2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
65 PACKET *cipher_suites,
67 **skp, int sslv2format,
71 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
72 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
73 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
74 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
76 * Valid return values are:
77 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
78 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
80 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
82 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
84 switch (st->hand_state) {
89 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
90 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
91 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
96 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
98 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
99 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
101 * 2) If we did request one then
102 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
104 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
105 * list if we requested a certificate)
107 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
108 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
109 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
110 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
111 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
113 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
114 * not going to accept it because we require a client
117 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
118 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
119 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
120 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
130 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
131 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
132 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
139 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
140 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
145 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
147 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
148 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
149 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
150 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
151 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
154 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
157 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
158 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
159 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
160 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
173 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
174 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
175 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
180 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
182 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
183 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
184 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
189 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
190 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
199 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
200 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
201 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
207 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
208 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
215 /* No valid transition found */
216 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
217 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
222 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
224 * Valid return values are:
228 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
230 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
233 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
234 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
235 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
236 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
237 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
240 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
242 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
246 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
247 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
248 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
249 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
250 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
253 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
254 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
264 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
266 * Valid return values are:
270 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
273 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
274 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
276 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
277 * during re-negotiation:
279 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
280 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
282 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
283 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
286 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
288 * ... except when the application insists on
289 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
292 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
293 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
294 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
296 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
299 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
307 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
308 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
310 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
312 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
314 switch (st->hand_state) {
316 /* Shouldn't happen */
317 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
320 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
321 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
324 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
326 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
328 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
330 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
331 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
333 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
334 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
335 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
336 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
339 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
341 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
342 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
344 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
346 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
347 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
351 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
352 /* normal PSK or SRP */
353 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
354 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
356 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
357 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
358 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
359 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
361 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
364 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
367 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
368 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
369 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
373 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
374 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
375 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
376 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
380 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
381 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
382 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
383 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
387 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
388 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
389 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
391 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
394 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
396 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
397 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
398 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
399 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
400 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
402 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
407 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
410 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
411 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
412 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
414 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
416 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
419 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
420 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
426 * the server to the client.
428 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
430 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
432 switch (st->hand_state) {
434 /* No pre work to be done */
437 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
440 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
443 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
445 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
446 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
447 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
452 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
453 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
455 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
456 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
462 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
464 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
465 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
467 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
469 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
470 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
472 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
473 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
479 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
480 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
481 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
482 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
485 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
487 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
488 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
489 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
490 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
494 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
497 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
500 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
504 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
505 * server to the client.
507 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
509 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
513 switch (st->hand_state) {
515 /* No post work to be done */
518 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
519 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
521 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
522 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
527 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
528 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
530 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
531 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
532 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
536 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
537 * treat like it was the first packet
542 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
544 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
545 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
546 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
549 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
552 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
553 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
555 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
556 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
557 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
559 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
563 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
564 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
569 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
571 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
573 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
576 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
580 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
581 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
583 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
588 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
591 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
592 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
596 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
597 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
600 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
602 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
605 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
612 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
616 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
619 * Valid return values are:
623 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
624 int (**confunc) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt),
627 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
629 switch (st->hand_state) {
631 /* Shouldn't happen */
634 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
636 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
638 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
639 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
642 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
643 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
644 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
647 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
648 /* No construction function needed */
650 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
653 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
654 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
655 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
659 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
660 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
663 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
664 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
665 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
668 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
669 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
670 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
673 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
674 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
675 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
678 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
679 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
680 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
683 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
684 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
685 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
688 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
689 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
690 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
698 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
699 * calculated as follows:
701 * 2 + # client_version
702 * 32 + # only valid length for random
703 * 1 + # length of session_id
704 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
705 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
706 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
707 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
708 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
709 * 2 + # length of extensions
710 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
712 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
714 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
715 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
718 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
719 * reading. Excludes the message header.
721 unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
723 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
725 switch (st->hand_state) {
727 /* Shouldn't happen */
730 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
731 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
734 return s->max_cert_list;
736 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
737 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
739 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
740 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
743 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
744 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
747 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
748 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
750 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
751 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
756 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
758 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
760 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
762 switch (st->hand_state) {
764 /* Shouldn't happen */
765 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
767 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
768 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
771 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
773 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
774 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
776 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
777 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
779 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
780 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
781 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
784 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
785 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
787 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
788 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
793 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
796 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
798 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
800 switch (st->hand_state) {
802 /* Shouldn't happen */
805 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
806 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
808 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
809 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
811 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
812 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
813 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
814 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
815 /* Are we renegotiating? */
816 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
817 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
818 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
819 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
820 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
821 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
824 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
827 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
833 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
835 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
837 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
839 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
840 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
841 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
843 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
847 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
849 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
856 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
857 unsigned char cookie_len)
859 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
860 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
861 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
867 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
869 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
870 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
871 &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
872 s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
873 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
874 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
878 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
879 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
880 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
887 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
889 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
890 unsigned int j, complen = 0;
893 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
894 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
896 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
898 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
899 PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
901 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
903 is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
905 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
906 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
908 unsigned int version;
911 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
912 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
913 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
914 * the rest right through. Its format is:
916 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
917 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
919 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
920 * 7-8 session_id_length
921 * 9-10 challenge_length
925 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
926 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
928 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
929 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
936 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
937 /* No protocol version supplied! */
938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
941 if (version == 0x0002) {
942 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
945 } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
947 s->client_version = version;
949 /* No idea what protocol this is */
950 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
955 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
956 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
958 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
959 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
966 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
967 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
969 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
970 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
971 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
972 DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) {
973 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
980 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
982 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
985 s->version = s->client_version;
987 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
991 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
994 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
995 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
996 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
998 unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1001 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
1002 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1003 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1005 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1006 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1010 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1011 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1016 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
1017 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
1018 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1019 /* No extensions. */
1020 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1022 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1023 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1027 /* Load the client random and compression list. */
1028 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
1030 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1031 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1032 s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1033 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1034 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1035 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1036 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1037 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1041 PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
1043 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1044 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1045 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1046 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1051 if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1052 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1057 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1058 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1059 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1064 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1065 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1066 * So check cookie length...
1068 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1069 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
1074 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
1075 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1076 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1080 /* Could be empty. */
1084 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1085 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1086 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1087 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1088 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
1089 PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) ==
1091 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1092 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1093 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1095 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1097 /* default verification */
1098 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1099 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1103 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1105 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1106 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
1107 if (protverr != 0) {
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1109 s->version = s->client_version;
1110 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1119 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1120 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1122 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1123 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1124 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1125 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1126 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1127 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1128 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1129 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1130 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1131 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1136 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1137 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1140 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
1142 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1144 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1145 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1146 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1147 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1148 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1150 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1151 /* previous session */
1153 } else if (i == -1) {
1157 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1162 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
1163 is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
1167 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1170 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1173 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1175 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1176 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1178 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1179 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1188 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1191 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1193 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1198 complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
1199 for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
1200 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
1206 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1211 /* TLS extensions */
1212 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1213 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1220 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1221 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1222 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1223 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1227 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1228 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1233 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1234 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1236 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1237 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1238 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1240 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1242 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1243 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1247 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1249 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1254 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1255 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1260 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1261 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1262 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1263 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1264 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1269 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1270 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1271 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1273 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1275 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1276 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1277 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1279 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1280 /* Can't disable compression */
1281 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1283 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1286 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1287 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1288 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1289 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1290 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1294 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1296 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1299 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1300 for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
1301 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
1305 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1307 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1312 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1313 /* See if we have a match */
1314 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1317 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1318 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1319 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1321 for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
1322 if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
1331 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1337 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1338 * using compression.
1340 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1347 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1351 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1352 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1354 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1356 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1357 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1358 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1359 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1364 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1370 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1371 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1373 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1375 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1377 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1378 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1382 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1384 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1385 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1387 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1389 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1390 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1391 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1393 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1395 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1399 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1402 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1405 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1407 if (cipher == NULL) {
1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1409 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1412 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1413 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1414 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1415 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1416 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1417 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1418 /* do not send a session ticket */
1419 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1421 /* Session-id reuse */
1422 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1425 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1426 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1427 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1433 * we now have the following setup.
1435 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1436 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1437 * compression - basically ignored right now
1438 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1439 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1440 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1441 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1444 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1445 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1446 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
1447 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1448 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1456 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1458 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1460 * callback indicates further work to be done
1462 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1465 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1467 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1468 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1470 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1472 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1479 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1481 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1482 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1486 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1488 int sl, compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1491 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version)
1493 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1494 * tls_process_client_hello()
1496 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1502 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1503 * back in the server hello:
1504 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1505 * we send back the old session ID.
1506 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1507 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1508 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1509 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1511 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1512 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1513 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1514 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1517 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1518 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1520 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1522 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1523 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1528 /* set up the compression method */
1529 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1532 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1535 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1538 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl)
1539 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
1540 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)
1541 || !ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s)
1542 || !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al)) {
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1549 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1553 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1555 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1556 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1557 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1567 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1569 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1570 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1575 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1576 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
1579 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1580 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
1582 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1587 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1588 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1592 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1594 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1596 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1597 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1599 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1601 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1602 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1604 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
1607 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1608 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1609 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
1610 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1613 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1616 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
1619 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1621 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1622 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
1623 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1626 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1631 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
1632 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1634 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1637 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1638 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
1639 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1641 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1644 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1646 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1650 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
1652 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1657 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1659 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1662 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
1663 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
1666 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1667 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1670 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1672 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1676 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1677 nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1678 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
1679 if (curve_id == 0) {
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1681 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1684 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1685 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1686 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1691 /* Encode the public key. */
1692 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
1694 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1700 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1701 * can set these to NULLs
1708 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1710 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1711 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1712 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1713 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1715 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1718 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1719 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1720 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1721 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1725 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1727 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1731 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1732 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1733 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1735 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1743 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1744 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
1745 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1748 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
1749 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
1751 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
1752 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1755 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1761 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1762 unsigned char *binval;
1765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1766 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1767 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
1770 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1774 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1780 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1781 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1784 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
1785 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
1788 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
1789 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1790 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1793 memset(binval, 0, len);
1797 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
1798 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1799 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1800 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1804 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
1807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1808 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1810 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
1811 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1812 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
1815 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
1816 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1817 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
1818 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
1819 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1820 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1823 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1824 encodedPoint = NULL;
1831 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1832 * points to the space at the end.
1835 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
1836 unsigned int siglen;
1838 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
1839 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
1840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1841 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1844 /* send signature algorithm */
1845 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1846 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
1847 /* Should never happen */
1848 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1849 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1854 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1857 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
1858 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
1859 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
1862 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey),
1864 || EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1865 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1866 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1867 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1868 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1869 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
1871 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, pkey) <= 0
1872 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
1873 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
1874 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1875 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1879 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1880 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1881 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1882 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1887 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1890 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1893 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1896 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1898 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1902 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1905 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1907 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1908 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1909 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt)
1910 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1911 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1915 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1916 const unsigned char *psigs;
1917 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
1918 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1919 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
1920 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1922 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1927 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
1928 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1929 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1933 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1935 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
1936 unsigned char *namebytes;
1937 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
1941 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
1942 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
1944 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
1945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1946 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1951 /* else no CA names */
1953 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1954 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1958 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
1962 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1966 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1969 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
1971 PACKET psk_identity;
1973 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
1974 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1978 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1979 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1983 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
1984 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
1989 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
1990 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1991 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1995 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
1998 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
1999 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2002 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2004 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2006 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2008 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2012 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2013 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2014 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2016 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2017 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2022 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2026 /* Should never happen */
2027 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2033 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2036 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2038 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2039 size_t j, padding_len;
2040 PACKET enc_premaster;
2042 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2045 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2047 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2052 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2053 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2054 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2056 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2057 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2058 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2065 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2066 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2067 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2068 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2070 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2071 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2076 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2077 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2078 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2079 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2084 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2085 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2086 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2087 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2088 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2091 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2095 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2096 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2098 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2099 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2100 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2101 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2104 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2107 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2108 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2109 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2111 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2112 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2117 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2118 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2119 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2120 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2121 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2123 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2126 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2127 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2128 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2129 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2130 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2131 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2134 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2135 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2137 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2138 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2141 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2142 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2143 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2144 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2145 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2146 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2149 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2150 unsigned char workaround_good;
2151 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2152 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2154 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2155 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2156 version_good |= workaround_good;
2160 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2161 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2163 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2166 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2167 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2168 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2169 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2171 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2172 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2173 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2174 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2175 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2178 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2179 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2180 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2181 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2187 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2190 /* Should never happen */
2191 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2192 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2197 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2200 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2204 const unsigned char *data;
2205 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2208 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2209 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2210 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2211 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2214 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2216 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2217 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2221 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2222 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2226 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2227 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2228 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2232 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2233 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2234 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2237 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2238 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2240 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2241 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2242 if (pub_key != NULL)
2247 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2248 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2249 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2254 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2255 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2257 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2260 /* Should never happen */
2261 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2267 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2270 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2271 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2274 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2275 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2276 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2281 const unsigned char *data;
2284 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2285 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2288 /* Get encoded point length */
2289 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2290 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2291 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2295 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2296 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2300 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2301 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2307 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2308 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2314 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2315 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2317 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2321 /* Should never happen */
2322 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2328 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2332 const unsigned char *data;
2334 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2335 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2336 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2340 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2344 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2345 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2346 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2349 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2350 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2351 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2352 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2356 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2363 /* Should never happen */
2364 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2365 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2370 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2373 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2374 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2375 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2376 const unsigned char *start;
2377 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2378 unsigned long alg_a;
2382 const unsigned char *data;
2385 /* Get our certificate private key */
2386 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2387 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2389 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2391 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2393 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2396 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2398 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2399 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2402 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2403 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2404 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2405 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2408 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2409 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2414 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2415 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2416 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2417 * client certificate for authorization only.
2419 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2420 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2421 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2424 /* Decrypt session key */
2425 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2426 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2427 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2428 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2431 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2432 &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2433 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2434 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2440 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2441 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2442 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2446 /* Generate master secret */
2447 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2448 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2449 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2453 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2454 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2455 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2456 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2460 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2463 /* Should never happen */
2464 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2470 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2473 unsigned long alg_k;
2475 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2477 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2478 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2481 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2482 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2483 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2484 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2485 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2486 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2489 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2490 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2491 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2495 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2496 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2498 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2499 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2501 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2502 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2504 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2505 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2507 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2508 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2511 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2513 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2517 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2520 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2522 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2523 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2525 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2526 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2529 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2532 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2533 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2534 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2535 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2537 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2540 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2541 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2543 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2544 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2545 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
2547 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2551 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2552 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2557 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2559 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2560 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2562 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2563 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2564 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2565 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2566 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2567 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2568 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2569 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2572 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2576 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
2578 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
2579 * the handshake_buffer
2581 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2582 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2585 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2587 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2588 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2589 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2590 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2594 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2595 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2597 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2598 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2603 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2606 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2608 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2609 const unsigned char *sig, *data;
2610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2611 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
2613 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2617 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2621 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2624 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2625 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2629 peer = s->session->peer;
2630 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
2631 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2633 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2634 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
2635 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2636 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2640 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2642 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2643 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2646 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
2647 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2652 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2655 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2656 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2659 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2661 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2663 } else if (rv == 0) {
2664 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2668 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2671 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2672 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
2674 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
2676 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2681 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2683 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2687 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2688 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
2689 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2691 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2694 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2696 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2700 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2701 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2702 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2703 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2707 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2709 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2710 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2712 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2717 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2718 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2719 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2720 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2721 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
2722 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2723 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2726 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
2732 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2733 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2734 s->session->master_key_length,
2735 s->session->master_key)) {
2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2737 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2741 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
2742 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2747 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2750 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2751 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2753 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2754 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2755 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2757 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
2762 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2764 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2766 unsigned long l, llen;
2767 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
2768 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2771 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2776 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
2777 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
2778 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2779 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2780 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2784 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
2785 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
2786 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
2787 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2789 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2793 certstart = certbytes;
2794 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
2796 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2799 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
2800 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2801 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2802 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2805 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2806 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2812 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2813 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2814 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2815 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2817 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2820 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2821 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2822 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2823 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2824 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2825 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2828 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2829 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2834 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2836 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2838 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
2843 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2846 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
2848 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2850 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2855 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2856 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2857 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2859 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
2860 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
2862 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
2863 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
2866 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2870 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2871 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2874 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2878 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2882 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2884 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2888 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2896 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2898 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
2899 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
2900 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2901 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
2902 const unsigned char *const_p;
2903 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
2906 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2907 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2908 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
2910 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
2912 /* get session encoding length */
2913 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2915 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
2918 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
2919 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2922 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
2924 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2928 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2929 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2930 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2936 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
2940 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
2943 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
2946 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
2948 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
2949 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
2950 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2954 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
2955 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2958 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2961 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
2962 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
2964 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2965 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
2966 int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
2971 /* Put timeout and length */
2972 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
2973 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
2974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2975 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2979 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2980 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
2985 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
2987 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
2989 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
2990 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
2992 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
2993 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
2995 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
2996 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
2997 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
2999 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3000 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
3004 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3005 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3006 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3008 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3009 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3010 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3011 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3012 /* Output key name */
3013 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3015 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3016 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3018 /* Encrypt session data */
3019 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3020 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3021 || encdata1 != encdata2
3022 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3023 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3024 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3025 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3026 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3027 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3028 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3029 macendoffset - macoffset)
3030 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3031 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3032 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3033 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3034 || macdata1 != macdata2
3035 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3039 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3040 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3046 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3047 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3048 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3052 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3054 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->tlsext_status_type)
3055 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
3056 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3058 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3065 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3067 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3068 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3070 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3072 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3073 size_t next_proto_len;
3076 * The payload looks like:
3078 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3079 * uint8 padding_len;
3080 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3082 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3083 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3084 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3089 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
3090 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3094 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3096 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3098 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3099 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3103 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3105 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3106 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3107 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3108 int sslv2format, int *al)
3110 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3111 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3113 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3114 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3116 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3118 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3120 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3122 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3126 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3128 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3129 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3133 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3134 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3137 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3142 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3145 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3146 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3147 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3151 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3153 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3154 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3155 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3157 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3160 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3161 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3162 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3163 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3164 if (s->renegotiate) {
3165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3166 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3167 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3170 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3174 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3175 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3176 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3178 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3179 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3182 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3184 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3185 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3191 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3192 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3194 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3196 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3201 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3202 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3211 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3212 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);