2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
65 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
66 PACKET *cipher_suites,
68 **skp, int sslv2format,
72 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
73 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
74 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
75 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
77 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
78 * (transition not allowed)
80 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
82 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
85 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
86 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
90 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
91 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
92 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
94 switch (st->hand_state) {
98 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
99 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
100 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
101 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
105 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
106 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
113 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
114 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
126 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
127 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
128 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
134 /* No valid transition found */
135 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
136 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION,
137 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
142 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
143 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
144 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
145 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
147 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
148 * (transition not allowed)
150 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
152 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
154 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
155 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
160 switch (st->hand_state) {
166 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
167 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
168 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
173 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
175 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
176 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
178 * 2) If we did request one then
179 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
181 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
182 * list if we requested a certificate)
184 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
185 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
186 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
187 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
188 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
190 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
191 * not going to accept it because we require a client
194 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
195 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
196 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
197 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
204 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
207 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
208 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
216 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
217 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
222 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
224 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
225 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
226 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
227 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
228 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
231 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
232 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
234 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
235 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
236 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
237 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
239 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
243 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
244 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
250 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
251 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
252 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
257 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
259 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
260 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
261 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
266 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
267 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
276 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
277 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
278 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
284 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
285 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
293 /* No valid transition found */
294 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
295 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
300 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
302 * Valid return values are:
306 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
308 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
311 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
312 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
313 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
314 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
315 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
318 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
320 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
324 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
325 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
326 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
327 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
328 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
331 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
332 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
342 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
344 * Valid return values are:
348 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
351 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
352 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
354 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
355 * during re-negotiation:
357 && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
358 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
360 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
361 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
364 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
366 * ... except when the application insists on
367 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
370 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
371 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
372 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
374 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
377 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
385 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
386 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
389 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
391 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
394 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
395 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
399 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
400 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
403 switch (st->hand_state) {
405 /* Shouldn't happen */
406 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
408 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
409 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
412 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
413 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
414 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
416 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
419 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
420 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
424 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
426 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
427 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
428 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
431 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
432 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
434 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
438 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
439 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
441 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
442 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
443 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
449 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
450 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
452 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
454 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
457 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
458 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
462 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
464 switch (st->hand_state) {
466 /* Shouldn't happen */
467 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
470 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
471 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
472 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
473 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
474 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
479 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
480 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
482 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
483 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
484 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
485 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
487 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
488 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
489 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
490 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
492 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
495 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
496 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
498 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
500 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
501 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
503 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
505 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
506 /* normal PSK or SRP */
507 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
508 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
509 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
510 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
511 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
512 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
513 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
515 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
518 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
521 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
523 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
527 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
528 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
529 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
530 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
534 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
535 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
536 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
537 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
541 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
542 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
543 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
545 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
546 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
548 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
550 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
551 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
552 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
553 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
554 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
558 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
560 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
561 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
562 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
564 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
565 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
566 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
568 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
570 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
572 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
573 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
579 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
580 * the server to the client.
582 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
584 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
586 switch (st->hand_state) {
588 /* No pre work to be done */
591 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
594 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
597 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
599 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
600 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
601 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
606 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
607 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
609 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
610 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
616 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
618 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
619 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
621 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
623 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
624 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
626 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
627 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
633 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
634 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
635 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
636 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
639 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
641 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
642 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
643 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
644 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
648 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
651 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
654 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
658 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
659 * server to the client.
661 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
663 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
667 switch (st->hand_state) {
669 /* No post work to be done */
672 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
673 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
675 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
676 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
681 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
682 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
684 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
685 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
686 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
690 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
691 * treat like it was the first packet
696 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
698 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
699 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
700 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
703 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
706 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
707 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
709 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
710 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
711 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
713 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
717 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
718 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
722 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
723 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
724 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
725 * something clever in the record layer for this.
727 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
728 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
729 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
730 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)
731 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
732 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
737 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
739 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
741 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
744 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
748 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
749 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
751 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
756 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
759 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
760 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
764 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
765 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
768 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
770 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
773 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
777 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
778 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
779 s->session->master_key, s->handshake_secret, 0,
780 &s->session->master_key_length)
781 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
782 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
788 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
792 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
795 * Valid return values are:
799 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
800 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
802 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
804 switch (st->hand_state) {
806 /* Shouldn't happen */
809 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
811 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
813 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
814 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
817 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
818 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
819 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
822 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
823 /* No construction function needed */
825 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
828 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
829 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
830 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
834 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
835 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
838 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
839 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
840 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
844 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
845 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
846 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
849 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
850 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
851 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
854 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
855 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
856 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
859 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
860 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
861 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
864 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
865 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
866 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
869 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
870 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
871 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
874 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
875 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
876 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
884 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
885 * calculated as follows:
887 * 2 + # client_version
888 * 32 + # only valid length for random
889 * 1 + # length of session_id
890 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
891 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
892 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
893 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
894 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
895 * 2 + # length of extensions
896 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
898 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
900 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
901 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
904 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
905 * reading. Excludes the message header.
907 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
909 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
911 switch (st->hand_state) {
913 /* Shouldn't happen */
916 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
917 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
920 return s->max_cert_list;
922 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
923 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
925 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
926 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
929 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
930 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
933 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
934 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
936 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
937 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
942 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
944 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
946 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
948 switch (st->hand_state) {
950 /* Shouldn't happen */
951 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
953 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
954 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
957 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
959 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
960 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
962 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
963 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
966 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
967 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
970 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
971 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
973 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
974 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
979 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
982 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
984 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
986 switch (st->hand_state) {
988 /* Shouldn't happen */
991 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
992 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
994 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
995 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
997 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
999 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
1000 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
1001 /* Are we renegotiating? */
1002 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1003 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1004 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1005 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1006 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1007 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
1010 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
1013 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1015 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1019 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
1021 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
1023 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1025 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1026 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1027 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1029 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1032 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
1033 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
1035 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
1042 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1045 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1046 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1047 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1053 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1055 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1056 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1057 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1058 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1059 cookie_leni > 255) {
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1061 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1064 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1066 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1067 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1077 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1078 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1079 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1084 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1085 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1086 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1087 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1089 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1091 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1092 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1093 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1094 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1095 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1096 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1097 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1099 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1100 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1101 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1102 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1103 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1104 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1105 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1106 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1107 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1108 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1109 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1110 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1111 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1113 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1114 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1119 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1121 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1122 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1123 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1127 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1130 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1131 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1133 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1136 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1138 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1140 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1144 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1146 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1148 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1150 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1151 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1152 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1153 CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello;
1156 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1158 memset(&clienthello, 0, sizeof(clienthello));
1159 clienthello.isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1160 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1162 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1166 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1167 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1168 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1169 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1171 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1172 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1174 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1175 * 7-8 session_id_length
1176 * 9-10 challenge_length
1180 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1181 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1183 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1184 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1185 * in the first place
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1192 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello.legacy_version)) {
1193 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1198 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1199 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1201 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1202 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1203 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1205 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1208 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1209 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1210 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1212 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1213 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1217 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1218 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1223 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites,
1225 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.session_id, session_id_len)
1226 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1227 /* No extensions. */
1228 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1230 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1231 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1234 clienthello.session_id_len = session_id_len;
1236 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1237 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit
1238 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1239 * sizeof(clienthello.random) does.
1241 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1242 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1243 memset(clienthello.random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1244 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1245 clienthello.random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1246 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1247 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1248 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1250 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1254 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1256 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1257 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1258 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1259 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello.session_id,
1260 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1261 &clienthello.session_id_len)) {
1262 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1267 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1268 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1269 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1270 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1273 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1274 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1275 &clienthello.dtls_cookie_len)) {
1276 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1281 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1282 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1283 * So check cookie length...
1285 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1286 if (clienthello.dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1291 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites)) {
1292 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1297 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1298 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1303 /* Could be empty. */
1304 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1305 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1307 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.extensions)) {
1308 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1315 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello.compressions,
1316 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1317 &clienthello.compressions_len)) {
1318 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1323 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1324 extensions = clienthello.extensions;
1325 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1326 &clienthello.pre_proc_exts, &al)) {
1327 /* SSLerr already been called */
1331 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1333 /* Set up the client_random */
1334 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1336 /* Choose the version */
1338 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1339 if (clienthello.legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1340 || (clienthello.legacy_version & 0xff00)
1341 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1343 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1350 s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1353 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1354 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1356 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1357 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1358 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1359 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello.legacy_version, s->version)) {
1360 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1367 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1368 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1369 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1371 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1375 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1376 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1377 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1378 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1379 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1380 clienthello.dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1381 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1383 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1385 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1387 /* default verification */
1388 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello.dtls_cookie_len
1389 || memcmp(clienthello.dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1390 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1391 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1395 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1397 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1398 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1399 if (protverr != 0) {
1400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1401 s->version = s->client_version;
1402 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1410 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1411 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1413 clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1419 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1420 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1422 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1423 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1424 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1425 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1426 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1427 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1428 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1429 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1430 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1431 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1434 if (clienthello.isv2 ||
1436 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1437 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1440 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello);
1442 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1444 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1445 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1446 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1447 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1448 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1450 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1451 /* previous session */
1453 } else if (i == -1) {
1457 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1462 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello.ciphersuites, &ciphers,
1463 clienthello.isv2, &al) == NULL) {
1467 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1470 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1473 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1475 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1476 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1478 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1479 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1488 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1491 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1493 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1498 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello.compressions_len; loop++) {
1499 if (clienthello.compressions[loop] == 0)
1503 if (loop >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1505 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1510 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1511 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1512 ssl_check_for_safari(s, &clienthello);
1513 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1515 /* TLS extensions */
1516 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1517 clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1518 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1522 /* Check we've got a key_share for TLSv1.3 */
1523 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL && !s->hit) {
1524 /* No suitable share */
1525 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Send a HelloRetryRequest */
1526 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
1532 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1533 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1534 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1535 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1539 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1540 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1545 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1546 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1548 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1549 * backwards compat reasons
1551 int master_key_length;
1553 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1554 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1555 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1557 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1558 && master_key_length > 0) {
1559 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1561 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1562 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1566 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1568 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1573 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1574 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1579 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1580 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1581 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1582 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1583 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1588 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1589 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1590 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1592 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1594 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1595 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1596 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1598 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1599 /* Can't disable compression */
1600 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1602 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1605 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1606 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1607 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1608 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1609 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1613 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1614 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1615 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1618 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1619 for (k = 0; k < clienthello.compressions_len; k++) {
1620 if (clienthello.compressions[k] == comp_id)
1623 if (k >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1624 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1626 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1631 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1632 /* See if we have a match */
1633 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1636 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1637 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1638 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1640 for (o = 0; o < clienthello.compressions_len; o++) {
1641 if (v == clienthello.compressions[o]) {
1650 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1656 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1657 * using compression.
1659 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1660 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1666 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1670 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1671 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1673 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1675 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1676 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1677 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1678 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1683 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1689 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1690 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1691 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1693 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1695 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1697 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1698 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1700 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1704 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1705 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
1707 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al)
1709 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1712 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1713 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1714 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1715 * influence which certificate is sent
1717 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
1718 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
1720 CERT_PKEY *certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
1722 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1723 if (certpkey != NULL) {
1725 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1726 * et al can pick it up.
1728 s->cert->key = certpkey;
1729 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
1731 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1732 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1733 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1735 /* status request response should be sent */
1736 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1737 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
1738 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1740 /* something bad happened */
1741 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1743 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1752 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1754 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1755 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1757 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1759 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1760 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1761 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1763 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1765 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1769 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1772 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1775 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1777 if (cipher == NULL) {
1778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1779 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1782 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1783 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1784 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1785 s->session->not_resumable =
1786 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey
1787 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1789 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1790 /* do not send a session ticket */
1791 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1793 /* Session-id reuse */
1794 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1797 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1798 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1799 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1805 * we now have the following setup.
1807 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1808 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1809 * compression - basically ignored right now
1810 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1811 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1812 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1813 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1817 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
1818 * certificate callbacks etc above.
1820 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) {
1821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1822 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1829 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1831 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1833 * callback indicates further work to be done
1835 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1838 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1840 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1841 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1843 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1844 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1845 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1848 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1855 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1857 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1858 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1862 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1864 int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1868 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
1869 version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
1870 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
1872 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1873 * tls_process_client_hello()
1875 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1881 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1882 * back in the server hello:
1883 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1884 * we send back the old session ID.
1885 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1886 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1887 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1888 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1890 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1891 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1892 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1893 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1896 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1897 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1899 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1901 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1902 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1903 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1907 /* set up the compression method */
1908 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1911 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1914 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1917 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1918 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl))
1919 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
1920 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1921 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
1922 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
1924 ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1925 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
1927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1933 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1937 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1939 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1940 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1941 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1948 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1950 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1951 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1954 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1955 size_t encodedlen = 0;
1959 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1960 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
1963 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1964 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1965 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
1967 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
1968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1972 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1977 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1979 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1981 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1982 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1984 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1985 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1986 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1987 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1989 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
1992 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1993 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1994 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
1995 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
1997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1998 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2001 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2004 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2006 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2007 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2008 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2011 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2016 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2017 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2019 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2022 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2023 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2024 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2026 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2029 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2030 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2031 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2035 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2037 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2038 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2042 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2044 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2047 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2048 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2051 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2052 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2055 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2057 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2061 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2062 nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2063 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
2064 if (curve_id == 0) {
2065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2066 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2069 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
2070 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2071 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2076 /* Encode the public key. */
2077 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2079 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2085 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2086 * can set these to NULLs
2093 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2095 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2096 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2097 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2098 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2100 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2103 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2104 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2105 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2106 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2110 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2111 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2112 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2116 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2117 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
2118 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
2120 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2128 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2129 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2130 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2133 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2134 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2136 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2137 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2139 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2140 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2146 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2147 unsigned char *binval;
2150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2151 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2152 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2155 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2158 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2159 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2165 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2166 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2169 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2170 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2173 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2174 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2175 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2178 memset(binval, 0, len);
2182 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2183 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2184 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2185 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2189 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2193 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2195 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2196 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2197 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2200 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2201 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2202 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2203 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2205 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2208 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2209 encodedPoint = NULL;
2216 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2217 * points to the space at the end.
2220 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
2224 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2225 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2226 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2227 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2230 /* send signature algorithm */
2231 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2232 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(s, pkt, pkey, md, &ispss)) {
2233 /* Should never happen */
2234 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2235 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2240 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2243 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2244 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2245 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2248 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2249 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2250 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2252 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2256 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx,
2257 RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2258 /* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */
2259 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1) <= 0) {
2260 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2265 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2266 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2267 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2268 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2269 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx,
2270 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2272 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0
2273 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2274 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2276 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2280 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2281 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2283 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2288 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2291 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2293 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2294 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2296 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2297 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2299 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2303 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2306 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2308 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2309 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2310 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt)
2311 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2316 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2317 const unsigned int *psigs;
2318 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2320 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2321 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2322 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2324 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2329 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2330 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2335 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2337 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2338 unsigned char *namebytes;
2339 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2343 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2344 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2346 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2348 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2353 /* else no CA names */
2355 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2360 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2364 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2368 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2371 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2373 PACKET psk_identity;
2375 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2376 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2380 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2381 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2382 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2385 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2386 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2391 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2392 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2397 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2400 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2401 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2404 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2406 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2408 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2410 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2414 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2415 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2416 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2418 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2419 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2424 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2428 /* Should never happen */
2429 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2435 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2438 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2440 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2441 size_t j, padding_len;
2442 PACKET enc_premaster;
2444 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2447 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2449 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2454 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2455 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2456 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2458 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2459 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2460 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2461 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2467 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2468 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2469 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2470 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2472 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2473 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2478 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2479 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2480 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2481 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2486 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2487 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2488 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2489 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2490 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2493 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2497 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2498 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2500 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2501 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2502 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2503 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2504 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2507 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2510 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2511 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2512 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2514 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2515 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2520 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2521 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2522 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2523 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2524 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2526 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2529 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2530 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2531 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2532 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2533 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2534 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2537 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2538 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2540 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2541 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2544 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2545 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2546 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2547 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2548 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2549 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2552 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2553 unsigned char workaround_good;
2554 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2555 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2557 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2558 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2559 version_good |= workaround_good;
2563 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2564 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2566 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2569 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2570 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2571 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2572 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2574 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2575 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2576 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2577 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2578 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2581 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2582 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2583 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2584 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2590 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2593 /* Should never happen */
2594 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2600 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2603 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2607 const unsigned char *data;
2608 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2611 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2612 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2613 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2614 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2617 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2619 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2620 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2624 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2625 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2626 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2629 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2630 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2631 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2632 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2635 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2636 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2637 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2640 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2641 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2643 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2645 if (pub_key != NULL)
2650 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2651 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2657 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2658 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2660 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2663 /* Should never happen */
2664 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2665 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2670 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2673 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2674 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2677 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2678 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2679 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2680 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2684 const unsigned char *data;
2687 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2688 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2691 /* Get encoded point length */
2692 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2693 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2694 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2698 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2699 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2703 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2704 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2710 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2711 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2717 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2718 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2720 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2724 /* Should never happen */
2725 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2726 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2731 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2735 const unsigned char *data;
2737 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2738 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2739 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2743 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2747 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2748 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2749 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2752 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2753 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2754 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2755 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2759 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2766 /* Should never happen */
2767 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2773 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2776 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2777 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2778 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2779 const unsigned char *start;
2780 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2781 unsigned long alg_a;
2784 size_t sess_key_len;
2785 const unsigned char *data;
2788 /* Get our certificate private key */
2789 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2790 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2792 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2794 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2796 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2799 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2801 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2802 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2805 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2806 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2807 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2808 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2811 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2812 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2817 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2818 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2819 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2820 * client certificate for authorization only.
2822 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2823 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2824 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2827 /* Decrypt session key */
2828 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2829 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2830 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2834 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2835 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2836 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2837 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2838 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2839 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2844 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2845 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2846 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2847 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2850 /* Generate master secret */
2851 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2852 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2853 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2854 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2857 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2858 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2859 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2860 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2864 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2867 /* Should never happen */
2868 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2874 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2877 unsigned long alg_k;
2879 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2881 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2882 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2885 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2886 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2887 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2888 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2890 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2893 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2894 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2895 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2899 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2900 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2902 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2903 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2905 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2906 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2908 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2909 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2911 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2912 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2915 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2916 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2917 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2921 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2924 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2926 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2927 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2929 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2930 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2933 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2935 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2936 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2937 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2938 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2939 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2941 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2944 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2945 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2947 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2948 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2949 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
2951 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2955 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2956 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2961 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2963 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2964 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2966 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2967 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2968 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2969 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2970 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2971 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2972 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2973 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2976 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2980 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
2982 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
2983 * the handshake_buffer
2985 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2986 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2989 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2991 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2993 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2994 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2998 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2999 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3001 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3002 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3007 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3010 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3012 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3014 unsigned long l, llen;
3015 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3016 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3017 PACKET spkt, context;
3020 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3025 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3026 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
3027 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3028 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3029 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3030 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3035 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3036 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3037 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3038 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3040 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3044 certstart = certbytes;
3045 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3047 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3050 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3051 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3053 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3057 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3058 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3061 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3062 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3063 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3066 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3068 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3069 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
3070 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3073 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3076 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3077 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3083 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3084 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3085 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3086 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3088 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3091 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3092 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3093 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3095 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3096 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3099 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3100 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3105 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3107 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3109 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3114 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3117 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3119 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3121 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3126 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3127 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3128 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3130 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3131 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3134 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3137 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3138 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3139 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3144 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3145 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3149 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3151 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3152 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3153 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3154 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3155 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3159 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3163 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3164 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3167 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3171 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3174 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3176 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3178 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3183 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3184 * for the server Certificate message
3186 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3187 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) {
3188 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3189 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3196 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3198 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3199 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3200 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3201 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3202 const unsigned char *const_p;
3203 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3206 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3207 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3208 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3210 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3212 /* get session encoding length */
3213 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3215 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3218 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3219 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3222 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3224 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3228 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3229 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3230 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3236 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3240 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3243 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3246 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3248 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3249 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3250 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3254 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3255 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3258 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3261 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3262 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3264 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3265 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3266 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3271 /* Put timeout and length */
3272 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3273 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3275 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3279 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3280 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3285 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3287 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3289 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3290 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3292 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3293 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv))
3295 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
3296 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
3297 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3299 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3300 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3304 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3305 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3306 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3308 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3309 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3310 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3311 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3312 /* Output key name */
3313 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3315 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3316 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3318 /* Encrypt session data */
3319 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3320 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3321 || encdata1 != encdata2
3322 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3323 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3324 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3325 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3326 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3327 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3328 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3329 macendoffset - macoffset)
3330 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3331 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3332 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3333 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3334 || macdata1 != macdata2
3335 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3339 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3340 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3346 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3347 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3348 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3353 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3354 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3356 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3358 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3359 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3360 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3361 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3368 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3370 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3371 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3380 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3381 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3383 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3385 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3386 size_t next_proto_len;
3389 * The payload looks like:
3391 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3392 * uint8 padding_len;
3393 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3395 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3396 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3397 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3398 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3402 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
3407 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3409 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3411 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3412 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3416 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3420 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3422 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3423 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3424 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3431 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3433 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3434 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3435 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3436 int sslv2format, int *al)
3438 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3439 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3441 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3442 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3444 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3446 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3448 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3450 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3454 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3456 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3457 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3461 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
3463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3464 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3469 size_t numciphers = PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) / n;
3470 PACKET sslv2ciphers = *cipher_suites;
3471 unsigned int leadbyte;
3475 * We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some
3476 * preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only
3477 * ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to
3478 * slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a
3481 raw = OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers * TLS_CIPHER_LEN);
3482 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = raw;
3484 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3487 for (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
3488 PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers) > 0;
3489 raw += TLS_CIPHER_LEN) {
3490 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers, &leadbyte)
3492 && !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers, raw,
3495 && !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers, TLS_CIPHER_LEN))) {
3496 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3497 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
3498 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;
3499 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
3503 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen += TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3505 } else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3506 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3507 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3511 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3513 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3514 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3515 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3517 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3520 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3521 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3522 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3523 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3524 if (s->renegotiate) {
3525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3526 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3527 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3530 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3534 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3535 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3536 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3538 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3539 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3542 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3544 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3545 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3551 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3552 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3554 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3556 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3561 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3562 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3570 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);