2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include <openssl/dh.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
27 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
29 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
32 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
33 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
34 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
35 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
37 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
38 * (transition not allowed)
40 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
42 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
45 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
46 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
47 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
49 switch (st->hand_state) {
53 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
54 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
55 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
56 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
60 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
61 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
62 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
69 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
70 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
71 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
72 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
73 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
77 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
78 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
85 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
86 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
87 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
91 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
92 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
98 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
99 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
100 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
107 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
108 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
110 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
113 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
114 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
126 /* No valid transition found */
131 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
132 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
133 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
134 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
136 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
137 * (transition not allowed)
139 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
141 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
143 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
144 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
149 switch (st->hand_state) {
155 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
156 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
157 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
162 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
164 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
165 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
167 * 2) If we did request one then
168 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
170 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
171 * list if we requested a certificate)
173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
174 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
175 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
176 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
177 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
179 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
180 * not going to accept it because we require a client
183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
184 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
185 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
192 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
195 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
196 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
197 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
204 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
205 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
210 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
212 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
213 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
214 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
215 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
216 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
219 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
220 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
222 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
223 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
224 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
225 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
227 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
231 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
232 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
238 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
239 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
240 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
245 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
247 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
248 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
264 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
265 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
266 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
272 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
273 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
281 /* No valid transition found */
282 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
286 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
287 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
290 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
291 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
292 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
293 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
296 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
297 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
298 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
303 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
305 * Valid return values are:
309 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
311 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
314 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
315 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
316 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
317 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
318 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
321 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
323 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
327 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
328 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
329 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
330 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
331 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
334 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
335 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
345 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
347 * Valid return values are:
351 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
354 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
355 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
357 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
358 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
360 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
361 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
363 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
366 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
367 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
369 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
370 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
373 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
375 * ... except when the application insists on
376 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
379 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
380 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
381 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
383 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
386 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
394 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
395 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
398 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
400 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
403 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
404 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
407 switch (st->hand_state) {
409 /* Shouldn't happen */
410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
411 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
412 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
413 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
416 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
417 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
420 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
421 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
422 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
424 /* Try to read from the client instead */
425 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
427 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
428 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
431 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
432 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
433 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
435 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
441 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
442 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
448 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
451 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
458 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
459 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
460 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
461 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
463 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
468 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
471 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
472 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
475 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
479 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
480 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
482 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
484 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
485 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
488 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
489 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
490 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
492 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
493 * handshake at this point.
495 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
496 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
498 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
499 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
501 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
504 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
505 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
506 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
507 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
511 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
512 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
513 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
515 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
516 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
517 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
518 * been configured for.
520 if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
521 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
529 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
530 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
532 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
534 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
537 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
538 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
542 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
544 switch (st->hand_state) {
546 /* Shouldn't happen */
547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
548 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
549 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
550 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
553 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
554 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
555 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
556 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
559 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
560 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
561 /* SSLfatal() already called */
562 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
567 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
568 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
570 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
572 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
574 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
575 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
576 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
577 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
578 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
579 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
583 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
587 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
588 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
590 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
592 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
595 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
597 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
598 /* normal PSK or SRP */
599 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
600 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
601 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
602 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
604 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
607 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
610 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
613 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
615 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
619 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
620 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
621 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
622 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
626 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
627 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
628 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
629 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
633 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
634 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
635 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
637 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
638 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
640 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
642 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
643 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
644 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
645 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
647 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
649 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
651 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
655 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
656 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
657 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
659 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
661 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
663 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
664 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
669 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
670 * the server to the client.
672 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
674 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
676 switch (st->hand_state) {
678 /* No pre work to be done */
681 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
684 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
687 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
689 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
690 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
691 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
696 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
697 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
699 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
700 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
706 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
708 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
709 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
710 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
713 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
715 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
716 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) {
718 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
719 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
720 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
722 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
724 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
725 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
727 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
728 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
734 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
737 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
738 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
739 /* SSLfatal() already called */
742 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
744 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
745 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
746 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
747 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
751 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
753 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
754 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
755 && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
756 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
760 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
761 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
764 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
768 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
769 * server to the client.
771 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
773 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
777 switch (st->hand_state) {
779 /* No post work to be done */
782 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
783 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
785 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
786 /* SSLfatal() already called */
791 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
792 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
794 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
795 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
796 /* SSLfatal() already called */
800 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
801 * treat like it was the first packet
806 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
807 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
808 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
809 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
814 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
815 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
816 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
819 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
822 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
823 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
825 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
826 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
827 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
830 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
831 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
835 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
836 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
840 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
841 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
845 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
846 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
847 if (!statem_flush(s))
852 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
853 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
854 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
855 * something clever in the record layer for this.
857 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
858 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
859 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
860 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
861 /* SSLfatal() already called */
865 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
866 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
867 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
868 /* SSLfatal() already called */
874 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
875 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
877 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
880 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
884 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
885 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
887 /* SSLfatal() already called */
892 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
895 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
896 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
900 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
901 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
904 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
906 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
909 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
913 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
914 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
915 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
916 &s->session->master_key_length)
917 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
918 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
919 /* SSLfatal() already called */
924 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
925 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
926 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
931 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
932 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
934 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
935 /* SSLfatal() already called */
940 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
941 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
946 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
950 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
953 * Valid return values are:
957 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
958 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
960 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
962 switch (st->hand_state) {
964 /* Shouldn't happen */
965 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
966 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
967 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
970 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
972 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
974 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
975 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
978 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
979 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
980 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
983 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
984 /* No construction function needed */
986 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
989 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
990 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
991 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
995 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
996 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
999 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1000 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1001 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1005 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1006 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1007 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1010 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1011 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1012 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1015 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1016 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1017 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1020 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1021 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1022 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1025 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1026 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1027 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1030 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1031 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1032 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1035 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1037 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1040 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1041 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1042 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1045 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1046 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1047 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1055 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1056 * calculated as follows:
1058 * 2 + # client_version
1059 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1060 * 1 + # length of session_id
1061 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1062 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1063 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1064 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1065 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1066 * 2 + # length of extensions
1067 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1069 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1071 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1072 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1075 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1076 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1078 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1080 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1082 switch (st->hand_state) {
1084 /* Shouldn't happen */
1087 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1088 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1090 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1091 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1093 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1094 return s->max_cert_list;
1096 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1097 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1099 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1100 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1103 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1104 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1107 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1108 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1110 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1111 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1113 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1114 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1119 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1121 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1123 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1125 switch (st->hand_state) {
1127 /* Shouldn't happen */
1128 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1129 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1130 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1131 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1133 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1134 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1136 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1137 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1139 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1140 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1142 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1143 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1145 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1146 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1149 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1150 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1153 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1154 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1156 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1157 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1159 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1160 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1166 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1169 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1171 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1173 switch (st->hand_state) {
1175 /* Shouldn't happen */
1176 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1177 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1178 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1181 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1182 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1184 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1185 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1190 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1191 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1194 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1196 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1197 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1198 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1200 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1203 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1204 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1205 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1208 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1211 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1212 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1213 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1214 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1215 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1224 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1227 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1228 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1229 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1235 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1237 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1238 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1239 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1240 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1241 cookie_leni > 255) {
1242 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1243 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1246 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1248 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1249 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1251 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1260 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1261 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1262 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1266 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1268 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1269 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1270 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1271 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1273 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1275 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1276 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1277 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1278 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1279 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1280 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1281 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1283 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1284 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1285 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1286 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1287 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1288 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1289 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1290 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1291 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1292 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1293 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1294 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1295 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1297 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1298 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1303 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1305 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1306 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1307 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1311 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1314 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1315 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1317 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1320 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1322 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1324 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1325 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1326 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1327 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1329 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1330 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1331 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1332 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1333 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1336 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
1337 || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding
1339 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1340 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1341 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1347 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1348 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1349 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1350 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1355 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1357 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1358 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1360 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1363 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1364 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1366 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1371 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1372 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1373 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1374 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1376 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1377 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1379 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1380 * 7-8 session_id_length
1381 * 9-10 challenge_length
1385 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1386 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1388 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1389 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1390 * in the first place
1392 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1393 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1398 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1400 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1404 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1405 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1407 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1408 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1409 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1411 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1414 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1415 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1416 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1418 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1422 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1424 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1428 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1430 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1431 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1432 /* No extensions. */
1433 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1434 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1435 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1438 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1440 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1441 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1442 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1443 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1445 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1446 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1447 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1448 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1449 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1450 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1451 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1452 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1454 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1458 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1460 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1461 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1462 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1463 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1464 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1465 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1467 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1471 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1472 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1474 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1477 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1478 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1479 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1480 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1481 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1485 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1486 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1487 * So check cookie length...
1489 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1490 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1491 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1495 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1496 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1497 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1501 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1503 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1507 /* Could be empty. */
1508 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1509 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1511 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1512 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1513 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1514 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1520 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1521 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1522 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1523 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1524 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1528 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1529 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1530 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1531 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1532 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1533 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1536 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1538 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1541 if (clienthello != NULL)
1542 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1543 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1545 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1548 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1551 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1556 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1558 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1559 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1560 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1561 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1562 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1564 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1565 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1566 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1567 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1568 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1569 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1571 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1572 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1574 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1577 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1578 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1583 /* Set up the client_random */
1584 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1586 /* Choose the version */
1588 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1589 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1590 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1591 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1593 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1596 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1597 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1598 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1602 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1605 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1606 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1608 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1609 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1610 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1611 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1612 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1618 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1619 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1620 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1622 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1623 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1627 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1628 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1629 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1630 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1631 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1635 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1636 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1637 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1638 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1639 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1640 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1642 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1643 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1645 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1647 /* default verification */
1648 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1649 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1650 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1652 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1653 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1656 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1658 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1659 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1660 if (protverr != 0) {
1661 s->version = s->client_version;
1662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1663 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1671 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1672 clienthello->isv2) ||
1673 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1674 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1675 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1679 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1680 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1681 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1682 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1683 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1684 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1685 if (s->renegotiate) {
1686 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1687 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1688 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1689 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1692 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1693 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1694 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1696 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1697 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1698 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1699 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1700 * an insecure downgrade.
1702 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1703 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1704 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1710 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1711 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1712 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1713 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1715 if (cipher == NULL) {
1716 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1717 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1718 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1721 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1722 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1723 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1725 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1726 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1729 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1733 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1736 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1737 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1738 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1739 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1740 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1745 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1746 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1748 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1749 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1750 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1751 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1752 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1753 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1754 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1755 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1756 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1757 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1760 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1762 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1763 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1764 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1768 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1770 /* previous session */
1772 } else if (i == -1) {
1773 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1777 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1778 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1784 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1785 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1786 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1787 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1791 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1792 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1794 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1796 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1799 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1801 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1802 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1804 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1805 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1814 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1817 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1818 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1819 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1824 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1825 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1829 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1831 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1832 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1833 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1838 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1839 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1840 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1842 /* TLS extensions */
1843 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1844 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1845 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1850 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1851 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1852 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1853 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1857 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1858 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1859 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1860 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1861 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1867 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1870 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1871 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1873 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1874 * backwards compat reasons
1876 int master_key_length;
1878 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1879 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1880 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1882 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1883 && master_key_length > 0) {
1884 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1886 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1887 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1891 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1892 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1893 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1894 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1895 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1896 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1897 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1898 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1902 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1903 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1904 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1905 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1906 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1911 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1912 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1913 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1915 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1916 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1918 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1919 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1920 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1922 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1923 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1924 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1925 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1930 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1931 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1932 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1934 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1935 /* Can't disable compression */
1936 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1938 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1939 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1942 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1943 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1944 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1945 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1946 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1950 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1952 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1953 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1956 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1957 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1958 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1961 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1962 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1963 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1964 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1967 } else if (s->hit) {
1969 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1970 /* See if we have a match */
1971 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1974 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1975 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1976 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1978 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1979 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1988 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1994 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1995 * using compression.
1997 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1998 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1999 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2000 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2006 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2009 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2010 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
2011 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
2012 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2013 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2014 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2015 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2022 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2023 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2025 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2027 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2028 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2033 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2034 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2035 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2036 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2037 s->clienthello = NULL;
2040 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2041 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2042 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2043 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2044 s->clienthello = NULL;
2050 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2051 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2053 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2055 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2058 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2059 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2060 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2061 * influence which certificate is sent
2063 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2064 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2067 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2068 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
2070 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2071 * et al can pick it up.
2073 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2074 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2076 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2077 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2078 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2080 /* status request response should be sent */
2081 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2082 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2083 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2085 /* something bad happened */
2086 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2089 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2090 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2100 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2101 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2103 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2105 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2106 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2108 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2109 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2110 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
2111 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
2112 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2114 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2115 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2116 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2117 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2118 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2119 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2122 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2124 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2125 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
2128 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2129 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2130 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2131 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2132 selected_len) != 0) {
2133 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2134 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2138 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2139 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2142 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2144 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2145 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2148 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2150 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2151 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2152 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2153 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2156 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2161 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2162 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2163 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2167 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2172 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2173 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2174 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2175 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2181 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2183 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2185 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2186 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2188 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2195 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2196 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2197 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2198 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2199 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2201 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2202 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2203 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2207 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2210 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2213 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2214 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2216 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2218 if (cipher == NULL) {
2219 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2220 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2221 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2224 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2227 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2228 /* SSLfatal already called */
2231 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2232 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2233 s->session->not_resumable =
2234 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2235 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2236 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2237 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2238 /* do not send a session ticket */
2239 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2242 /* Session-id reuse */
2243 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2247 * we now have the following setup.
2249 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2250 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2251 * compression - basically ignored right now
2252 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2253 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2254 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2255 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2259 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2260 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2262 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2263 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2267 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2268 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2269 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2270 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2272 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2273 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2280 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2282 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2284 * callback indicates further work to be done
2286 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2290 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2296 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2301 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2306 unsigned char *session_id;
2307 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2309 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2310 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2312 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2313 * tls_process_client_hello()
2315 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2316 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2317 ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random,
2318 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2319 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2320 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2325 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2326 * back in the server hello:
2327 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2328 * we send back the old session ID.
2329 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2330 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2331 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2332 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2334 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2335 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2336 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2338 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2339 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2342 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2343 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2345 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2348 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2349 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2351 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2352 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2355 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2356 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2357 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2361 /* set up the compression method */
2362 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2365 if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2368 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2371 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2372 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2373 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2374 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2375 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2379 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2380 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2381 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2383 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2384 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2386 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2390 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2391 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2392 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2397 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2398 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2400 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2401 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2404 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2405 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2406 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2413 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2415 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2416 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2417 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2424 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2427 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2430 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2431 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2434 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2438 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2439 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2440 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2442 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2443 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2444 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2448 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2449 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2450 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2454 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2456 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2457 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2458 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2459 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2461 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2463 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2464 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2466 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2469 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2470 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2471 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2472 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2475 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2476 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2479 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2482 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2484 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2485 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2486 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2488 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2489 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2490 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2495 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2496 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2497 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2498 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2501 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2502 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2503 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2504 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2505 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2508 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2510 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2511 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2515 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2516 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2517 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2521 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2523 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2524 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2525 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2529 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2532 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2533 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2537 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2539 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2541 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2542 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2546 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2547 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2548 if (curve_id == 0) {
2549 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2550 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2551 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2554 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2555 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2556 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2557 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2561 /* Encode the public key. */
2562 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2564 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2565 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2566 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2571 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2572 * can set these to NULLs
2579 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2581 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2582 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2583 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2584 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2585 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2586 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2587 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2590 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2591 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2592 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2593 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2597 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2598 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2599 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2603 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2604 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2606 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2607 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2608 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2613 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2614 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2615 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2618 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2619 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2621 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2622 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2624 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2625 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2626 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2632 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2633 unsigned char *binval;
2636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2637 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2638 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2641 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2644 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2645 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2646 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2652 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2653 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2656 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2657 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2660 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2662 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2663 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2666 memset(binval, 0, len);
2670 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2671 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2672 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2673 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2674 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2678 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2681 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2682 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2684 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2685 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2686 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2689 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2690 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2691 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2692 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2693 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2694 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2695 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2698 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2699 encodedPoint = NULL;
2705 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2707 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2708 size_t siglen, tbslen;
2711 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2712 /* Should never happen */
2713 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2714 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2715 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2718 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2719 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2720 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2721 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2722 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2725 /* send signature algorithm */
2726 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2727 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2728 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2729 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2733 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2734 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2735 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2738 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2739 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2740 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2741 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2742 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2743 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2746 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2747 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2748 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2749 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2750 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2755 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2756 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2759 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2762 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
2764 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2765 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2767 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2768 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2773 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2777 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2779 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2780 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2782 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2786 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2788 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2789 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2790 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2791 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2792 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2793 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
2794 || RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0
2795 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
2796 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2797 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2798 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2801 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2802 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2803 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2807 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2808 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2809 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2810 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2815 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2816 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2818 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2824 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2825 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2826 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2827 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2828 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2832 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2833 const uint16_t *psigs;
2834 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2836 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2837 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2838 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2839 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2840 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2841 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2842 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2847 if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2848 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2854 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2858 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2861 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2863 PACKET psk_identity;
2865 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2866 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2867 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2870 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2872 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2875 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2876 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2877 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2881 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2882 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2883 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2887 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2890 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2891 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2892 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2894 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2896 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2898 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2899 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2900 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2904 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2905 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2906 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2908 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2909 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2910 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2914 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2918 /* Should never happen */
2919 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2920 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2925 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2928 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2930 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2931 size_t j, padding_len;
2932 PACKET enc_premaster;
2934 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2937 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2940 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2944 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2945 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2946 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2948 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2949 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2950 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2951 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2957 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2958 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2959 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2960 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2962 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2963 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2964 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2968 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2969 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2970 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2971 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2976 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2977 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2978 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2979 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2980 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2983 if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2984 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2986 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2991 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2992 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2994 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2995 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2996 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2997 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2998 if (decrypt_len < 0) {
2999 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3000 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3004 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
3007 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
3008 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
3009 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
3011 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3012 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3013 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3017 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3018 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
3019 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
3020 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
3021 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
3023 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
3026 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
3027 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
3028 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
3029 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
3030 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
3031 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
3034 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3035 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
3037 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3038 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
3041 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
3042 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
3043 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
3044 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
3045 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
3046 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
3049 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
3050 unsigned char workaround_good;
3051 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3052 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
3054 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3055 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
3056 version_good |= workaround_good;
3060 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
3061 * remain non-zero (0xff).
3063 decrypt_good &= version_good;
3066 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
3067 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
3068 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
3069 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
3071 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
3072 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
3073 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
3074 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
3075 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
3078 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
3079 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
3080 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3086 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3089 /* Should never happen */
3090 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3091 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3096 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3098 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3099 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3103 const unsigned char *data;
3104 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3107 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3109 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3112 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3114 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3115 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3119 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3120 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3121 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3124 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3125 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3126 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3127 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3130 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3131 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3137 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3138 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3139 if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3140 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3141 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3146 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3147 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3152 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3153 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3155 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3158 /* Should never happen */
3159 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3160 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3165 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3168 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3169 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3172 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3173 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3174 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3175 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3179 const unsigned char *data;
3182 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3183 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3186 /* Get encoded point length */
3187 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3188 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3189 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3190 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3193 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3194 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3195 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3199 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3206 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3207 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3212 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3213 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3215 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3219 /* Should never happen */
3220 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3221 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3226 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3228 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3230 const unsigned char *data;
3232 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3233 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3234 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3235 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3238 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3239 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3243 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3244 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3245 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3248 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3249 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3250 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3251 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3252 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3256 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3257 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3263 /* Should never happen */
3264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3265 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3270 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3273 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3274 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3275 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3276 const unsigned char *start;
3277 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3278 unsigned long alg_a;
3279 unsigned int asn1id, asn1len;
3283 /* Get our certificate private key */
3284 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3285 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3287 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3289 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3291 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3294 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3296 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3297 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3300 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3301 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3302 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3303 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3306 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3307 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3308 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3312 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3313 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3314 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3315 * client certificate for authorization only.
3317 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3318 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3319 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3322 /* Decrypt session key */
3323 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &asn1id)
3324 || asn1id != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3325 || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt, &asn1len)) {
3326 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3327 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3330 if (asn1len == 0x81) {
3332 * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else
3334 * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail
3336 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 1)) {
3337 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3338 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3341 } else if (asn1len >= 0x80) {
3343 * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't
3346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3347 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3349 } /* else short form length */
3351 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encdata)) {
3352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3353 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3356 inlen = PACKET_remaining(&encdata);
3357 start = PACKET_data(&encdata);
3359 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3361 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3362 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3365 /* Generate master secret */
3366 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3367 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3368 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3371 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3372 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3374 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3378 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3381 /* Should never happen */
3382 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3383 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3388 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3390 unsigned long alg_k;
3392 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3394 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3395 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3396 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3400 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3401 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3402 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3404 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3405 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3408 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3409 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3410 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3413 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3414 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3415 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3418 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3419 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3420 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3423 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3424 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3425 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3428 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3429 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3430 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3433 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3434 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3435 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3440 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3441 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3445 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3448 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3449 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3451 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3454 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3457 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3458 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3459 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3460 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3462 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3465 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3466 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3468 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3469 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3470 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3472 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3473 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3474 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3478 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3479 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3484 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3486 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3487 * the handshake_buffer
3489 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3490 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3493 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3495 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3496 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3497 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3498 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3502 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3503 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3505 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3506 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3511 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3514 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3517 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3520 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3521 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3522 PACKET spkt, context;
3524 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3526 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3528 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3532 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3533 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3534 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3535 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3536 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3537 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3541 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3542 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3543 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3544 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3548 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3549 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3550 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3551 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3552 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3553 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3557 certstart = certbytes;
3558 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3560 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3561 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3564 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3565 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3566 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3567 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3571 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3572 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3575 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3576 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3577 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3581 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3582 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3583 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3584 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3585 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3586 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3587 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3590 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3593 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3594 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3595 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3596 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3602 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3603 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3604 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3605 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3606 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3607 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3610 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3611 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3612 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3613 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3614 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3615 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3618 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3619 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3620 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3625 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3627 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3628 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3629 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3634 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3637 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3639 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3640 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3641 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3647 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3648 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3649 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3650 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3651 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3654 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3655 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3656 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3657 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3658 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3662 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3663 s->session = new_sess;
3666 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3667 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3668 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3670 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3671 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3674 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3677 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3678 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3683 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3684 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3688 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3689 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3690 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3691 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3692 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3693 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3697 /* Resend session tickets */
3698 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3701 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3705 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3709 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3711 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3715 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3720 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3721 * for the server Certificate message
3723 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3724 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3725 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3728 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3729 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3736 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3737 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3740 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3741 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3742 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3745 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3746 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3747 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) {
3748 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3749 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3753 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3754 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3755 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3757 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3762 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3763 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3764 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3765 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3772 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3773 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3775 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3776 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3777 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3778 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3779 const unsigned char *const_p;
3780 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3783 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3784 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3785 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3787 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3789 /* get session encoding length */
3790 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3792 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3795 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3796 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3797 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3800 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3802 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3803 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3807 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3808 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3809 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3811 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3816 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3817 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3818 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3823 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3826 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3828 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3829 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3833 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3834 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3835 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3836 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3837 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3838 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3842 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3844 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3845 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3848 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3851 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3852 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3854 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3855 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3856 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3861 /* Put timeout and length */
3862 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3863 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3864 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3865 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3866 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3870 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3871 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3875 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3876 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3879 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3881 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3883 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3884 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0
3885 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3886 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
3887 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
3888 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
3889 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
3890 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3891 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3894 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3895 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3898 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3899 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3903 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3904 /* Output key name */
3905 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3907 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3908 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3910 /* Encrypt session data */
3911 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3912 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3913 || encdata1 != encdata2
3914 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3915 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3916 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3917 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3918 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3919 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3920 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3921 macendoffset - macoffset)
3922 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3923 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3924 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3925 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3926 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
3927 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3928 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3932 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
3933 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3934 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3935 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3942 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3943 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3947 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3948 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3950 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3951 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3955 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
3956 s->session->session_id_length)
3957 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3958 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET,
3959 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3966 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3968 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3969 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
3971 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3975 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
3977 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3980 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
3981 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
3982 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
3983 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
3985 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
3986 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
3987 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3988 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3989 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3992 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
3994 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
3995 cb = s->info_callback;
3996 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
3997 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
4001 * We don't start and stop the handshake in between each ticket when
4002 * sending more than one - but it should appear that way to the info
4005 if (s->sent_tickets != 0) {
4006 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
4007 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
4008 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
4010 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
4013 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4014 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4015 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4017 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
4018 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
4020 if (new_sess == NULL) {
4021 /* SSLfatal already called */
4025 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
4026 s->session = new_sess;
4029 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
4030 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4033 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
4034 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4035 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4036 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4039 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
4041 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
4042 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
4043 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
4047 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
4049 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
4052 s->session->master_key,
4054 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4057 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
4059 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
4060 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
4061 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
4062 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
4063 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
4064 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
4065 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4066 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4067 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4070 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
4072 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
4075 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
4076 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
4080 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4081 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4082 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4085 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
4086 || (s->max_early_data > 0
4087 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
4088 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4089 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4092 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
4094 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4098 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4099 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
4100 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4102 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4106 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4107 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4108 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
4111 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
4112 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4121 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4122 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4124 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4126 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4127 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4128 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4129 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
4130 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4137 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4139 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4140 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4149 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4150 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4152 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4154 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4155 size_t next_proto_len;
4158 * The payload looks like:
4160 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4161 * uint8 padding_len;
4162 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4164 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4165 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4166 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4167 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4168 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4169 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4172 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4174 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4175 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4176 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4179 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4181 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4185 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4187 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4189 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4196 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4198 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4200 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4201 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4204 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4205 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4207 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4208 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4212 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4213 * a record boundary.
4215 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4216 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
4217 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4218 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4219 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4222 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4223 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4224 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4225 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4226 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4229 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;