2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/md5.h>
26 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
27 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
30 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
31 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
32 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
33 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
35 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
36 * (transition not allowed)
38 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
40 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
43 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
44 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
45 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
47 switch (st->hand_state) {
51 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
52 if (s->hello_retry_request) {
53 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
54 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
58 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
59 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
60 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
67 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
68 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
69 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
70 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
71 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
75 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
76 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
83 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
84 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
85 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
89 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
90 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
96 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
97 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
98 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
105 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
106 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
108 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
110 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
111 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
117 /* No valid transition found */
122 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
123 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
124 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
125 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
127 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
128 * (transition not allowed)
130 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
132 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
134 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
135 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
140 switch (st->hand_state) {
146 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
147 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
148 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
153 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
155 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
156 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
158 * 2) If we did request one then
159 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
161 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
162 * list if we requested a certificate)
164 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
165 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
166 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
167 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
168 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
170 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
171 * not going to accept it because we require a client
174 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
175 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
176 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
179 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
183 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
186 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
187 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
195 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
196 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
201 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
203 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
204 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
205 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
206 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
207 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
210 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
211 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
213 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
214 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
215 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
216 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
218 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
222 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
223 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
229 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
230 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
231 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
236 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
238 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
239 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
240 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
245 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
246 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
255 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
256 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
257 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
263 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
272 /* No valid transition found */
273 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
274 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
275 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
280 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
282 * Valid return values are:
286 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
288 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
291 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
292 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
293 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
294 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
295 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
298 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
300 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
304 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
305 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
306 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
307 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
308 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
311 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
312 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
322 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
324 * Valid return values are:
328 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
331 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
332 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
334 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
335 * during re-negotiation:
337 && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
338 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
340 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
341 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
344 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
346 * ... except when the application insists on
347 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
350 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
351 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
352 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
354 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
357 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
365 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
366 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
369 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
371 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
374 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
375 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
378 switch (st->hand_state) {
380 /* Shouldn't happen */
381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
382 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
383 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
384 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
387 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
388 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
389 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
391 /* Try to read from the client instead */
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
394 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
395 if (s->hello_retry_request)
396 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
398 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
399 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
401 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
402 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
403 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
405 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
406 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
407 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
409 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
411 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
412 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
413 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
415 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
417 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
419 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
420 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
421 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
424 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
425 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
427 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
428 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
431 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
432 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
433 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
435 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
436 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
438 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
440 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
441 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
443 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
444 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
447 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
450 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
451 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
453 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
457 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
458 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
465 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
466 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
468 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
470 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
473 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
474 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
478 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
480 switch (st->hand_state) {
482 /* Shouldn't happen */
483 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
484 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
485 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
486 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
489 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
490 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
491 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
492 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
495 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
496 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
497 /* SSLfatal() already called */
498 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
503 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
504 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
506 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
510 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
511 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
512 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
513 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
515 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
516 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
518 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
519 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
521 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
523 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
524 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
526 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
528 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
529 /* normal PSK or SRP */
530 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
531 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
532 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
533 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
534 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
535 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
536 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
538 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
541 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
544 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
546 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
550 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
551 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
552 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
553 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
557 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
558 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
559 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
560 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
564 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
565 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
566 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
568 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
569 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
571 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
573 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
575 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
576 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
578 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
583 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
584 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
586 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
587 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
588 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
590 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
592 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
600 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
601 * the server to the client.
603 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
605 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
607 switch (st->hand_state) {
609 /* No pre work to be done */
612 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
615 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
618 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
620 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
621 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
622 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
627 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
628 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
630 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
631 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
637 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
639 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
640 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
641 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
644 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
646 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
647 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
649 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
650 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
651 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
653 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
655 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
656 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
658 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
659 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
665 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
666 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
667 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
668 /* SSLfatal() already called */
671 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
673 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
674 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
675 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
676 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
680 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
682 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
683 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING)
684 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
688 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
689 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
692 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
696 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
697 * server to the client.
699 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
701 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
705 switch (st->hand_state) {
707 /* No post work to be done */
710 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
711 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
715 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
716 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
718 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
719 /* SSLfatal() already called */
724 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
725 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
727 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
728 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
729 /* SSLfatal() already called */
733 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
734 * treat like it was the first packet
739 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
741 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
742 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
743 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
746 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
749 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
750 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
752 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
753 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
754 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
757 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
758 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
762 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
763 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
767 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
768 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
769 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
770 * something clever in the record layer for this.
772 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
773 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
774 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
775 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
776 /* SSLfatal() already called */
780 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
781 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
782 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
783 /* SSLfatal() already called */
789 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
791 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
793 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
796 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
800 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
801 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
803 /* SSLfatal() already called */
808 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
811 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
812 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
816 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
817 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
820 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
822 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
825 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
829 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
830 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
831 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
832 &s->session->master_key_length)
833 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
834 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
835 /* SSLfatal() already called */
840 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
841 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
843 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
844 /* SSLfatal() already called */
849 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
850 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
855 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
859 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
862 * Valid return values are:
866 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
867 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
869 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
871 switch (st->hand_state) {
873 /* Shouldn't happen */
874 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
875 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
876 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
879 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
881 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
883 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
884 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
887 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
888 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
889 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
892 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
893 /* No construction function needed */
895 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
898 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
899 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
900 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
904 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
905 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
908 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
909 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
910 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
914 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
915 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
916 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
919 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
920 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
921 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
924 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
925 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
926 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
929 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
930 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
931 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
934 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
935 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
936 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
939 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
940 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
941 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
944 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
949 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
950 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
951 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
954 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
955 *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request;
956 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
959 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
960 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
961 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
969 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
970 * calculated as follows:
972 * 2 + # client_version
973 * 32 + # only valid length for random
974 * 1 + # length of session_id
975 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
976 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
977 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
978 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
979 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
980 * 2 + # length of extensions
981 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
983 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
985 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
986 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
989 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
990 * reading. Excludes the message header.
992 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
994 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
996 switch (st->hand_state) {
998 /* Shouldn't happen */
1001 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1002 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1004 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1005 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1007 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1008 return s->max_cert_list;
1010 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1011 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1013 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1014 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1017 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1018 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1021 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1022 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1024 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1025 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1027 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1028 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1033 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1035 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1037 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1039 switch (st->hand_state) {
1041 /* Shouldn't happen */
1042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1043 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1044 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1045 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1047 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1048 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1050 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1051 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1053 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1054 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1056 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1057 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1059 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1060 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1062 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1063 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1064 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1067 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1068 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1070 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1071 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1073 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1074 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1080 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1083 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1085 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1087 switch (st->hand_state) {
1089 /* Shouldn't happen */
1090 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1091 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1092 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1095 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1096 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1098 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1099 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1101 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1105 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1106 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1109 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1111 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1112 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1113 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1115 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1118 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1119 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1120 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1123 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1126 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1127 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1128 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1129 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1130 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1139 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1142 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1143 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1144 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1150 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1152 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1153 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1154 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1155 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1156 cookie_leni > 255) {
1157 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1158 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1161 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1163 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1164 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1165 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1166 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1175 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1176 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1177 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1181 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1183 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1184 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1185 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1186 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1188 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1190 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1191 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1192 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1193 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1194 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1195 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1196 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1198 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1199 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1200 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1201 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1202 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1203 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1204 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1205 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1206 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1207 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1208 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1209 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1210 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1212 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1213 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1218 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1220 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1221 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1222 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1226 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1229 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1230 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1232 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1235 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1237 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1239 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1240 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1241 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1242 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello;
1244 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1245 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1247 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1250 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1251 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1252 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1253 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1261 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1263 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1264 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1266 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1269 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) {
1270 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1271 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1276 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1277 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1278 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1279 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1281 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1282 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1284 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1285 * 7-8 session_id_length
1286 * 9-10 challenge_length
1290 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1291 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1293 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1294 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1295 * in the first place
1297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1298 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1303 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1304 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1305 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1309 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1310 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1312 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1313 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1314 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1316 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1319 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1320 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1321 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1323 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1327 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1328 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1329 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1333 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1335 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1336 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1337 /* No extensions. */
1338 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1340 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1343 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1345 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1346 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1347 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1348 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1350 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1351 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1352 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1353 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1354 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1355 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1356 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1357 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1358 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1359 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1363 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1365 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1366 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1367 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1368 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1369 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1370 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1371 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1372 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1376 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1377 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1379 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1382 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1383 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1384 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1386 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1390 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1391 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1392 * So check cookie length...
1394 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1395 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1396 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1400 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1402 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1406 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1408 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1412 /* Could be empty. */
1413 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1414 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1416 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1417 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1419 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1425 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1426 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1427 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1428 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1429 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1433 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1434 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1435 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1436 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1437 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1438 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1441 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1443 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1446 if (clienthello != NULL)
1447 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1448 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1450 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1453 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1456 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1461 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1463 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1464 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1465 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1466 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1467 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1469 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1470 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1471 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1472 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1473 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1474 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1476 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1477 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1479 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1482 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1483 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1488 /* Set up the client_random */
1489 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1491 /* Choose the version */
1493 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1494 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1495 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1496 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1498 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1501 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1502 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1503 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1507 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1510 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1511 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1513 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1514 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1515 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1516 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1517 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1523 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1524 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1525 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1528 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1532 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1533 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1534 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1535 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1536 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1540 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1541 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1542 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1543 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1544 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1545 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1546 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1547 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1548 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1550 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1552 /* default verification */
1553 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1554 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1555 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1557 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1558 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1561 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1563 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1564 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1565 if (protverr != 0) {
1566 s->version = s->client_version;
1567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1568 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1576 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1577 clienthello->isv2) ||
1578 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1579 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1580 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1584 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1585 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1586 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1587 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1588 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1589 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1590 if (s->renegotiate) {
1591 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1593 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1594 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1597 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1598 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1599 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1601 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1602 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1603 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1604 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1605 * an insecure downgrade.
1607 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1608 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1609 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1615 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1616 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1617 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1618 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1620 if (cipher == NULL) {
1621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1622 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1623 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1626 if (s->hello_retry_request
1627 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1628 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1630 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1631 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1634 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1638 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1641 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1642 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1643 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1644 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1645 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1650 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1651 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1653 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1654 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1655 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1656 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1657 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1658 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1659 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1660 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1661 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1662 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1665 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1667 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1668 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1669 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1673 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1675 /* previous session */
1677 } else if (i == -1) {
1678 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1682 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1683 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1690 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1691 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1693 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1695 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1698 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1700 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1701 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1703 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1704 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1713 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1716 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1717 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1718 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1723 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1724 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1728 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1730 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1731 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1732 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1737 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1738 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1739 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1741 /* TLS extensions */
1742 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1743 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1744 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1749 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1750 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1751 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1752 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1756 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1757 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1758 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1759 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1760 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1766 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1769 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1770 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1772 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1773 * backwards compat reasons
1775 int master_key_length;
1777 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1778 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1779 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1781 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1782 && master_key_length > 0) {
1783 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1785 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1786 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1790 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1791 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1792 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1793 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1794 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1795 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1796 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1797 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1801 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1802 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1803 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1804 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1805 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1810 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1811 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1812 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1814 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1815 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1817 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1818 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1819 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1821 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1822 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1823 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1824 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1829 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1830 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1831 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1833 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1834 /* Can't disable compression */
1835 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1836 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1837 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1838 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1841 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1842 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1843 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1844 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1845 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1849 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1850 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1851 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1852 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1855 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1856 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1857 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1860 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1861 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1862 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1863 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1866 } else if (s->hit) {
1868 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1869 /* See if we have a match */
1870 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1873 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1874 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1875 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1877 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1878 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1887 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1893 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1894 * using compression.
1896 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1897 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1898 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1899 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1905 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1908 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1909 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1910 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1911 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1912 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1913 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1914 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1921 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1922 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1924 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1926 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1927 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1932 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1933 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1934 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1935 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1936 s->clienthello = NULL;
1939 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1940 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1941 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1942 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1943 s->clienthello = NULL;
1949 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1950 * Upon failure, returns 0.
1952 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
1954 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1957 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1958 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1959 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1960 * influence which certificate is sent
1962 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
1963 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
1966 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1967 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
1969 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1970 * et al can pick it up.
1972 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
1973 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
1975 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1976 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1977 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1979 /* status request response should be sent */
1980 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1981 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
1982 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1984 /* something bad happened */
1985 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1987 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1988 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
1989 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1999 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2000 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2002 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2004 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2005 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2007 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2008 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2009 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
2010 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
2011 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2013 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2014 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2015 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2016 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2017 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2018 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2021 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2023 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2024 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
2027 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2028 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2029 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2030 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2031 selected_len) != 0) {
2032 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2033 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2036 /* If a new session update it with the new ALPN value */
2037 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2039 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2040 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2041 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2042 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2045 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2050 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2051 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2052 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2056 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2061 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2062 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2063 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2064 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2070 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2072 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2074 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2075 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2077 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2084 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2085 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2086 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2087 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2088 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2090 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2091 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2092 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2096 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2099 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2102 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2103 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2105 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2107 if (cipher == NULL) {
2108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2109 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2110 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2113 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2116 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2117 /* SSLfatal already called */
2120 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2121 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2122 s->session->not_resumable =
2123 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2124 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2125 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2126 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2127 /* do not send a session ticket */
2128 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2131 /* Session-id reuse */
2132 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2136 * we now have the following setup.
2138 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2139 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2140 * compression - basically ignored right now
2141 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2142 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2143 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2144 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2148 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2149 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2151 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2152 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2156 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2157 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2158 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2159 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2161 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2162 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2169 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2171 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2173 * callback indicates further work to be done
2175 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2179 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2185 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2190 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2196 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
2197 version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
2198 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2200 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2201 * tls_process_client_hello()
2203 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2205 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2210 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2211 * back in the server hello:
2212 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2213 * we send back the old session ID.
2214 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2215 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2216 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2217 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2219 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2220 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2221 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2222 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2225 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2226 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2228 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2230 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2231 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2233 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2237 /* set up the compression method */
2238 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2241 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2244 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2247 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2248 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl))
2249 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2250 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2251 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
2252 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2254 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2255 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
2257 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2261 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2262 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2263 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2270 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2272 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2273 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2274 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2281 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2284 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2286 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2287 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2288 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2291 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2295 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2296 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2297 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2299 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2300 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2301 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2305 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2307 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2311 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2313 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2315 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2316 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2318 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2319 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2320 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2321 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2323 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2326 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2327 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2328 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2329 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2331 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2332 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2333 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2336 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2339 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2341 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2342 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2343 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2345 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2346 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2347 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2352 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2354 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2355 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2358 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2359 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2361 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2362 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2365 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2366 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2367 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2368 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2372 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2373 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2374 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2378 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2380 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2383 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2384 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2388 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2390 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2392 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2393 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2397 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2398 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2399 if (curve_id == 0) {
2400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2401 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2402 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2405 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2406 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2407 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2408 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2412 /* Encode the public key. */
2413 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2415 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2417 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2422 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2423 * can set these to NULLs
2430 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2432 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2433 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2434 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2435 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2437 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2438 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2441 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2442 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2443 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2444 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2448 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2449 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2450 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2454 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2455 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2457 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2458 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2459 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2464 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2465 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2466 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2469 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2470 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2472 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2473 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2476 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2477 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2483 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2484 unsigned char *binval;
2487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2488 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2489 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2492 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2495 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2496 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2497 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2503 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2504 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2507 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2508 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2511 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2513 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2514 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2517 memset(binval, 0, len);
2521 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2522 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2523 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2524 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2525 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2529 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2533 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2535 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2536 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2537 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2540 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2541 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2542 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2543 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2545 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2546 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2549 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2550 encodedPoint = NULL;
2556 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2558 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2559 size_t siglen, tbslen;
2562 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2563 /* Should never happen */
2564 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2565 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2566 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2570 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2571 * points to the space at the end.
2574 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2575 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2576 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2577 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2578 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2581 /* send signature algorithm */
2582 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2584 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2585 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2589 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2590 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2591 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2594 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2595 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2596 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2597 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2598 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2599 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2602 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2603 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2604 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2605 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2606 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2611 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2612 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2615 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2618 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
2620 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2621 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2622 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2623 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2624 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2629 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2633 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2635 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2636 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2638 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2642 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2644 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2645 /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */
2646 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2647 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2648 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2649 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2653 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2654 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2656 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2662 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2663 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2664 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2665 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2666 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2670 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2671 const uint16_t *psigs;
2672 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2674 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2675 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2676 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2677 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2678 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2679 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2680 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2685 if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2686 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2691 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2695 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2698 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2700 PACKET psk_identity;
2702 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2704 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2707 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2708 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2709 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2712 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2713 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2714 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2718 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2720 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2724 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2727 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2729 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2731 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2733 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2735 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2736 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2737 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2741 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2742 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2743 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2745 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2746 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2747 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2751 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2755 /* Should never happen */
2756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2757 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2762 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2765 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2767 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2768 size_t j, padding_len;
2769 PACKET enc_premaster;
2771 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2774 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2776 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2777 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2781 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2782 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2783 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2785 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2786 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2788 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2794 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2795 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2796 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2797 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2799 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2800 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2801 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2805 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2806 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2807 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2808 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2813 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2814 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2815 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2816 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2817 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2820 if (ssl_randbytes(s, rand_premaster_secret,
2821 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2822 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2823 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2828 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2829 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2831 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2832 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2833 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2834 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2835 if (decrypt_len < 0) {
2836 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2837 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2841 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2844 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2845 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2846 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2848 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2849 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2850 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2854 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2855 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2856 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2857 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2858 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2860 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2863 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2864 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2865 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2866 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2867 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2868 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2871 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2872 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2874 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2875 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2878 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2879 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2880 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2881 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2882 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2883 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2886 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2887 unsigned char workaround_good;
2888 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2889 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2891 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2892 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2893 version_good |= workaround_good;
2897 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2898 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2900 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2903 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2904 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2905 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2906 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2908 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2909 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2910 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2911 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2912 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2915 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2916 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2917 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2923 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2926 /* Should never happen */
2927 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2928 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2933 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2935 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2936 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2940 const unsigned char *data;
2941 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2944 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2945 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2946 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2949 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2952 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2956 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2957 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2958 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2961 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2962 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2963 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2964 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2967 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2968 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2969 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2973 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2974 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2976 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2977 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2978 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2979 if (pub_key != NULL)
2984 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2985 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2990 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2991 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2993 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2996 /* Should never happen */
2997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2998 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3003 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3006 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3007 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3010 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3011 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3012 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3013 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3017 const unsigned char *data;
3020 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3021 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3024 /* Get encoded point length */
3025 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3026 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3027 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3028 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3031 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3032 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3033 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3037 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3038 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3044 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3045 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3050 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3051 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3053 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3057 /* Should never happen */
3058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3059 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3064 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3066 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3068 const unsigned char *data;
3070 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3071 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3072 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3073 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3076 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3077 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3081 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3082 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3083 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3086 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3087 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3088 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3089 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3090 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3094 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3095 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3101 /* Should never happen */
3102 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3103 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3108 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3110 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3111 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3112 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3113 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3114 const unsigned char *start;
3115 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3116 unsigned long alg_a;
3119 size_t sess_key_len;
3120 const unsigned char *data;
3123 /* Get our certificate private key */
3124 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3125 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3127 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3129 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3131 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3134 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3136 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3137 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3140 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3141 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3143 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3146 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3147 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3148 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3152 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3153 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3154 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3155 * client certificate for authorization only.
3157 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3158 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3159 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3162 /* Decrypt session key */
3163 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3164 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
3165 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3166 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3169 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3170 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
3171 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
3172 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
3173 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3174 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3179 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3182 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3185 /* Generate master secret */
3186 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3187 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3188 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3191 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3192 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3194 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3198 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3201 /* Should never happen */
3202 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3203 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3208 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3210 unsigned long alg_k;
3212 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3214 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3215 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3216 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3220 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3221 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3222 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3224 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3225 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3228 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3229 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3230 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3233 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3234 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3235 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3238 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3239 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3240 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3243 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3244 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3245 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3248 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3249 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3250 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3253 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3254 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3255 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3260 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3261 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3265 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3268 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3269 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3271 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3274 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3276 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3277 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3278 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3279 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3280 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3282 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3285 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3286 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3288 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3289 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3290 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3292 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3293 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3294 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3298 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3299 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3304 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3306 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3307 * the handshake_buffer
3309 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3310 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3313 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3315 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3317 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3318 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3322 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3323 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3325 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3326 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3331 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3334 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3337 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3339 unsigned long l, llen;
3340 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3341 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3342 PACKET spkt, context;
3345 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3347 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3351 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3352 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
3353 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3354 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3355 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3356 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3357 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3361 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3362 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3363 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3364 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3365 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3366 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3370 certstart = certbytes;
3371 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3373 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3374 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3377 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3379 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3380 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3384 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3385 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3388 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3390 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3394 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3395 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3396 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3397 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3398 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3399 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3400 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3403 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3406 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3408 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3409 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3415 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3416 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3417 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3419 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3420 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3423 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3424 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3425 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3427 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3428 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3431 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3432 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3433 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3438 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3440 SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result),
3441 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3442 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3447 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3450 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3453 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3454 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3459 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3460 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3461 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3463 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3464 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3467 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3470 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3471 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3476 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3477 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3481 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3483 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3484 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3485 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3486 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3490 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3494 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3498 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3500 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3503 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3504 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3509 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3510 * for the server Certificate message
3512 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3513 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3514 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3517 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3518 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3525 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3527 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3528 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3529 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3530 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3531 const unsigned char *const_p;
3532 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3535 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3536 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3537 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3539 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3541 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3545 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3546 if (ssl_randbytes(s, age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
3547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3548 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3549 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3552 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3554 * ticket_nonce is set to a single 0 byte because we only ever send a
3555 * single ticket per connection. IMPORTANT: If we ever support multiple
3556 * tickets per connection then this will need to be changed.
3558 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick_nonce);
3559 s->session->ext.tick_nonce = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(char));
3560 if (s->session->ext.tick_nonce == NULL) {
3561 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3562 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3563 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3566 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len = 1;
3567 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
3568 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
3569 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
3570 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
3571 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
3572 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
3573 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3574 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3575 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3578 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
3580 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
3583 /* get session encoding length */
3584 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3586 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3589 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3590 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3591 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3594 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3596 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3597 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3601 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3602 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3603 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3604 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3605 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3610 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3611 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3612 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3617 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3620 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3622 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3623 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3626 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3628 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3629 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3630 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3632 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3633 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3637 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3638 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3639 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3640 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3643 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3646 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3647 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3649 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3650 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3651 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3656 /* Put timeout and length */
3657 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3658 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3659 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3660 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3661 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3665 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3666 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3671 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3672 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3675 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3677 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3679 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3680 if (ssl_randbytes(s, iv, iv_len) <= 0
3681 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3682 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv)
3683 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
3684 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
3685 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
3686 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3687 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3688 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3691 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3692 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3696 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3697 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3698 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3701 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3702 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3703 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3705 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add)
3706 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
3707 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
3708 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3709 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3710 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3711 /* Output key name */
3712 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3714 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3715 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3717 /* Encrypt session data */
3718 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3719 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3720 || encdata1 != encdata2
3721 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3722 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3723 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3724 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3725 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3726 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3727 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3728 macendoffset - macoffset)
3729 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3730 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3731 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3732 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3733 || macdata1 != macdata2
3734 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3735 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3736 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3740 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3741 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3743 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3746 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3747 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3753 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3754 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3759 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3760 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3762 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3764 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3765 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3766 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3767 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
3768 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3775 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3777 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3778 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3787 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3788 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3790 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3792 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3793 size_t next_proto_len;
3796 * The payload looks like:
3798 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3799 * uint8 padding_len;
3800 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3802 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3803 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3804 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3805 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
3806 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3807 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3810 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
3812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
3813 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3814 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3817 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3819 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3823 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3825 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3827 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3834 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3839 * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
3840 * (should be s->version)
3842 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
3843 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt,
3845 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3846 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3850 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
3852 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3856 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
3857 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3862 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
3863 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
3865 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
3866 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3873 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3875 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3876 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3877 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3878 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3881 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
3882 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
3883 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3884 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3885 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3889 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
3890 * a record boundary.
3892 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
3893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
3894 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3895 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
3896 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3899 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
3900 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3901 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
3902 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3903 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3906 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;