2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
65 PACKET *cipher_suites,
67 **skp, int sslv2format,
71 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
72 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
73 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
74 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
76 * Valid return values are:
77 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
78 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
80 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
82 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
84 switch (st->hand_state) {
89 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
90 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
91 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
96 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
98 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
99 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
101 * 2) If we did request one then
102 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
104 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
105 * list if we requested a certificate)
107 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
108 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
109 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
110 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
111 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
113 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
114 * not going to accept it because we require a client
117 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
118 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
119 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
120 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
130 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
131 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
132 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
139 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
140 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
145 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
147 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
148 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
149 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
150 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
151 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
154 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
157 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
158 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
159 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
160 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
173 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
174 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
175 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
180 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
182 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
183 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
184 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
189 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
190 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
199 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
200 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
201 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
207 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
208 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
215 /* No valid transition found */
216 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
217 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
222 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
224 * Valid return values are:
228 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
230 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
233 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
234 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
235 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
236 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
237 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
240 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
242 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
246 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
247 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
248 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
249 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
250 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
253 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
254 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
264 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
266 * Valid return values are:
270 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
273 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
274 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
276 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
277 * during re-negotiation:
279 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
280 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
282 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
283 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
286 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
288 * ... except when the application insists on
289 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
292 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
293 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
294 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
296 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
299 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
307 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
308 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
310 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
312 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
314 switch (st->hand_state) {
316 /* Shouldn't happen */
317 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
320 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
321 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
324 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
326 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
328 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
330 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
331 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
333 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
334 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
335 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
336 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
339 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
341 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
342 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
344 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
346 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
347 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
351 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
352 /* normal PSK or SRP */
353 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
354 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
356 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
357 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
358 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
359 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
361 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
364 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
367 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
368 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
369 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
373 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
374 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
375 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
376 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
380 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
381 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
382 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
383 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
387 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
388 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
389 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
391 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
394 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
396 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
397 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
398 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
399 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
400 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
402 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
407 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
410 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
411 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
412 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
414 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
416 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
419 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
420 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
426 * the server to the client.
428 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
430 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
432 switch (st->hand_state) {
434 /* No pre work to be done */
437 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
440 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
443 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
445 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
446 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
447 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
452 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
453 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
455 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
456 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
462 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
464 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
465 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
467 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
469 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
470 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
472 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
473 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
479 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
480 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
481 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
482 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
485 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
487 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
488 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
489 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
490 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
494 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
497 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
500 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
504 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
505 * server to the client.
507 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
509 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
513 switch (st->hand_state) {
515 /* No post work to be done */
518 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
519 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
521 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
522 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
527 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
528 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
530 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
531 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
532 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
536 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
537 * treat like it was the first packet
542 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
544 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
545 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
546 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
549 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
552 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
553 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
555 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
556 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
557 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
559 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
563 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
564 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
569 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
571 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
573 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
576 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
580 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
581 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
583 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
588 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
591 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
592 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
596 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
597 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
600 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
602 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
605 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
612 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
616 * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
618 * Valid return values are:
622 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s)
624 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
626 switch (st->hand_state) {
628 /* Shouldn't happen */
631 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
632 return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s);
634 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
635 return tls_construct_hello_request(s);
637 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
638 return tls_construct_server_hello(s);
641 return tls_construct_server_certificate(s);
643 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
644 return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
646 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
647 return tls_construct_certificate_request(s);
649 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
650 return tls_construct_server_done(s);
652 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
653 return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s);
655 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
656 return tls_construct_cert_status(s);
658 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
660 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
662 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
664 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
665 return tls_construct_finished(s,
667 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
669 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
674 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
675 * calculated as follows:
677 * 2 + # client_version
678 * 32 + # only valid length for random
679 * 1 + # length of session_id
680 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
681 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
682 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
683 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
684 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
685 * 2 + # length of extensions
686 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
688 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
690 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
691 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
694 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
695 * reading. Excludes the message header.
697 unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
699 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
701 switch (st->hand_state) {
703 /* Shouldn't happen */
706 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
707 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
710 return s->max_cert_list;
712 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
713 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
715 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
716 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
719 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
720 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
723 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
724 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
726 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
727 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
732 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
734 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
736 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
738 switch (st->hand_state) {
740 /* Shouldn't happen */
741 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
743 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
744 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
747 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
749 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
750 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
752 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
753 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
756 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
757 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
760 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
761 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
763 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
764 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
769 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
772 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
774 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
776 switch (st->hand_state) {
778 /* Shouldn't happen */
781 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
782 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
784 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
785 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
787 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
789 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
790 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
791 /* Are we renegotiating? */
792 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
793 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
794 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
795 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
796 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
797 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
800 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
803 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
809 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
811 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
813 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
815 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
816 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
817 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
819 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
823 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
825 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
832 int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s)
834 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
836 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
843 unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf,
844 unsigned char *cookie,
845 unsigned char cookie_len)
847 unsigned int msg_len;
851 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
852 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
853 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF;
855 *(p++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len;
856 memcpy(p, cookie, cookie_len);
863 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
868 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
870 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
871 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
872 &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
873 s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
874 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
875 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
876 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
880 len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH],
881 s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
883 dtls1_set_message_header(s, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0, len);
884 len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
886 /* number of bytes to write */
893 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
895 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
896 unsigned int j, complen = 0;
899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
900 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
902 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
904 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
905 PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
907 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
909 is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
911 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
912 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
914 unsigned int version;
917 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
918 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
919 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
920 * the rest right through. Its format is:
922 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
923 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
925 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
926 * 7-8 session_id_length
927 * 9-10 challenge_length
931 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
932 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
934 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
935 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
942 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
943 /* No protocol version supplied! */
944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
947 if (version == 0x0002) {
948 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
951 } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
953 s->client_version = version;
955 /* No idea what protocol this is */
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
961 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
962 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
964 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
965 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
966 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
972 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
973 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
975 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
976 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
977 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
978 DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) {
979 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
986 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
988 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
991 s->version = s->client_version;
993 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
997 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1000 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1001 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1002 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1004 unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1007 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
1008 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1009 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1011 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1012 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1016 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1017 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1018 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1022 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
1023 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
1024 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1025 /* No extensions. */
1026 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1028 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1029 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1033 /* Load the client random and compression list. */
1034 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
1036 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1037 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1038 s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1039 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1040 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1041 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1042 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1043 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1047 PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
1049 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1050 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1051 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1052 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1057 if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1058 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1063 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1064 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1065 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1070 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1071 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1072 * So check cookie length...
1074 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1075 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
1080 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
1081 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1082 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1086 /* Could be empty. */
1090 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1091 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1092 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1093 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1094 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
1095 PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) ==
1097 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1099 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1101 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1103 /* default verification */
1104 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1105 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1109 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1111 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1112 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
1113 if (protverr != 0) {
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1115 s->version = s->client_version;
1116 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1125 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1126 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1128 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1129 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1130 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1131 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1132 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1133 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1134 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1135 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1136 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1137 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1142 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1143 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1146 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
1148 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1150 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1151 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1152 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1153 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1154 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1156 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1157 /* previous session */
1159 } else if (i == -1) {
1163 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1168 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
1169 is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
1173 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1176 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1179 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1181 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1182 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1184 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1185 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1194 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1197 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1199 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1204 complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
1205 for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
1206 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
1212 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1217 /* TLS extensions */
1218 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1219 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1226 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1227 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1228 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1229 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1233 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1234 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1239 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1240 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1242 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1243 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1244 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1246 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1248 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1249 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1253 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1255 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1260 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1261 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1266 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1267 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1268 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1269 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1270 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1275 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1276 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1277 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1279 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1281 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1282 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1283 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1285 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1286 /* Can't disable compression */
1287 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1289 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1292 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1293 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1294 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1295 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1296 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1300 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1302 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1305 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1306 for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
1307 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
1311 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1313 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1318 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1319 /* See if we have a match */
1320 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1323 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1324 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1325 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1327 for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
1328 if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
1337 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1343 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1344 * using compression.
1346 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1347 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1353 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1357 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1358 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1360 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1362 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1363 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1364 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1365 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1370 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1376 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1377 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1379 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1381 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1383 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1384 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1388 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1390 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1391 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1393 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1395 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1396 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1397 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1399 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1401 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1405 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1408 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1411 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1413 if (cipher == NULL) {
1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1415 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1418 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1419 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1420 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1421 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1422 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1423 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1424 /* do not send a session ticket */
1425 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1427 /* Session-id reuse */
1428 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1431 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1432 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1433 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1439 * we now have the following setup.
1441 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1442 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1443 * compression - basically ignored right now
1444 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1445 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1446 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1447 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1450 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1451 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1452 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
1453 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1454 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1462 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1464 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1466 * callback indicates further work to be done
1468 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1471 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1473 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1474 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1476 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1478 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1485 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1487 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1488 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1492 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s)
1495 unsigned char *p, *d;
1500 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1502 /* Do the message type and length last */
1503 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1505 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1506 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1509 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1510 * tls_process_client_hello()
1512 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1513 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1516 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1517 * back in the server hello:
1518 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1519 * we send back the old session ID.
1520 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1521 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1522 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1523 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1525 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1526 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1527 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1528 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1531 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1532 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1534 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1536 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1537 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1539 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1543 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1546 /* put the cipher */
1547 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char_old(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1550 /* put the compression method */
1551 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1554 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1557 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1560 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1561 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1562 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1566 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1568 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1570 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1576 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1578 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1585 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s)
1587 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
1588 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1589 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1593 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1594 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1595 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1602 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1604 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1605 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1609 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1614 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1615 unsigned char *p, *d;
1622 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1624 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1626 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1630 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1634 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1637 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1639 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1642 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
1643 n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1645 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1646 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1648 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1650 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1651 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1653 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
1656 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1657 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1658 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
1659 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
1661 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1662 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1663 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1666 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
1669 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1671 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1672 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
1673 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
1675 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1677 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1682 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
1683 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1685 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1688 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1689 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
1690 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1692 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1695 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1697 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1701 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
1703 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1708 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1710 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1713 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
1714 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
1717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1718 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1721 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1723 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1727 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1728 nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1729 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
1730 if (curve_id == 0) {
1731 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1732 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1735 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1736 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1737 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1738 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1743 /* Encode the public key. */
1744 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
1746 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1752 * We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key
1753 * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to
1754 * encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure.
1756 n += 4 + encodedlen;
1759 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1760 * can set these to NULLs
1767 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1768 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1769 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1770 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1771 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1772 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1774 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1777 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1778 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1779 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1780 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1784 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1786 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1789 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1790 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1791 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1792 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1798 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1799 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1800 * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here
1802 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)))
1809 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1810 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1811 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1813 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1816 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1817 /* Allow space for signature algorithm */
1818 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1820 /* Allow space for signature length */
1827 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1831 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1834 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1835 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1836 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
1837 size_t len = strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1838 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1840 * Should not happen - we already checked this when we set
1843 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1844 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1848 memcpy(p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, len);
1856 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1858 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1865 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1866 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1869 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
1871 for (j = 0; j < (nr[0] - nr[2]); ++j) {
1882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1883 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1885 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1886 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1887 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1888 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1890 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1898 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1899 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1900 encodedPoint = NULL;
1908 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1909 * points to the space at the end.
1912 /* send signature algorithm */
1913 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1914 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash_old(p, pkey, md)) {
1915 /* Should never happen */
1916 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1917 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1918 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1924 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1926 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1927 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1928 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1929 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1930 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1931 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
1932 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]),
1933 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
1934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
1935 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1940 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1943 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1944 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1946 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1951 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
1952 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1957 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1960 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1963 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1966 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1968 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1969 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1973 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1975 unsigned char *p, *d;
1976 int i, j, nl, off, n;
1977 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1983 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1985 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1987 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
1992 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1993 const unsigned char *psigs;
1994 unsigned char *etmp = p;
1995 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
1996 /* Skip over length for now */
1998 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs_old(s, p, psigs, nl);
1999 /* Now fill in length */
2009 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2012 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2013 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2014 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2015 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2019 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2021 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2026 /* else no CA names */
2027 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2030 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
2031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2035 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2039 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2043 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2045 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2046 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2048 PACKET psk_identity;
2050 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2051 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2055 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2056 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2057 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2060 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2061 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2066 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2067 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2068 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2072 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2075 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2076 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2077 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2079 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2081 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2083 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2085 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2089 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2090 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2091 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2093 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2094 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2099 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2103 /* Should never happen */
2104 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2110 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2112 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2113 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2115 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2116 size_t j, padding_len;
2117 PACKET enc_premaster;
2119 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2122 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2124 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2129 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2130 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2131 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2133 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2134 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2135 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2142 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2143 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2144 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2145 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2147 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2148 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2149 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2153 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2154 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2155 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2156 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2161 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2162 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2163 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2164 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2165 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2168 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2172 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2173 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2175 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2176 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2177 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2178 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2181 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2184 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2185 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2186 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2188 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2189 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2194 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2195 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2196 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2197 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2198 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2200 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2203 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2204 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2205 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2206 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2207 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2208 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2211 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2212 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2214 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2215 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2218 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2219 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2220 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2221 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2222 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2223 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2226 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2227 unsigned char workaround_good;
2228 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2229 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2231 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2232 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2233 version_good |= workaround_good;
2237 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2238 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2240 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2243 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2244 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2245 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2246 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2248 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2249 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2250 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2251 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2252 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2255 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2256 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2257 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2264 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2267 /* Should never happen */
2268 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2269 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2274 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2276 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2277 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2281 const unsigned char *data;
2282 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2285 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2286 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2288 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2291 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2293 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2294 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2298 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2299 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2300 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2303 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2304 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2305 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2309 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2310 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2314 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2315 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2317 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2319 if (pub_key != NULL)
2324 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2325 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2326 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2331 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2332 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2334 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2337 /* Should never happen */
2338 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2339 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2344 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2347 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2348 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2351 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2352 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2353 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2358 const unsigned char *data;
2361 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2362 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2365 /* Get encoded point length */
2366 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2367 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2368 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2372 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2373 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2377 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2378 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2384 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2385 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2391 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2392 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2394 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2398 /* Should never happen */
2399 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2405 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2409 const unsigned char *data;
2411 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2412 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2413 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2417 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2418 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2421 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2422 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2423 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2426 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2427 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2428 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2433 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2440 /* Should never happen */
2441 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2447 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2449 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2450 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2451 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2452 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2453 const unsigned char *start;
2454 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2455 unsigned long alg_a;
2459 const unsigned char *data;
2462 /* Get our certificate private key */
2463 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2464 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2466 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2468 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2470 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2473 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2475 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2476 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2479 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2480 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2481 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2485 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2486 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2491 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2492 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2493 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2494 * client certificate for authorization only.
2496 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2497 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2498 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2501 /* Decrypt session key */
2502 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2503 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2504 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2508 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2509 &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2510 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2511 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2517 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2518 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2519 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2523 /* Generate master secret */
2524 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2525 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2526 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2530 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2531 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2532 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2533 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2537 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2540 /* Should never happen */
2541 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2547 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2550 unsigned long alg_k;
2552 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2554 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2555 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2558 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2559 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2560 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2561 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2562 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2563 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2566 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2567 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2568 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2572 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2573 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2575 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2576 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2578 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2579 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2581 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2582 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2584 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2585 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2588 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2590 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2594 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2597 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2599 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2600 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2602 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2603 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2606 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2609 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2610 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2611 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2612 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2614 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2617 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2618 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2620 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2621 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2622 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
2624 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2628 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2629 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2634 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2636 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2637 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2639 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2640 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2641 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2642 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2643 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2644 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2645 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2646 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2649 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2653 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
2655 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
2656 * the handshake_buffer
2658 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2659 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2662 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2664 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2665 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2666 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2667 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2671 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2672 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2674 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2675 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2680 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2683 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2685 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2686 const unsigned char *sig, *data;
2687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2688 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
2690 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2694 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2698 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2702 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2706 peer = s->session->peer;
2707 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
2708 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2710 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
2712 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2713 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2717 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2719 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2720 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2722 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2723 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
2724 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2729 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2732 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2733 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2736 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2738 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2740 } else if (rv == 0) {
2741 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2745 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2748 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2749 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
2751 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
2753 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2758 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2760 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2764 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2765 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
2766 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2768 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2771 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2773 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2777 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2778 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2780 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2784 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2786 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2787 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2789 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2792 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2794 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2795 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2796 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2797 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2798 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2800 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2803 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
2809 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2810 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2811 s->session->master_key_length,
2812 s->session->master_key)) {
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2814 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2818 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
2819 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2824 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2827 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2828 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2830 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2831 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2832 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2834 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
2839 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2841 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2843 unsigned long l, llen;
2844 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
2845 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2848 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2853 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
2854 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
2855 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2856 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2861 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
2862 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
2863 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
2864 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2866 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2870 certstart = certbytes;
2871 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
2873 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2876 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
2877 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2879 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2882 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2889 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2890 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2891 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2892 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2894 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2897 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2898 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2899 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2900 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2901 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2902 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2905 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2906 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2911 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2913 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2915 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
2919 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
2920 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2923 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
2925 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2927 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2932 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2933 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2934 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2936 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
2937 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
2939 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
2940 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
2943 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2947 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2948 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2951 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2955 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2959 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2962 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2966 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2968 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2975 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
2977 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
2978 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2979 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2980 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
2981 const unsigned char *const_p;
2982 int len, slen_full, slen;
2985 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2986 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2987 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
2990 /* get session encoding length */
2991 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2993 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
2996 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
2997 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3000 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3002 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3006 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3007 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3010 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3014 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3017 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3020 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3022 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3023 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3024 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3028 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3029 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3032 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3035 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3036 * follows handshake_header_length +
3037 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3038 * sizeof(keyname) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3039 * max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) +
3040 * max_md_size (HMAC) + session_length.
3042 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3043 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 + sizeof(key_name) +
3044 EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3045 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3048 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3050 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3051 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3053 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3054 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3055 int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3059 l2n(0, p); /* timeout */
3060 s2n(0, p); /* length */
3061 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header
3062 (s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s)))
3065 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3066 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3071 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3073 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3075 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3076 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3078 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3079 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3081 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3082 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3083 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3085 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3086 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
3090 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3091 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3092 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3094 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3096 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3098 /* Output key name */
3100 memcpy(p, key_name, sizeof(key_name));
3101 p += sizeof(key_name);
3103 memcpy(p, iv, iv_len);
3105 /* Encrypt session data */
3106 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3109 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len))
3113 if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3115 if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen))
3118 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3119 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3124 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3126 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3127 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3128 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3130 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
3137 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3138 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3139 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3143 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s)
3149 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3150 * follows handshake_header_length +
3151 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3154 msglen = 4 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3155 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + msglen))
3158 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3161 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3162 /* length of OCSP response */
3163 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3164 /* actual response */
3165 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3167 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, msglen))
3173 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3177 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3179 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3180 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3182 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3184 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3185 size_t next_proto_len;
3188 * The payload looks like:
3190 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3191 * uint8 padding_len;
3192 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3194 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3195 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3196 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3201 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
3202 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3206 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3208 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3210 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3211 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3215 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3217 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3218 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3219 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3220 int sslv2format, int *al)
3222 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3223 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3225 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3226 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3228 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3230 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3232 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3234 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3238 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3240 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3241 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3245 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3246 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3249 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3254 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3257 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3258 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3259 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3263 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3265 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3266 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3267 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3269 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3272 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3273 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3274 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3275 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3276 if (s->renegotiate) {
3277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3278 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3279 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3282 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3286 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3287 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3288 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3290 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3291 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3294 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3296 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3297 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3303 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3304 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3306 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3308 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3313 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3314 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3323 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3324 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);