2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_local.h"
15 #include "statem_local.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/trace.h>
23 #include <openssl/encoder.h>
26 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
28 typedef struct x509err2alert_st {
33 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
34 const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = {
35 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
36 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
37 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
40 int ossl_statem_set_mutator(SSL *s,
41 ossl_statem_mutate_handshake_cb mutate_handshake_cb,
42 ossl_statem_finish_mutate_handshake_cb finish_mutate_handshake_cb,
45 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
50 sc->statem.mutate_handshake_cb = mutate_handshake_cb;
51 sc->statem.mutatearg = mutatearg;
52 sc->statem.finish_mutate_handshake_cb = finish_mutate_handshake_cb;
58 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
59 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
61 int ssl3_do_write(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint8_t type)
65 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
68 * If we're running the test suite then we may need to mutate the message
69 * we've been asked to write. Does not happen in normal operation.
71 if (s->statem.mutate_handshake_cb != NULL
72 && !s->statem.write_in_progress
73 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
74 && s->init_num >= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
78 if (!s->statem.mutate_handshake_cb((unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
83 if (msglen < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
84 || !BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, msglen))
86 memcpy(s->init_buf->data, msg, msglen);
88 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
89 s->statem.finish_mutate_handshake_cb(s->statem.mutatearg);
90 s->statem.write_in_progress = 1;
93 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
94 s->init_num, &written);
97 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
99 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
100 * ignore the result anyway
101 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
103 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
104 || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
105 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
106 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE))
107 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
108 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
111 if (written == s->init_num) {
112 s->statem.write_in_progress = 0;
114 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
115 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), ssl,
116 s->msg_callback_arg);
119 s->init_off += written;
120 s->init_num -= written;
124 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
128 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
129 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
132 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
138 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
140 int ver_min, ver_max, ok;
141 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
142 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
144 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
145 /* SSLfatal() already called */
149 /* Reset any extension flags */
150 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
152 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) {
153 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
157 /* Sanity check that we have MD5-SHA1 if we need it */
158 if (sctx->ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) {
159 int md5sha1_needed = 0;
161 /* We don't have MD5-SHA1 - do we need it? */
162 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
163 if (DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, DTLS1_VERSION))
166 if (ver_max <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
169 if (md5sha1_needed) {
170 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
171 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,
172 "The max supported SSL/TLS version needs the"
173 " MD5-SHA1 digest but it is not available"
174 " in the loaded providers. Use (D)TLSv1.2 or"
175 " above, or load different providers");
180 /* Don't allow TLSv1.1 or below to be negotiated */
181 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
182 if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(ver_min, DTLS1_2_VERSION))
183 ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, DTLS1_2_VERSION);
185 if (ver_min < TLS1_2_VERSION)
186 ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_2_VERSION);
189 /* Shouldn't happen */
190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
197 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
201 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
202 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
205 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
206 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
208 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
209 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
210 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
212 } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
219 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
220 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
221 "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
225 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
226 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
227 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
229 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
230 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
232 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0;
235 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
236 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect);
238 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
239 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
241 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
242 memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random));
245 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
247 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
248 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
255 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
256 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
258 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
259 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
261 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
262 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
264 /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
265 static const char servercontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x73\x65\x72"
266 "\x76\x65\x72\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79";
267 /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
268 static const char clientcontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x63\x6c\x69"
269 "\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79";
271 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
274 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
275 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
276 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
277 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
278 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
279 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
281 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
284 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
285 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
286 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
288 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
289 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
290 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
291 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
292 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
293 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
294 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
295 /* SSLfatal() already called */
300 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
305 retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata);
307 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
316 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
318 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
319 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
320 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
321 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
322 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
324 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
325 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
326 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
327 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
329 if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) {
330 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
333 pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
335 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, &md)) {
336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
340 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
346 /* Get the data to be signed */
347 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
348 /* SSLfatal() already called */
352 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
357 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx, &pctx,
358 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
359 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
361 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
365 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
366 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
367 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
368 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
373 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
375 * Here we use EVP_DigestSignUpdate followed by EVP_DigestSignFinal
376 * in order to add the EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET call between them.
378 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
379 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
380 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
381 s->session->master_key) <= 0
382 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) {
384 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
387 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
389 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
395 * Here we *must* use EVP_DigestSign() because Ed25519/Ed448 does not
396 * support streaming via EVP_DigestSignUpdate/EVP_DigestSignFinal
398 if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, NULL, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
402 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
404 || EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
412 int pktype = lu->sig;
414 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
415 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
416 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
417 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
421 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
422 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
426 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
427 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
428 /* SSLfatal() already called */
433 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
434 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
437 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
438 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
441 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
443 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
444 const unsigned char *data;
445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
446 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
448 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
451 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
454 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
455 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
456 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
457 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
464 pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
470 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL, sctx) == NULL) {
471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
472 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
476 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
479 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
480 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET);
483 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) {
484 /* SSLfatal() already called */
487 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
488 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
489 SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED);
493 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
494 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
498 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
499 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
500 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
502 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
504 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
505 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
507 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
508 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
509 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
510 && (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
511 || EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
512 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
513 && EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
514 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
517 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
518 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
522 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
523 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
527 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
528 /* SSLfatal() already called */
532 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n",
533 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
535 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(mctx, &pctx,
536 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
537 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
539 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
544 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
545 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
546 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
547 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
548 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL)
550 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
556 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
557 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
558 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
559 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
560 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
564 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
565 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
566 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
567 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
568 s->session->master_key) <= 0) {
569 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
572 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
573 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
577 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
579 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
585 * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
586 * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
587 * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
588 * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
589 * want to make sure that SSL_get1_peer_certificate() will return the actual
590 * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
592 if (!s->server && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1)
593 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
595 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
597 BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer);
598 s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL;
599 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
601 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
606 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
608 size_t finish_md_len;
611 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
613 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
614 if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
615 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
618 * If we attempted to write early data or we're in middlebox compat mode
619 * then we deferred changing the handshake write keys to the last possible
620 * moment. If we didn't already do this when we sent the client certificate
621 * then we need to do it now.
623 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
625 && (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
626 || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
627 && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0
628 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
629 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {;
630 /* SSLfatal() already called */
631 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
635 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
636 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
638 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
639 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
642 finish_md_len = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
644 s->s3.tmp.finish_md);
645 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
646 /* SSLfatal() already called */
647 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
650 s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
652 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
653 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
654 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
658 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
659 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
661 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
662 && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->session->master_key,
663 s->session->master_key_length)) {
664 /* SSLfatal() already called */
665 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
669 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
671 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
672 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
673 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
676 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
678 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
680 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
682 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
685 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
688 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
690 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
691 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
692 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
695 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
696 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
699 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
701 unsigned int updatetype;
704 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
705 * be on a record boundary.
707 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
708 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
709 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
712 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
713 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
715 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
719 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
722 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
723 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
724 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
725 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
729 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
730 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
731 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
733 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
734 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
736 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
737 /* SSLfatal() already called */
738 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
741 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
745 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
748 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
752 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
755 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
756 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
758 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
759 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
762 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len =
763 ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
764 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md);
766 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) {
767 /* SSLfatal() already called */
774 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
779 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
781 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
782 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
783 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
785 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
786 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
787 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
788 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
789 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
790 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
791 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
795 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
796 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
800 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
801 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
802 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
803 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
806 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1;
807 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
808 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
809 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
812 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
813 dtls1_increment_epoch(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
815 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
816 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
820 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
821 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
824 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)),
825 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
829 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
832 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
835 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
836 int was_first = SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s);
840 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
843 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
844 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than
847 if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
848 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 0);
849 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
850 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
851 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
852 && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
853 /* SSLfatal() already called */
854 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
859 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
860 * message must be on a record boundary.
862 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
863 && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
864 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
865 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
868 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
869 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) {
870 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
871 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
873 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0;
875 md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
877 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
878 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
879 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
882 ok = CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
884 #ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
886 if ((PACKET_data(pkt)[0] ^ s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md[0]) != 0xFF) {
892 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
893 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
897 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
899 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
900 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
901 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
904 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
906 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
908 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
910 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
914 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
915 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
917 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
919 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED &&
920 !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
921 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
922 /* SSLfatal() already called */
923 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
926 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
928 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
929 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
931 /* SSLfatal() already called */
932 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
934 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
935 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
936 /* SSLfatal() already called */
937 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
939 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
940 /* SSLfatal() already called */
941 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
947 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
948 && s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake != NULL)
949 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake(s->rlayer.rrl, 0);
951 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
954 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
956 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
957 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
958 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
961 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
964 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
965 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
966 X509 *x, int chain, int for_comp)
969 unsigned char *outbytes;
970 int context = SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE;
973 context |= SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION;
975 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
981 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
982 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
984 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
988 if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || for_comp)
989 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, context, x, chain)) {
990 /* SSLfatal() already called */
997 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
998 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int for_comp)
1002 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
1003 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
1004 X509_STORE *chain_store;
1005 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1007 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
1013 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
1015 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
1016 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
1018 extra_certs = sctx->extra_certs;
1020 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
1022 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
1023 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
1025 chain_store = sctx->cert_store;
1027 if (chain_store != NULL) {
1028 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(sctx->libctx,
1031 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
1033 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
1036 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
1037 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1039 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
1043 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
1044 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
1045 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
1046 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
1048 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
1049 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
1051 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
1052 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
1055 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
1056 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1057 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1058 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
1060 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1062 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i);
1065 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
1066 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
1067 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1069 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, for_comp)) {
1070 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1071 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1075 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1077 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
1080 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i);
1083 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, for_comp)) {
1084 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1087 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
1088 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
1089 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, for_comp)) {
1090 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1098 EVP_PKEY* tls_get_peer_pkey(const SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
1100 if (sc->session->peer_rpk != NULL)
1101 return sc->session->peer_rpk;
1102 if (sc->session->peer != NULL)
1103 return X509_get0_pubkey(sc->session->peer);
1107 int tls_process_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **peer_rpk)
1109 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1111 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1114 unsigned long cert_len = 0, spki_len = 0;
1115 const unsigned char *spki, *spkistart;
1116 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(sc);
1119 * ----------------------------
1120 * TLS 1.3 Certificate message:
1121 * ----------------------------
1122 * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446#section-4.4.2
1128 * } CertificateType;
1131 * select (certificate_type) {
1132 * case RawPublicKey:
1133 * // From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo
1134 * opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>;
1137 * opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>;
1139 * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
1140 * } CertificateEntry;
1143 * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
1144 * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
1147 * The client MUST send a Certificate message if and only if the server
1148 * has requested client authentication via a CertificateRequest message
1149 * (Section 4.3.2). If the server requests client authentication but no
1150 * suitable certificate is available, the client MUST send a Certificate
1151 * message containing no certificates (i.e., with the "certificate_list"
1152 * field having length 0).
1154 * ----------------------------
1155 * TLS 1.2 Certificate message:
1156 * ----------------------------
1157 * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7250#section-3
1159 * opaque ASN.1Cert<1..2^24-1>;
1162 * select(certificate_type){
1164 * // certificate type defined in this document.
1165 * case RawPublicKey:
1166 * opaque ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>;
1168 * // X.509 certificate defined in RFC 5246
1170 * ASN.1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
1172 * // Additional certificate type based on
1173 * // "TLS Certificate Types" subregistry
1180 * After the (TLS 1.3 only) context octet string (1 byte length + data) the
1181 * Certificate message has a 3-byte length that is zero in the client to
1182 * server message when the client has no RPK to send. In that case, there
1183 * are no (TLS 1.3 only) per-certificate extensions either, because the
1184 * [CertificateEntry] list is empty.
1186 * In the server to client direction, or when the client had an RPK to send,
1187 * the TLS 1.3 message just prepends the length of the RPK+extensions,
1188 * while TLS <= 1.2 sends just the RPK (octet-string).
1190 * The context must be zero-length in the server to client direction, and
1191 * must match the value recorded in the certificate request in the client
1192 * to server direction.
1194 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
1195 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)) {
1196 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
1200 if (sc->pha_context == NULL) {
1201 if (PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0) {
1202 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
1206 if (!PACKET_equal(&context, sc->pha_context, sc->pha_context_len)) {
1207 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
1212 if (PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0) {
1213 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
1219 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1220 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_len) {
1221 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1226 * The list length may be zero when there is no RPK. In the case of TLS
1227 * 1.2 this is actually the RPK length, which cannot be zero as specified,
1228 * but that breaks the ability of the client to decline client auth. We
1229 * overload the 0 RPK length to mean "no RPK". This interpretation is
1230 * also used some other (reference?) implementations, but is not supported
1231 * by the verbatim RFC7250 text.
1236 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
1238 * With TLS 1.3, a non-empty explicit-length RPK octet-string followed
1239 * by a possibly empty extension block.
1241 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &spki_len)) {
1242 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1245 if (spki_len == 0) {
1247 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EMPTY_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY);
1251 spki_len = cert_len;
1254 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &spki, spki_len)) {
1255 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1259 if ((pkey = d2i_PUBKEY_ex(NULL, &spki, spki_len, sctx->libctx, sctx->propq)) == NULL
1260 || spki != (spkistart + spki_len)) {
1261 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1264 if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1265 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1266 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1270 /* Process the Extensions block */
1271 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
1272 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != (cert_len - 3 - spki_len)) {
1273 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1276 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
1277 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1278 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1281 if (!tls_collect_extensions(sc, &extensions, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY,
1282 &rawexts, NULL, 1)) {
1283 /* SSLfatal already called */
1286 /* chain index is always zero and fin always 1 for RPK */
1287 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(sc, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY,
1288 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1289 /* SSLfatal already called */
1294 if (peer_rpk != NULL) {
1300 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1301 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1305 unsigned long tls_output_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
1308 unsigned char *pdata = NULL;
1309 X509_PUBKEY *xpk = NULL;
1310 unsigned long ret = 0;
1313 if (cpk != NULL && cpk->x509 != NULL) {
1315 /* Get the RPK from the certificate */
1316 xpk = X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cpk->x509);
1318 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1321 pdata_len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(xpk, &pdata);
1322 } else if (cpk != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
1323 /* Get the RPK from the private key */
1324 pdata_len = i2d_PUBKEY(cpk->privatekey, &pdata);
1326 /* The server RPK is not optional */
1328 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1331 /* The client can send a zero length certificate list */
1332 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, pdata, pdata_len)) {
1333 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1339 if (pdata_len <= 0) {
1340 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1345 * TLSv1.2 is _just_ the raw public key
1346 * TLSv1.3 includes extensions, so there's a length wrapper
1348 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
1349 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) {
1350 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1355 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, pdata, pdata_len)) {
1356 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1360 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
1362 * Only send extensions relevant to raw public keys. Until such
1363 * extensions are defined, this will be an empty set of extensions.
1364 * |x509| may be NULL, which raw public-key extensions need to handle.
1366 if (!tls_construct_extensions(sc, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY,
1368 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1371 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1372 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1379 OPENSSL_free(pdata);
1383 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1384 CERT_PKEY *cpk, int for_comp)
1386 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) {
1388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1392 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, for_comp))
1395 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1405 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1406 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1409 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s, ossl_unused WORK_STATE wst,
1410 int clearbufs, int stop)
1412 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1413 int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand;
1414 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1415 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1418 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1421 * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS
1422 * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions
1424 * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used.
1426 || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl))
1430 * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf
1431 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1433 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1437 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) {
1438 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1444 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server
1445 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
1446 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1449 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
1450 * post handshake exchange
1453 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1456 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
1457 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1459 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1463 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
1466 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
1467 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1469 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1470 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
1471 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
1473 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1475 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
1476 * so we remove this one from the cache.
1478 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode
1479 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0)
1480 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1483 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1486 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
1489 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
1490 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit);
1492 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
1493 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
1494 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
1497 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1498 /* done with handshaking */
1499 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
1500 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
1501 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
1502 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1506 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1507 cb = s->info_callback;
1508 else if (sctx->info_callback != NULL)
1509 cb = sctx->info_callback;
1511 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
1512 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
1516 || !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1517 || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1518 cb(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
1522 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
1523 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1524 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1527 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1530 int tls_get_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *mt)
1532 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1533 int skip_message, i;
1536 size_t l, readbytes;
1537 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1539 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1542 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1543 i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1545 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1548 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1551 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1553 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1554 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1556 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1558 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1561 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
1562 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) {
1564 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1565 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1566 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1567 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1568 * with a valid cookie.
1572 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1573 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1574 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1575 s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1577 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1578 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1579 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1582 s->init_num += readbytes;
1587 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1588 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1590 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1591 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1592 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1595 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1599 if (s->msg_callback)
1600 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1601 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl,
1602 s->msg_callback_arg);
1604 } while (skip_message);
1605 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1608 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1610 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1612 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1615 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1616 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1618 l = s->rlayer.tlsrecs[0].length + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1619 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
1621 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1622 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1625 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1626 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1627 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1628 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1631 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
1633 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1640 int tls_get_message_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t *len)
1642 size_t n, readbytes;
1645 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1647 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1648 /* We've already read everything in */
1649 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1654 n = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1656 i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1657 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1659 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1663 s->init_num += readbytes;
1668 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1669 * Finished verification.
1671 if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
1672 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1677 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1678 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1679 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1681 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1685 if (s->msg_callback)
1686 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1687 (size_t)s->init_num, ssl, s->msg_callback_arg);
1690 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1691 * processing the message
1692 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1695 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1696 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1697 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1698 || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1699 && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) {
1700 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1701 || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1702 || memcmp(hrrrandom,
1703 s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET,
1704 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) {
1705 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1706 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1707 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1713 if (s->msg_callback)
1714 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1715 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl,
1716 s->msg_callback_arg);
1723 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = {
1724 {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE},
1725 {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1726 {X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1727 {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1728 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1729 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1730 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1731 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1732 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED},
1733 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1734 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1735 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1736 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1737 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1738 {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1739 {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1740 {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1741 {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1742 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1743 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1744 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1745 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1746 {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1747 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1748 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1749 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE},
1750 {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1751 {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1752 {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1753 {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1754 {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1755 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1756 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1757 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1758 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1759 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1760 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1761 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1762 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1763 {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1765 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
1766 {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN}
1769 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err)
1771 const X509ERR2ALERT *tp;
1773 for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp)
1774 if (tp->x509err == x509err)
1779 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1781 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1783 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1786 static int version_cmp(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int a, int b)
1788 int dtls = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s);
1793 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1794 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1799 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1800 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1803 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION
1804 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1807 /* Must be in order high to low */
1808 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1810 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1812 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1815 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1817 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1820 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1822 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1825 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1827 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1830 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1832 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1837 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1838 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1841 /* Must be in order high to low */
1842 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1843 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1844 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1846 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1848 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1849 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1850 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1852 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1853 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1859 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1861 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1862 * @method: the intended method.
1864 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1866 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1868 int version = method->version;
1870 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1871 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1872 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1873 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1875 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1876 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1877 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1879 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1880 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1881 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1882 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1888 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
1889 * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has
1890 * a servername callback configure. Otherwise returns 0.
1892 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1896 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1898 if (!ossl_assert(sctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL))
1902 * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername
1903 * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok
1905 if (sctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL
1906 || s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL)
1909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1910 if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL)
1914 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL)
1917 /* All provider-based sig algs are required to support at least TLS1.3 */
1918 for (i = 0; i < s->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
1919 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
1921 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1922 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1923 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1924 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1929 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i))
1931 if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC)
1934 * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
1935 * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
1936 * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
1938 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
1939 if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve))
1947 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1950 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1951 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1953 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1955 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
1956 const SSL_METHOD **meth)
1958 const version_info *vent;
1959 const version_info *table;
1961 switch (SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version) {
1963 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1964 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1965 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1966 table = tls_version_table;
1968 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1969 table = dtls_version_table;
1974 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1976 if (vent->cmeth != NULL
1977 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0
1978 && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0
1980 || version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1981 || is_tls13_capable(s))) {
1983 *meth = vent->cmeth();
1991 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1992 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1993 * supported protocol version.
1995 * @s server SSL handle.
1997 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1999 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2001 const version_info *vent;
2002 const version_info *table;
2003 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2006 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
2007 * (according to ssl->defltmethod, as version negotiation may have changed
2010 if (s->version == ssl->defltmeth->version)
2014 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
2015 * highest protocol version).
2017 if (ssl->defltmeth->version == TLS_method()->version)
2018 table = tls_version_table;
2019 else if (ssl->defltmeth->version == DTLS_method()->version)
2020 table = dtls_version_table;
2022 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
2026 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2027 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
2028 return s->version == vent->version;
2034 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
2035 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
2036 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
2037 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
2039 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
2040 * @version: the intended limit.
2041 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
2043 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
2045 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
2055 valid_tls = version >= SSL3_VERSION && version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
2057 /* We support client side pre-standardisation version of DTLS */
2058 (version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2059 || (DTLS_VERSION_LE(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL)
2060 && DTLS_VERSION_GE(version, DTLS1_VERSION));
2062 if (!valid_tls && !valid_dtls)
2066 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
2067 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
2068 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
2070 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
2071 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
2072 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
2073 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
2074 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
2076 * We ignore attempts to set bounds on version-inflexible methods,
2077 * returning success.
2079 switch (method_version) {
2083 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
2088 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
2096 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
2098 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
2099 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) {
2100 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
2101 } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
2102 && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
2104 * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2
2105 * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still
2106 * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and
2107 * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is
2108 * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not.
2110 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) {
2111 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
2113 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
2118 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
2119 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
2120 * the version specific method.
2122 * @s: server SSL handle.
2124 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2126 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
2130 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
2132 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
2133 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL.
2135 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
2138 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2139 int server_version = ssl->method->version;
2140 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
2141 const version_info *vent;
2142 const version_info *table;
2144 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
2146 s->client_version = client_version;
2148 switch (server_version) {
2150 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2151 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
2152 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
2153 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
2155 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2156 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2157 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2158 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2159 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2164 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
2165 * a HelloRetryRequest
2168 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
2169 table = tls_version_table;
2171 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
2172 table = dtls_version_table;
2176 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
2178 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
2179 if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
2180 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
2182 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2183 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
2184 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
2185 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
2186 PACKET versionslist;
2188 suppversions->parsed = 1;
2190 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
2191 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
2192 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
2196 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
2197 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
2198 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
2199 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
2200 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
2201 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
2202 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
2204 if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION)
2205 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION;
2207 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
2208 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
2210 if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method))
2211 best_vers = candidate_vers;
2213 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
2214 /* Trailing data? */
2215 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
2218 if (best_vers > 0) {
2219 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
2221 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
2222 * negotiated TLSv1.3
2224 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
2225 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
2228 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
2229 s->version = best_vers;
2230 ssl->method = best_method;
2231 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, best_vers))
2232 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2236 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
2240 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
2241 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
2243 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
2244 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
2247 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
2250 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2251 const SSL_METHOD *method;
2253 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
2254 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
2256 method = vent->smeth();
2257 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
2258 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
2259 s->version = vent->version;
2260 ssl->method = method;
2261 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version))
2262 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2268 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
2272 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
2273 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
2274 * the version specific method.
2276 * @s: client SSL handle.
2277 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
2278 * @extensions: The extensions received
2280 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
2282 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
2283 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
2285 const version_info *vent;
2286 const version_info *table;
2287 int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv;
2288 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2291 s->version = version;
2293 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
2294 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions,
2295 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
2296 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions,
2302 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
2303 && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2305 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
2309 switch (ssl->method->version) {
2311 if (s->version != ssl->method->version) {
2313 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
2317 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2318 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2319 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2320 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2321 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2323 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) {
2324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2328 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
2329 table = tls_version_table;
2331 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
2332 table = dtls_version_table;
2336 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max);
2339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ret);
2342 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min)
2343 : s->version < ver_min) {
2345 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
2347 } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max)
2348 : s->version > ver_max) {
2350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
2354 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0)
2357 /* Check for downgrades */
2358 if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) {
2359 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
2360 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
2361 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
2362 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
2364 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2365 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
2368 } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
2369 && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION
2370 && real_max > s->version) {
2371 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
2372 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
2373 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
2374 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
2376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2377 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
2382 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2383 if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version)
2386 ssl->method = vent->cmeth();
2387 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) {
2388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
2400 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
2401 * @s: The SSL connection
2402 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
2403 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
2404 * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole
2405 * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled
2408 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
2409 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
2410 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
2411 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
2412 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
2414 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
2415 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
2416 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
2418 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
2419 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
2421 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *min_version,
2422 int *max_version, int *real_max)
2424 int version, tmp_real_max;
2426 const SSL_METHOD *method;
2427 const version_info *table;
2428 const version_info *vent;
2429 const SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2431 switch (ssl->method->version) {
2434 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2435 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2436 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2437 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2438 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2440 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
2442 * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version
2445 if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL))
2446 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2448 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
2449 table = tls_version_table;
2451 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
2452 table = dtls_version_table;
2457 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
2458 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
2459 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
2460 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
2462 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
2463 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
2464 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
2466 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
2467 * the selected version. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
2469 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, we support a contiguous
2470 * range of at least two methods. If we hit a disabled method,
2471 * then hole becomes true again, but nothing else changes yet,
2472 * because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
2473 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
2474 * selected, as we start from scratch.
2476 *min_version = version = 0;
2478 if (real_max != NULL)
2481 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2483 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
2484 * "version capability" vector.
2486 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
2491 method = vent->cmeth();
2493 if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0)
2494 tmp_real_max = vent->version;
2496 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
2499 *min_version = method->version;
2501 if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0)
2502 *real_max = tmp_real_max;
2503 version = method->version;
2504 *min_version = version;
2509 *max_version = version;
2511 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
2513 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
2519 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
2520 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2522 * @s: client SSL handle.
2524 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2526 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2528 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
2531 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
2532 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
2534 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
2537 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL);
2542 s->version = ver_max;
2544 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2545 if (ver_max == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2547 * Even though this is technically before version negotiation,
2548 * because we have asked for DTLS1_BAD_VER we will never negotiate
2549 * anything else, and this has impacts on the record layer for when
2550 * we read the ServerHello. So we need to tell the record layer
2551 * about this immediately.
2553 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, ver_max))
2556 } else if (ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2557 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2558 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
2561 s->client_version = ver_max;
2566 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2567 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2568 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2569 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2571 int check_in_list(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
2572 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
2576 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
2579 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
2580 uint16_t group = groups[i];
2582 if (group_id == group
2584 || tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
2592 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2593 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2594 const unsigned char *hashval,
2595 size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
2598 unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2599 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
2601 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
2603 if (hashval == NULL) {
2604 hashval = hashvaltmp;
2606 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2607 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
2608 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp),
2610 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2615 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2616 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
2617 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2621 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2622 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
2623 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen;
2624 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2625 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
2626 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2631 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2632 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2633 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2636 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen)
2637 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
2638 s->s3.tmp.message_size
2639 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) {
2640 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2647 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2649 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
2652 int parse_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2654 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
2655 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2658 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
2659 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2662 /* get the CA RDNs */
2663 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2664 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2668 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2669 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2670 unsigned int name_len;
2672 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2673 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2674 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2678 namestart = namebytes;
2679 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2680 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2683 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2688 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2689 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2695 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2696 s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2701 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2706 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2708 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2709 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2712 ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl);
2713 if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
2718 ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(ssl);
2723 int construct_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk,
2726 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2727 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2732 if ((ca_sk != NULL) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES)) {
2735 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2736 unsigned char *namebytes;
2737 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2741 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2742 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2744 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2745 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2751 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2752 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2759 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2760 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
2761 const void *param, size_t paramlen)
2763 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
2764 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
2767 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2770 memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2771 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2773 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);
2780 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2781 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2783 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2785 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2786 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1))
2787 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2790 s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2791 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2792 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2795 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst,
2796 s->s3.handshake_dgst)) {
2797 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2798 EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst);
2807 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2808 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2810 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2812 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2813 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2816 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst,
2818 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
2825 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls13_process_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
2830 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2832 COMP_METHOD *method = NULL;
2833 COMP_CTX *comp = NULL;
2834 size_t expected_length;
2840 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2843 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int*)&comp_alg)) {
2844 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2847 /* If we have a prefs list, make sure the algorithm is in it */
2848 if (sc->cert_comp_prefs[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none) {
2849 for (i = 0; sc->cert_comp_prefs[i] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; i++) {
2850 if (sc->cert_comp_prefs[i] == comp_alg) {
2856 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2860 if (!ossl_comp_has_alg(comp_alg)) {
2861 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2865 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib:
2866 method = COMP_zlib_oneshot();
2868 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli:
2869 method = COMP_brotli_oneshot();
2871 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd:
2872 method = COMP_zstd_oneshot();
2875 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2879 if ((comp = COMP_CTX_new(method)) == NULL
2880 || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &expected_length)
2881 || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &comp_length)
2882 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != comp_length
2883 || !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, expected_length)
2884 || !PACKET_buf_init(tmppkt, (unsigned char *)buf->data, expected_length)
2885 || COMP_expand_block(comp, (unsigned char *)buf->data, expected_length,
2886 (unsigned char*)PACKET_data(pkt), comp_length) != (int)expected_length) {
2887 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
2890 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2892 COMP_CTX_free(comp);