2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include <openssl/dh.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
27 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
30 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
31 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
32 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
33 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
35 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
36 * (transition not allowed)
38 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
40 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
43 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
44 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
45 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
47 switch (st->hand_state) {
51 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
52 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
53 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
54 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
58 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
59 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
60 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
67 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
68 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
69 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
70 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
71 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
75 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
76 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
83 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
84 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
85 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
89 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
90 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
96 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
97 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
98 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
105 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
106 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
108 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
111 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
112 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
113 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
124 /* No valid transition found */
129 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
130 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
131 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
132 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
134 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
135 * (transition not allowed)
137 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
139 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
141 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
142 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
147 switch (st->hand_state) {
153 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
154 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
155 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
160 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
162 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
163 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
165 * 2) If we did request one then
166 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
168 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
169 * list if we requested a certificate)
171 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
172 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
173 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
174 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
175 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
177 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
178 * not going to accept it because we require a client
181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
182 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
183 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
186 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
190 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
193 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
194 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
195 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
202 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
203 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
208 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
210 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
211 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
212 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
213 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
214 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
217 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
218 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
220 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
221 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
222 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
223 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
225 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
229 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
230 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
236 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
237 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
238 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
243 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
245 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
246 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
247 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
252 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
253 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
262 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
270 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
271 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
272 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
279 /* No valid transition found */
280 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
284 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
285 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
288 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
289 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
290 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
291 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
294 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
295 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
296 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
301 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
303 * Valid return values are:
307 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
309 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
312 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
313 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
314 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
315 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
316 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
319 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
321 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
325 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
326 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
327 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
328 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
329 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
332 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
333 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
343 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
345 * Valid return values are:
349 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
352 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
353 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
355 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
356 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
358 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
359 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
361 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
364 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
365 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
367 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
368 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
371 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
373 * ... except when the application insists on
374 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
377 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
378 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
379 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
381 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
384 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
392 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
393 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
396 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
398 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
401 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
402 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
405 switch (st->hand_state) {
407 /* Shouldn't happen */
408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
409 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
410 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
411 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
414 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
415 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
416 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
418 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
419 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
420 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
422 /* Try to read from the client instead */
423 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
425 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
426 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
427 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
429 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
430 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
431 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
432 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
433 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
437 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
439 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
440 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
441 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
446 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
448 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
449 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
456 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
457 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
458 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
461 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
466 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
467 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
469 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
473 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
474 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
475 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
477 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
478 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
480 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
482 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
483 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
485 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
486 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
489 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
490 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
491 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
492 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
494 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
495 * handshake at this point.
497 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
499 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
501 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
502 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
503 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
504 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
508 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
509 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
510 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
511 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
516 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
517 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
519 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
521 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
524 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
525 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
529 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
531 switch (st->hand_state) {
533 /* Shouldn't happen */
534 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
535 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
536 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
537 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
540 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
541 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
542 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
543 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
544 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
546 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
547 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
548 /* SSLfatal() already called */
549 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
554 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
555 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
557 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
558 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
559 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
561 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
562 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
563 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
564 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
565 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
566 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
567 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
572 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
574 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
575 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
577 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
579 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
582 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
584 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
585 /* normal PSK or SRP */
586 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
587 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
588 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
589 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
591 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
592 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
597 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
600 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
601 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
602 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
606 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
607 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
609 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
613 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
614 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
616 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
620 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
621 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
622 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
624 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
625 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
627 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
629 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
630 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
631 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
632 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
634 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
636 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
638 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
639 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
640 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
642 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
643 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
644 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
646 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
648 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
650 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
651 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
656 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
657 * the server to the client.
659 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
661 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
663 switch (st->hand_state) {
665 /* No pre work to be done */
668 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
671 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
674 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
676 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
677 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
678 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
683 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
684 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
686 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
687 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
693 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
695 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
696 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
697 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
700 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
702 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
703 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
705 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
706 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
707 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
709 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
711 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
712 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
714 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
715 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
721 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
724 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
725 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
726 /* SSLfatal() already called */
729 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
731 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
732 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
733 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
734 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
738 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
740 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
741 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
742 && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
743 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
747 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
748 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
751 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
755 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
756 * server to the client.
758 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
760 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
764 switch (st->hand_state) {
766 /* No post work to be done */
769 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
770 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
772 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
773 /* SSLfatal() already called */
778 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
779 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
781 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
782 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
783 /* SSLfatal() already called */
787 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
788 * treat like it was the first packet
793 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
794 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
795 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
796 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
800 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
801 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
802 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
803 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
806 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
809 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
810 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
812 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
813 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
814 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
816 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
817 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
818 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
822 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
823 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
827 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
828 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
832 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
833 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
834 if (!statem_flush(s))
839 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
840 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
841 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
842 * something clever in the record layer for this.
844 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
845 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
846 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
847 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
848 /* SSLfatal() already called */
852 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
853 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
854 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
855 /* SSLfatal() already called */
861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
862 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
864 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
867 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
871 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
872 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
874 /* SSLfatal() already called */
879 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
882 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
883 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
887 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
888 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
891 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
893 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
896 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
900 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
901 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
902 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
903 &s->session->master_key_length)
904 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
905 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
906 /* SSLfatal() already called */
911 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
912 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
913 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
918 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
919 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
921 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
922 /* SSLfatal() already called */
927 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
928 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
933 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
937 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
940 * Valid return values are:
944 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
945 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
947 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
949 switch (st->hand_state) {
951 /* Shouldn't happen */
952 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
953 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
954 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
957 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
959 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
961 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
962 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
965 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
966 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
967 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
970 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
971 /* No construction function needed */
973 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
976 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
977 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
978 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
982 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
983 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
986 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
987 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
988 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
992 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
993 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
994 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
997 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
998 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
999 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1002 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1003 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1004 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1007 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1008 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1009 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1012 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1013 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1014 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1017 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1018 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1019 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1022 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1024 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1027 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1028 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1029 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1032 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1033 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1034 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1042 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1043 * calculated as follows:
1045 * 2 + # client_version
1046 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1047 * 1 + # length of session_id
1048 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1049 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1050 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1051 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1052 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1053 * 2 + # length of extensions
1054 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1056 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1058 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1059 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1062 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1063 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1065 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1067 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1069 switch (st->hand_state) {
1071 /* Shouldn't happen */
1074 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1075 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1077 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1078 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1080 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1081 return s->max_cert_list;
1083 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1084 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1086 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1087 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1090 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1091 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1094 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1095 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1097 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1098 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1100 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1101 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1106 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1108 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1110 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1112 switch (st->hand_state) {
1114 /* Shouldn't happen */
1115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1116 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1117 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1118 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1120 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1121 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1123 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1124 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1126 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1127 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1129 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1130 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1132 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1133 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1136 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1137 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1140 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1141 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1143 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1144 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1146 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1147 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1153 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1156 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1158 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1160 switch (st->hand_state) {
1162 /* Shouldn't happen */
1163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1164 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1165 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1168 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1169 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1171 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1172 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1177 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1178 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1181 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1183 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1184 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1185 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1187 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1191 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1192 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1195 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1198 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1199 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1200 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1201 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1202 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1211 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1214 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1215 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1216 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1222 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1224 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1225 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1226 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1227 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1228 cookie_leni > 255) {
1229 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1230 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1233 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1235 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1236 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1237 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1238 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1247 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1248 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1249 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1253 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1255 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1256 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1257 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1258 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1260 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1262 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1263 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1264 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1265 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1266 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1267 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1268 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1270 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1271 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1272 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1273 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1274 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1275 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1276 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1277 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1278 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1279 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1280 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1281 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1282 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1284 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1285 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1290 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1292 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1293 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1294 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1298 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1301 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1302 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1304 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1307 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1309 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1311 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1312 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1313 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1314 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1316 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1317 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1318 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1319 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1320 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1323 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
1324 || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding
1326 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1327 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1328 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1334 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1335 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1337 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1342 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1344 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1345 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1347 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1350 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1351 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1353 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1358 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1359 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1360 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1361 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1363 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1364 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1366 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1367 * 7-8 session_id_length
1368 * 9-10 challenge_length
1372 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1373 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1375 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1376 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1377 * in the first place
1379 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1380 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1385 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1387 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1391 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1392 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1394 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1395 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1396 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1398 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1401 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1402 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1403 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1404 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1405 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1409 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1411 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1415 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1417 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1418 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1419 /* No extensions. */
1420 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1421 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1422 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1425 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1427 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1428 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1429 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1430 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1432 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1433 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1434 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1435 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1436 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1437 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1438 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1439 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1440 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1441 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1445 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1447 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1448 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1449 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1450 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1451 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1452 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1454 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1458 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1459 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1461 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1464 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1465 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1466 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1467 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1468 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1472 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1473 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1474 * So check cookie length...
1476 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1477 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1478 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1482 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1483 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1484 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1488 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1489 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1490 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1494 /* Could be empty. */
1495 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1496 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1498 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1499 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1500 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1501 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1507 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1508 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1509 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1511 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1515 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1516 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1517 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1518 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1519 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1520 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1523 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1525 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1528 if (clienthello != NULL)
1529 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1530 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1532 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1535 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1538 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1543 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1545 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1546 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1547 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1548 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1549 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1551 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1552 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1553 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1554 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1555 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1556 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1558 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1559 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1561 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1564 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1565 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1570 /* Set up the client_random */
1571 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1573 /* Choose the version */
1575 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1576 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1577 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1578 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1580 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1584 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1585 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1589 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1592 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1593 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1595 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1596 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1597 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1598 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1599 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1605 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1606 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1607 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1609 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1610 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1614 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1615 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1616 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1617 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1618 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1622 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1623 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1624 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1625 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1626 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1627 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1628 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1629 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1630 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1632 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1634 /* default verification */
1635 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1636 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1637 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1638 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1639 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1640 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1643 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1645 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1646 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1647 if (protverr != 0) {
1648 s->version = s->client_version;
1649 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1650 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1658 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1659 clienthello->isv2) ||
1660 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1661 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1662 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1666 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1667 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1668 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1669 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1670 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1671 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1672 if (s->renegotiate) {
1673 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1674 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1675 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1676 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1679 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1680 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1681 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1683 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1684 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1685 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1686 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1687 * an insecure downgrade.
1689 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1690 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1691 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1697 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1698 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1699 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1700 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1702 if (cipher == NULL) {
1703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1704 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1705 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1708 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1709 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1710 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1712 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1713 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1715 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1716 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1720 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1723 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1724 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1725 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1726 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1727 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1732 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1733 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1735 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1736 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1737 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1738 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1739 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1740 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1741 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1742 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1743 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1744 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1747 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1749 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1750 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1751 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1755 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1757 /* previous session */
1759 } else if (i == -1) {
1760 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1764 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1765 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1771 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1772 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1773 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1774 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1778 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1779 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1781 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1783 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1786 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1788 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1789 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1791 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1792 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1801 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1805 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1806 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1811 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1812 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1816 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1818 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1819 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1820 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1825 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1826 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1827 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1829 /* TLS extensions */
1830 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1831 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1832 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1837 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1838 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1839 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1840 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1844 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1845 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1846 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1847 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1848 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1854 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1857 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1858 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1860 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1861 * backwards compat reasons
1863 int master_key_length;
1865 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1866 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1867 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1869 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1870 && master_key_length > 0) {
1871 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1873 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1874 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1878 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1879 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1880 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1881 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1882 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1883 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1884 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1885 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1889 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1890 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1891 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1892 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1893 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1898 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1899 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1900 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1902 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1903 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1905 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1906 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1907 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1909 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1911 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1912 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1917 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1918 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1919 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1921 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1922 /* Can't disable compression */
1923 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1924 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1925 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1926 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1929 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1930 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1931 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1932 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1933 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1937 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1938 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1939 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1940 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1943 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1944 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1945 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1948 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1949 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1950 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1951 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1954 } else if (s->hit) {
1956 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1957 /* See if we have a match */
1958 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1961 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1962 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1963 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1965 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1966 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1975 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1981 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1982 * using compression.
1984 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1986 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1987 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1993 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1996 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1997 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1998 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1999 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2000 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2001 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2002 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2009 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2010 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2012 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2014 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2015 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2020 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2021 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2022 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2023 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2024 s->clienthello = NULL;
2027 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2028 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2029 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2030 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2031 s->clienthello = NULL;
2037 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2038 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2040 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2042 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2045 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2046 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2047 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2048 * influence which certificate is sent
2050 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2051 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2054 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2055 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
2057 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2058 * et al can pick it up.
2060 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2061 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2063 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2064 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2065 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2067 /* status request response should be sent */
2068 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2069 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2070 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2072 /* something bad happened */
2073 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2075 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2076 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2077 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2087 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2088 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2090 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2092 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2093 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2095 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2096 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2097 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
2098 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
2099 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2101 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2102 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2103 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2104 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2105 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2106 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2109 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2110 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2111 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2112 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
2115 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2116 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2117 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2118 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2119 selected_len) != 0) {
2120 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2121 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2125 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2126 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2129 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2130 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2131 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2132 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2135 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2137 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2138 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2139 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2140 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2143 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2148 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2149 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2150 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2154 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2159 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2160 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2161 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2162 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2168 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2170 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2172 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2173 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2175 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2182 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2183 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2184 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2185 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2186 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2189 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2190 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2194 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2197 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2200 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2201 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2203 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2205 if (cipher == NULL) {
2206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2207 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2208 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2211 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2214 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2215 /* SSLfatal already called */
2218 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2219 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2220 s->session->not_resumable =
2221 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2222 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2223 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2224 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2225 /* do not send a session ticket */
2226 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2229 /* Session-id reuse */
2230 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2234 * we now have the following setup.
2236 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2237 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2238 * compression - basically ignored right now
2239 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2240 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2241 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2242 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2246 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2247 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2249 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2250 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2254 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2255 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2256 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2257 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2259 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2260 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2267 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2269 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2271 * callback indicates further work to be done
2273 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2277 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2283 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2288 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2293 unsigned char *session_id;
2294 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2296 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2297 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2299 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2300 * tls_process_client_hello()
2302 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2303 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2304 ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random,
2305 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2307 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2312 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2313 * back in the server hello:
2314 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2315 * we send back the old session ID.
2316 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2317 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2318 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2319 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2321 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2322 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2323 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2325 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2326 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2329 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2330 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2332 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2335 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2336 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2338 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2339 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2342 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2343 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2344 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2348 /* set up the compression method */
2349 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2352 if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2355 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2358 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2359 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2360 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)
2361 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2362 s->hello_retry_request
2364 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2366 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2367 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2369 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2373 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2374 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2375 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2380 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2381 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2383 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2384 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2387 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2388 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2389 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2396 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2398 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2399 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2400 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2407 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2410 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2413 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2414 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2417 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2421 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2422 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2423 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2425 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2427 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2431 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2433 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2437 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2439 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2441 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2442 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2444 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2446 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2447 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2449 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2452 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2453 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2454 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2455 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2457 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2458 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2459 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2462 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2465 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2467 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2468 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2469 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2472 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2473 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2478 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2480 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2481 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2484 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2485 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2486 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2487 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2488 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2491 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2493 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2494 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2498 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2499 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2500 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2504 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2506 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2507 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2508 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2512 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2515 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2516 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2520 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2522 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2523 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2524 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2525 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2529 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2530 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2531 if (curve_id == 0) {
2532 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2533 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2534 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2537 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2538 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2539 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2540 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2544 /* Encode the public key. */
2545 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2547 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2548 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2549 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2554 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2555 * can set these to NULLs
2562 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2564 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2565 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2566 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2567 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2568 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2569 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2570 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2573 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2574 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2575 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2576 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2580 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2581 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2582 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2586 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2587 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2589 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2590 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2591 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2596 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2597 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2598 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2601 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2602 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2604 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2605 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2607 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2608 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2609 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2615 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2616 unsigned char *binval;
2619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2620 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2621 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2624 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2627 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2628 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2629 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2635 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2636 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2639 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2640 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2643 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2644 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2645 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2646 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2649 memset(binval, 0, len);
2653 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2654 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2655 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2656 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2657 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2661 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2665 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2667 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2668 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2669 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2672 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2673 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2674 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2675 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2676 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2677 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2678 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2681 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2682 encodedPoint = NULL;
2688 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2690 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2691 size_t siglen, tbslen;
2694 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2695 /* Should never happen */
2696 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2697 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2698 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2701 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2702 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2704 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2705 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2708 /* send signature algorithm */
2709 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2710 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2711 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2712 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2716 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2717 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2718 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2721 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2722 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2723 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2724 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2725 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2726 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2729 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2730 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2731 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2732 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2733 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2738 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2739 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2742 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2745 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
2747 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2748 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2749 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2750 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2751 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2756 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2760 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2763 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2765 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2769 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2771 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2772 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2773 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2774 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2775 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2776 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
2777 || RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0
2778 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
2779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2780 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2781 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2784 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2785 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2786 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2790 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2792 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2793 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2798 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2799 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2801 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2807 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2808 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2809 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2811 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2815 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2816 const uint16_t *psigs;
2817 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2819 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2820 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2821 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2822 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2823 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2824 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2825 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2830 if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2831 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2837 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2841 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2843 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2844 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2846 PACKET psk_identity;
2848 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2849 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2850 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2853 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2854 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2855 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2858 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2859 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2860 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2864 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2865 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2866 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2870 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2873 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2874 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2875 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2877 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2879 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2881 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2882 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2883 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2887 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2888 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2889 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2891 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2892 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2893 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2897 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2901 /* Should never happen */
2902 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2903 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2908 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2911 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2913 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2914 size_t j, padding_len;
2915 PACKET enc_premaster;
2917 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2920 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2923 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2927 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2928 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2929 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2931 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2932 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2933 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2934 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2940 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2941 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2942 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2943 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2945 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2946 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2947 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2951 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2952 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2953 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2954 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2959 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2960 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2961 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2962 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2963 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2966 if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2967 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2968 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2969 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2974 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2975 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2977 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2978 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2979 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2980 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2981 if (decrypt_len < 0) {
2982 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2983 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2987 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2990 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2991 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2992 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2994 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2995 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2996 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3000 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3001 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
3002 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
3003 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
3004 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
3006 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
3009 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
3010 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
3011 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
3012 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
3013 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
3014 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
3017 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3018 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
3020 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3021 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
3024 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
3025 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
3026 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
3027 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
3028 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
3029 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
3032 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
3033 unsigned char workaround_good;
3034 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3035 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
3037 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3038 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
3039 version_good |= workaround_good;
3043 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
3044 * remain non-zero (0xff).
3046 decrypt_good &= version_good;
3049 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
3050 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
3051 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
3052 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
3054 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
3055 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
3056 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
3057 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
3058 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
3061 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
3062 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
3063 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3069 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3072 /* Should never happen */
3073 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3074 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3079 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3082 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3086 const unsigned char *data;
3087 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3090 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3091 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3092 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3095 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3097 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3098 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3102 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3103 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3104 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3107 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3108 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3110 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3113 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3114 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3119 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3120 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3122 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3123 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3124 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3125 if (pub_key != NULL)
3130 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3131 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3136 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3137 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3139 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3142 /* Should never happen */
3143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3144 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3149 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3151 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3152 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3153 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3156 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3157 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3158 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3159 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3163 const unsigned char *data;
3166 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3167 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3170 /* Get encoded point length */
3171 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3172 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3173 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3174 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3177 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3178 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3179 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3183 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3184 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3190 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3196 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3197 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3199 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3203 /* Should never happen */
3204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3205 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3210 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3214 const unsigned char *data;
3216 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3217 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3219 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3222 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3227 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3228 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3229 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3232 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3233 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3234 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3236 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3240 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3241 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3247 /* Should never happen */
3248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3249 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3254 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3257 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3258 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3259 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3260 const unsigned char *start;
3261 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3262 unsigned long alg_a;
3263 unsigned int asn1id, asn1len;
3267 /* Get our certificate private key */
3268 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3269 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3271 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3273 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3275 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3278 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3280 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3281 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3284 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3285 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3286 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3287 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3290 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3292 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3296 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3297 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3298 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3299 * client certificate for authorization only.
3301 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3302 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3303 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3306 /* Decrypt session key */
3307 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &asn1id)
3308 || asn1id != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3309 || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt, &asn1len)) {
3310 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3311 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3314 if (asn1len == 0x81) {
3316 * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else
3318 * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail
3320 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 1)) {
3321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3322 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3325 } else if (asn1len >= 0x80) {
3327 * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't
3330 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3331 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3333 } /* else short form length */
3335 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encdata)) {
3336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3337 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3340 inlen = PACKET_remaining(&encdata);
3341 start = PACKET_data(&encdata);
3343 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3345 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3346 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3349 /* Generate master secret */
3350 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3351 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3352 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3355 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3356 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3358 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3362 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3365 /* Should never happen */
3366 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3367 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3372 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3374 unsigned long alg_k;
3376 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3378 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3379 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3380 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3384 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3385 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3386 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3387 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3388 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3389 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3392 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3393 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3394 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3397 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3398 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3399 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3402 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3403 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3404 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3407 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3408 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3409 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3412 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3413 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3414 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3417 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3418 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3419 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3424 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3425 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3429 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3432 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3433 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3435 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3438 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3441 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3442 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3443 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3444 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3446 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3449 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3450 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3452 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3453 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3454 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3457 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3458 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3462 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3463 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3468 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3470 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3471 * the handshake_buffer
3473 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3474 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3477 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3479 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3480 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3481 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3482 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3486 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3487 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3489 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3490 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3495 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3498 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3501 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3504 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3505 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3506 PACKET spkt, context;
3508 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3510 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3511 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3512 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3516 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3517 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3518 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3519 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3521 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3525 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3526 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3528 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3532 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3533 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3534 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3536 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3537 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3541 certstart = certbytes;
3542 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3545 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3548 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3549 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3550 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3551 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3555 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3556 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3559 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3560 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3561 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3565 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3566 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3567 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3568 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3569 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3570 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3571 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3574 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3577 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3578 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3579 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3580 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3586 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3587 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3588 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3590 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3591 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3594 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3595 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3596 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3597 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3598 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3599 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3602 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3603 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3604 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3609 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3611 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3612 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3613 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3617 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3618 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3621 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3623 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3624 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3625 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3631 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3632 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3633 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3634 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3635 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3638 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3639 int m = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
3641 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3642 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3643 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3644 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3648 if (m & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) {
3650 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
3652 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
3655 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3656 s->session = new_sess;
3659 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3660 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3661 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3663 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3664 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3667 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3670 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3671 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3676 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3677 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3681 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3683 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3684 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3685 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3686 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3690 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3694 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3698 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3700 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3704 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3709 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3710 * for the server Certificate message
3712 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3713 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3714 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3717 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3718 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3725 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3727 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3728 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3729 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3730 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3731 const unsigned char *const_p;
3732 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3735 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3736 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3737 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3739 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3741 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3745 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3746 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED) {
3747 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
3750 * This is the first session ticket we've sent. In the state
3751 * machine we "cheated" and tacked this onto the end of the first
3752 * handshake. From an info callback perspective this should appear
3753 * like the start of a new handshake.
3755 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
3756 cb = s->info_callback;
3757 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
3758 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
3760 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
3763 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
3764 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3767 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
3768 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3769 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3770 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3773 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3775 * ticket_nonce is set to a single 0 byte because we only ever send a
3776 * single ticket per connection. IMPORTANT: If we ever support multiple
3777 * tickets per connection then this will need to be changed.
3779 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick_nonce);
3780 s->session->ext.tick_nonce = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(char));
3781 if (s->session->ext.tick_nonce == NULL) {
3782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3783 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3784 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3787 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len = 1;
3788 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
3789 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
3790 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
3791 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
3792 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
3793 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
3794 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3795 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3796 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3799 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
3801 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
3804 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
3805 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
3808 /* get session encoding length */
3809 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3811 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3814 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3815 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3816 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3819 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3821 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3822 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3826 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3827 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3828 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3830 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3835 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3836 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3837 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3842 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3845 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3848 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3852 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3853 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3854 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3856 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3857 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3861 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3862 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3863 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3864 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3867 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3870 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3871 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3873 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3874 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3875 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3880 /* Put timeout and length */
3881 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3882 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3883 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3884 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3885 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3889 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3890 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3894 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3895 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3896 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3899 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3901 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3903 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3904 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0
3905 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3906 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
3907 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
3908 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
3909 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
3910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3911 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3912 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3915 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3916 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3920 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3921 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3922 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3925 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3926 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3927 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3929 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add)
3930 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
3931 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
3932 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3933 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3934 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3935 /* Output key name */
3936 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3938 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3939 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3941 /* Encrypt session data */
3942 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3943 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3944 || encdata1 != encdata2
3945 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3946 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3947 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3948 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3949 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3950 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3951 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3952 macendoffset - macoffset)
3953 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3954 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3955 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3956 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3957 || macdata1 != macdata2
3958 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3960 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3963 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3964 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
3965 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3966 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3968 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3972 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3973 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3979 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3980 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3985 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3986 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3988 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3990 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3991 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3992 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3993 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
3994 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4001 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4003 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4004 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4011 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4013 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4014 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4016 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4018 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4019 size_t next_proto_len;
4022 * The payload looks like:
4024 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4025 * uint8 padding_len;
4026 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4028 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4029 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4030 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4032 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4033 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4036 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4038 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4039 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4040 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4043 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4045 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4049 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4051 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4053 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4060 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4062 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4063 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4064 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4065 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4068 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4069 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4070 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4071 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4072 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4076 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4077 * a record boundary.
4079 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4080 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
4081 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4082 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4083 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4086 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4087 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4088 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4089 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4090 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4093 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;