2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/md5.h>
26 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
27 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
30 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
31 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
32 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
33 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
35 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
36 * (transition not allowed)
38 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
40 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
43 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
44 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
45 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
47 switch (st->hand_state) {
51 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
52 if (s->hello_retry_request) {
53 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
54 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
58 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
59 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
60 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
67 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
68 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
69 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
70 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
71 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
75 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
76 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
83 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
84 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
85 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
89 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
90 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
96 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
97 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
98 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
105 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
106 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
108 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
110 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
111 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
117 /* No valid transition found */
122 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
123 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
124 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
125 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
127 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
128 * (transition not allowed)
130 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
132 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
134 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
135 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
140 switch (st->hand_state) {
146 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
147 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
148 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
153 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
155 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
156 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
158 * 2) If we did request one then
159 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
161 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
162 * list if we requested a certificate)
164 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
165 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
166 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
167 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
168 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
170 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
171 * not going to accept it because we require a client
174 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
175 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
176 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
179 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
183 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
186 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
187 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
195 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
196 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
201 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
203 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
204 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
205 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
206 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
207 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
210 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
211 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
213 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
214 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
215 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
216 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
218 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
222 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
223 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
229 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
230 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
231 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
236 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
238 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
239 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
240 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
245 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
246 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
255 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
256 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
257 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
263 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
272 /* No valid transition found */
273 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
274 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
275 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
280 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
282 * Valid return values are:
286 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
288 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
291 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
292 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
293 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
294 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
295 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
298 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
300 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
304 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
305 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
306 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
307 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
308 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
311 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
312 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
322 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
324 * Valid return values are:
328 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
331 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
332 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
334 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
335 * during re-negotiation:
337 && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
338 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
340 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
341 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
344 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
346 * ... except when the application insists on
347 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
350 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
351 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
352 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
354 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
357 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
365 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
366 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
369 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
371 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
374 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
375 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
378 switch (st->hand_state) {
380 /* Shouldn't happen */
381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
382 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
383 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
384 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
387 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
388 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
389 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
391 /* Try to read from the client instead */
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
394 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
395 if (s->hello_retry_request)
396 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
398 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
399 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
401 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
402 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
403 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
405 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
406 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
407 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
409 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
412 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
413 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
414 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
416 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
419 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
420 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
424 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
426 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
427 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
428 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
431 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
432 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
434 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
438 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
440 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
442 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
443 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
445 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
447 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
448 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
450 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
451 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
457 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
458 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
464 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
465 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
466 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
467 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
472 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
473 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
475 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
477 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
480 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
481 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
485 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
487 switch (st->hand_state) {
489 /* Shouldn't happen */
490 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
491 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
492 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
493 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
496 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
497 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
498 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
499 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
500 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
502 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
503 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
504 /* SSLfatal() already called */
505 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
510 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
511 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
513 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
514 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
515 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
517 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
518 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
519 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
520 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
523 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
525 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
526 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
528 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
530 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
531 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
533 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
535 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
536 /* normal PSK or SRP */
537 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
538 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
539 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
540 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
541 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
542 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
543 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
548 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
551 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
552 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
553 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
557 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
558 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
559 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
560 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
564 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
565 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
571 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
572 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
573 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
575 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
576 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
578 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
583 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
585 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
587 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
589 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
593 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
597 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
599 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
601 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
602 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
607 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
608 * the server to the client.
610 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
612 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
614 switch (st->hand_state) {
616 /* No pre work to be done */
619 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
622 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
625 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
627 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
628 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
629 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
634 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
635 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
637 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
638 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
644 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
646 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
647 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
648 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
651 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
653 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
654 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
656 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
657 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
658 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
660 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
662 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
663 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
665 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
666 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
672 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
673 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
674 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
675 /* SSLfatal() already called */
678 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
680 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
681 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
682 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
683 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
687 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
689 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
690 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING)
691 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
695 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
696 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
699 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
703 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
704 * server to the client.
706 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
708 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
712 switch (st->hand_state) {
714 /* No post work to be done */
717 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
718 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
722 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
723 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
725 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
726 /* SSLfatal() already called */
731 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
732 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
734 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
735 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
736 /* SSLfatal() already called */
740 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
741 * treat like it was the first packet
746 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
748 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
749 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
750 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
753 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
756 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
757 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
759 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
760 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
761 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
764 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
765 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
769 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
770 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
774 || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
778 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
780 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
781 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
782 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
783 * something clever in the record layer for this.
785 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
786 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
787 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
788 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
789 /* SSLfatal() already called */
793 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
794 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
795 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
796 /* SSLfatal() already called */
802 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
803 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
805 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
808 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
812 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
813 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
815 /* SSLfatal() already called */
820 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
823 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
824 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
828 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
829 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
832 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
834 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
837 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
841 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
842 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
843 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
844 &s->session->master_key_length)
845 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
846 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
847 /* SSLfatal() already called */
852 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
853 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
855 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
856 /* SSLfatal() already called */
861 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
862 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
867 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
871 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
874 * Valid return values are:
878 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
879 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
881 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
883 switch (st->hand_state) {
885 /* Shouldn't happen */
886 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
887 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
888 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
891 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
893 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
895 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
896 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
899 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
900 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
901 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
904 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
905 /* No construction function needed */
907 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
910 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
911 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
912 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
916 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
917 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
920 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
921 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
922 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
926 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
927 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
928 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
931 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
932 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
933 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
936 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
937 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
938 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
941 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
942 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
943 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
946 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
947 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
948 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
951 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
952 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
953 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
956 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
961 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
962 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
963 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
966 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
967 *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request;
968 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
971 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
972 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
973 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
981 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
982 * calculated as follows:
984 * 2 + # client_version
985 * 32 + # only valid length for random
986 * 1 + # length of session_id
987 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
988 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
989 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
990 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
991 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
992 * 2 + # length of extensions
993 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
995 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
997 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
998 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1001 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1002 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1004 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1006 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1008 switch (st->hand_state) {
1010 /* Shouldn't happen */
1013 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1014 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1016 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1017 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1019 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1020 return s->max_cert_list;
1022 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1023 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1025 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1026 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1029 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1030 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1033 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1034 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1036 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1037 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1039 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1040 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1045 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1047 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1049 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1051 switch (st->hand_state) {
1053 /* Shouldn't happen */
1054 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1055 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1056 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1057 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1059 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1060 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1062 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1063 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1065 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1066 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1068 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1069 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1071 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1072 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1075 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1076 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1079 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1080 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1082 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1083 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1085 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1086 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1092 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1095 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1097 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1099 switch (st->hand_state) {
1101 /* Shouldn't happen */
1102 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1103 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1104 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1107 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1108 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1110 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1111 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1113 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1117 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1118 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1121 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1123 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1124 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1125 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1127 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1130 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1131 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1132 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1135 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1138 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1139 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1140 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1141 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1142 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1151 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1154 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1155 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1156 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1162 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1164 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1165 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1166 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1167 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1168 cookie_leni > 255) {
1169 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1170 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1173 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1175 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1176 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1177 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1178 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1187 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1188 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1189 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1193 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1195 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1196 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1197 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1198 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1200 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1202 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1203 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1204 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1205 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1206 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1207 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1208 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1210 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1211 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1212 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1213 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1214 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1215 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1216 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1217 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1218 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1219 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1220 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1221 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1222 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1224 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1225 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1230 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1232 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1233 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1234 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1238 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1241 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1242 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1244 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1247 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1249 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1251 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1252 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1253 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1254 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello;
1256 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1257 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1258 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1259 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1262 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1263 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1264 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1265 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1273 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1275 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1276 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1278 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1281 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) {
1282 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1283 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1288 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1289 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1290 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1291 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1293 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1294 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1296 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1297 * 7-8 session_id_length
1298 * 9-10 challenge_length
1302 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1303 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1305 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1306 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1307 * in the first place
1309 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1310 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1315 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1317 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1321 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1322 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1324 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1325 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1326 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1328 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1331 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1332 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1333 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1335 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1339 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1340 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1341 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1345 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1347 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1348 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1349 /* No extensions. */
1350 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1351 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1352 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1355 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1357 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1358 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1359 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1360 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1362 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1363 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1364 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1365 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1366 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1367 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1368 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1369 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1370 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1371 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1375 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1377 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1378 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1379 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1380 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1381 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1382 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1384 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1388 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1389 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1391 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1394 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1395 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1396 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1398 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1402 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1403 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1404 * So check cookie length...
1406 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1407 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1408 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1412 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1414 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1418 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1420 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1424 /* Could be empty. */
1425 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1426 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1428 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1429 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1431 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1437 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1438 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1439 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1440 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1441 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1445 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1446 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1447 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1448 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1449 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1450 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1453 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1455 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1458 if (clienthello != NULL)
1459 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1460 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1462 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1465 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1468 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1473 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1475 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1476 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1477 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1478 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1479 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1481 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1482 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1483 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1484 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1485 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1486 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1488 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1489 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1491 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1494 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1495 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1500 /* Set up the client_random */
1501 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1503 /* Choose the version */
1505 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1506 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1507 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1508 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1510 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1513 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1514 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1515 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1519 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1522 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1523 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1525 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1526 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1527 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1528 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1529 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1535 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1536 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1537 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1539 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1540 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1544 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1545 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1546 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1547 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1548 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1552 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1553 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1554 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1555 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1556 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1557 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1558 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1559 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1560 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1562 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1564 /* default verification */
1565 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1566 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1567 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1568 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1569 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1570 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1573 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1575 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1576 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1577 if (protverr != 0) {
1578 s->version = s->client_version;
1579 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1580 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1588 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1589 clienthello->isv2) ||
1590 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1591 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1592 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1596 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1597 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1598 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1599 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1600 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1601 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1602 if (s->renegotiate) {
1603 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1604 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1605 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1606 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1609 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1610 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1611 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1613 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1614 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1615 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1616 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1617 * an insecure downgrade.
1619 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1620 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1621 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1627 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1628 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1629 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1630 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1632 if (cipher == NULL) {
1633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1634 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1635 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1638 if (s->hello_retry_request
1639 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1640 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1642 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1643 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1645 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1646 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1650 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1653 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1654 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1655 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1656 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1657 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1662 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1663 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1665 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1666 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1667 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1668 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1669 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1670 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1671 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1672 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1673 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1674 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1677 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1679 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1680 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1681 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1685 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1687 /* previous session */
1689 } else if (i == -1) {
1690 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1694 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1695 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1701 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1702 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1703 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1704 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1708 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1709 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1711 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1713 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1716 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1718 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1719 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1721 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1722 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1731 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1734 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1735 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1736 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1741 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1742 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1746 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1748 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1749 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1750 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1755 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1756 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1757 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1759 /* TLS extensions */
1760 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1761 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1762 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1767 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1768 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1769 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1770 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1774 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1775 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1776 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1777 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1778 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1784 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1787 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1788 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1790 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1791 * backwards compat reasons
1793 int master_key_length;
1795 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1796 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1797 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1799 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1800 && master_key_length > 0) {
1801 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1803 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1804 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1808 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1809 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1810 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1811 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1812 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1813 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1814 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1815 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1819 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1820 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1821 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1822 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1823 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1828 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1829 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1830 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1832 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1833 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1835 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1836 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1837 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1839 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1840 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1841 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1842 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1847 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1848 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1849 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1851 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1852 /* Can't disable compression */
1853 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1854 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1855 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1856 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1859 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1860 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1861 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1862 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1863 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1867 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1868 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1869 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1870 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1873 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1874 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1875 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1878 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1880 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1881 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1884 } else if (s->hit) {
1886 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1887 /* See if we have a match */
1888 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1891 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1892 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1893 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1895 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1896 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1905 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1911 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1912 * using compression.
1914 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1915 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1916 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1917 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1923 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1926 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1927 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1928 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1929 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1931 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1932 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1939 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1940 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1942 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1944 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1945 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1950 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1951 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1952 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1953 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1954 s->clienthello = NULL;
1957 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1958 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1959 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1960 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1961 s->clienthello = NULL;
1967 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1968 * Upon failure, returns 0.
1970 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
1972 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1975 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1976 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1977 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1978 * influence which certificate is sent
1980 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
1981 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
1984 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1985 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
1987 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1988 * et al can pick it up.
1990 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
1991 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
1993 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1994 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1995 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1997 /* status request response should be sent */
1998 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1999 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2000 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2002 /* something bad happened */
2003 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2006 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2007 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2017 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2018 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2020 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2022 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2023 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2025 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2026 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2027 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
2028 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
2029 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2031 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2032 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2033 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2034 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2035 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2036 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2039 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2041 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2042 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
2045 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2046 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2047 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2048 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2049 selected_len) != 0) {
2050 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2051 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2054 /* If a new session update it with the new ALPN value */
2055 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2057 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2059 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2060 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2063 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2068 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2069 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2070 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2074 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2079 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2080 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2081 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2082 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2088 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2090 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2092 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2093 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2095 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2102 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2103 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2104 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2105 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2106 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2109 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2110 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2114 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2117 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2120 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2121 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2123 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2125 if (cipher == NULL) {
2126 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2127 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2128 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2131 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2134 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2135 /* SSLfatal already called */
2138 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2139 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2140 s->session->not_resumable =
2141 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2142 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2143 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2144 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2145 /* do not send a session ticket */
2146 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2149 /* Session-id reuse */
2150 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2154 * we now have the following setup.
2156 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2157 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2158 * compression - basically ignored right now
2159 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2160 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2161 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2162 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2166 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2167 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2169 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2170 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2174 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2175 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2176 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2177 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2179 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2180 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2187 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2189 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2191 * callback indicates further work to be done
2193 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2197 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2203 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2208 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2213 unsigned char *session_id;
2215 version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2216 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2218 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2219 * tls_process_client_hello()
2221 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2223 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2228 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2229 * back in the server hello:
2230 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2231 * we send back the old session ID.
2232 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2233 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2234 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2235 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2237 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2238 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2239 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2241 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2242 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2245 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2246 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2248 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2250 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2251 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2252 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2254 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2255 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2258 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2260 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2264 /* set up the compression method */
2265 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2268 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2271 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2274 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2275 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2276 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)
2277 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2279 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2280 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
2282 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2286 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2287 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2288 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2295 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2297 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2298 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2299 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2306 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2308 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2309 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2312 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2313 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2316 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2320 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2321 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2322 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2324 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2325 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2326 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2330 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2331 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2332 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2336 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2338 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2340 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2341 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2343 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2345 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2346 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2348 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2351 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2352 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2353 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2354 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2356 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2357 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2358 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2361 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2364 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2366 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2367 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2368 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2370 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2371 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2372 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2377 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2379 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2380 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2383 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2384 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2386 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2387 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2390 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2392 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2393 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2397 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2398 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2399 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2403 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2405 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2408 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2409 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2413 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2415 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2417 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2418 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2422 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2423 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2424 if (curve_id == 0) {
2425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2426 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2427 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2430 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2431 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2432 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2433 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2437 /* Encode the public key. */
2438 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2440 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2441 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2442 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2447 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2448 * can set these to NULLs
2455 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2457 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2458 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2459 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2460 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2462 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2463 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2466 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2467 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2468 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2469 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2474 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2475 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2479 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2480 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2482 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2483 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2484 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2489 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2490 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2491 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2494 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2495 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2497 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2498 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2500 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2501 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2502 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2508 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2509 unsigned char *binval;
2512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2513 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2514 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2517 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2521 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2522 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2526 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2528 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2529 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2532 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2533 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2536 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2538 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2539 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2542 memset(binval, 0, len);
2546 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2547 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2548 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2549 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2550 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2554 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2558 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2560 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2561 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2562 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2565 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2566 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2567 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2568 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2569 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2570 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2571 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2574 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2575 encodedPoint = NULL;
2581 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2583 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2584 size_t siglen, tbslen;
2587 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2588 /* Should never happen */
2589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2590 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2591 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2595 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2596 * points to the space at the end.
2599 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2600 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2601 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2602 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2603 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2606 /* send signature algorithm */
2607 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2609 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2610 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2614 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2615 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2616 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2619 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2620 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2621 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2622 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2623 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2624 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2627 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2628 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2629 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2631 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2636 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2637 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2640 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2643 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
2645 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2646 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2647 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2648 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2649 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2654 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2658 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2661 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2663 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2667 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2669 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2670 /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */
2671 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2672 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2673 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2674 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2678 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2679 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2681 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2687 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2688 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2689 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2690 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2691 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2695 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2696 const uint16_t *psigs;
2697 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2699 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2700 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2701 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2702 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2704 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2705 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2710 if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2711 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2716 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2720 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2722 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2723 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2725 PACKET psk_identity;
2727 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2729 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2732 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2733 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2734 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2737 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2738 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2739 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2743 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2744 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2745 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2749 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2752 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2753 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2754 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2756 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2758 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2761 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2762 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2766 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2767 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2768 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2770 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2771 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2772 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2776 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2780 /* Should never happen */
2781 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2782 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2787 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2790 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2792 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2793 size_t j, padding_len;
2794 PACKET enc_premaster;
2796 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2799 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2801 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2802 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2806 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2807 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2808 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2810 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2811 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2813 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2819 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2820 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2821 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2822 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2824 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2826 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2830 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2831 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2832 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2833 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2838 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2839 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2840 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2841 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2842 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2845 if (ssl_randbytes(s, rand_premaster_secret,
2846 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2848 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2853 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2854 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2856 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2857 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2858 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2859 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2860 if (decrypt_len < 0) {
2861 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2862 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2866 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2869 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2870 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2871 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2873 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2874 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2875 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2879 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2880 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2881 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2882 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2883 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2885 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2888 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2889 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2890 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2891 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2892 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2893 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2896 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2897 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2899 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2900 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2903 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2904 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2905 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2906 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2907 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2908 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2911 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2912 unsigned char workaround_good;
2913 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2914 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2916 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2917 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2918 version_good |= workaround_good;
2922 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2923 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2925 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2928 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2929 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2930 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2931 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2933 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2934 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2935 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2936 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2937 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2940 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2941 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2942 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2948 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2951 /* Should never happen */
2952 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2953 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2958 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2961 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2965 const unsigned char *data;
2966 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2969 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2970 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2971 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2974 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2976 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2977 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2981 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2982 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2983 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2986 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2987 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2988 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2989 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2992 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2993 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2998 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2999 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3001 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3003 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3004 if (pub_key != NULL)
3009 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3010 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3015 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3016 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3018 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3021 /* Should never happen */
3022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3023 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3028 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3031 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3032 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3035 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3036 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3037 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3038 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3042 const unsigned char *data;
3045 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3046 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3049 /* Get encoded point length */
3050 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3051 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3052 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3053 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3056 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3057 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3062 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3063 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3069 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3070 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3075 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3076 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3078 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3082 /* Should never happen */
3083 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3084 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3089 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3093 const unsigned char *data;
3095 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3096 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3097 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3098 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3101 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3102 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3106 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3107 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3108 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3111 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3112 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3113 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3114 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3115 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3119 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3120 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3126 /* Should never happen */
3127 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3128 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3133 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3136 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3137 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3138 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3139 const unsigned char *start;
3140 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3141 unsigned long alg_a;
3144 size_t sess_key_len;
3145 const unsigned char *data;
3148 /* Get our certificate private key */
3149 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3150 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3152 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3154 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3156 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3159 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3161 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3162 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3165 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3166 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3167 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3168 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3171 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3172 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3173 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3177 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3178 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3179 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3180 * client certificate for authorization only.
3182 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3183 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3184 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3187 /* Decrypt session key */
3188 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3189 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
3190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3194 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3195 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
3196 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
3197 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
3198 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3199 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3204 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3207 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3210 /* Generate master secret */
3211 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3212 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3213 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3216 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3217 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3219 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3223 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3226 /* Should never happen */
3227 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3228 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3233 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3235 unsigned long alg_k;
3237 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3239 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3240 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3241 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3245 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3246 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3247 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3249 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3250 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3253 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3254 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3255 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3258 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3259 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3260 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3263 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3264 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3265 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3268 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3269 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3270 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3273 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3274 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3275 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3278 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3279 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3280 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3284 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3285 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3286 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3290 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3293 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3294 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3296 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3299 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3302 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3303 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3304 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3305 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3307 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3310 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3311 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3313 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3314 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3315 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3318 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3319 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3323 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3324 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3329 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3331 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3332 * the handshake_buffer
3334 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3335 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3338 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3340 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3342 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3347 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3348 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3350 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3351 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3356 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3359 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3362 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3364 unsigned long l, llen;
3365 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3366 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3367 PACKET spkt, context;
3370 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3371 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3372 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3376 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3377 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
3378 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3379 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3380 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3382 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3386 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3387 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3388 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3390 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3391 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3395 certstart = certbytes;
3396 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3399 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3402 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3404 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3405 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3409 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3410 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3413 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3414 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3415 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3419 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3420 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3421 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3422 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3423 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3424 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3425 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3428 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3431 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3433 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3434 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3440 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3441 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3442 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3443 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3444 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3445 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3448 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3449 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3450 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3451 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3452 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3453 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3456 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3457 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3458 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3463 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3465 SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result),
3466 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3467 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3472 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3475 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3477 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3478 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3479 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3484 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3485 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3486 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3488 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3489 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3492 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3495 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3496 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3501 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3502 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3506 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3508 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3509 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3510 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3511 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3515 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3519 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3523 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3525 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3528 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3529 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3534 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3535 * for the server Certificate message
3537 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3539 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3542 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3543 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3550 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3552 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3553 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3554 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3555 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3556 const unsigned char *const_p;
3557 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3560 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3561 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3562 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3564 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3566 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3570 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3571 if (ssl_randbytes(s, age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
3572 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3573 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3574 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3577 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3579 * ticket_nonce is set to a single 0 byte because we only ever send a
3580 * single ticket per connection. IMPORTANT: If we ever support multiple
3581 * tickets per connection then this will need to be changed.
3583 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick_nonce);
3584 s->session->ext.tick_nonce = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(char));
3585 if (s->session->ext.tick_nonce == NULL) {
3586 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3587 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3588 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3591 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len = 1;
3592 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
3593 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
3594 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
3595 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
3596 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
3597 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
3598 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3599 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3600 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3603 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
3605 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
3608 /* get session encoding length */
3609 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3611 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3614 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3615 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3616 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3619 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3622 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3626 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3627 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3628 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3629 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3630 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3635 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3637 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3642 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3645 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3647 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3648 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3651 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3653 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3654 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3655 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3656 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3657 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3658 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3662 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3663 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3664 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3665 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3668 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3671 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3672 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3674 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3675 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3676 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3681 /* Put timeout and length */
3682 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3683 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3685 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3686 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3690 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3691 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3695 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3696 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3697 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3700 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3702 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3704 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3705 if (ssl_randbytes(s, iv, iv_len) <= 0
3706 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3707 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv)
3708 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
3709 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
3710 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
3711 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3712 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3713 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3716 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3717 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3721 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3722 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3723 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3726 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3727 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3728 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3730 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add)
3731 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
3732 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
3733 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3734 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3735 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3736 /* Output key name */
3737 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3739 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3740 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3742 /* Encrypt session data */
3743 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3744 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3745 || encdata1 != encdata2
3746 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3747 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3748 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3749 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3750 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3751 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3752 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3753 macendoffset - macoffset)
3754 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3755 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3756 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3757 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3758 || macdata1 != macdata2
3759 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3761 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3765 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3766 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3768 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3771 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3772 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3778 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3779 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3784 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3785 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3787 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3789 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3790 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3791 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3792 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
3793 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3800 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3802 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3803 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3810 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3812 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3813 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3815 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3817 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3818 size_t next_proto_len;
3821 * The payload looks like:
3823 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3824 * uint8 padding_len;
3825 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3827 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3828 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3829 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
3831 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3832 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3835 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
3837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
3838 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3839 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3842 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3844 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3848 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3850 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3852 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3859 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3864 * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
3865 * (should be s->version)
3867 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
3868 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt,
3870 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3871 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3875 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
3877 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3881 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
3882 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3887 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
3888 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
3890 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
3891 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3898 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3900 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3901 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3902 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3903 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3906 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
3907 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
3908 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3909 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3910 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3914 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
3915 * a record boundary.
3917 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
3918 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
3919 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3920 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
3921 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3924 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
3925 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3926 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
3927 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3928 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3931 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;