2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_local.h"
15 #include "statem_local.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/trace.h>
25 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
27 typedef struct x509err2alert_st {
32 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
33 const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = {
34 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
35 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
36 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
40 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
41 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
43 int ssl3_do_write(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int type)
47 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
49 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
50 s->init_num, &written);
53 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
55 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
56 * ignore the result anyway
57 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
59 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
60 || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
61 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
62 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE))
63 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
64 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
67 if (written == s->init_num) {
69 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
70 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), ssl,
74 s->init_off += written;
75 s->init_num -= written;
79 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
83 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
84 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
87 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
93 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
95 int ver_min, ver_max, ok;
96 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
97 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
99 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
100 /* SSLfatal() already called */
104 /* Reset any extension flags */
105 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
107 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) {
108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
112 /* Sanity check that we have MD5-SHA1 if we need it */
113 if (sctx->ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) {
114 int md5sha1_needed = 0;
116 /* We don't have MD5-SHA1 - do we need it? */
117 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
118 if (DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, DTLS1_VERSION))
121 if (ver_max <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
124 if (md5sha1_needed) {
125 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
126 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,
127 "The max supported SSL/TLS version needs the"
128 " MD5-SHA1 digest but it is not available"
129 " in the loaded providers. Use (D)TLSv1.2 or"
130 " above, or load different providers");
135 /* Don't allow TLSv1.1 or below to be negotiated */
136 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
137 if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(ver_min, DTLS1_2_VERSION))
138 ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, DTLS1_2_VERSION);
140 if (ver_min < TLS1_2_VERSION)
141 ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_2_VERSION);
144 /* Shouldn't happen */
145 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
152 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
156 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
157 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
160 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
161 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
163 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
164 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
165 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
167 } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
174 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
175 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
176 "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
180 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
181 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
182 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
184 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
185 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
187 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0;
190 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
191 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect);
193 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
194 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
196 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
197 memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random));
200 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
202 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
203 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
210 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
211 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
213 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
214 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
216 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
217 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
219 /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
220 static const char servercontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x73\x65\x72"
221 "\x76\x65\x72\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79";
222 /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
223 static const char clientcontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x63\x6c\x69"
224 "\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79";
226 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
229 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
230 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
231 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
232 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
233 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
234 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
236 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
239 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
240 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
241 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
243 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
244 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
245 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
246 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
247 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
248 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
249 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
250 /* SSLfatal() already called */
255 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
260 retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata);
262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
271 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
273 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
274 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
275 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
276 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
277 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
279 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
280 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
281 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
282 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
284 if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) {
285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
288 pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
290 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, &md)) {
291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
295 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
301 /* Get the data to be signed */
302 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
303 /* SSLfatal() already called */
307 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
312 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx, &pctx,
313 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
314 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
320 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
321 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
322 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
323 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
328 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
330 * Here we use EVP_DigestSignUpdate followed by EVP_DigestSignFinal
331 * in order to add the EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET call between them.
333 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
334 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
335 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
336 s->session->master_key) <= 0
337 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) {
339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
342 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
344 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
345 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
350 * Here we *must* use EVP_DigestSign() because Ed25519/Ed448 does not
351 * support streaming via EVP_DigestSignUpdate/EVP_DigestSignFinal
353 if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, NULL, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
357 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
359 || EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
367 int pktype = lu->sig;
369 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
370 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
371 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
372 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
376 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
381 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
382 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
383 /* SSLfatal() already called */
388 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
389 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
392 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
393 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
396 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
398 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
399 const unsigned char *data;
400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
401 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
403 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
407 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
410 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
411 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
412 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
413 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
420 peer = s->session->peer;
421 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
427 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) {
428 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
429 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
433 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
436 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET);
440 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) {
441 /* SSLfatal() already called */
444 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
449 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
450 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
454 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
455 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
456 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
458 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
460 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
461 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
464 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
465 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
466 && (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
467 || EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
468 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
469 && EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
470 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
473 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
478 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
483 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
484 /* SSLfatal() already called */
488 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n",
489 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
491 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(mctx, &pctx,
492 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
493 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
495 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
500 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
501 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
502 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
503 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
504 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL)
506 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
512 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
513 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
514 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
515 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
516 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
520 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
521 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
522 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
523 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
524 s->session->master_key) <= 0) {
525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
528 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
529 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
533 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
541 * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
542 * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
543 * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
544 * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
545 * want to make sure that SSL_get1_peer_certificate() will return the actual
546 * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
548 if (!s->server && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1)
549 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
551 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
553 BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer);
554 s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL;
555 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
557 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
562 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
564 size_t finish_md_len;
567 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
569 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
570 if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
571 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
574 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
577 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
579 && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0
580 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
581 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {;
582 /* SSLfatal() already called */
583 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
587 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
588 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
590 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
591 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
594 finish_md_len = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
596 s->s3.tmp.finish_md);
597 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
598 /* SSLfatal() already called */
599 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
602 s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
604 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
605 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
606 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
610 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
611 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
613 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
614 && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->session->master_key,
615 s->session->master_key_length)) {
616 /* SSLfatal() already called */
617 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
621 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
623 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
624 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
625 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
628 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
630 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
632 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
634 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
637 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
640 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
642 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
643 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
644 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
647 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
648 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
651 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
653 unsigned int updatetype;
656 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
657 * be on a record boundary.
659 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
661 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
664 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
665 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
667 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
671 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
674 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
675 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
676 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
677 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
681 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
682 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
683 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
685 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
686 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
688 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
689 /* SSLfatal() already called */
690 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
693 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
697 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
700 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
704 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
707 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
708 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
710 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
711 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
714 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len =
715 ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
716 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md);
718 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) {
719 /* SSLfatal() already called */
726 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
731 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
733 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
734 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
735 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
737 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
738 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
739 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
740 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
741 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
742 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
743 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
747 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
748 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
752 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
753 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
754 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
755 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
758 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1;
759 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
761 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
764 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
765 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
767 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
768 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
770 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
772 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
773 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
776 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)),
777 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
781 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
784 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
787 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
788 int was_first = SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s);
791 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
794 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
795 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than
798 if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
799 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 0);
800 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
801 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
802 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
803 && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
804 /* SSLfatal() already called */
805 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
810 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
811 * message must be on a record boundary.
813 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
814 && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
815 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
816 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
819 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
820 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) {
821 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
822 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
824 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0;
826 md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
828 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
830 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
833 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
835 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
836 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
840 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
842 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
844 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
847 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
849 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
851 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
853 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
857 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
858 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
860 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
862 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED &&
863 !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
864 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
865 /* SSLfatal() already called */
866 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
869 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
871 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
872 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
874 /* SSLfatal() already called */
875 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
877 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
878 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
879 /* SSLfatal() already called */
880 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
882 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
883 /* SSLfatal() already called */
884 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
890 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
891 && s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake != NULL)
892 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake(s->rlayer.rrl, 0);
894 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
897 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
899 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
900 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
901 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
904 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
907 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
908 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
912 unsigned char *outbytes;
914 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
916 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
919 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
920 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
925 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
926 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
928 /* SSLfatal() already called */
935 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
936 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
940 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
941 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
942 X509_STORE *chain_store;
943 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
945 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
951 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
953 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
954 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
956 extra_certs = sctx->extra_certs;
958 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
960 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
961 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
963 chain_store = sctx->cert_store;
965 if (chain_store != NULL) {
966 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(sctx->libctx,
969 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
970 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
973 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
974 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
975 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
979 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
980 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
981 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
982 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
984 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
985 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
987 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
988 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
991 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
992 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
993 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
994 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
996 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i);
1000 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
1001 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
1002 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1004 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) {
1005 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1006 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1010 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1012 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
1014 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i);
1017 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) {
1018 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1021 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
1022 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
1023 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) {
1024 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1032 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1035 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) {
1036 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1040 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk))
1043 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1044 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1052 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1053 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1056 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s, ossl_unused WORK_STATE wst,
1057 int clearbufs, int stop)
1059 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1060 int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand;
1061 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1062 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1065 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1066 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1068 * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS
1069 * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions
1071 * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used.
1073 || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl))
1077 * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf
1078 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1080 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1084 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) {
1085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1091 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server
1092 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
1093 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1096 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
1097 * post handshake exchange
1100 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1103 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
1104 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1106 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1110 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
1113 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
1114 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1116 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1117 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
1118 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
1120 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1122 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
1123 * so we remove this one from the cache.
1125 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode
1126 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0)
1127 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1130 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1133 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
1136 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
1137 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit);
1139 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
1140 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
1141 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
1144 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1145 /* done with handshaking */
1146 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
1147 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
1148 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
1149 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1153 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1154 cb = s->info_callback;
1155 else if (sctx->info_callback != NULL)
1156 cb = sctx->info_callback;
1158 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
1159 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
1163 || !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1164 || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1165 cb(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
1169 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
1170 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1171 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1174 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1177 int tls_get_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *mt)
1179 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1180 int skip_message, i, recvd_type;
1182 size_t l, readbytes;
1183 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1185 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1188 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1189 i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1191 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1194 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1197 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1199 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1200 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1202 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1203 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1204 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1207 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
1208 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) {
1210 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1211 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1212 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1213 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1214 * with a valid cookie.
1218 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1219 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1220 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1221 s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1223 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1225 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1228 s->init_num += readbytes;
1233 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1234 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1236 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1237 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1238 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1241 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1245 if (s->msg_callback)
1246 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1247 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl,
1248 s->msg_callback_arg);
1250 } while (skip_message);
1251 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1254 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1256 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1258 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1261 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1262 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1264 l = s->rlayer.tlsrecs[0].length + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1265 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
1267 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1268 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1271 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1272 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1273 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1274 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1277 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
1279 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1286 int tls_get_message_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t *len)
1288 size_t n, readbytes;
1291 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1293 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1294 /* We've already read everything in */
1295 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1300 n = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1302 i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1303 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1305 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1309 s->init_num += readbytes;
1314 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1315 * Finished verification.
1317 if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
1318 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1323 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1324 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1325 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1327 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1331 if (s->msg_callback)
1332 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1333 (size_t)s->init_num, ssl, s->msg_callback_arg);
1336 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1337 * processing the message
1338 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1341 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1342 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1343 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1344 || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1345 && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) {
1346 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1347 || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1348 || memcmp(hrrrandom,
1349 s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET,
1350 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) {
1351 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1352 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1353 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1359 if (s->msg_callback)
1360 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1361 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl,
1362 s->msg_callback_arg);
1369 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = {
1370 {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE},
1371 {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1372 {X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1373 {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1374 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1375 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1376 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1377 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1378 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED},
1379 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1380 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1381 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1382 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1383 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1384 {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1385 {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1386 {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1387 {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1388 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1389 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1390 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1391 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1392 {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1393 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1394 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1395 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE},
1396 {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1397 {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1398 {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1399 {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1400 {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1401 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1402 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1403 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1404 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1405 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1406 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1407 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1408 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1409 {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1411 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
1412 {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN}
1415 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err)
1417 const X509ERR2ALERT *tp;
1419 for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp)
1420 if (tp->x509err == x509err)
1425 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1427 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1429 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1432 static int version_cmp(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int a, int b)
1434 int dtls = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s);
1439 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1440 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1445 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1446 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1449 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION
1450 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1453 /* Must be in order high to low */
1454 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1456 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1458 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1461 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1463 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1465 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1466 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1468 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1471 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1473 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1476 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1478 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1483 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1484 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1487 /* Must be in order high to low */
1488 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1490 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1492 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1495 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1496 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1498 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1499 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1505 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1507 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1508 * @method: the intended method.
1510 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1512 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1514 int version = method->version;
1516 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1517 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1518 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1519 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1521 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1522 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1523 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1525 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1526 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1527 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1528 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1534 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
1535 * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has
1536 * a servername callback configure. Otherwise returns 0.
1538 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1542 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1544 if (!ossl_assert(sctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL))
1548 * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername
1549 * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok
1551 if (sctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL
1552 || s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL)
1555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1556 if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL)
1560 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL)
1563 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1564 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
1566 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1567 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1568 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1569 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1574 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i))
1576 if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC)
1579 * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
1580 * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
1581 * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
1583 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
1584 if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve))
1592 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1595 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1596 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1598 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1600 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
1601 const SSL_METHOD **meth)
1603 const version_info *vent;
1604 const version_info *table;
1606 switch (SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version) {
1608 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1609 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1610 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1611 table = tls_version_table;
1613 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1614 table = dtls_version_table;
1619 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1621 if (vent->cmeth != NULL
1622 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0
1623 && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0
1625 || version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1626 || is_tls13_capable(s))) {
1628 *meth = vent->cmeth();
1636 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1637 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1638 * supported protocol version.
1640 * @s server SSL handle.
1642 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1644 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1646 const version_info *vent;
1647 const version_info *table;
1648 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1651 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1652 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1655 if (s->version == sctx->method->version)
1659 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1660 * highest protocol version).
1662 if (sctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1663 table = tls_version_table;
1664 else if (sctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1665 table = dtls_version_table;
1667 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1671 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1672 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1673 return s->version == vent->version;
1679 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1680 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1681 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1682 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1684 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1685 * @version: the intended limit.
1686 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1688 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1690 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1700 valid_tls = version >= SSL3_VERSION && version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
1702 DTLS_VERSION_LE(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) &&
1703 DTLS_VERSION_GE(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER);
1705 if (!valid_tls && !valid_dtls)
1709 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1710 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1711 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1713 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1714 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1715 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1716 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1717 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1719 * We ignore attempts to set bounds on version-inflexible methods,
1720 * returning success.
1722 switch (method_version) {
1726 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1731 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1739 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1741 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
1742 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) {
1743 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
1744 } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1745 && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
1747 * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2
1748 * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still
1749 * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and
1750 * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is
1751 * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not.
1753 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) {
1754 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
1756 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1761 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1762 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1763 * the version specific method.
1765 * @s: server SSL handle.
1767 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1769 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1773 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1775 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1776 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL.
1778 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1781 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1782 int server_version = ssl->method->version;
1783 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1784 const version_info *vent;
1785 const version_info *table;
1787 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1789 s->client_version = client_version;
1791 switch (server_version) {
1793 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1794 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1795 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1796 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1798 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1799 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1800 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1801 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1802 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1807 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1808 * a HelloRetryRequest
1811 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1812 table = tls_version_table;
1814 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1815 table = dtls_version_table;
1819 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1821 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
1822 if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
1823 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1825 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1826 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1827 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1828 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1829 PACKET versionslist;
1831 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1833 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1834 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1835 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1839 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
1840 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
1841 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
1842 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
1843 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
1844 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
1845 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
1847 if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION)
1848 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION;
1850 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1851 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1853 if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method))
1854 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1856 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1857 /* Trailing data? */
1858 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1861 if (best_vers > 0) {
1862 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1864 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
1865 * negotiated TLSv1.3
1867 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
1868 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1871 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
1872 s->version = best_vers;
1873 ssl->method = best_method;
1874 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, best_vers))
1875 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1879 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1883 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1884 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1886 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1887 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1890 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1893 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1894 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1896 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1897 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1899 method = vent->smeth();
1900 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1901 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
1902 s->version = vent->version;
1903 ssl->method = method;
1904 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version))
1905 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1911 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1915 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1916 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1917 * the version specific method.
1919 * @s: client SSL handle.
1920 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1921 * @extensions: The extensions received
1923 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
1925 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
1926 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
1928 const version_info *vent;
1929 const version_info *table;
1930 int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv;
1931 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1934 s->version = version;
1936 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
1937 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions,
1938 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1939 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions,
1945 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
1946 && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1948 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1952 switch (ssl->method->version) {
1954 if (s->version != ssl->method->version) {
1956 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1960 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1961 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1962 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1963 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1964 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1966 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) {
1967 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1971 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1972 table = tls_version_table;
1974 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1975 table = dtls_version_table;
1979 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max);
1982 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ret);
1985 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min)
1986 : s->version < ver_min) {
1988 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1990 } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max)
1991 : s->version > ver_max) {
1993 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1997 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0)
2000 /* Check for downgrades */
2001 if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) {
2002 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
2003 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
2004 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
2005 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
2007 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2008 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
2011 } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
2012 && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION
2013 && real_max > s->version) {
2014 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
2015 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
2016 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
2017 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
2019 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2020 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
2025 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2026 if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version)
2029 ssl->method = vent->cmeth();
2030 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) {
2031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2038 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
2043 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
2044 * @s: The SSL connection
2045 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
2046 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
2047 * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole
2048 * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled
2051 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
2052 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
2053 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
2054 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
2055 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
2057 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
2058 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
2059 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
2061 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
2062 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
2064 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *min_version,
2065 int *max_version, int *real_max)
2067 int version, tmp_real_max;
2069 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
2070 const SSL_METHOD *method;
2071 const version_info *table;
2072 const version_info *vent;
2073 const SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2075 switch (ssl->method->version) {
2078 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2079 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2080 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2081 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2082 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2084 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
2086 * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version
2089 if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL))
2090 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2092 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
2093 table = tls_version_table;
2095 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
2096 table = dtls_version_table;
2101 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
2102 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
2103 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
2104 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
2106 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
2107 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
2108 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
2110 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
2111 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
2112 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
2114 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
2115 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
2116 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
2117 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
2118 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
2119 * selected, as we start from scratch.
2121 *min_version = version = 0;
2123 if (real_max != NULL)
2126 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2128 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
2129 * "version capability" vector.
2131 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
2136 method = vent->cmeth();
2138 if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0)
2139 tmp_real_max = vent->version;
2141 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
2145 *min_version = method->version;
2147 if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0)
2148 *real_max = tmp_real_max;
2149 version = (single = method)->version;
2150 *min_version = version;
2155 *max_version = version;
2157 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
2159 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
2165 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
2166 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2168 * @s: client SSL handle.
2170 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2172 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2174 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
2177 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
2178 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
2180 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
2183 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL);
2188 s->version = ver_max;
2190 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2191 if (ver_max == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2193 * Even though this is technically before version negotiation,
2194 * because we have asked for DTLS1_BAD_VER we will never negotiate
2195 * anything else, and this has impacts on the record layer for when
2196 * we read the ServerHello. So we need to tell the record layer
2197 * about this immediately.
2199 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, ver_max))
2202 } else if (ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2203 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2204 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
2207 s->client_version = ver_max;
2212 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2213 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2214 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2215 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2217 int check_in_list(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
2218 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
2222 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
2225 if (checkallow == 1)
2226 group_id = ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(group_id);
2228 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
2229 uint16_t group = groups[i];
2231 if (checkallow == 2)
2232 group = ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(group);
2234 if (group_id == group
2236 || tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
2244 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2245 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2246 const unsigned char *hashval,
2247 size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
2250 unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2251 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
2253 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
2255 if (hashval == NULL) {
2256 hashval = hashvaltmp;
2258 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2259 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
2260 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp),
2262 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2267 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2268 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
2269 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2273 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2274 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
2275 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen;
2276 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2277 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
2278 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2283 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2284 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2285 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2288 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen)
2289 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
2290 s->s3.tmp.message_size
2291 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) {
2292 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2299 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2301 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
2304 int parse_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2306 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
2307 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2310 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
2311 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2314 /* get the CA RDNs */
2315 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2320 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2321 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2322 unsigned int name_len;
2324 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2325 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2326 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2330 namestart = namebytes;
2331 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2332 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2335 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2340 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2347 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2348 s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2353 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2358 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2360 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2361 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2364 ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl);
2365 if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
2370 ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(ssl);
2375 int construct_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk,
2378 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2379 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2384 if ((ca_sk != NULL) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES)) {
2387 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2388 unsigned char *namebytes;
2389 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2393 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2394 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2396 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2403 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2404 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2411 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2412 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
2413 const void *param, size_t paramlen)
2415 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
2416 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
2419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2422 memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2423 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2425 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);
2432 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2433 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2435 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2437 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2438 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1))
2439 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2442 s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2443 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2447 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst,
2448 s->s3.handshake_dgst)) {
2449 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2450 EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst);
2459 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2460 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2462 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2464 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2468 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst,
2470 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);