2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/md5.h>
26 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
29 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
30 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
31 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
32 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
34 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
35 * (transition not allowed)
37 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
39 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
42 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
43 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
44 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
46 switch (st->hand_state) {
50 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
51 if (s->hello_retry_request) {
52 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
53 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
57 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
58 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
59 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
66 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
67 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
68 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
69 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
70 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
74 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
75 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
82 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
83 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
84 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
88 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
89 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
95 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
96 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
97 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
104 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
105 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
107 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
116 /* No valid transition found */
121 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
122 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
123 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
124 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
126 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
127 * (transition not allowed)
129 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
131 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
133 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
134 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
139 switch (st->hand_state) {
145 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
146 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
147 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
152 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
154 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
155 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
157 * 2) If we did request one then
158 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
160 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
161 * list if we requested a certificate)
163 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
164 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
165 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
166 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
167 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
169 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
170 * not going to accept it because we require a client
173 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
174 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
175 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
178 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
182 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
185 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
186 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
187 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
194 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
195 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
200 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
202 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
203 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
204 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
205 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
206 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
209 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
210 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
212 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
213 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
214 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
215 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
217 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
221 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
222 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
228 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
229 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
230 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
235 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
237 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
238 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
239 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
244 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
245 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
248 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
254 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
255 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
256 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
262 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
271 /* No valid transition found */
272 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
273 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
274 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
279 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
281 * Valid return values are:
285 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
287 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
290 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
291 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
292 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
293 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
294 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
297 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
299 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
303 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
304 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
305 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
306 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
307 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
309 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
310 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
311 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
321 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
323 * Valid return values are:
327 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
330 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
331 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
333 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
334 * during re-negotiation:
336 && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
337 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
339 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
340 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
343 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
345 * ... except when the application insists on
346 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
349 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
350 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
351 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
353 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
356 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
364 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
365 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
368 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
370 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
373 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
374 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
377 switch (st->hand_state) {
379 /* Shouldn't happen */
380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
381 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
382 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
383 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
386 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
387 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
388 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
390 /* Try to read from the client instead */
391 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
393 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
394 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
395 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
397 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
398 if (s->hello_retry_request)
399 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
400 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
401 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
403 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
407 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
410 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
412 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
413 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
414 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
416 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
420 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
421 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
422 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
426 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
428 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
429 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
430 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
432 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
433 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
434 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
436 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
437 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
439 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
441 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
442 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
444 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
445 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
448 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
449 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
451 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
452 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
453 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
458 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
459 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
460 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
466 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
467 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
469 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
471 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
474 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
475 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
479 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
481 switch (st->hand_state) {
483 /* Shouldn't happen */
484 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
485 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
486 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
487 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
490 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
491 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
492 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
493 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
494 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
496 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
497 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
498 /* SSLfatal() already called */
499 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
504 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
505 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
507 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
508 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
509 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
511 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
512 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
513 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
514 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
519 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
520 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
522 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
524 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
525 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
527 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
529 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
530 /* normal PSK or SRP */
531 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
532 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
533 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
534 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
536 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
537 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
539 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
542 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
545 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
546 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
547 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
551 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
552 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
553 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
554 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
558 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
559 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
560 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
565 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
569 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
570 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
572 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
576 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
579 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
583 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
584 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
587 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
588 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
589 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
591 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
593 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
595 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
596 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
601 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
602 * the server to the client.
604 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
606 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
608 switch (st->hand_state) {
610 /* No pre work to be done */
613 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
616 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
619 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
621 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
622 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
623 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
628 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
629 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
631 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
632 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
638 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
640 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
641 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
642 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
645 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
647 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
648 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
650 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
651 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
652 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
654 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
656 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
657 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
659 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
660 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
666 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
667 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
668 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
669 /* SSLfatal() already called */
672 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
674 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
675 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
676 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
677 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
681 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
683 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
684 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING)
685 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
689 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
690 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
693 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
697 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
698 * server to the client.
700 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
702 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
706 switch (st->hand_state) {
708 /* No post work to be done */
711 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
712 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
714 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
715 /* SSLfatal() already called */
720 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
721 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
723 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
724 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
725 /* SSLfatal() already called */
729 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
730 * treat like it was the first packet
735 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
736 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request) {
737 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
742 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
743 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
744 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
747 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
750 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
751 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
753 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
754 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
755 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
757 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
758 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
759 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
763 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
764 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
768 || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
772 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
774 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
775 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
776 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
777 * something clever in the record layer for this.
779 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
780 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
781 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
782 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
783 /* SSLfatal() already called */
787 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
788 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
789 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
790 /* SSLfatal() already called */
796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
797 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
799 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
802 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
806 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
807 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
809 /* SSLfatal() already called */
814 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
817 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
818 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
822 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
823 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
826 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
828 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
831 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
835 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
836 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
837 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
838 &s->session->master_key_length)
839 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
840 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
841 /* SSLfatal() already called */
846 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
847 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
849 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
850 /* SSLfatal() already called */
855 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
856 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
861 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
865 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
868 * Valid return values are:
872 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
873 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
875 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
877 switch (st->hand_state) {
879 /* Shouldn't happen */
880 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
881 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
882 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
885 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
887 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
889 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
890 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
893 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
894 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
895 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
898 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
899 /* No construction function needed */
901 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
904 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
905 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
906 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
910 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
911 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
914 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
915 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
916 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
920 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
921 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
922 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
925 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
926 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
927 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
930 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
931 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
932 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
935 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
936 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
937 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
940 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
941 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
942 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
945 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
946 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
947 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
950 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
955 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
956 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
957 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
960 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
961 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
962 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
970 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
971 * calculated as follows:
973 * 2 + # client_version
974 * 32 + # only valid length for random
975 * 1 + # length of session_id
976 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
977 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
978 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
979 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
980 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
981 * 2 + # length of extensions
982 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
984 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
986 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
987 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
990 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
991 * reading. Excludes the message header.
993 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
995 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
997 switch (st->hand_state) {
999 /* Shouldn't happen */
1002 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1003 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1005 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1006 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1008 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1009 return s->max_cert_list;
1011 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1012 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1014 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1015 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1017 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1018 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1019 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1022 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1023 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1025 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1026 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1028 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1029 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1034 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1036 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1038 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1040 switch (st->hand_state) {
1042 /* Shouldn't happen */
1043 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1044 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1045 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1046 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1048 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1049 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1051 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1052 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1054 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1055 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1057 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1058 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1060 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1061 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1063 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1064 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1065 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1068 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1069 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1071 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1072 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1074 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1075 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1081 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1084 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1086 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1088 switch (st->hand_state) {
1090 /* Shouldn't happen */
1091 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1092 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1093 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1096 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1097 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1099 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1100 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1102 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1105 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1106 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1107 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1110 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1112 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1113 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1114 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1116 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1119 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1120 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1121 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1124 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1127 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1128 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1129 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1130 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1131 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1140 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1143 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1144 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1145 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1151 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1153 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1154 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1155 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1156 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1157 cookie_leni > 255) {
1158 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1159 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1162 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1164 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1165 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1166 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1167 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1176 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1177 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1178 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1182 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1184 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1185 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1186 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1187 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1189 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1191 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1192 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1193 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1194 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1195 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1196 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1197 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1199 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1200 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1201 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1202 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1203 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1204 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1205 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1206 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1207 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1208 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1209 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1210 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1211 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1213 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1214 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1219 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1221 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1222 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1223 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1227 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1230 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1231 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1233 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1236 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1238 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1240 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1241 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1242 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1243 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello;
1245 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1246 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1248 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1252 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1253 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1254 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1262 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1264 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1265 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1267 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1270 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) {
1271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1272 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1277 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1278 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1279 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1280 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1282 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1283 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1285 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1286 * 7-8 session_id_length
1287 * 9-10 challenge_length
1291 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1292 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1294 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1295 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1296 * in the first place
1298 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1299 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1304 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1305 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1306 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1310 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1311 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1313 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1314 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1315 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1317 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1320 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1321 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1322 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1324 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1328 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1330 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1334 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1336 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1337 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1338 /* No extensions. */
1339 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1340 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1341 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1344 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1346 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1347 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1348 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1349 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1351 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1352 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1353 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1354 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1355 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1356 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1357 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1358 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1360 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1364 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1366 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1367 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1368 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1369 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1370 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1371 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1373 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1377 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1378 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1379 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1380 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1383 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1384 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1385 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1387 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1391 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1392 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1393 * So check cookie length...
1395 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1396 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1397 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1401 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1403 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1407 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1409 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1413 /* Could be empty. */
1414 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1415 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1417 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1418 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1420 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1426 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1427 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1428 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1429 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1430 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1434 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1435 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1436 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1437 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1438 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1439 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1442 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1444 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1447 if (clienthello != NULL)
1448 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1449 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1451 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1454 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1457 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1462 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1464 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1465 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1466 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1467 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1468 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1470 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1471 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1472 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1473 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1474 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1475 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1477 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1478 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1480 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1483 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1484 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1489 /* Set up the client_random */
1490 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1492 /* Choose the version */
1494 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1495 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1496 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1497 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1499 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1503 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1504 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1508 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1511 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1512 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1514 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1515 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1516 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1517 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1518 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1524 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1525 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1526 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1528 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1529 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1533 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1534 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1536 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1537 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1541 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1542 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1543 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1544 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1545 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1546 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1548 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1549 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1551 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1553 /* default verification */
1554 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1555 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1556 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1558 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1559 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1562 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1564 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1565 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1566 if (protverr != 0) {
1567 s->version = s->client_version;
1568 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1569 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1577 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1578 clienthello->isv2) ||
1579 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1580 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1581 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1585 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1586 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1587 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1588 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1589 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1590 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1591 if (s->renegotiate) {
1592 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1593 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1594 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1595 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1598 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1599 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1600 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1602 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1603 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1604 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1605 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1606 * an insecure downgrade.
1608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1609 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1610 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1616 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1617 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1618 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1619 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1621 if (cipher == NULL) {
1622 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1623 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1624 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1627 if (s->hello_retry_request
1628 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1629 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1631 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1632 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1634 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1635 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1639 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1642 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1643 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1644 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1645 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1646 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1651 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1652 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1654 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1655 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1656 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1657 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1658 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1659 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1660 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1661 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1662 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1663 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1666 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1668 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1669 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1670 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1674 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1676 /* previous session */
1678 } else if (i == -1) {
1679 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1683 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1684 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1690 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1691 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1692 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1693 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1697 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1698 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1700 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1702 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1705 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1707 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1708 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1710 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1711 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1720 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1723 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1724 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1725 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1730 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1731 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1735 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1737 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1738 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1739 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1744 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1745 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1746 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1748 /* TLS extensions */
1749 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1750 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1751 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1756 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1757 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1758 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1759 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1763 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1764 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1765 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1766 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1767 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1773 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1776 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1777 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1779 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1780 * backwards compat reasons
1782 int master_key_length;
1784 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1785 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1786 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1788 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1789 && master_key_length > 0) {
1790 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1792 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1793 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1797 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1798 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1799 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1800 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1801 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1802 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1803 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1804 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1808 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1809 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1810 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1811 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1812 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1817 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1818 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1819 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1821 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1822 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1824 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1825 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1826 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1828 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1830 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1831 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1835 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1836 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1837 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1838 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1840 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1841 /* Can't disable compression */
1842 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1844 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1845 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1848 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1849 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1850 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1851 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1852 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1856 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1857 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1858 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1859 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1862 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1863 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1864 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1867 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1868 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1869 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1870 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1873 } else if (s->hit) {
1875 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1876 /* See if we have a match */
1877 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1880 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1881 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1882 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1884 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1885 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1894 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1900 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1901 * using compression.
1903 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1904 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1905 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1906 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1912 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1915 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1916 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1917 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1918 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1919 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1920 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1921 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1928 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1929 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1931 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1933 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1934 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1939 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1940 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1941 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1942 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1943 s->clienthello = NULL;
1946 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1947 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1948 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1949 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1950 s->clienthello = NULL;
1956 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1957 * Upon failure, returns 0.
1959 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
1961 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1964 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1965 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1966 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1967 * influence which certificate is sent
1969 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
1970 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
1973 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1974 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
1976 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1977 * et al can pick it up.
1979 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
1980 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
1982 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1983 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1984 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1986 /* status request response should be sent */
1987 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1988 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
1989 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1991 /* something bad happened */
1992 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1995 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
1996 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2006 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2007 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2009 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2011 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2012 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2014 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2015 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2016 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
2017 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
2018 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2020 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2021 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2022 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2023 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2024 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2025 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2028 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2029 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2030 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2031 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
2034 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2035 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2036 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2037 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2038 selected_len) != 0) {
2039 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2040 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2043 /* If a new session update it with the new ALPN value */
2044 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2046 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2047 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2048 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2049 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2052 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2057 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2059 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2063 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2068 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2069 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2070 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2071 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2077 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2079 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2081 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2082 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2084 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2091 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2092 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2093 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2094 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2095 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2097 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2098 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2099 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2103 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2106 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2109 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2110 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2112 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2114 if (cipher == NULL) {
2115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2116 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2117 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2120 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2123 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2124 /* SSLfatal already called */
2127 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2128 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2129 s->session->not_resumable =
2130 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2131 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2132 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2133 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2134 /* do not send a session ticket */
2135 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2138 /* Session-id reuse */
2139 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2143 * we now have the following setup.
2145 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2146 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2147 * compression - basically ignored right now
2148 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2149 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2150 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2151 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2155 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2156 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2158 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2159 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2163 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2164 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2165 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2166 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2168 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2169 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2176 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2178 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2180 * callback indicates further work to be done
2182 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2186 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2192 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2197 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2202 unsigned char *session_id;
2203 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request;
2205 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2206 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2208 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2209 * tls_process_client_hello()
2211 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2212 s->hello_retry_request
2213 ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random,
2214 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2216 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2221 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2222 * back in the server hello:
2223 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2224 * we send back the old session ID.
2225 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2226 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2227 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2228 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2230 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2231 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2232 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2234 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2235 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2238 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2239 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2241 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2244 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2245 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2247 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2248 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2251 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2253 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2257 /* set up the compression method */
2258 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2261 if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2264 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2267 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2268 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2269 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)
2270 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2271 s->hello_retry_request
2272 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2274 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2275 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2277 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2281 if (s->hello_retry_request) {
2282 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2283 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2288 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2289 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2291 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
2292 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2295 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2296 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2297 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2304 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2306 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2307 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2308 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2315 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2318 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2321 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2322 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2325 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2329 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2330 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2331 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2333 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2335 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2339 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2340 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2341 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2345 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2347 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2349 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2350 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2352 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2354 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2355 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2357 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2360 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2361 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2362 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2363 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2366 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2367 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2370 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2373 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2375 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2376 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2377 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2379 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2380 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2381 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2386 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2387 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2388 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2389 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2392 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2393 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2395 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2396 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2399 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2401 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2402 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2406 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2407 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2408 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2412 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2414 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2417 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2418 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2422 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2424 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2426 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2427 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2431 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2432 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2433 if (curve_id == 0) {
2434 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2435 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2436 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2439 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2440 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2441 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2442 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2446 /* Encode the public key. */
2447 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2449 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2450 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2451 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2456 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2457 * can set these to NULLs
2464 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2465 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2466 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2467 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2468 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2469 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2470 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2471 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2472 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2475 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2476 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2477 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2478 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2483 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2484 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2488 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2489 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2491 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2493 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2498 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2499 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2500 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2503 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2504 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2506 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2507 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2510 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2511 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2517 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2518 unsigned char *binval;
2521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2522 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2523 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2526 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2529 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2530 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2531 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2537 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2538 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2541 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2542 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2545 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2546 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2547 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2548 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2551 memset(binval, 0, len);
2555 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2556 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2558 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2559 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2563 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2567 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2569 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2570 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2571 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2574 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2575 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2576 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2577 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2578 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2579 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2580 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2583 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2584 encodedPoint = NULL;
2590 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2592 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2593 size_t siglen, tbslen;
2596 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2597 /* Should never happen */
2598 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2599 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2600 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2604 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2605 * points to the space at the end.
2608 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2609 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2610 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2611 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2612 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2615 /* send signature algorithm */
2616 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2617 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2618 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2619 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2623 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2624 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2625 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2628 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2629 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2630 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2632 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2633 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2636 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2637 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2638 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2639 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2640 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2645 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2646 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2649 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2652 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
2654 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2655 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2656 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2657 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2658 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2663 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2666 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2667 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2670 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2672 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2676 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2678 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2679 /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */
2680 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2681 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2682 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2683 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2687 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2688 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2690 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2696 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2697 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2698 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2700 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2704 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2705 const uint16_t *psigs;
2706 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2708 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2709 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2710 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2711 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2712 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2713 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2714 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2719 if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2720 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2725 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2729 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2731 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2732 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2734 PACKET psk_identity;
2736 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2737 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2738 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2741 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2742 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2743 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2746 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2747 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2748 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2752 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2753 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2754 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2758 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2761 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2762 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2763 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2765 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2767 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2769 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2770 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2771 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2775 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2776 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2777 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2779 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2780 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2781 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2785 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2789 /* Should never happen */
2790 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2791 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2796 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2798 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2799 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2801 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2802 size_t j, padding_len;
2803 PACKET enc_premaster;
2805 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2808 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2811 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2815 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2816 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2817 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2819 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2820 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2821 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2822 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2828 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2829 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2830 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2831 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2833 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2834 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2835 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2839 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2840 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2841 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2842 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2847 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2848 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2849 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2850 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2851 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2854 if (ssl_randbytes(s, rand_premaster_secret,
2855 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2856 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2857 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2862 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2863 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2865 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2866 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2867 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2868 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2869 if (decrypt_len < 0) {
2870 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2871 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2875 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2878 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2879 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2880 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2882 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2883 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2884 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2888 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2889 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2890 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2891 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2892 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2894 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2897 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2898 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2899 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2900 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2901 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2902 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2905 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2906 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2908 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2909 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2912 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2913 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2914 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2915 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2916 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2917 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2920 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2921 unsigned char workaround_good;
2922 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2923 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2925 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2926 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2927 version_good |= workaround_good;
2931 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2932 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2934 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2937 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2938 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2939 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2940 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2942 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2943 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2944 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2945 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2946 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2949 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2950 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2951 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2957 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2960 /* Should never happen */
2961 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2962 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2967 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2970 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2974 const unsigned char *data;
2975 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2978 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2979 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2980 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2983 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2986 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2990 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2991 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2992 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2995 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2996 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2998 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3001 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3002 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3003 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3007 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3008 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3010 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3012 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3013 if (pub_key != NULL)
3018 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3019 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3024 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3025 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3027 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3030 /* Should never happen */
3031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3032 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3037 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3040 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3041 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3044 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3045 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3046 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3047 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3051 const unsigned char *data;
3054 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3055 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3058 /* Get encoded point length */
3059 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3060 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3061 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3062 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3065 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3066 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3067 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3071 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3072 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3078 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3079 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3084 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3085 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3087 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3091 /* Should never happen */
3092 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3093 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3098 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3102 const unsigned char *data;
3104 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3105 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3107 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3110 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3111 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3115 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3117 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3120 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3121 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3122 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3123 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3124 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3128 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3129 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3135 /* Should never happen */
3136 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3137 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3142 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3145 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3146 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3147 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3148 const unsigned char *start;
3149 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3150 unsigned long alg_a;
3153 size_t sess_key_len;
3154 const unsigned char *data;
3157 /* Get our certificate private key */
3158 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3159 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3161 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3163 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3165 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3168 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3170 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3171 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3174 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3175 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3176 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3177 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3180 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3182 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3186 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3187 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3188 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3189 * client certificate for authorization only.
3191 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3192 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3193 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3196 /* Decrypt session key */
3197 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3198 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
3199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3200 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3203 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3204 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
3205 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
3206 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
3207 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3208 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3213 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3216 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3219 /* Generate master secret */
3220 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3221 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3222 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3225 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3226 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3228 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3232 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3235 /* Should never happen */
3236 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3237 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3242 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3244 unsigned long alg_k;
3246 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3248 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3249 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3250 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3254 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3255 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3256 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3258 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3259 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3262 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3263 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3264 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3267 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3268 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3269 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3272 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3273 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3274 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3277 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3278 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3279 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3282 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3283 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3284 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3287 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3288 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3289 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3293 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3294 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3295 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3299 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3302 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3303 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3305 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3308 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3311 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3312 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3313 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3314 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3316 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3319 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3320 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3322 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3323 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3324 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3326 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3327 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3328 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3332 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3333 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3338 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3340 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3341 * the handshake_buffer
3343 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3344 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3347 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3349 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3351 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3352 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3356 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3357 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3359 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3360 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3365 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3368 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3371 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3373 unsigned long l, llen;
3374 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3375 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3376 PACKET spkt, context;
3379 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3381 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3385 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3386 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
3387 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3388 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3389 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3391 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3395 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3396 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3397 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3399 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3400 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3404 certstart = certbytes;
3405 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3408 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3411 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3412 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3413 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3414 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3418 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3419 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3422 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3424 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3428 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3429 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3430 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3431 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3432 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3433 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3434 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3437 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3440 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3441 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3442 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3443 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3449 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3450 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3451 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3453 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3454 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3457 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3458 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3459 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3461 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3462 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3465 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3466 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3467 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3472 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3474 SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result),
3475 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3476 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3480 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3481 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3484 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3486 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3487 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3488 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3493 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3494 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3495 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3497 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3498 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3501 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3504 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3505 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3510 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3511 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3515 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3517 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3518 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3519 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3520 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3524 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3528 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3532 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3534 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3538 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3543 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3544 * for the server Certificate message
3546 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3548 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3551 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3552 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3559 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3561 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3562 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3563 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3564 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3565 const unsigned char *const_p;
3566 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3569 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3570 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3571 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3573 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3575 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3579 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3580 if (ssl_randbytes(s, age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
3581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3582 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3583 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3586 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3588 * ticket_nonce is set to a single 0 byte because we only ever send a
3589 * single ticket per connection. IMPORTANT: If we ever support multiple
3590 * tickets per connection then this will need to be changed.
3592 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick_nonce);
3593 s->session->ext.tick_nonce = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(char));
3594 if (s->session->ext.tick_nonce == NULL) {
3595 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3596 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3597 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3600 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len = 1;
3601 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
3602 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
3603 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
3604 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
3605 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
3606 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
3607 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3608 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3609 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3612 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
3614 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
3617 /* get session encoding length */
3618 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3620 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3623 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3624 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3625 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3628 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3631 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3635 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3636 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3637 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3638 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3639 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3644 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3645 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3646 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3651 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3654 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3656 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3657 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3660 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3662 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3663 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3664 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3665 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3666 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3667 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3671 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3672 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3673 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3674 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3677 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3680 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3681 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3683 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3684 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3685 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3690 /* Put timeout and length */
3691 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3692 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3693 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3694 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3695 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3699 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3700 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3705 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3706 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3709 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3711 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3713 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3714 if (ssl_randbytes(s, iv, iv_len) <= 0
3715 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3716 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv)
3717 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
3718 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
3719 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
3720 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3721 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3722 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3725 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3726 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3730 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3731 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3732 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3735 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3736 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3737 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3739 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add)
3740 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
3741 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
3742 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3743 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3744 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3745 /* Output key name */
3746 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3748 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3749 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3751 /* Encrypt session data */
3752 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3753 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3754 || encdata1 != encdata2
3755 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3756 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3757 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3758 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3759 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3760 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3761 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3762 macendoffset - macoffset)
3763 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3764 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3765 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3766 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3767 || macdata1 != macdata2
3768 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3769 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3770 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3774 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3775 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3777 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3780 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3781 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3787 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3788 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3793 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3794 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3796 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3798 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3799 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3800 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3801 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
3802 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3809 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3811 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3812 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3821 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3822 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3824 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3826 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3827 size_t next_proto_len;
3830 * The payload looks like:
3832 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3833 * uint8 padding_len;
3834 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3836 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3837 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3838 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
3840 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3841 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3844 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
3846 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
3847 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3848 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3851 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3853 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3857 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3859 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3861 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3868 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3870 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3872 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3873 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3876 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
3877 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
3878 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3879 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3880 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3884 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
3885 * a record boundary.
3887 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
3888 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
3889 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3890 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
3891 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3894 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
3895 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3896 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
3897 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3898 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3901 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;