2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include <openssl/dh.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
27 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
30 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
31 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
32 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
33 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
35 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
36 * (transition not allowed)
38 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
40 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
43 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
44 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
45 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
47 switch (st->hand_state) {
51 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
52 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
53 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
54 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
58 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
59 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
60 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
67 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
68 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
69 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
70 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
71 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
75 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
76 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
83 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
84 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
85 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
89 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
90 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
96 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
97 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
98 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
105 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
106 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
108 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
111 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
112 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
113 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
124 /* No valid transition found */
129 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
130 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
131 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
132 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
134 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
135 * (transition not allowed)
137 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
139 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
141 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
142 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
147 switch (st->hand_state) {
153 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
154 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
155 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
160 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
162 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
163 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
165 * 2) If we did request one then
166 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
168 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
169 * list if we requested a certificate)
171 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
172 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
173 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
174 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
175 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
177 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
178 * not going to accept it because we require a client
181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
182 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
183 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
186 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
190 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
193 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
194 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
195 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
202 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
203 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
208 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
210 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
211 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
212 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
213 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
214 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
217 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
218 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
220 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
221 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
222 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
223 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
225 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
229 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
230 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
236 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
237 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
238 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
243 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
245 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
246 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
247 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
252 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
253 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
262 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
270 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
271 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
272 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
279 /* No valid transition found */
280 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
281 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
282 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
287 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
289 * Valid return values are:
293 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
295 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
298 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
299 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
300 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
301 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
302 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
305 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
307 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
311 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
312 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
313 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
314 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
315 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
318 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
319 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
329 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
331 * Valid return values are:
335 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
338 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
339 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
341 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
342 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
344 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
345 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
347 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
350 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
351 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
353 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
354 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
357 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
359 * ... except when the application insists on
360 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
363 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
364 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
365 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
367 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
370 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
378 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
379 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
382 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
384 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
387 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
388 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
391 switch (st->hand_state) {
393 /* Shouldn't happen */
394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
395 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
396 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
397 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
400 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
401 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
402 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
404 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
405 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
406 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
408 /* Try to read from the client instead */
409 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
411 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
412 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
413 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
415 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
416 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
417 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
419 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
420 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
426 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
427 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
429 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
430 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
432 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
435 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
440 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
442 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
443 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
444 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
447 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
449 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
453 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
455 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
456 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
457 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
459 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
460 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
464 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
466 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
468 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
469 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
471 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
472 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
475 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
476 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
480 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
481 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
487 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
488 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
489 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
490 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
495 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
496 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
498 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
500 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
503 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
504 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
508 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
510 switch (st->hand_state) {
512 /* Shouldn't happen */
513 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
514 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
515 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
516 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
519 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
520 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
521 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
522 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
523 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
525 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
526 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
527 /* SSLfatal() already called */
528 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
533 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
534 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
536 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
537 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
538 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
540 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
541 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
542 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
543 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
544 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
545 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
546 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
547 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
549 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
551 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
553 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
554 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
556 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
558 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
559 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
561 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
563 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
564 /* normal PSK or SRP */
565 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
566 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
567 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
568 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
569 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
570 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
573 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
579 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
585 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
586 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
587 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
588 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
592 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
593 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
599 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
600 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
601 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
603 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
604 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
606 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
609 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
610 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
611 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
615 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
617 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
618 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
619 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
621 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
622 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
623 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
625 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
627 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
629 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
630 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
635 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
636 * the server to the client.
638 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
640 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
642 switch (st->hand_state) {
644 /* No pre work to be done */
647 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
650 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
653 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
655 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
656 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
657 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
662 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
663 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
665 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
666 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
672 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
674 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
675 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
676 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
679 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
681 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
682 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
684 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
685 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
686 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
688 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
690 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
691 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
693 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
694 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
700 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
703 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
704 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
705 /* SSLfatal() already called */
708 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
710 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
711 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
712 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
713 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
717 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
719 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
720 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
721 && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
722 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
726 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
727 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
730 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
734 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
735 * server to the client.
737 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
739 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
743 switch (st->hand_state) {
745 /* No post work to be done */
748 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
749 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
751 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
752 /* SSLfatal() already called */
757 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
758 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
760 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
761 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
762 /* SSLfatal() already called */
766 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
767 * treat like it was the first packet
772 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
773 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
774 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
775 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
779 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
780 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
781 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
782 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
785 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
788 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
789 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
791 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
792 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
793 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
795 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
796 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
797 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
801 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
802 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
806 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
807 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
811 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
812 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
813 if (!statem_flush(s))
818 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
819 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
820 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
821 * something clever in the record layer for this.
823 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
824 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
825 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
826 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
827 /* SSLfatal() already called */
831 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
832 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
833 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
834 /* SSLfatal() already called */
840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
841 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
843 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
846 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
850 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
851 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
853 /* SSLfatal() already called */
858 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
861 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
862 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
866 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
867 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
870 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
872 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
875 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
879 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
880 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
881 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
882 &s->session->master_key_length)
883 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
884 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
885 /* SSLfatal() already called */
890 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
891 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
892 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
897 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
898 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
900 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
901 /* SSLfatal() already called */
906 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
907 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
912 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
916 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
919 * Valid return values are:
923 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
924 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
926 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
928 switch (st->hand_state) {
930 /* Shouldn't happen */
931 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
932 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
933 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
936 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
938 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
940 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
941 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
944 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
945 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
946 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
949 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
950 /* No construction function needed */
952 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
955 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
956 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
957 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
961 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
962 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
965 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
966 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
967 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
971 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
972 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
973 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
976 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
977 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
978 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
981 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
982 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
983 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
986 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
987 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
988 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
991 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
992 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
993 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
996 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
997 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
998 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1001 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1003 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1006 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1007 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1008 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1011 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1012 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1013 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1021 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1022 * calculated as follows:
1024 * 2 + # client_version
1025 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1026 * 1 + # length of session_id
1027 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1028 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1029 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1030 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1031 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1032 * 2 + # length of extensions
1033 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1035 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1037 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1038 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1041 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1042 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1044 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1046 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1048 switch (st->hand_state) {
1050 /* Shouldn't happen */
1053 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1054 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1056 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1057 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1059 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1060 return s->max_cert_list;
1062 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1063 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1065 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1066 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1069 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1070 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1073 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1074 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1076 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1077 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1079 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1080 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1085 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1087 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1089 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1091 switch (st->hand_state) {
1093 /* Shouldn't happen */
1094 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1095 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1096 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1097 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1099 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1100 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1102 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1103 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1105 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1106 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1108 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1109 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1111 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1112 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1115 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1116 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1119 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1120 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1122 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1123 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1125 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1126 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1132 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1135 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1137 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1139 switch (st->hand_state) {
1141 /* Shouldn't happen */
1142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1143 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1144 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1147 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1148 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1150 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1151 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1156 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1157 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1160 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1162 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1163 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1164 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1166 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1169 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1170 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1171 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1174 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1177 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1178 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1179 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1180 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1181 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1190 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1193 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1194 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1195 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1201 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1203 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1204 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1205 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1206 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1207 cookie_leni > 255) {
1208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1209 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1212 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1214 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1215 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1216 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1217 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1226 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1227 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1228 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1232 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1234 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1235 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1236 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1237 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1239 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1241 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1242 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1243 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1244 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1245 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1246 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1247 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1249 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1250 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1251 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1252 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1253 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1254 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1255 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1256 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1257 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1258 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1259 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1260 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1261 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1263 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1264 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1269 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1271 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1272 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1273 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1277 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1280 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1281 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1283 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1286 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1288 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1290 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1291 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1292 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1293 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1295 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1296 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1297 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1298 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1299 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1302 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
1303 || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding
1305 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1306 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1307 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1313 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1314 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1316 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1321 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1323 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1324 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1326 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1329 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1330 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1331 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1332 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1337 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1338 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1339 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1340 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1342 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1343 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1345 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1346 * 7-8 session_id_length
1347 * 9-10 challenge_length
1351 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1352 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1354 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1355 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1356 * in the first place
1358 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1359 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1364 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1366 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1370 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1371 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1373 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1374 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1375 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1377 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1380 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1381 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1382 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1384 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1388 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1390 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1394 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1396 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1397 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1398 /* No extensions. */
1399 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1401 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1404 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1406 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1407 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1408 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1409 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1411 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1412 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1413 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1414 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1415 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1416 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1417 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1418 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1420 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1424 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1426 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1427 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1428 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1429 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1430 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1431 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1433 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1437 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1438 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1440 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1443 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1444 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1445 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1447 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1451 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1452 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1453 * So check cookie length...
1455 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1456 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1457 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1461 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1462 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1463 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1467 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1468 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1469 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1473 /* Could be empty. */
1474 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1475 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1477 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1478 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1480 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1486 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1487 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1488 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1489 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1490 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1494 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1495 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1496 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1497 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1498 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1499 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1502 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1504 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1507 if (clienthello != NULL)
1508 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1509 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1511 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1514 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1517 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1522 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1524 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1525 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1526 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1527 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1528 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1530 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1531 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1532 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1533 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1534 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1535 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1537 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1538 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1540 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1543 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1544 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1549 /* Set up the client_random */
1550 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1552 /* Choose the version */
1554 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1555 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1556 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1557 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1559 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1562 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1563 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1564 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1568 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1571 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1572 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1574 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1575 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1576 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1577 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1578 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1584 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1585 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1586 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1588 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1589 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1593 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1594 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1595 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1596 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1597 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1601 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1602 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1603 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1604 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1605 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1606 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1607 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1608 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1609 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1611 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1613 /* default verification */
1614 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1615 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1616 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1617 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1618 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1619 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1622 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1624 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1625 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1626 if (protverr != 0) {
1627 s->version = s->client_version;
1628 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1629 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1637 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1638 clienthello->isv2) ||
1639 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1640 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1641 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1645 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1646 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1647 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1648 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1649 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1650 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1651 if (s->renegotiate) {
1652 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1653 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1654 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1655 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1658 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1659 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1660 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1662 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1663 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1664 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1665 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1666 * an insecure downgrade.
1668 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1669 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1670 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1676 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1677 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1678 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1679 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1681 if (cipher == NULL) {
1682 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1683 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1684 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1687 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1688 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1689 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1691 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1692 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1694 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1695 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1699 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1702 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1703 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1704 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1705 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1706 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1711 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1712 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1714 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1715 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1716 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1717 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1718 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1719 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1720 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1721 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1722 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1723 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1726 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1728 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1729 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1730 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1734 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1736 /* previous session */
1738 } else if (i == -1) {
1739 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1743 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1744 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1750 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1751 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1752 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1753 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1757 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1758 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1760 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1762 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1765 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1767 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1768 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1770 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1771 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1780 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1783 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1784 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1785 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1790 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1791 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1795 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1797 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1798 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1799 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1804 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1805 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1806 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1808 /* TLS extensions */
1809 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1810 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1811 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1816 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1817 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1818 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1819 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1823 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1824 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1826 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1827 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1833 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1836 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1837 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1839 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1840 * backwards compat reasons
1842 int master_key_length;
1844 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1845 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1846 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1848 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1849 && master_key_length > 0) {
1850 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1852 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1853 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1857 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1858 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1859 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1860 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1861 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1862 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1863 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1864 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1868 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1869 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1870 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1871 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1872 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1877 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1878 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1879 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1881 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1882 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1884 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1885 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1886 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1888 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1889 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1890 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1891 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1896 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1897 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1898 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1900 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1901 /* Can't disable compression */
1902 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1903 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1904 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1905 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1908 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1909 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1910 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1911 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1912 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1916 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1917 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1918 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1919 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1922 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1923 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1924 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1927 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1928 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1929 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1930 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1933 } else if (s->hit) {
1935 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1936 /* See if we have a match */
1937 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1940 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1941 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1942 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1944 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1945 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1954 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1960 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1961 * using compression.
1963 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1965 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1966 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1972 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1975 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1976 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1977 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1978 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1979 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1980 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1981 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1988 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1989 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1991 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1993 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1994 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1999 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2000 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2001 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2002 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2003 s->clienthello = NULL;
2006 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2007 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2008 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2009 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2010 s->clienthello = NULL;
2016 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2017 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2019 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2021 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2024 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2025 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2026 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2027 * influence which certificate is sent
2029 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2030 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2033 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2034 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
2036 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2037 * et al can pick it up.
2039 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2040 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2042 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2043 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2044 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2046 /* status request response should be sent */
2047 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2048 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2049 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2051 /* something bad happened */
2052 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2054 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2055 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2056 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2066 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2067 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2069 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2071 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2072 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2074 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2075 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2076 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
2077 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
2078 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2080 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2081 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2082 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2083 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2085 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2088 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2090 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2091 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
2094 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2095 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2096 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2097 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2098 selected_len) != 0) {
2099 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2100 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2104 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2105 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2108 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2110 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2111 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2114 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2116 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2117 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2118 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2119 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2122 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2127 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2128 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2129 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2133 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2138 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2139 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2140 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2141 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2147 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2149 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2151 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2152 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2154 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2161 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2162 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2163 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2164 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2165 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2167 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2168 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2169 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2173 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2176 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2179 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2180 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2182 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2184 if (cipher == NULL) {
2185 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2186 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2187 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2190 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2193 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2194 /* SSLfatal already called */
2197 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2198 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2199 s->session->not_resumable =
2200 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2201 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2202 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2203 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2204 /* do not send a session ticket */
2205 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2208 /* Session-id reuse */
2209 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2213 * we now have the following setup.
2215 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2216 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2217 * compression - basically ignored right now
2218 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2219 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2220 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2221 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2225 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2226 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2228 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2229 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2233 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2234 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2235 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2236 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2238 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2239 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2246 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2248 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2250 * callback indicates further work to be done
2252 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2256 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2262 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2267 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2272 unsigned char *session_id;
2273 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2275 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2276 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2278 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2279 * tls_process_client_hello()
2281 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2282 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2283 ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random,
2284 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2286 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2291 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2292 * back in the server hello:
2293 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2294 * we send back the old session ID.
2295 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2296 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2297 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2298 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2300 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2301 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2302 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2304 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2305 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2308 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2309 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2311 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2314 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2315 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2317 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2318 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2321 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2323 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2327 /* set up the compression method */
2328 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2331 if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2334 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2337 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2338 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2339 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)
2340 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2341 s->hello_retry_request
2343 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2345 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2346 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2348 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2352 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2353 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2354 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2359 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2360 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2362 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2363 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2366 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2367 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2368 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2375 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2377 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2378 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2379 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2386 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2389 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2392 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2393 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2396 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2400 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2401 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2402 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2404 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2406 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2410 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2411 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2412 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2416 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2418 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2420 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2421 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2423 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2425 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2426 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2428 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2431 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2432 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2433 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2434 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2437 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2438 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2441 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2444 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2446 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2447 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2448 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2450 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2451 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2452 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2457 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2458 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2459 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2460 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2463 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2464 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2466 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2467 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2470 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2472 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2473 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2477 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2478 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2479 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2483 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2485 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2488 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2489 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2492 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2493 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2495 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2496 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2497 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2498 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2502 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2503 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2504 if (curve_id == 0) {
2505 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2506 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2507 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2510 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2511 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2512 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2513 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2517 /* Encode the public key. */
2518 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2520 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2521 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2522 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2527 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2528 * can set these to NULLs
2535 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2537 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2538 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2539 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2540 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2542 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2543 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2546 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2547 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2548 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2549 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2554 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2555 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2559 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2560 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2562 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2563 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2564 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2568 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2569 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2570 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2571 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2574 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2575 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2577 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2578 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2580 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2581 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2582 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2588 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2589 unsigned char *binval;
2592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2593 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2594 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2597 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2600 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2601 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2602 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2608 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2609 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2612 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2613 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2616 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2617 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2618 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2619 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2622 memset(binval, 0, len);
2626 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2627 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2628 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2629 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2630 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2634 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2638 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2640 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2641 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2642 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2645 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2646 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2647 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2648 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2649 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2650 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2651 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2654 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2655 encodedPoint = NULL;
2661 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2663 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2664 size_t siglen, tbslen;
2667 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2668 /* Should never happen */
2669 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2670 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2671 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2674 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2675 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2676 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2677 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2678 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2681 /* send signature algorithm */
2682 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2683 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2684 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2685 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2689 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2690 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2691 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2694 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2695 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2696 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2697 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2698 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2699 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2702 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2703 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2704 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2705 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2706 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2711 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2712 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2715 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2718 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
2720 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2721 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2722 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2723 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2724 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2729 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2733 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2736 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2738 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2742 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2744 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2745 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2746 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2747 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2748 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2749 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
2750 || RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0
2751 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
2752 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2753 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2754 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2757 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2758 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2759 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2763 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2764 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2765 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2766 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2771 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2772 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2774 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2780 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2781 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2782 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2783 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2784 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2788 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2789 const uint16_t *psigs;
2790 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2792 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2793 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2794 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2795 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2796 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2797 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2798 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2803 if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2804 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2810 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2814 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2816 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2817 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2819 PACKET psk_identity;
2821 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2822 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2823 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2826 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2827 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2828 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2831 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2832 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2833 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2837 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2839 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2843 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2846 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2848 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2850 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2852 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2854 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2855 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2856 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2860 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2861 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2862 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2864 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2865 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2866 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2870 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2874 /* Should never happen */
2875 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2876 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2881 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2884 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2886 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2887 size_t j, padding_len;
2888 PACKET enc_premaster;
2890 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2893 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2895 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2896 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2900 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2901 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2902 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2904 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2905 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2906 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2907 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2913 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2914 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2915 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2916 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2918 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2919 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2920 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2924 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2925 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2926 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2927 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2932 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2933 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2934 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2935 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2936 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2939 if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2940 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2941 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2942 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2947 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2948 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2950 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2951 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2952 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2953 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2954 if (decrypt_len < 0) {
2955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2956 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2960 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2963 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2964 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2965 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2967 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2968 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2969 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2973 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2974 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2975 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2976 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2977 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2979 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2982 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2983 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2984 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2985 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2986 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2987 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2990 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2991 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2993 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2994 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2997 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2998 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2999 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
3000 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
3001 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
3002 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
3005 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
3006 unsigned char workaround_good;
3007 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3008 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
3010 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3011 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
3012 version_good |= workaround_good;
3016 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
3017 * remain non-zero (0xff).
3019 decrypt_good &= version_good;
3022 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
3023 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
3024 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
3025 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
3027 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
3028 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
3029 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
3030 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
3031 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
3034 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
3035 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
3036 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3042 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3045 /* Should never happen */
3046 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3047 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3052 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3054 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3055 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3059 const unsigned char *data;
3060 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3063 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3064 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3065 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3068 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3070 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3071 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3075 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3077 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3080 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3081 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3082 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3083 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3086 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3087 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3092 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3093 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3095 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3096 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3097 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3098 if (pub_key != NULL)
3103 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3104 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3109 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3110 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3112 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3115 /* Should never happen */
3116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3117 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3122 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3125 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3126 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3129 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3130 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3131 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3132 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3136 const unsigned char *data;
3139 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3140 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3143 /* Get encoded point length */
3144 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3145 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3147 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3150 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3151 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3156 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3157 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3163 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3164 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3169 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3170 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3172 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3176 /* Should never happen */
3177 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3178 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3183 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3187 const unsigned char *data;
3189 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3190 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3191 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3192 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3195 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3196 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3200 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3201 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3202 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3205 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3206 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3207 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3209 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3213 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3214 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3220 /* Should never happen */
3221 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3222 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3227 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3230 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3231 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3232 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3233 const unsigned char *start;
3234 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3235 unsigned long alg_a;
3236 unsigned int asn1id, asn1len;
3240 /* Get our certificate private key */
3241 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3242 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3244 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3246 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3248 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3251 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3253 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3254 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3257 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3258 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3260 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3263 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3265 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3269 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3270 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3271 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3272 * client certificate for authorization only.
3274 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3275 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3276 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3279 /* Decrypt session key */
3280 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &asn1id)
3281 || asn1id != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3282 || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt, &asn1len)) {
3283 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3284 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3287 if (asn1len == 0x81) {
3289 * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else
3291 * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail
3293 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 1)) {
3294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3295 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3298 } else if (asn1len >= 0x80) {
3300 * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't
3303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3304 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3306 } /* else short form length */
3308 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encdata)) {
3309 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3310 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3313 inlen = PACKET_remaining(&encdata);
3314 start = PACKET_data(&encdata);
3316 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3319 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3322 /* Generate master secret */
3323 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3324 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3325 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3328 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3329 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3331 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3335 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3338 /* Should never happen */
3339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3340 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3345 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3347 unsigned long alg_k;
3349 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3351 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3352 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3353 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3357 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3358 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3359 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3361 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3362 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3365 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3366 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3367 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3370 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3371 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3372 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3375 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3376 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3377 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3380 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3381 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3382 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3385 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3386 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3387 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3390 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3391 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3392 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3397 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3398 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3402 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3405 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3406 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3408 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3411 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3414 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3415 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3416 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3417 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3419 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3422 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3423 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3425 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3426 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3427 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3429 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3430 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3431 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3435 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3436 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3441 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3443 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3444 * the handshake_buffer
3446 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3447 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3450 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3452 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3454 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3455 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3459 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3460 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3462 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3463 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3468 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3471 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3474 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3477 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3478 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3479 PACKET spkt, context;
3481 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3483 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3484 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3485 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3489 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3490 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3491 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3492 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3494 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3498 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3499 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3500 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3501 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3505 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3506 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3507 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3509 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3510 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3514 certstart = certbytes;
3515 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3517 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3518 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3521 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3523 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3524 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3528 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3529 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3532 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3533 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3534 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3538 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3539 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3540 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3541 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3542 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3543 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3544 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3547 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3550 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3551 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3552 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3553 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3559 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3560 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3561 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3562 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3563 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3564 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3567 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3568 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3569 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3570 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3571 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3572 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3575 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3576 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3577 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3582 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3584 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3585 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3586 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3590 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3591 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3594 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3596 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3597 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3598 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3604 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3605 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3606 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3607 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3608 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3611 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3612 int m = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
3614 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3615 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3616 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3617 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3621 if (m & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) {
3623 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
3625 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
3628 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3629 s->session = new_sess;
3632 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3633 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3634 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3636 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3637 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3640 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3643 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3644 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3649 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3650 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3654 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3656 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3657 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3658 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3659 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3663 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3667 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3671 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3673 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3676 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3677 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3682 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3683 * for the server Certificate message
3685 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3686 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3687 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3690 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3691 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3698 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3700 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3701 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3702 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3703 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3704 const unsigned char *const_p;
3705 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3708 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3709 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3710 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3712 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3714 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3718 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3719 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED) {
3720 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
3723 * This is the first session ticket we've sent. In the state
3724 * machine we "cheated" and tacked this onto the end of the first
3725 * handshake. From an info callback perspective this should appear
3726 * like the start of a new handshake.
3728 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
3729 cb = s->info_callback;
3730 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
3731 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
3733 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
3736 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
3737 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3740 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
3741 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3742 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3743 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3746 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3748 * ticket_nonce is set to a single 0 byte because we only ever send a
3749 * single ticket per connection. IMPORTANT: If we ever support multiple
3750 * tickets per connection then this will need to be changed.
3752 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick_nonce);
3753 s->session->ext.tick_nonce = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(char));
3754 if (s->session->ext.tick_nonce == NULL) {
3755 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3756 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3757 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3760 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len = 1;
3761 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
3762 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
3763 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
3764 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
3765 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
3766 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
3767 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3768 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3769 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3772 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
3774 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
3777 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
3778 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
3781 /* get session encoding length */
3782 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3784 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3787 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3788 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3789 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3792 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3794 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3795 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3799 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3800 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3801 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3802 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3803 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3808 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3809 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3810 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3815 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3818 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3821 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3825 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3826 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3827 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3828 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3829 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3830 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3834 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3835 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3836 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3837 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3840 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3843 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3844 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3846 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3847 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3848 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3853 /* Put timeout and length */
3854 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3855 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3856 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3857 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3858 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3862 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3863 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3867 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3868 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3869 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3872 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3874 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3876 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3877 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0
3878 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3879 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
3880 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
3881 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
3882 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
3883 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3884 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3885 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3888 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3889 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3893 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3894 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3895 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3898 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3899 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3900 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3902 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add)
3903 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
3904 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
3905 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3906 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3907 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3908 /* Output key name */
3909 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3911 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3912 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3914 /* Encrypt session data */
3915 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3916 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3917 || encdata1 != encdata2
3918 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3919 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3920 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3921 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3922 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3923 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3924 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3925 macendoffset - macoffset)
3926 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3927 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3928 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3929 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3930 || macdata1 != macdata2
3931 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3932 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3933 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3936 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3937 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
3938 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3939 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3941 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3945 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3946 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3952 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3953 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3958 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3959 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3961 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3963 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3964 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3965 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3966 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
3967 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3974 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3976 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3977 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3986 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3987 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3989 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3991 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3992 size_t next_proto_len;
3995 * The payload looks like:
3997 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3998 * uint8 padding_len;
3999 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4001 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4002 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4003 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4004 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4005 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4006 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4009 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4012 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4013 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4016 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4018 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4022 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4024 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4026 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4033 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4035 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4036 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4037 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4038 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4041 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4042 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4043 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4044 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4045 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4049 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4050 * a record boundary.
4052 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4053 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
4054 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4055 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4056 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4059 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4060 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4061 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4062 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4063 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4066 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;