2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include <openssl/dh.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
27 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
30 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
31 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
32 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
33 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
35 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
36 * (transition not allowed)
38 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
40 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
43 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
44 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
45 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
47 switch (st->hand_state) {
51 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
52 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
53 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
54 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
58 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
59 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
60 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
67 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
68 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
69 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
70 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
71 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
75 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
76 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
83 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
84 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
85 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
89 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
90 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
96 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
97 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
98 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
105 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
106 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
108 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
111 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
112 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
113 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
124 /* No valid transition found */
129 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
130 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
131 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
132 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
134 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
135 * (transition not allowed)
137 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
139 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
141 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
142 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
147 switch (st->hand_state) {
153 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
154 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
155 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
160 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
162 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
163 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
165 * 2) If we did request one then
166 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
168 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
169 * list if we requested a certificate)
171 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
172 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
173 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
174 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
175 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
177 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
178 * not going to accept it because we require a client
181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
182 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
183 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
186 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
190 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
193 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
194 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
195 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
202 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
203 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
208 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
210 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
211 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
212 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
213 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
214 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
217 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
218 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
220 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
221 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
222 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
223 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
225 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
229 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
230 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
236 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
237 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
238 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
243 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
245 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
246 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
247 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
252 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
253 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
262 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
270 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
271 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
272 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
279 /* No valid transition found */
280 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
281 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
282 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
287 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
289 * Valid return values are:
293 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
295 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
298 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
299 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
300 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
301 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
302 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
305 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
307 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
311 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
312 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
313 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
314 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
315 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
318 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
319 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
329 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
331 * Valid return values are:
335 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
338 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
339 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
341 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
342 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
344 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
345 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
347 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
350 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
351 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
353 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
354 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
357 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
359 * ... except when the application insists on
360 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
363 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
364 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
365 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
367 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
370 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
378 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
379 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
382 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
384 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
387 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
388 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
391 switch (st->hand_state) {
393 /* Shouldn't happen */
394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
395 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
396 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
397 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
400 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
401 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
402 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
404 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
405 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
406 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
408 /* Try to read from the client instead */
409 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
411 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
412 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
413 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
415 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
416 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
417 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
419 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
420 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
426 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
427 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
429 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
430 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
432 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
435 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
440 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
442 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
443 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
444 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
447 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
449 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
453 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
455 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
456 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
457 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
459 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
460 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
464 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
466 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
468 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
469 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
471 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
472 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
475 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
476 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
480 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
481 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
487 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
488 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
489 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
490 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
495 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
496 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
498 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
500 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
503 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
504 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
508 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
510 switch (st->hand_state) {
512 /* Shouldn't happen */
513 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
514 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
515 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
516 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
519 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
520 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
521 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
522 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
523 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
525 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
526 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
527 /* SSLfatal() already called */
528 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
533 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
534 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
536 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
537 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
538 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
540 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
541 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
542 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
543 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
544 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
545 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
546 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
547 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
549 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
551 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
553 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
554 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
556 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
558 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
559 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
561 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
563 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
564 /* normal PSK or SRP */
565 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
566 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
567 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
568 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
569 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
570 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
573 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
579 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
585 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
586 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
587 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
588 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
592 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
593 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
599 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
600 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
601 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
603 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
604 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
606 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
609 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
610 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
611 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
615 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
617 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
618 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
619 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
621 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
622 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
623 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
625 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
627 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
629 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
630 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
635 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
636 * the server to the client.
638 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
640 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
642 switch (st->hand_state) {
644 /* No pre work to be done */
647 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
650 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
653 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
655 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
656 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
657 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
662 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
663 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
665 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
666 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
672 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
674 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
675 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
676 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
679 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
681 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
682 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
684 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
685 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
686 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
688 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
690 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
691 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
693 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
694 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
700 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
703 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
704 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
705 /* SSLfatal() already called */
708 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
710 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
711 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
712 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
713 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
717 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
719 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
720 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
721 && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
722 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
726 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
727 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
730 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
734 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
735 * server to the client.
737 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
739 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
743 switch (st->hand_state) {
745 /* No post work to be done */
748 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
749 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
751 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
752 /* SSLfatal() already called */
757 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
758 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
760 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
761 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
762 /* SSLfatal() already called */
766 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
767 * treat like it was the first packet
772 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
773 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
774 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
775 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
779 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
780 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
781 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
782 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
785 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
788 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
789 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
791 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
792 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
793 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
795 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
796 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
797 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
801 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
802 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
806 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
807 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
811 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
812 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
813 if (!statem_flush(s))
818 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
819 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
820 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
821 * something clever in the record layer for this.
823 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
824 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
825 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
826 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
827 /* SSLfatal() already called */
831 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
832 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
833 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
834 /* SSLfatal() already called */
840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
841 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
843 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
846 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
850 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
851 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
853 /* SSLfatal() already called */
858 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
861 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
862 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
866 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
867 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
870 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
872 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
875 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
879 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
880 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
881 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
882 &s->session->master_key_length)
883 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
884 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
885 /* SSLfatal() already called */
890 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
891 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
892 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
897 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
898 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
900 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
901 /* SSLfatal() already called */
906 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
907 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
912 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
916 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
919 * Valid return values are:
923 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
924 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
926 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
928 switch (st->hand_state) {
930 /* Shouldn't happen */
931 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
932 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
933 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
936 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
938 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
940 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
941 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
944 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
945 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
946 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
949 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
950 /* No construction function needed */
952 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
955 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
956 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
957 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
961 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
962 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
965 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
966 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
967 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
971 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
972 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
973 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
976 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
977 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
978 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
981 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
982 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
983 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
986 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
987 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
988 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
991 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
992 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
993 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
996 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
997 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
998 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1001 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1003 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1006 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1007 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1008 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1011 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1012 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1013 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1021 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1022 * calculated as follows:
1024 * 2 + # client_version
1025 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1026 * 1 + # length of session_id
1027 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1028 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1029 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1030 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1031 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1032 * 2 + # length of extensions
1033 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1035 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1037 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1038 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1041 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1042 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1044 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1046 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1048 switch (st->hand_state) {
1050 /* Shouldn't happen */
1053 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1054 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1056 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1057 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1059 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1060 return s->max_cert_list;
1062 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1063 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1065 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1066 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1069 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1070 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1073 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1074 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1076 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1077 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1079 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1080 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1085 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1087 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1089 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1091 switch (st->hand_state) {
1093 /* Shouldn't happen */
1094 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1095 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1096 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1097 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1099 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1100 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1102 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1103 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1105 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1106 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1108 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1109 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1111 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1112 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1115 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1116 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1119 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1120 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1122 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1123 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1125 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1126 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1132 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1135 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1137 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1139 switch (st->hand_state) {
1141 /* Shouldn't happen */
1142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1143 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1144 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1147 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1148 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1150 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1151 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1153 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1156 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1157 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1158 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1161 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1163 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1164 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1165 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1167 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1170 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1171 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1172 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1175 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1178 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1179 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1180 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1181 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1182 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1191 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1194 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1195 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1196 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1202 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1204 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1205 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1206 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1207 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1208 cookie_leni > 255) {
1209 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1210 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1213 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1215 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1216 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1218 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1227 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1228 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1229 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1233 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1235 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1236 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1237 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1238 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1240 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1242 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1243 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1244 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1245 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1246 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1247 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1248 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1250 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1251 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1252 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1253 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1254 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1255 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1256 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1257 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1258 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1259 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1260 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1261 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1262 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1264 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1265 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1270 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1272 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1273 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1274 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1278 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1281 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1282 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1284 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1287 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1289 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1291 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1292 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1293 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1294 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1296 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1297 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1298 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1299 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1300 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1303 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
1304 || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding
1306 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1307 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1308 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1314 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1315 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1317 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1322 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1324 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1325 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1327 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1330 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1331 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1332 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1333 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1338 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1339 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1340 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1341 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1343 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1344 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1346 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1347 * 7-8 session_id_length
1348 * 9-10 challenge_length
1352 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1353 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1355 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1356 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1357 * in the first place
1359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1360 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1365 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1366 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1367 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1371 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1372 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1374 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1375 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1376 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1378 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1381 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1382 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1383 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1384 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1385 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1389 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1391 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1395 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1397 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1398 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1399 /* No extensions. */
1400 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1402 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1405 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1407 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1408 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1409 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1410 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1412 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1413 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1414 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1415 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1416 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1417 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1418 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1419 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1420 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1421 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1425 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1427 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1428 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1429 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1430 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1431 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1432 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1433 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1434 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1438 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1439 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1440 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1441 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1444 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1445 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1446 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1447 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1448 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1452 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1453 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1454 * So check cookie length...
1456 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1457 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1458 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1462 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1464 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1468 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1469 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1470 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1474 /* Could be empty. */
1475 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1476 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1478 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1479 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1480 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1481 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1487 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1488 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1489 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1490 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1491 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1495 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1496 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1497 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1498 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1499 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1500 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1503 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1505 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1508 if (clienthello != NULL)
1509 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1510 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1512 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1515 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1518 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1523 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1525 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1526 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1527 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1528 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1529 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1531 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1532 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1533 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1534 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1535 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1536 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1538 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1539 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1541 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1544 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1545 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1550 /* Set up the client_random */
1551 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1553 /* Choose the version */
1555 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1556 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1557 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1558 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1560 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1563 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1564 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1565 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1569 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1572 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1573 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1575 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1576 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1577 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1578 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1579 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1585 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1586 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1587 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1590 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1594 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1595 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1596 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1597 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1598 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1602 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1603 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1604 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1605 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1606 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1607 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1609 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1610 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1612 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1614 /* default verification */
1615 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1616 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1617 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1618 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1619 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1620 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1623 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1625 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1626 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1627 if (protverr != 0) {
1628 s->version = s->client_version;
1629 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1630 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1638 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1639 clienthello->isv2) ||
1640 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1641 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1642 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1646 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1647 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1648 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1649 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1650 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1651 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1652 if (s->renegotiate) {
1653 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1654 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1655 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1656 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1659 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1660 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1661 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1663 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1664 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1665 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1666 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1667 * an insecure downgrade.
1669 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1670 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1671 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1677 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1678 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1679 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1680 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1682 if (cipher == NULL) {
1683 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1684 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1685 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1688 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1689 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1690 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1692 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1693 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1695 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1696 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1700 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1703 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1704 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1705 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1706 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1707 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1712 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1713 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1715 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1716 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1717 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1718 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1719 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1720 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1721 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1722 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1723 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1724 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1727 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1729 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1730 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1731 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1735 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1737 /* previous session */
1739 } else if (i == -1) {
1740 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1744 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1745 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1751 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1752 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1753 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1754 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1758 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1759 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1761 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1763 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1766 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1768 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1769 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1771 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1772 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1781 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1785 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1786 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1791 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1792 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1796 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1798 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1799 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1800 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1805 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1806 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1807 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1809 /* TLS extensions */
1810 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1811 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1812 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1817 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1818 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1819 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1820 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1824 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1825 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1826 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1827 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1828 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1834 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1837 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1838 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1840 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1841 * backwards compat reasons
1843 int master_key_length;
1845 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1846 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1847 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1849 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1850 && master_key_length > 0) {
1851 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1853 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1854 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1858 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1859 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1860 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1861 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1862 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1864 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1865 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1869 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1870 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1871 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1872 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1873 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1878 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1879 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1880 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1882 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1883 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1885 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1886 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1887 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1889 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1890 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1891 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1892 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1897 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1898 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1899 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1901 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1902 /* Can't disable compression */
1903 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1904 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1905 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1906 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1909 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1910 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1911 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1912 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1913 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1917 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1918 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1919 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1920 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1923 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1924 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1925 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1928 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1929 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1930 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1931 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1934 } else if (s->hit) {
1936 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1937 /* See if we have a match */
1938 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1941 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1942 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1943 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1945 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1946 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1955 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1961 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1962 * using compression.
1964 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1965 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1966 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1967 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1973 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1976 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1977 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1978 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1979 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1980 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1981 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1982 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1989 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1990 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1992 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1994 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1995 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2000 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2001 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2002 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2003 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2004 s->clienthello = NULL;
2007 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2008 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2009 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2010 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2011 s->clienthello = NULL;
2017 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2018 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2020 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2022 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2025 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2026 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2027 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2028 * influence which certificate is sent
2030 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2031 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2034 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2035 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
2037 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2038 * et al can pick it up.
2040 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2041 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2043 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2044 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2045 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2047 /* status request response should be sent */
2048 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2049 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2050 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2052 /* something bad happened */
2053 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2055 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2056 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2057 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2067 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2068 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2070 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2072 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2073 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2075 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2076 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2077 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
2078 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
2079 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2081 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2082 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2083 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2084 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2086 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2089 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2091 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2092 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
2095 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2096 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2097 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2098 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2099 selected_len) != 0) {
2100 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2101 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2104 /* If a new session update it with the new ALPN value */
2105 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2107 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2109 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2110 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2113 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2118 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2119 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2120 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2124 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2129 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2130 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2131 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2132 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2138 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2140 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2142 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2143 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2145 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2152 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2153 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2154 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2155 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2156 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2158 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2159 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2160 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2164 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2167 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2170 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2171 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2173 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2175 if (cipher == NULL) {
2176 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2177 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2178 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2181 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2184 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2185 /* SSLfatal already called */
2188 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2189 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2190 s->session->not_resumable =
2191 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2192 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2193 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2194 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2195 /* do not send a session ticket */
2196 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2199 /* Session-id reuse */
2200 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2204 * we now have the following setup.
2206 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2207 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2208 * compression - basically ignored right now
2209 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2210 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2211 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2212 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2216 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2217 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2219 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2220 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2224 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2225 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2226 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2227 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2229 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2230 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2237 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2239 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2241 * callback indicates further work to be done
2243 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2247 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2253 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2258 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2263 unsigned char *session_id;
2264 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2266 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2267 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2269 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2270 * tls_process_client_hello()
2272 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2273 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2274 ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random,
2275 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2277 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2282 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2283 * back in the server hello:
2284 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2285 * we send back the old session ID.
2286 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2287 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2288 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2289 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2291 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2292 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2293 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2295 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2296 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2299 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2300 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2302 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2305 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2306 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2308 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2309 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2312 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2313 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2314 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2318 /* set up the compression method */
2319 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2322 if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2325 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2328 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2329 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2330 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)
2331 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2332 s->hello_retry_request
2334 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2336 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2337 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2339 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2343 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2344 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2345 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2350 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2351 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2353 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2354 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2357 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2358 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2359 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2366 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2368 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2369 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2370 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2377 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2380 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2383 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2384 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2387 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2391 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2392 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2393 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2395 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2397 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2401 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2403 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2407 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2409 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2411 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2412 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2414 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2416 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2417 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2419 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2422 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2423 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2424 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2425 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2428 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2429 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2432 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2435 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2437 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2438 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2439 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2441 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2442 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2443 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2448 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2449 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2450 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2451 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2454 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2455 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2457 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2458 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2461 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2462 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2463 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2464 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2468 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2469 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2470 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2474 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2476 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2479 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2480 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2484 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2486 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2487 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2488 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2489 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2493 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2494 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2495 if (curve_id == 0) {
2496 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2497 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2498 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2501 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2502 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2503 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2504 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2508 /* Encode the public key. */
2509 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2511 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2513 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2518 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2519 * can set these to NULLs
2526 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2528 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2529 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2530 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2531 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2532 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2533 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2534 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2537 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2538 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2539 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2540 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2545 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2546 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2550 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2551 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2553 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2554 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2555 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2560 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2561 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2562 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2565 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2566 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2568 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2569 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2571 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2572 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2573 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2579 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2580 unsigned char *binval;
2583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2584 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2585 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2588 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2591 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2592 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2593 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2599 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2600 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2603 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2604 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2607 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2609 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2610 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2613 memset(binval, 0, len);
2617 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2618 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2619 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2620 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2621 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2625 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2628 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2629 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2631 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2632 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2633 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2636 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2637 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2638 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2639 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2640 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2641 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2642 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2645 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2646 encodedPoint = NULL;
2652 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2654 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2655 size_t siglen, tbslen;
2658 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2659 /* Should never happen */
2660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2661 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2662 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2665 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2666 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2667 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2668 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2669 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2672 /* send signature algorithm */
2673 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2674 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2675 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2676 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2680 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2681 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2682 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2685 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2686 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2687 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2688 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2689 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2690 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2693 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2694 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2695 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2696 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2697 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2702 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2703 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2706 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2709 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
2711 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2712 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2713 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2714 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2715 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2720 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2724 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2726 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2727 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2729 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2733 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2735 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2736 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2737 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2738 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2739 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2740 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
2741 || ssl_randbytes(s, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0
2742 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
2743 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2744 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2745 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2748 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2749 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2750 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2754 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2755 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2756 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2757 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2762 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2763 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2765 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2771 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2772 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2773 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2774 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2775 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2779 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2780 const uint16_t *psigs;
2781 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2783 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2784 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2785 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2786 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2788 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2789 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2794 if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2795 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2801 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2805 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2808 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2810 PACKET psk_identity;
2812 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2813 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2814 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2817 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2818 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2819 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2822 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2823 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2824 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2828 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2830 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2834 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2837 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2839 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2841 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2843 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2845 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2846 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2847 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2851 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2852 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2853 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2855 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2856 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2857 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2861 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2865 /* Should never happen */
2866 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2867 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2872 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2874 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2875 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2877 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2878 size_t j, padding_len;
2879 PACKET enc_premaster;
2881 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2884 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2886 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2887 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2891 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2892 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2893 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2895 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2896 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2897 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2898 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2904 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2905 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2906 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2907 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2909 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2911 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2915 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2916 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2917 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2918 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2923 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2924 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2925 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2926 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2927 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2930 if (ssl_randbytes(s, rand_premaster_secret,
2931 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2932 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2933 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2938 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2939 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2941 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2942 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2943 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2944 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2945 if (decrypt_len < 0) {
2946 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2947 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2951 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2954 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2955 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2956 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2958 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2960 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2964 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2965 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2966 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2967 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2968 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2970 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2973 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2974 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2975 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2976 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2977 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2978 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2981 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2982 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2984 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2985 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2988 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2989 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2990 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2991 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2992 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2993 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2996 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2997 unsigned char workaround_good;
2998 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2999 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
3001 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3002 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
3003 version_good |= workaround_good;
3007 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
3008 * remain non-zero (0xff).
3010 decrypt_good &= version_good;
3013 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
3014 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
3015 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
3016 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
3018 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
3019 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
3020 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
3021 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
3022 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
3025 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
3026 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
3027 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3033 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3036 /* Should never happen */
3037 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3038 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3043 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3045 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3046 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3050 const unsigned char *data;
3051 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3054 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3055 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3056 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3059 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3061 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3062 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3066 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3067 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3068 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3071 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3072 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3073 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3074 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3077 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3078 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3079 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3083 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3084 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3086 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3087 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3088 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3089 if (pub_key != NULL)
3094 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3095 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3100 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3101 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3103 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3106 /* Should never happen */
3107 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3108 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3113 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3116 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3117 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3120 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3121 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3122 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3123 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3127 const unsigned char *data;
3130 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3131 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3134 /* Get encoded point length */
3135 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3136 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3137 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3138 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3141 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3142 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3147 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3154 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3155 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3160 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3161 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3163 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3167 /* Should never happen */
3168 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3169 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3174 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3178 const unsigned char *data;
3180 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3181 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3182 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3183 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3186 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3187 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3191 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3192 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3193 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3196 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3197 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3198 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3200 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3204 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3205 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3211 /* Should never happen */
3212 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3213 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3218 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3221 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3222 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3223 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3224 const unsigned char *start;
3225 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3226 unsigned long alg_a;
3229 size_t sess_key_len;
3230 const unsigned char *data;
3233 /* Get our certificate private key */
3234 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3235 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3237 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3239 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3241 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3244 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3246 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3247 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3250 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3251 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3253 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3256 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3258 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3262 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3263 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3264 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3265 * client certificate for authorization only.
3267 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3268 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3269 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3272 /* Decrypt session key */
3273 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3274 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
3275 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3276 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3279 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3280 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
3281 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
3282 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
3283 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3284 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3289 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3292 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3295 /* Generate master secret */
3296 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3297 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3298 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3301 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3302 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3304 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3308 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3311 /* Should never happen */
3312 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3313 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3318 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3320 unsigned long alg_k;
3322 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3324 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3325 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3326 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3330 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3331 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3332 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3333 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3334 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3335 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3338 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3339 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3340 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3343 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3344 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3345 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3348 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3349 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3350 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3353 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3354 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3355 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3358 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3359 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3360 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3363 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3364 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3365 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3370 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3371 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3375 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3378 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3379 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3381 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3384 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3387 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3388 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3389 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3390 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3392 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3395 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3396 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3398 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3399 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3400 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3403 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3404 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3408 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3409 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3414 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3416 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3417 * the handshake_buffer
3419 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3420 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3423 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3425 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3427 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3428 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3432 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3433 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3435 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3436 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3441 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3444 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3447 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3450 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3451 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3452 PACKET spkt, context;
3454 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3456 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3457 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3458 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3462 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3463 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3464 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3465 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3467 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3471 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3472 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3474 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3478 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3479 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3480 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3482 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3483 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3487 certstart = certbytes;
3488 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3490 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3491 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3494 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3495 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3496 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3497 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3501 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3502 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3505 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3506 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3507 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3511 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3512 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3513 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3514 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3515 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3516 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3517 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3520 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3523 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3524 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3525 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3526 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3532 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3533 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3534 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3536 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3537 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3540 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3541 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3542 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3543 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3544 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3545 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3548 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3549 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3550 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3555 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3557 SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result),
3558 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3559 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3563 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3564 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3567 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3569 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3570 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3571 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3577 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3578 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3579 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3580 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3581 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3584 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3585 int m = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
3587 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3588 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3589 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3590 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3594 if (m & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) {
3596 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
3598 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
3601 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3602 s->session = new_sess;
3605 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3606 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3607 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3609 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3610 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3612 if (new_sess != NULL)
3613 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
3616 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3619 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3620 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3625 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3626 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3630 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3632 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3633 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3634 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3635 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3639 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3643 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3647 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3649 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3653 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3658 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3659 * for the server Certificate message
3661 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3663 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3666 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3667 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3674 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3676 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3677 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3678 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3679 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3680 const unsigned char *const_p;
3681 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3684 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3685 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3686 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3688 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3690 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3694 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3695 if (ssl_randbytes(s, age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
3696 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3697 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3698 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3701 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3703 * ticket_nonce is set to a single 0 byte because we only ever send a
3704 * single ticket per connection. IMPORTANT: If we ever support multiple
3705 * tickets per connection then this will need to be changed.
3707 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick_nonce);
3708 s->session->ext.tick_nonce = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(char));
3709 if (s->session->ext.tick_nonce == NULL) {
3710 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3711 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3712 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3715 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len = 1;
3716 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
3717 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
3718 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
3719 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
3720 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
3721 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
3722 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3723 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3724 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3727 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
3729 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
3732 /* get session encoding length */
3733 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3735 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3738 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3739 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3740 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3743 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3745 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3746 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3750 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3751 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3752 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3753 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3754 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3759 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3761 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3766 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3769 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3771 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3772 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3775 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3777 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3778 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3779 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3780 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3781 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3782 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3786 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3788 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3789 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3792 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3795 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3796 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3798 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3799 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3800 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3805 /* Put timeout and length */
3806 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3807 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3808 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3809 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3810 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3814 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3815 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3820 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3821 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3824 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3826 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3828 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3829 if (ssl_randbytes(s, iv, iv_len) <= 0
3830 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3831 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv)
3832 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
3833 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
3834 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
3835 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3836 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3837 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3840 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3841 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3845 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3846 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3847 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3850 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3851 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3852 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3854 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add)
3855 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
3856 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
3857 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3858 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3859 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3860 /* Output key name */
3861 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3863 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3864 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3866 /* Encrypt session data */
3867 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3868 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3869 || encdata1 != encdata2
3870 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3871 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3872 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3873 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3874 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3875 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3876 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3877 macendoffset - macoffset)
3878 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3879 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3880 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3881 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3882 || macdata1 != macdata2
3883 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3885 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3889 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3890 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3892 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3895 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3896 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3902 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3903 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3908 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3909 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3911 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3913 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3914 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3915 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3916 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
3917 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3924 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3926 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3927 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3936 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3937 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3939 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3941 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3942 size_t next_proto_len;
3945 * The payload looks like:
3947 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3948 * uint8 padding_len;
3949 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3951 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3952 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3953 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3954 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
3955 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3956 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3959 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
3961 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
3962 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3963 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3966 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3968 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3972 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3974 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3976 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3983 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3985 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3987 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3988 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3991 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
3992 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
3993 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3994 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3995 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3999 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4000 * a record boundary.
4002 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4003 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
4004 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4005 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4006 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4009 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4010 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4011 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4012 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4013 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4016 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;