2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
65 PACKET *cipher_suites,
67 **skp, int sslv2format,
71 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
72 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
73 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
74 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
76 * Valid return values are:
77 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
78 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
80 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
82 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
84 switch (st->hand_state) {
89 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
90 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
91 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
96 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
98 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
99 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
101 * 2) If we did request one then
102 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
104 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
105 * list if we requested a certificate)
107 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
108 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
109 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
110 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
111 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
113 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
114 * not going to accept it because we require a client
117 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
118 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
119 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
120 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
130 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
131 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
132 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
139 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
140 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
145 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
147 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
148 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
149 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
150 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
151 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
154 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
157 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
158 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
159 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
160 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
173 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
174 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
175 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
180 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
182 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
183 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
184 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
189 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
190 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
199 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
200 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
201 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
207 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
208 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
215 /* No valid transition found */
216 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
217 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
222 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
224 * Valid return values are:
228 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
230 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
233 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
234 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
235 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
236 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
237 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
240 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
242 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
246 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
247 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
248 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
249 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
250 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
253 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
254 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
264 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
266 * Valid return values are:
270 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
273 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
274 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
276 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
277 * during re-negotiation:
279 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
280 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
282 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
283 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
286 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
288 * ... except when the application insists on
289 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
292 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
293 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
294 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
296 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
299 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
307 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
308 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
310 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
312 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
314 switch (st->hand_state) {
316 /* Shouldn't happen */
317 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
320 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
321 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
324 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
326 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
328 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
330 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
331 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
333 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
334 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
335 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
336 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
339 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
341 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
342 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
344 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
346 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
347 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
351 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
352 /* normal PSK or SRP */
353 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
354 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
356 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
357 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
358 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
359 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
361 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
364 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
367 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
368 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
369 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
373 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
374 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
375 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
376 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
380 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
381 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
382 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
383 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
387 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
388 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
389 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
391 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
394 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
396 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
397 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
398 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
399 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
400 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
402 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
407 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
410 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
411 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
412 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
414 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
416 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
419 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
420 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
426 * the server to the client.
428 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
430 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
432 switch (st->hand_state) {
434 /* No pre work to be done */
437 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
440 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
443 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
445 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
446 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
447 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
452 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
453 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
455 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
456 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
462 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
464 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
465 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
467 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
469 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
470 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
472 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
473 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
479 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
480 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
481 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
482 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
485 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
487 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
488 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
489 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
490 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
494 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
497 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
500 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
504 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
505 * server to the client.
507 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
509 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
513 switch (st->hand_state) {
515 /* No post work to be done */
518 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
519 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
521 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
522 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
527 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
528 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
530 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
531 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
532 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
536 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
537 * treat like it was the first packet
542 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
544 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
545 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
546 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
549 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
552 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
553 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
555 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
556 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
557 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
559 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
563 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
564 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
569 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
571 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
573 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
576 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
580 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
581 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
583 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
588 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
591 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
592 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
596 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
597 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
600 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
602 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
605 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
612 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
616 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
619 * Valid return values are:
623 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
624 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
626 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
628 switch (st->hand_state) {
630 /* Shouldn't happen */
633 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
635 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
637 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
638 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
641 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
642 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
643 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
646 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
647 /* No construction function needed */
649 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
652 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
653 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
654 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
658 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
659 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
662 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
663 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
664 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
667 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
668 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
669 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
672 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
673 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
674 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
677 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
678 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
679 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
682 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
683 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
684 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
687 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
688 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
689 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
697 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
698 * calculated as follows:
700 * 2 + # client_version
701 * 32 + # only valid length for random
702 * 1 + # length of session_id
703 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
704 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
705 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
706 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
707 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
708 * 2 + # length of extensions
709 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
711 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
713 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
714 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
717 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
718 * reading. Excludes the message header.
720 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
722 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
724 switch (st->hand_state) {
726 /* Shouldn't happen */
729 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
730 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
733 return s->max_cert_list;
735 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
736 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
738 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
739 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
742 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
743 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
746 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
747 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
749 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
750 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
755 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
757 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
759 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
761 switch (st->hand_state) {
763 /* Shouldn't happen */
764 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
766 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
767 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
770 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
772 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
773 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
775 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
776 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
779 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
780 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
783 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
784 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
786 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
787 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
792 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
795 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
797 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
799 switch (st->hand_state) {
801 /* Shouldn't happen */
804 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
805 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
807 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
808 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
810 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
812 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
813 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
814 /* Are we renegotiating? */
815 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
816 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
817 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
818 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
819 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
820 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
823 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
826 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
832 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
834 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
836 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
838 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
839 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
840 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
842 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
846 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
848 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
855 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
858 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
859 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
860 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
866 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
868 unsigned int cookie_leni;
869 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
870 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
871 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
873 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
874 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
877 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
879 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
880 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
888 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
890 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
896 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
898 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
900 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
901 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
902 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
903 CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello;
906 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
908 memset(&clienthello, 0, sizeof(clienthello));
909 clienthello.isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
910 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
912 if (clienthello.isv2) {
916 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
917 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
918 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
919 * the rest right through. Its format is:
921 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
922 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
924 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
925 * 7-8 session_id_length
926 * 9-10 challenge_length
930 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
931 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
933 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
934 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
942 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello.legacy_version)) {
943 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
948 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
949 if (clienthello.isv2) {
951 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
952 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
953 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
955 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
958 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
959 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
960 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
962 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
963 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
966 clienthello.session_id_len = session_id_len;
968 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
969 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
970 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
974 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites,
976 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.session_id,
977 clienthello.session_id_len)
978 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
980 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
982 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
983 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
987 /* Load the client random and compression list. */
988 challenge_len = challenge_len > sizeof(clienthello.random)
989 ? sizeof(clienthello.random) : challenge_len;
990 memset(clienthello.random, 0, sizeof(clienthello.random));
991 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
992 clienthello.random + sizeof(clienthello.random) -
993 challenge_len, challenge_len)
994 /* Advertise only null compression. */
995 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
997 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1001 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1003 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1004 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1005 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1006 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello.session_id,
1007 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1008 &clienthello.session_id_len)) {
1009 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1014 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1015 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1016 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1020 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1021 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1022 &clienthello.dtls_cookie_len)) {
1023 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1028 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1029 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1030 * So check cookie length...
1032 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1033 if (clienthello.dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1038 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites)) {
1039 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1044 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1045 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1046 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1050 /* Could be empty. */
1051 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1052 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1054 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.extensions)) {
1055 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1062 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello.compressions,
1063 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1064 &clienthello.compressions_len)) {
1065 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1070 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1071 extensions = clienthello.extensions;
1072 if (!tls_collect_extensions(&extensions, &clienthello.pre_proc_exts,
1073 &clienthello.num_extensions, &al)) {
1074 /* SSLerr already been called */
1078 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1080 /* Set up the client_random */
1081 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1083 /* Choose the version */
1085 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1086 if (clienthello.legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1087 || (clienthello.legacy_version & 0xff00)
1088 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1090 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1097 s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1100 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1101 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1103 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1104 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1105 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1106 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello.legacy_version, s->version)) {
1107 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1114 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1115 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1116 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1118 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1122 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1123 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1124 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1125 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1126 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1127 clienthello.dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1128 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1130 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1132 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1134 /* default verification */
1135 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello.dtls_cookie_len
1136 || memcmp(clienthello.dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1137 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1138 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1139 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1142 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1144 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1145 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1146 if (protverr != 0) {
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1148 s->version = s->client_version;
1149 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1157 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1158 if (!tls_check_client_ems_support(s, &clienthello)) {
1159 /* Only fails if the extension is malformed */
1160 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1166 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1167 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1169 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1170 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1171 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1172 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1173 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1174 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1175 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1176 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1177 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1178 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1181 if (clienthello.isv2 ||
1183 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1184 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1187 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello);
1189 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1191 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1192 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1193 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1194 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1195 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1197 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1198 /* previous session */
1200 } else if (i == -1) {
1204 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1209 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello.ciphersuites, &ciphers,
1210 clienthello.isv2, &al) == NULL) {
1214 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1217 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1220 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1222 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1223 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1225 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1226 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1235 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1238 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1240 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1245 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello.compressions_len; loop++) {
1246 if (clienthello.compressions[loop] == 0)
1250 if (loop >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1252 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1257 /* TLS extensions */
1258 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &clienthello)) {
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1264 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1265 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1266 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1267 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1271 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1272 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1277 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1278 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1280 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1281 * backwards compat reasons
1283 int master_key_length;
1285 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1286 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1287 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1289 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)
1290 && master_key_length > 0) {
1291 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1293 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1294 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1298 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1300 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1305 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1306 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1311 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1312 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1313 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1314 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1315 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1320 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1321 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1322 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1324 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1326 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1327 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1328 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1330 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1331 /* Can't disable compression */
1332 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1334 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1337 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1338 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1339 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1340 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1341 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1345 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1347 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1350 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1351 for (k = 0; k < clienthello.compressions_len; k++) {
1352 if (clienthello.compressions[k] == comp_id)
1355 if (k >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1356 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1358 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1363 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1364 /* See if we have a match */
1365 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1368 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1369 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1370 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1372 for (o = 0; o < clienthello.compressions_len; o++) {
1373 if (v == clienthello.compressions[o]) {
1382 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1388 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1389 * using compression.
1391 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1398 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1402 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1403 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1405 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1407 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1408 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1409 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1410 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1415 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1421 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1422 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1423 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1425 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1427 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1429 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1430 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1432 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1435 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1437 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1438 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1440 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1442 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1443 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1444 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1446 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1447 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1448 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1452 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1455 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1458 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1460 if (cipher == NULL) {
1461 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1462 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1465 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1466 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1467 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1468 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1469 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1470 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1471 /* do not send a session ticket */
1472 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1474 /* Session-id reuse */
1475 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1478 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1479 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1480 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1486 * we now have the following setup.
1488 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1489 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1490 * compression - basically ignored right now
1491 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1492 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1493 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1494 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1497 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1498 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1499 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1501 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1509 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1511 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1513 * callback indicates further work to be done
1515 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1518 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1520 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1521 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1523 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1525 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1532 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1534 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1535 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1539 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1541 int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1544 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version)
1546 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1547 * tls_process_client_hello()
1549 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1550 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1555 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1556 * back in the server hello:
1557 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1558 * we send back the old session ID.
1559 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1560 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1561 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1562 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1564 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1565 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1566 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1567 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1570 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1571 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1573 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1575 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1576 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1581 /* set up the compression method */
1582 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1585 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1588 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1591 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl)
1592 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
1593 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)
1594 || !ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s)
1595 || !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al)) {
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1602 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1606 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1608 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1609 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1610 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1617 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1620 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1623 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1624 size_t encodedlen = 0;
1628 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1629 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
1632 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1633 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
1635 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1640 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1645 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1647 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1649 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1650 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1652 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1654 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1655 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1657 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
1660 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1661 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1662 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
1663 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
1665 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1666 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1669 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
1672 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1674 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1675 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
1676 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1679 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1684 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
1685 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1687 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1690 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1691 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
1692 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1694 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1697 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1699 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1703 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
1705 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1710 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1712 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1715 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
1716 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
1719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1720 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1723 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1725 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1729 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1730 nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1731 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
1732 if (curve_id == 0) {
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1734 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1737 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1738 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1739 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1744 /* Encode the public key. */
1745 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
1747 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1753 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1754 * can set these to NULLs
1761 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1763 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1764 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1765 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1766 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1767 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1768 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1771 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1772 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1773 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1774 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1778 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1780 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1784 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1785 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1786 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1788 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1795 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1796 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1797 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
1798 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1801 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
1802 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
1804 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
1805 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
1807 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1808 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1814 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1815 unsigned char *binval;
1818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1819 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1820 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
1823 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
1826 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1827 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1833 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1834 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1837 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
1838 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
1841 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
1842 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1843 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1846 memset(binval, 0, len);
1850 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
1851 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1852 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1853 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1857 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
1860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1861 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1863 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
1864 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1865 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
1868 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
1869 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1870 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
1871 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
1872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1873 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1876 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1877 encodedPoint = NULL;
1884 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1885 * points to the space at the end.
1888 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
1889 unsigned int siglen;
1891 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
1892 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
1893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1894 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1897 /* send signature algorithm */
1898 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1899 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
1900 /* Should never happen */
1901 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1902 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1907 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1910 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
1911 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
1912 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
1915 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey),
1917 || EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1918 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1919 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1920 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1921 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1922 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
1924 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, pkey) <= 0
1925 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
1926 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
1927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1928 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1932 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1933 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1935 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1940 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1943 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1946 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1948 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1949 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1951 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1955 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1958 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1960 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1961 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1962 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt)
1963 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1968 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1969 const unsigned char *psigs;
1970 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
1971 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1972 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
1973 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1975 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1980 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
1981 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1986 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1988 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
1989 unsigned char *namebytes;
1990 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
1994 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
1995 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
1997 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1999 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2004 /* else no CA names */
2006 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2011 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2015 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2019 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2021 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2022 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2024 PACKET psk_identity;
2026 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2027 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2031 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2032 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2036 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2037 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2038 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2042 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2043 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2048 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2051 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2052 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2055 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2057 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2059 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2061 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2065 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2066 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2067 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2069 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2070 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2071 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2075 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2079 /* Should never happen */
2080 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2086 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2088 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2089 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2091 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2092 size_t j, padding_len;
2093 PACKET enc_premaster;
2095 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2098 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2100 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2105 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2106 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2107 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2109 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2110 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2111 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2118 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2119 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2120 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2121 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2123 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2124 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2129 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2130 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2131 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2132 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2137 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2138 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2139 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2140 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2141 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2144 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2148 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2149 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2151 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2152 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2153 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2154 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2155 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2158 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2161 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2162 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2163 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2165 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2166 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2171 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2172 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2173 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2174 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2175 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2177 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2180 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2181 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2182 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2183 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2184 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2185 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2188 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2189 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2191 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2192 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2195 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2196 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2197 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2198 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2199 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2200 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2203 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2204 unsigned char workaround_good;
2205 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2206 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2208 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2209 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2210 version_good |= workaround_good;
2214 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2215 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2217 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2220 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2221 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2222 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2223 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2225 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2226 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2227 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2228 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2229 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2232 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2233 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2234 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2235 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2241 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2244 /* Should never happen */
2245 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2246 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2251 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2254 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2258 const unsigned char *data;
2259 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2262 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2263 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2264 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2265 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2268 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2270 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2271 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2275 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2276 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2280 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2281 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2282 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2286 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2287 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2288 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2291 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2292 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2294 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2296 if (pub_key != NULL)
2301 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2302 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2303 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2308 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2309 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2311 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2314 /* Should never happen */
2315 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2321 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2324 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2325 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2328 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2329 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2330 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2335 const unsigned char *data;
2338 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2339 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2342 /* Get encoded point length */
2343 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2344 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2345 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2346 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2349 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2350 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2354 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2355 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2361 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2362 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2368 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2369 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2371 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2375 /* Should never happen */
2376 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2382 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2386 const unsigned char *data;
2388 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2389 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2390 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2391 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2394 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2398 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2399 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2403 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2404 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2405 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2410 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2417 /* Should never happen */
2418 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2424 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2427 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2428 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2429 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2430 const unsigned char *start;
2431 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2432 unsigned long alg_a;
2435 size_t sess_key_len;
2436 const unsigned char *data;
2439 /* Get our certificate private key */
2440 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2441 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2443 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2445 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2447 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2450 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2452 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2453 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2456 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2457 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2458 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2459 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2462 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2463 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2468 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2469 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2470 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2471 * client certificate for authorization only.
2473 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2474 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2475 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2478 /* Decrypt session key */
2479 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2480 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2481 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2485 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2486 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2487 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2488 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2489 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2495 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2496 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2497 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2498 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2501 /* Generate master secret */
2502 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2503 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2504 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2508 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2509 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2510 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2511 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2515 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2518 /* Should never happen */
2519 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2525 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2528 unsigned long alg_k;
2530 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2532 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2533 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2536 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2537 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2538 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2539 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2541 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2544 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2545 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2546 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2550 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2551 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2553 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2554 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2556 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2557 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2559 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2560 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2562 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2563 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2566 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2568 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2572 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2575 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2577 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2578 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2580 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2581 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2584 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2587 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2588 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2589 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2590 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2592 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2595 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2596 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2598 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2599 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2600 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
2602 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2606 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2607 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2612 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2614 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2615 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2617 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2618 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2619 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2620 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2621 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2622 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2623 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2624 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2627 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2631 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
2633 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
2634 * the handshake_buffer
2636 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2637 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2640 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2642 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2644 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2645 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2649 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2650 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2652 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2653 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2658 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2661 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2663 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2664 const unsigned char *sig, *data;
2665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2666 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
2668 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2672 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2676 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2680 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2684 peer = s->session->peer;
2685 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
2686 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2688 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
2690 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2691 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2695 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2697 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2698 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2700 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2701 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
2702 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2707 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2710 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2711 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2714 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2716 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2718 } else if (rv == 0) {
2719 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2723 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2726 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2727 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
2729 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
2731 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2736 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2738 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2742 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2743 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
2744 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2746 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2749 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2751 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2755 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2756 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2758 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2762 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2764 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2765 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2767 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2770 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2772 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2773 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2774 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2775 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2776 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2778 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2781 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
2787 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2788 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2789 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
2790 s->session->master_key)) {
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2792 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2796 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
2797 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2802 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2805 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2806 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2808 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2809 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2810 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2812 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
2817 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2819 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2821 unsigned long l, llen;
2822 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
2823 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2826 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2827 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2831 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
2832 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
2833 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2834 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2839 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
2840 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
2841 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
2842 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2844 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2848 certstart = certbytes;
2849 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
2851 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2854 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
2855 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2857 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2860 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2867 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2868 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2869 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2870 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2871 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2872 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2875 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2876 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2877 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2879 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2880 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2883 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2884 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2889 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2891 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2893 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
2898 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2901 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
2903 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2904 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2905 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2910 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2911 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2912 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2914 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
2915 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
2917 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
2918 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
2921 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2925 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2926 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2929 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2933 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2937 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2943 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
2944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2951 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2953 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
2954 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
2955 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2956 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
2957 const unsigned char *const_p;
2958 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
2961 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2962 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2963 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
2965 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
2967 /* get session encoding length */
2968 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2970 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
2973 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
2974 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2977 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
2979 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2983 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2984 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2985 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
2986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2991 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
2995 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
2998 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3001 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3003 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3004 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3005 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3009 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3010 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3013 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3016 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3017 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3019 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3020 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3021 int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3026 /* Put timeout and length */
3027 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3028 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3030 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3034 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3035 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3040 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3042 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3044 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3045 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3047 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3048 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3050 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3051 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3052 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3054 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3055 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
3059 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3060 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3061 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3063 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3064 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3065 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3066 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3067 /* Output key name */
3068 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3070 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3071 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3073 /* Encrypt session data */
3074 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3075 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3076 || encdata1 != encdata2
3077 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3078 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3079 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3080 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3081 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3082 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3083 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3084 macendoffset - macoffset)
3085 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3086 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3087 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3088 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3089 || macdata1 != macdata2
3090 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3094 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3095 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3101 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3102 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3103 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3107 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3109 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->tlsext_status_type)
3110 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
3111 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3113 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3122 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3123 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3125 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3127 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3128 size_t next_proto_len;
3131 * The payload looks like:
3133 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3134 * uint8 padding_len;
3135 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3137 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3138 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3139 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3140 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3144 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
3145 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3149 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3151 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3153 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3154 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3158 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3160 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3161 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3162 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3163 int sslv2format, int *al)
3165 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3166 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3168 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3169 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3171 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3173 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3175 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3177 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3181 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3183 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3184 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3188 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3189 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3192 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3197 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3200 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3201 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3202 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3206 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3208 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3209 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3210 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3212 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3215 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3216 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3217 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3218 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3219 if (s->renegotiate) {
3220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3221 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3222 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3225 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3229 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3230 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3231 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3233 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3234 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3237 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3239 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3240 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3246 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3247 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3249 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3251 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3256 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3257 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3266 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3267 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);