2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
65 PACKET *cipher_suites,
67 **skp, int sslv2format,
71 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
72 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
73 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
74 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
76 * Valid return values are:
77 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
78 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
80 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
82 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
84 switch (st->hand_state) {
89 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
90 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
91 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
96 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
98 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
99 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
101 * 2) If we did request one then
102 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
104 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
105 * list if we requested a certificate)
107 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
108 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
109 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
110 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
111 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
113 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
114 * not going to accept it because we require a client
117 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
118 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
119 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
120 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
130 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
131 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
132 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
139 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
140 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
145 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
147 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
148 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
149 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
150 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
151 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
154 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
157 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
158 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
159 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
160 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
173 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
174 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
175 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
180 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
182 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
183 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
184 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
189 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
190 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
199 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
200 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
201 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
207 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
208 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
215 /* No valid transition found */
216 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
217 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
222 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
224 * Valid return values are:
228 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
230 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
233 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
234 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
235 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
236 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
237 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
240 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
242 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
246 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
247 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
248 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
249 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
250 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
253 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
254 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
264 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
266 * Valid return values are:
270 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
273 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
274 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
276 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
277 * during re-negotiation:
279 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
280 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
282 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
283 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
286 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
288 * ... except when the application insists on
289 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
292 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
293 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
294 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
296 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
299 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
307 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
308 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
310 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
312 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
314 switch (st->hand_state) {
316 /* Shouldn't happen */
317 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
320 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
321 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
324 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
326 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
328 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
330 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
331 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
333 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
334 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
335 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
336 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
339 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
341 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
342 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
344 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
346 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
347 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
351 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
352 /* normal PSK or SRP */
353 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
354 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
356 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
357 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
358 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
359 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
361 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
364 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
367 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
368 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
369 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
373 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
374 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
375 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
376 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
380 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
381 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
382 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
383 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
387 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
388 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
389 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
391 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
394 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
396 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
397 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
398 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
399 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
400 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
402 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
407 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
410 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
411 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
412 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
414 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
416 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
419 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
420 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
426 * the server to the client.
428 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
430 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
432 switch (st->hand_state) {
434 /* No pre work to be done */
437 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
440 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
443 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
445 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
446 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
447 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
452 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
453 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
455 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
456 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
462 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
464 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
465 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
467 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
469 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
470 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
472 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
473 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
479 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
480 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
481 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
482 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
485 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
487 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
488 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
489 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
490 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
494 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
497 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
500 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
504 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
505 * server to the client.
507 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
509 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
513 switch (st->hand_state) {
515 /* No post work to be done */
518 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
519 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
521 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
522 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
527 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
528 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
530 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
531 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
532 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
536 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
537 * treat like it was the first packet
542 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
544 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
545 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
546 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
549 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
552 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
553 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
555 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
556 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
557 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
559 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
563 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
564 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
569 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
571 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
573 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
576 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
580 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
581 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
583 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
588 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
591 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
592 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
596 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
597 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
600 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
602 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
605 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
612 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
616 * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
618 * Valid return values are:
622 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s)
624 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
626 switch (st->hand_state) {
628 /* Shouldn't happen */
631 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
632 return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s);
634 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
635 return tls_construct_hello_request(s);
637 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
638 return tls_construct_server_hello(s);
641 return tls_construct_server_certificate(s);
643 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
644 return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
646 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
647 return tls_construct_certificate_request(s);
649 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
650 return tls_construct_server_done(s);
652 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
653 return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s);
655 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
656 return tls_construct_cert_status(s);
658 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
660 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
662 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
664 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
665 return tls_construct_finished(s,
667 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
669 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
674 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
675 * calculated as follows:
677 * 2 + # client_version
678 * 32 + # only valid length for random
679 * 1 + # length of session_id
680 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
681 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
682 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
683 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
684 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
685 * 2 + # length of extensions
686 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
688 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
690 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
691 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
694 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
695 * reading. Excludes the message header.
697 unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
699 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
701 switch (st->hand_state) {
703 /* Shouldn't happen */
706 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
707 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
710 return s->max_cert_list;
712 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
713 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
715 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
716 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
719 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
720 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
723 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
724 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
726 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
727 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
732 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
734 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
736 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
738 switch (st->hand_state) {
740 /* Shouldn't happen */
741 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
743 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
744 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
747 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
749 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
750 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
752 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
753 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
756 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
757 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
760 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
761 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
763 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
764 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
769 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
772 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
774 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
776 switch (st->hand_state) {
778 /* Shouldn't happen */
781 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
782 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
784 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
785 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
787 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
789 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
790 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
791 /* Are we renegotiating? */
792 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
793 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
794 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
795 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
796 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
797 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
800 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
803 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
809 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
811 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
813 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
815 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
816 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
817 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
819 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
823 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
825 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
832 int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s)
836 if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf)
837 || !ssl_set_handshake_header2(s, &pkt, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
838 || !ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt)) {
839 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
840 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
841 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
848 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
849 unsigned char cookie_len)
851 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
852 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
853 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
859 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
864 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
865 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
866 &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
867 s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
869 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
870 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
874 if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf)
875 || !ssl_set_handshake_header2(s, &pkt,
876 DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
877 || !dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&pkt, s->d1->cookie,
880 * We don't call close_construct_packet() because we don't want
881 * to buffer this message
883 || !WPACKET_close(&pkt)
884 || !WPACKET_get_length(&pkt, &msglen)
885 || !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
886 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
887 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
888 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
892 /* number of bytes to write */
893 s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len = msglen - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
894 s->d1->w_msg_hdr.frag_len = msglen - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
895 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
901 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
903 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
904 unsigned int j, complen = 0;
907 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
908 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
910 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
912 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
913 PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
915 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
917 is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
919 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
920 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
922 unsigned int version;
925 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
926 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
927 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
928 * the rest right through. Its format is:
930 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
931 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
933 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
934 * 7-8 session_id_length
935 * 9-10 challenge_length
939 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
940 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
942 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
943 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
946 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
950 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
951 /* No protocol version supplied! */
952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
955 if (version == 0x0002) {
956 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
957 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
959 } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
961 s->client_version = version;
963 /* No idea what protocol this is */
964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
969 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
970 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
972 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
973 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
980 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
981 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
983 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
984 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
985 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
986 DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) {
987 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
994 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
996 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
999 s->version = s->client_version;
1001 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1005 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1008 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1009 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1010 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1012 unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1015 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
1016 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1017 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1018 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1019 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1020 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1024 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1025 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1030 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
1031 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
1032 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1033 /* No extensions. */
1034 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1036 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1037 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1041 /* Load the client random and compression list. */
1042 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
1044 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1045 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1046 s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1047 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1048 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1049 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1050 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1051 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1055 PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
1057 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1058 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1059 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1060 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1065 if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1066 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1071 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1072 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1073 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1074 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1078 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1079 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1080 * So check cookie length...
1082 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1083 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
1088 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
1089 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1090 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1094 /* Could be empty. */
1098 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1099 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1100 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1101 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1102 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
1103 PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) ==
1105 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1107 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1109 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1111 /* default verification */
1112 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1113 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1117 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1119 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1120 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
1121 if (protverr != 0) {
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1123 s->version = s->client_version;
1124 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1133 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1134 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1136 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1137 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1138 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1139 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1140 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1141 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1142 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1143 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1144 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1145 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1150 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1151 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1154 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
1156 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1158 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1159 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1160 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1161 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1162 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1164 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1165 /* previous session */
1167 } else if (i == -1) {
1171 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1176 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
1177 is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
1181 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1184 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1187 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1189 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1190 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1192 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1193 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1202 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1205 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1207 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1212 complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
1213 for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
1214 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
1220 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1225 /* TLS extensions */
1226 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1227 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1234 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1235 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1236 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1237 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1241 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1242 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1247 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1248 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1250 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1251 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1252 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1254 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1256 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1257 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1261 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1263 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1268 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1269 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1270 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1274 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1275 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1276 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1277 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1278 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1283 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1284 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1285 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1287 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1289 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1290 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1291 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1293 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1294 /* Can't disable compression */
1295 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1296 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1297 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1300 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1301 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1302 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1303 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1304 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1308 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1310 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1313 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1314 for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
1315 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
1319 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1321 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1326 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1327 /* See if we have a match */
1328 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1331 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1332 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1333 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1335 for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
1336 if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
1345 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1351 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1352 * using compression.
1354 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1361 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1365 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1366 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1368 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1370 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1371 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1372 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1373 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1378 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1384 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1385 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1387 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1389 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1391 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1392 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1396 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1398 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1399 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1401 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1403 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1404 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1405 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1407 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1409 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1413 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1416 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1419 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1421 if (cipher == NULL) {
1422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1423 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1426 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1427 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1428 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1429 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1430 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1431 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1432 /* do not send a session ticket */
1433 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1435 /* Session-id reuse */
1436 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1439 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1440 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1441 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1447 * we now have the following setup.
1449 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1450 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1451 * compression - basically ignored right now
1452 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1453 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1454 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1455 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1458 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1459 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1460 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
1461 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1462 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1470 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1472 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1474 * callback indicates further work to be done
1476 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1479 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1481 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1482 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1484 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1486 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1493 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1495 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1496 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1500 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s)
1502 int sl, compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1506 if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf)
1507 || !ssl_set_handshake_header2(s, &pkt, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
1508 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&pkt, s->version)
1510 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1511 * tls_process_client_hello()
1513 || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1519 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1520 * back in the server hello:
1521 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1522 * we send back the old session ID.
1523 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1524 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1525 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1526 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1528 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1529 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1530 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1531 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1534 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1535 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1537 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1539 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1540 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1545 /* set up the compression method */
1546 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1549 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1552 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1555 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&pkt, s->session->session_id, sl)
1556 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &pkt, &len)
1557 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&pkt, compm)
1558 || !ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s)
1559 || !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, &pkt, &al)
1560 || !ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt)) {
1561 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1567 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
1568 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1569 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1573 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s)
1575 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
1576 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1577 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1581 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1582 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1583 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1590 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1593 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1596 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1601 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1602 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
1605 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1607 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
1609 if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf)
1610 || !ssl_set_handshake_header2(s, &pkt,
1611 SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
1612 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, ¶moffset)) {
1613 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1617 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1618 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1622 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1624 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1626 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1627 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1629 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1631 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1632 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1634 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
1637 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1638 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1639 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
1640 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1643 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1646 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
1649 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1651 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1652 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
1653 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1656 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1661 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
1662 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1663 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1664 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1667 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1668 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
1669 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1671 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1674 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1676 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1680 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
1682 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1687 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1689 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1692 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
1693 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
1696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1697 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1700 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1702 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1706 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1707 nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1708 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
1709 if (curve_id == 0) {
1710 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1711 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1714 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1715 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1716 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1717 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1721 /* Encode the public key. */
1722 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
1724 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1730 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1731 * can set these to NULLs
1738 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1740 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1741 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1742 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1743 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1745 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1748 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1749 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1750 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1751 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1755 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1757 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1761 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1762 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1763 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1765 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1773 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1774 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
1775 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1778 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
1779 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
1781 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
1782 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
1784 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1785 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1791 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1792 unsigned char *binval;
1795 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1796 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1797 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(&pkt);
1800 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&pkt);
1803 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1804 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1810 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1811 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1814 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
1815 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
1817 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt, len, &binval)) {
1818 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1819 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1822 memset(binval, 0, len);
1826 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
1827 || !WPACKET_close(&pkt)) {
1828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1829 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1833 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
1836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1837 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1839 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
1840 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1841 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
1844 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
1845 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&pkt, 0)
1846 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&pkt, curve_id)
1847 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
1848 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1849 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1852 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1853 encodedPoint = NULL;
1860 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1861 * points to the space at the end.
1864 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
1865 unsigned int siglen;
1867 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
1868 if (!WPACKET_get_length(&pkt, ¶mlen)) {
1869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1870 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1873 /* send signature algorithm */
1874 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1875 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(&pkt, pkey, md)) {
1876 /* Should never happen */
1877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1878 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1883 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1886 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
1887 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
1888 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
1891 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(&pkt, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey),
1893 || EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1894 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1895 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1896 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1897 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1898 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
1900 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, pkey) <= 0
1901 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(&pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
1902 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
1903 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1904 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1908 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1909 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1911 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1916 if (!ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt)) {
1917 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1921 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1924 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1927 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1930 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1932 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1933 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1934 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
1938 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1941 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1944 if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf)
1945 || !ssl_set_handshake_header2(s, &pkt,
1946 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)) {
1947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1952 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1953 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(&pkt)
1954 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, &pkt)
1955 || !WPACKET_close(&pkt)) {
1956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1960 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1961 const unsigned char *psigs;
1962 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
1963 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&pkt)
1964 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, &pkt, psigs, nl)
1965 || !WPACKET_close(&pkt)) {
1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1967 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1972 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
1973 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&pkt)) {
1974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1978 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1980 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
1981 unsigned char *namebytes;
1982 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
1986 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
1987 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(&pkt, namelen,
1989 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1991 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1996 /* else no CA names */
1998 if (!WPACKET_close(&pkt)
1999 || !ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt)) {
2000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2004 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2008 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
2009 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2010 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2014 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2017 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2019 PACKET psk_identity;
2021 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2022 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2026 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2027 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2031 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2032 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2037 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2038 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2043 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2046 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2047 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2050 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2052 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2054 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2056 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2060 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2061 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2062 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2064 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2065 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2070 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2074 /* Should never happen */
2075 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2081 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2084 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2086 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2087 size_t j, padding_len;
2088 PACKET enc_premaster;
2090 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2093 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2095 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2100 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2101 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2102 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2104 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2105 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2106 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2113 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2114 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2115 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2116 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2118 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2119 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2124 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2125 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2126 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2127 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2132 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2133 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2134 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2135 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2136 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2139 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2143 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2144 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2146 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2147 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2148 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2149 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2152 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2155 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2156 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2157 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2159 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2160 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2165 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2166 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2167 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2168 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2169 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2171 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2174 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2175 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2176 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2177 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2178 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2179 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2182 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2183 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2185 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2186 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2189 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2190 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2191 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2192 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2193 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2194 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2197 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2198 unsigned char workaround_good;
2199 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2200 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2202 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2203 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2204 version_good |= workaround_good;
2208 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2209 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2211 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2214 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2215 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2216 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2217 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2219 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2220 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2221 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2222 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2223 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2226 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2227 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2228 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2235 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2238 /* Should never happen */
2239 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2240 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2245 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2248 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2252 const unsigned char *data;
2253 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2256 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2257 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2259 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2262 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2264 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2269 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2270 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2271 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2274 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2275 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2276 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2280 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2281 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2285 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2286 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2288 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2289 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2290 if (pub_key != NULL)
2295 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2296 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2302 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2303 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2305 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2308 /* Should never happen */
2309 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2310 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2315 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2318 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2319 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2322 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2323 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2324 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2325 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2329 const unsigned char *data;
2332 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2333 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2336 /* Get encoded point length */
2337 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2338 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2339 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2340 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2343 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2344 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2348 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2349 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2355 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2356 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2362 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2363 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2365 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2369 /* Should never happen */
2370 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2376 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2380 const unsigned char *data;
2382 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2383 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2384 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2388 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2392 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2393 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2397 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2398 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2399 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2404 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2405 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2411 /* Should never happen */
2412 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2418 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2421 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2422 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2423 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2424 const unsigned char *start;
2425 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2426 unsigned long alg_a;
2430 const unsigned char *data;
2433 /* Get our certificate private key */
2434 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2435 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2437 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2439 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2441 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2444 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2446 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2447 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2450 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2451 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2452 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2456 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2457 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2462 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2463 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2464 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2465 * client certificate for authorization only.
2467 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2468 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2469 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2472 /* Decrypt session key */
2473 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2474 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2475 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2476 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2479 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2480 &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2481 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2482 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2483 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2488 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2489 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2490 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2491 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2494 /* Generate master secret */
2495 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2496 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2497 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2498 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2501 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2502 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2503 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2504 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2508 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2511 /* Should never happen */
2512 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2518 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2521 unsigned long alg_k;
2523 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2525 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2526 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2529 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2530 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2531 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2532 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2533 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2534 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2537 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2538 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2539 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2543 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2544 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2546 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2547 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2549 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2550 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2552 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2553 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2555 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2556 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2559 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2560 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2561 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2565 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2568 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2569 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2570 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2571 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2573 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2574 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2577 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2580 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2581 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2582 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2583 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2585 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2588 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2589 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2591 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2592 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2593 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
2595 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2599 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2600 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2605 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2607 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2608 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2610 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2611 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2612 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2613 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2614 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2615 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2616 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2617 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2620 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2624 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
2626 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
2627 * the handshake_buffer
2629 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2630 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2633 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2635 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2637 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2638 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2642 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2643 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2645 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2646 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2651 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2654 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2656 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2657 const unsigned char *sig, *data;
2658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2659 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
2661 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2665 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2669 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2673 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2677 peer = s->session->peer;
2678 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
2679 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2681 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
2683 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2684 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2688 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2690 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2691 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2694 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
2695 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2700 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2703 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2704 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2707 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2709 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2711 } else if (rv == 0) {
2712 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2716 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2719 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2720 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
2722 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
2724 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2729 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
2730 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2731 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2735 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2736 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
2737 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2739 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2742 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2744 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2748 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2749 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2751 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2755 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2757 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2758 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2760 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2765 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2766 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2767 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2768 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2769 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
2770 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2771 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2774 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
2780 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2781 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2782 s->session->master_key_length,
2783 s->session->master_key)) {
2784 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2785 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2789 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
2790 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2795 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2798 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2799 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2801 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2802 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2803 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2805 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
2810 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2812 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2814 unsigned long l, llen;
2815 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
2816 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2819 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2824 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
2825 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
2826 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2827 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2832 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
2833 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
2834 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
2835 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2837 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2841 certstart = certbytes;
2842 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2847 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
2848 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2850 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2853 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2854 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2860 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2861 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2862 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2863 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2865 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2868 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2869 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2870 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2871 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2872 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2873 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2876 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2877 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2882 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2884 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2885 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2886 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
2890 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
2891 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2894 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
2896 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2898 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2903 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2904 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2905 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2907 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
2908 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
2910 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
2911 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
2914 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2918 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2919 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2922 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2926 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2930 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2933 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2937 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
2938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2939 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2946 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
2948 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
2949 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2950 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2951 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
2952 const unsigned char *const_p;
2953 int len, slen_full, slen;
2956 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2957 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2958 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
2961 /* get session encoding length */
2962 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2964 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
2967 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
2968 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2971 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
2973 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2977 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2978 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2981 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
2985 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
2988 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
2991 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
2993 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
2994 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
2995 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2999 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3000 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3003 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3006 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3007 * follows handshake_header_length +
3008 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3009 * sizeof(keyname) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3010 * max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) +
3011 * max_md_size (HMAC) + session_length.
3013 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3014 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 + sizeof(key_name) +
3015 EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3016 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3019 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3021 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3022 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3024 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3025 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3026 int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3030 l2n(0, p); /* timeout */
3031 s2n(0, p); /* length */
3032 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header
3033 (s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s)))
3036 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3037 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3042 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3044 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3046 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3047 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3049 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3050 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3052 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3053 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3054 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3056 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3057 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
3061 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3062 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3063 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3065 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3067 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3069 /* Output key name */
3071 memcpy(p, key_name, sizeof(key_name));
3072 p += sizeof(key_name);
3074 memcpy(p, iv, iv_len);
3076 /* Encrypt session data */
3077 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3080 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len))
3084 if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3086 if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen))
3089 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3090 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3095 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3097 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3098 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3099 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3101 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
3108 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3109 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3110 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3114 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s)
3120 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3121 * follows handshake_header_length +
3122 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3125 msglen = 4 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3126 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + msglen))
3129 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3132 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3133 /* length of OCSP response */
3134 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3135 /* actual response */
3136 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3138 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, msglen))
3144 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3150 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3151 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3153 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3155 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3156 size_t next_proto_len;
3159 * The payload looks like:
3161 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3162 * uint8 padding_len;
3163 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3165 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3166 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3167 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3172 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
3173 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3177 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3179 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3181 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3182 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3186 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3188 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3189 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3190 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3191 int sslv2format, int *al)
3193 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3194 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3196 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3197 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3199 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3201 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3203 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3205 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3209 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3211 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3212 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3216 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3217 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3220 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3225 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3228 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3229 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3230 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3234 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3236 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3237 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3238 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3240 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3243 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3244 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3245 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3246 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3247 if (s->renegotiate) {
3248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3249 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3250 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3253 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3257 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3258 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3259 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3261 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3262 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3265 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3267 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3268 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3274 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3275 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3277 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3279 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3284 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3285 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3294 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3295 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);