 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
791 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
793 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
794 if (group_id != OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1)
796 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
797 if (group_id != OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
800 /* Should never happen */
805 if (check_own_groups) {
806 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
807 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
808 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
812 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
815 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
819 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
820 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
823 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
824 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
825 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
826 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
830 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
833 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
837 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
839 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
840 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
841 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
843 *pformats = ecformats_default;
844 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
846 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
848 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
852 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
853 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
855 unsigned char comp_id;
859 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
860 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
864 /* Get required compression id */
865 point_conv = EVP_PKEY_get_ec_point_conv_form(pkey);
868 if (point_conv == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
869 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
870 } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
872 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
877 int field_type = EVP_PKEY_get_field_type(pkey);
879 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
880 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
881 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
882 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
887 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
888 * supported (see RFC4492).
890 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
893 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
894 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
900 /* Return group id of a key */
901 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
903 int curve_nid = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
905 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
907 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
911 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
912 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
914 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
918 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
921 /* If not EC nothing to do */
922 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
924 /* Check compression */
925 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
927 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
929 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
932 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
935 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
938 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
942 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
943 if (group_id == OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1)
944 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
945 else if (group_id == OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
946 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
948 return 0; /* Should never happen */
949 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
950 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
959 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
961 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
963 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
964 * is compatible with the client extensions.
966 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
968 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned long cid)
970 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
972 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
974 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
977 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
978 return tls1_check_group_id(s, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1, 1);
979 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
980 return tls1_check_group_id(s, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1, 1);
985 /* Default sigalg schemes */
986 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
987 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
988 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
989 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
990 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
992 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256,
993 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384,
994 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512,
996 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
997 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
998 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
999 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1000 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1001 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1003 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1004 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1005 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1007 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1008 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1010 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1011 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1013 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1014 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1016 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1017 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1018 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1020 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1021 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1022 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1023 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1024 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1025 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1030 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1031 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1032 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1035 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
1036 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1037 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1038 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1},
1039 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1040 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1041 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1, 1},
1042 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1043 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1044 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1, 1},
1045 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1046 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
1047 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1048 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1049 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
1050 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1051 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1052 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1053 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef, 1},
1054 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1055 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1056 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1057 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256,
1058 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1059 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_brainpoolP256r1, 1},
1060 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384,
1061 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1062 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_brainpoolP384r1, 1},
1063 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512,
1064 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1065 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_brainpoolP512r1, 1},
1066 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1067 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1068 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1069 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1070 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1071 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1072 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1073 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1074 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1075 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1076 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1077 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1078 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1079 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1080 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1081 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1082 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1083 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1084 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1085 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1086 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1087 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1088 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1089 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1090 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1091 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1092 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1093 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1094 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1095 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1096 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1097 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1098 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1099 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1100 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1101 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef, 1},
1102 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1103 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1104 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1105 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1106 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1107 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1108 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1109 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1110 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1111 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1112 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1113 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1115 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1116 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1117 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1118 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1119 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1120 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1121 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1122 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1123 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1124 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1125 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1126 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1127 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1128 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1129 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1130 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1131 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1132 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
1133 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
1134 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1}
1137 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1138 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
1139 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1140 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
1141 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1142 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1
1146 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1147 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1149 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
1150 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1151 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1152 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1153 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1154 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1155 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1156 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1157 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1158 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1161 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
1164 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1165 SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache
1166 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
1167 EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1170 if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
1174 for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1175 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
1181 * Check hash is available.
1182 * This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1183 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1184 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1185 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1186 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1188 if (lu->hash != NID_undef
1189 && ctx->ssl_digest_methods[lu->hash_idx] == NULL) {
1190 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1194 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
1195 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1198 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx->libctx, tmpkey, ctx->propq);
1199 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1201 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1202 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1205 ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
1210 OPENSSL_free(cache);
1211 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
1215 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1216 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1220 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1222 for (i = 0, lu = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->sigalg_lookup_cache;
1223 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1224 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1226 if (lu->sigalg == sigalg) {
1234 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1235 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
1241 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1242 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
1245 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
1255 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1257 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1258 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1259 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1261 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_get_size(md) + 2)
1262 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
1263 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1269 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
1271 if (EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
1277 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1278 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1279 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1280 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1281 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1283 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1290 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1291 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1292 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
1296 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
1303 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1305 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
1308 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1310 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1317 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1318 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1320 else if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256) {
1323 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1325 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1332 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
1335 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
1337 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
1338 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
1342 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu, NULL))
1344 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1348 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
1350 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
1352 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1353 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1356 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1358 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
1360 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1363 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1367 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1370 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1373 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1374 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1375 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1376 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1378 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1379 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1382 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1383 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1387 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1388 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1389 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1391 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1392 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1393 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1394 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1395 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1396 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1398 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1399 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1404 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1405 * specified EC curve.
1407 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int curve)
1409 const uint16_t *sigs;
1412 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1413 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1414 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1416 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1417 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1420 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1421 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sigs[i]);
1425 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1426 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1427 && curve == lu->curve)
1435 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1438 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1440 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1443 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1447 int md_type = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
1449 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1450 secbits = EVP_MD_get_size(md) * 4;
1452 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1453 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1454 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1456 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1457 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1458 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1459 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1461 if (md_type == NID_sha1)
1463 else if (md_type == NID_md5_sha1)
1465 else if (md_type == NID_md5)
1468 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1469 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1471 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1478 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1479 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1482 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1484 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1485 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1487 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1489 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1492 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
1493 /* Should never happen */
1496 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1497 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1498 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1499 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1502 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1503 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1504 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1506 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sig);
1508 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1509 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1512 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1513 && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1514 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1515 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1516 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1519 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1520 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey), &cidx)
1521 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1526 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1528 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1529 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1530 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1531 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1535 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1536 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1537 int curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
1539 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1544 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1545 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1546 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1550 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1551 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1552 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1553 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1554 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1555 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1560 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1561 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1565 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1566 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1567 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1568 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1571 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1572 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1573 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1577 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu, &md)) {
1578 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1582 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1583 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1585 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1586 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1587 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu);
1589 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1590 md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
1591 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1595 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1596 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1600 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1602 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
1607 if (sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1609 *pnid = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1613 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1615 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
1620 if (sc->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1622 *pnid = sc->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1627 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1628 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1629 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1631 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1634 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1636 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1638 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1639 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1640 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1641 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1642 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1645 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1646 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1647 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1648 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1650 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1652 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1653 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1654 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1661 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1662 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1663 * @c: cipher to check
1664 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1665 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1667 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1669 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c,
1672 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1673 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1675 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1677 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1678 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1681 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1682 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1684 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1685 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1686 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1688 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1691 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1692 && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1693 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1696 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1699 int tls_use_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1701 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1703 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1706 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1710 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1711 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1712 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1713 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1714 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1715 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1716 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1718 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1719 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1721 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1722 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1723 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1724 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1726 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1727 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1732 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1733 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1734 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1735 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1743 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1744 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1747 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1750 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1751 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1752 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1757 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1759 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1760 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1761 * point to the resulting session.
1763 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1764 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1768 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1771 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1774 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1775 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1778 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1779 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1781 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1782 if (!ticketext->present)
1783 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1785 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1787 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1788 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1792 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1794 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1795 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1796 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1797 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1800 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1801 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1802 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1803 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1804 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1805 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1807 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1808 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1809 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1810 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1811 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1812 * point to the resulting session.
1814 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1815 const unsigned char *etick,
1817 const unsigned char *sess_id,
1818 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1820 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1821 unsigned char *sdec;
1822 const unsigned char *p;
1823 int slen, ivlen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1824 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1826 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1827 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
1828 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1829 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1831 if (eticklen == 0) {
1833 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1834 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1836 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1839 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1841 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1842 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1843 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1844 * calculate the master secret later.
1846 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1850 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1851 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1852 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1856 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1857 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
1859 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1862 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1864 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1868 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1870 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1873 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1876 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1877 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), nctick,
1878 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1880 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1883 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1884 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1885 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), nctick,
1886 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1887 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
1890 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1894 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1900 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
1901 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1903 /* Check key name matches */
1904 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1905 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1906 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1910 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(sctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
1912 if (aes256cbc == NULL
1913 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1914 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1916 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
1917 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1918 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1919 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1920 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1923 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1924 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
1928 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1931 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
1933 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1937 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
1939 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1943 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1944 if (eticklen <= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen + mlen) {
1945 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1949 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1950 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1951 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
1952 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1956 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1957 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1960 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1961 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1962 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen;
1963 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen;
1964 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1965 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1966 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1968 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1971 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1973 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1979 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1983 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1985 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1987 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1991 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1992 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1993 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1997 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1998 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2001 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2003 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2008 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
2010 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2013 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2014 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
2017 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
2018 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
2019 * performs any action
2021 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
2022 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
2023 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
2024 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2025 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
2026 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
2029 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
2030 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
2031 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2032 sess, etick, keyname_len,
2034 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
2036 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
2037 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2040 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
2041 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
2042 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2046 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
2047 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
2048 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2049 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2050 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2054 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
2055 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
2056 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2057 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
2058 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2059 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
2060 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2062 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2066 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2070 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2072 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
2073 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
2074 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
2075 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
2084 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2085 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op,
2086 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2088 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
2091 if (lu == NULL || !lu->enabled)
2093 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2094 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2097 * At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
2100 if (!s->server && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
2101 && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
2102 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2103 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2104 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
2107 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2108 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu->sig_idx))
2111 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2112 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2113 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2114 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2115 if (s->server && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
2118 && SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
2119 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2121 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
2124 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2125 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2126 * ciphersuites enabled.
2129 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
2132 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
2133 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
2134 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
2135 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2137 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2138 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2139 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
2142 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kGOST | SSL_kGOST18)) != 0)
2150 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2151 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu);
2152 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
2153 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
2154 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
2158 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2159 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2163 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op)
2165 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
2166 size_t i, sigalgslen;
2167 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
2169 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2172 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
2173 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
2174 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *sigalgs);
2175 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2180 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
2184 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2185 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
2186 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
2187 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
2189 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
2192 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
2193 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
2198 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
2199 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2202 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
2204 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
2207 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2208 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2210 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2211 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
2212 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
2213 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
2217 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2221 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2222 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2223 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
2224 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
2225 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
2227 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
2228 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
2229 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
2230 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *ptmp);
2232 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2234 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
2236 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
2237 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
2248 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2249 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2251 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
2252 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
2254 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
2256 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
2258 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
2259 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2260 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2261 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2262 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2263 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
2264 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
2265 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2266 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
2267 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
2269 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
2270 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
2273 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2274 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2278 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2279 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2281 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2283 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL)
2285 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2289 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
2290 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
2294 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
2300 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2302 /* Invalid data length */
2303 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
2308 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL)
2310 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
2318 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
2325 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
2327 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2328 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2330 /* Should never happen */
2331 if (s->cert == NULL)
2335 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
2336 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
2338 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
2339 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
2343 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2345 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2348 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
2350 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
2353 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2356 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2357 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2358 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
2360 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2361 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2363 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2364 if (pvalid[idx] == 0
2365 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), idx))
2366 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2371 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2372 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2373 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2377 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
2382 psig = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2383 numsigalgs = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2385 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2388 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2390 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2394 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2396 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
2397 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sc, *psig);
2399 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2401 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2402 if (psignhash != NULL)
2403 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2405 return (int)numsigalgs;
2408 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2409 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2410 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2412 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2413 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
2418 if (sc->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2420 || idx >= (int)sc->shared_sigalgslen
2421 || sc->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2423 shsigalgs = sc->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2425 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2427 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2428 if (psignhash != NULL)
2429 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2431 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2433 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2434 return (int)sc->shared_sigalgslen;
2437 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2438 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2442 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2443 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2446 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2448 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2449 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2450 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2451 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2452 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2453 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2454 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2455 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2457 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2458 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2459 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2462 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2463 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2465 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2467 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2469 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2470 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2471 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2474 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2476 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2478 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2480 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2482 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2483 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2484 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2485 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2486 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2487 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2491 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2493 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2494 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2498 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2505 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2506 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2507 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2509 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2511 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2512 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2516 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2520 /* Reject duplicates */
2521 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2522 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2531 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2532 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2534 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2538 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2542 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2545 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2550 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL)
2552 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2555 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2556 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2557 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2559 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2560 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2561 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2567 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2569 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2574 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL)
2576 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2578 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2579 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2580 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2582 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2584 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2585 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2590 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2595 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2596 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2597 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2599 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2600 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2601 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2607 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2611 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2613 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2615 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2618 if (default_nid == -1)
2620 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2622 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2624 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2626 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2627 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2628 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2630 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2633 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2635 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2636 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2637 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2638 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2639 if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2645 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2646 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2648 const X509_NAME *nm;
2650 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2651 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2652 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2659 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2660 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2661 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2662 * attempting to use them.
2665 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2667 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2668 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2669 /* Strict mode flags */
2670 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2671 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2672 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2674 int tls1_check_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk,
2675 STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int idx)
2679 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2680 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2683 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2685 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2687 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2690 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2692 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2693 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2695 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2697 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2698 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2707 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2710 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2712 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2713 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2715 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2722 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2723 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2724 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2725 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2726 else if (!check_flags)
2731 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2732 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2734 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
2739 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2740 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2742 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2746 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2747 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2750 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2751 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2752 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2756 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2757 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2760 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2761 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2762 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2765 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2766 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2767 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2770 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2771 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2772 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2781 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2782 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2784 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2786 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2787 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2788 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *p);
2790 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2793 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2800 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2801 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2803 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2804 * so check_flags is always set.
2806 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2807 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2808 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2812 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2813 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2814 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2815 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2817 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2824 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2825 else if (check_flags)
2826 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2828 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2829 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2830 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2831 else if (!check_flags)
2834 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2835 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2836 else if (strict_mode) {
2837 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2838 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2839 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2840 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2842 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2849 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2850 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2853 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
2854 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2855 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
2856 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2857 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
2858 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2861 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2864 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2865 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2866 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2870 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2873 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2876 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2879 || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn) == 0
2880 || ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2881 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2883 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2884 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2886 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2887 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2892 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2895 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2897 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2898 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2902 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2903 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2905 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2908 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2912 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2915 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2916 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2923 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2924 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2926 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2927 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2928 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2929 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2930 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2931 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2932 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2933 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2934 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2937 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2938 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2940 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
2945 return tls1_check_chain(sc, x, pk, chain, -1);
2948 EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2950 EVP_PKEY *dhp = NULL;
2952 int dh_secbits = 80, sec_level_bits;
2953 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2954 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2955 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2956 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2958 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
2959 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2960 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2965 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2967 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2971 /* Do not pick a prime that is too weak for the current security level */
2972 sec_level_bits = ssl_get_security_level_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2974 if (dh_secbits < sec_level_bits)
2975 dh_secbits = sec_level_bits;
2977 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2978 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2979 else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
2980 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
2981 else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
2982 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2983 else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2984 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
2986 p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
2990 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx->libctx, "DH", sctx->propq);
2992 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) != 1)
2995 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2997 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2998 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, 2))
3001 params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl);
3003 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &dhp, EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1)
3007 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
3008 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
3009 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3014 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x,
3018 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
3022 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3023 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3024 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
3025 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
3027 secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey);
3030 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
3032 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
3035 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x,
3038 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3039 int secbits, nid, pknid;
3041 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
3042 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
3044 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
3046 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
3047 if (nid == NID_undef)
3050 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
3052 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
3055 int ssl_security_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy,
3059 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
3061 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
3062 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3064 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
3065 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3067 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
3068 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
3073 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
3074 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
3075 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3078 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk,
3081 int rv, start_idx, i;
3084 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
3086 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3091 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
3095 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
3096 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
3097 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
3105 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3106 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3109 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3110 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
3112 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3113 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
3115 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3117 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
3118 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3119 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
3122 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
3126 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3127 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3129 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3131 static int check_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig,
3132 X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3134 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
3135 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
3137 const char *mdname = NULL;
3138 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3141 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot support signing with this digest,
3142 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3144 if (sig->hash != NID_undef)
3145 mdname = OBJ_nid2sn(sig->hash);
3146 supported = EVP_PKEY_digestsign_supports_digest(pkey, sctx->libctx,
3153 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3154 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3156 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
3157 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
3159 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
3160 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
3165 * This does not differentiate between the
3166 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3167 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3168 * signing certificate.
3170 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
3177 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3178 * a viable public key is permitted.
3184 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3185 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3186 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3187 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3188 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3190 static int has_usable_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
3192 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3195 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
3198 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
3199 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
3203 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3204 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3206 static int is_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3211 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
3214 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3215 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
3218 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
3222 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3223 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3224 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3226 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x,
3229 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3233 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3235 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3236 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3237 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3239 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3240 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
3241 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
3242 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
3243 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3245 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3246 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, NULL))
3248 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
3249 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
3252 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
3253 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
3255 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3257 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey);
3258 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
3260 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3261 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3262 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx, tmppkey, lu))
3268 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
3275 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3276 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3278 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3279 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3281 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3282 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3283 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3285 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int fatalerrs)
3287 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3290 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
3291 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
3293 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3294 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
3298 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3299 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3303 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3304 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
3306 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
3309 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3311 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
3313 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3315 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3317 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
3321 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3324 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3325 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3328 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
3331 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
3333 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3334 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
3337 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3338 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
3340 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3341 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3342 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
3344 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx, pkey, lu))
3347 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
3350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3352 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3353 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3354 * we have to assume GOST support.
3356 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen
3357 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
3358 & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) != 0) {
3359 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3362 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3363 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3367 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3371 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
3374 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3375 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3380 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3382 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
3383 size_t sent_sigslen;
3385 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3389 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3393 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3394 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
3395 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
3396 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
3397 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
3400 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
3403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3404 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3409 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3412 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3413 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3419 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3420 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3421 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3422 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3426 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3428 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3429 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3430 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3434 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3438 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3440 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl);
3445 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3446 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3447 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3451 sc->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3455 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3457 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3461 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3463 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
3465 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
3466 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3471 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3472 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3473 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret))
3478 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", ctx->propq);
3479 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
3484 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
3490 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3493 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
3494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3495 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx);
3501 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3506 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
3508 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
3510 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3511 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3512 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3513 if (EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx, key, len, params))
3516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3517 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3518 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx, key, len, md);
3523 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
3525 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3526 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3528 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3529 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx, data, len);
3534 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
3537 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3538 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3540 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3541 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx, md, len);
3546 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3548 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3549 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx);
3550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3551 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3552 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx);
3557 int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3559 char gname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
3561 if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey, gname, sizeof(gname), NULL) > 0)
3562 return OBJ_txt2nid(gname);
3567 __owur int tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
3568 const unsigned char *enckey,
3571 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "DH")) {
3572 int bits = EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pkey);
3574 if (bits <= 0 || enckeylen != (size_t)bits / 8)
3575 /* the encoded key must be padded to the length of the p */
3577 } else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC")) {
3578 if (enckeylen < 3 /* point format and at least 1 byte for x and y */
3579 || enckey[0] != 0x04)
3583 return EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(pkey, enckey, enckeylen);