2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_local.h"
15 #include "statem_local.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/trace.h>
25 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
27 typedef struct x509err2alert_st {
32 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
33 const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = {
34 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
35 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
36 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
40 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
41 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
43 int ssl3_do_write(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int type)
47 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
49 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
50 s->init_num, &written);
53 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
55 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
56 * ignore the result anyway
57 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
59 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
60 || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
61 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
62 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE))
63 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
64 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
67 if (written == s->init_num) {
69 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
70 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), ssl,
74 s->init_off += written;
75 s->init_num -= written;
79 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
83 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
84 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
87 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
93 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
95 int ver_min, ver_max, ok;
96 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
97 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
99 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
100 /* SSLfatal() already called */
104 /* Reset any extension flags */
105 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
107 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) {
108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
112 /* Sanity check that we have MD5-SHA1 if we need it */
113 if (sctx->ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) {
114 int md5sha1_needed = 0;
116 /* We don't have MD5-SHA1 - do we need it? */
117 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
118 if (DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, DTLS1_VERSION))
121 if (ver_max <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
124 if (md5sha1_needed) {
125 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
126 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,
127 "The max supported SSL/TLS version needs the"
128 " MD5-SHA1 digest but it is not available"
129 " in the loaded providers. Use (D)TLSv1.2 or"
130 " above, or load different providers");
135 /* Don't allow TLSv1.1 or below to be negotiated */
136 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
137 if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(ver_min, DTLS1_2_VERSION))
138 ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, DTLS1_2_VERSION);
140 if (ver_min < TLS1_2_VERSION)
141 ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_2_VERSION);
144 /* Shouldn't happen */
145 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
152 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
156 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
157 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
160 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
161 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
163 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
164 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
165 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
167 } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
174 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
175 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
176 "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
180 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
181 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
182 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
184 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
185 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
187 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0;
190 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
191 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect);
193 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
194 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
196 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
197 memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random));
200 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
202 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
203 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
210 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
211 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
213 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
214 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
216 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
217 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
219 /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
220 static const char servercontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x73\x65\x72"
221 "\x76\x65\x72\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79";
222 /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
223 static const char clientcontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x63\x6c\x69"
224 "\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79";
226 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
229 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
230 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
231 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
232 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
233 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
234 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
236 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
239 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
240 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
241 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
243 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
244 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
245 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
246 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
247 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
248 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
249 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
250 /* SSLfatal() already called */
255 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
260 retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata);
262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
271 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
273 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
274 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
275 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
276 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
277 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
279 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
280 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
281 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
282 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
284 if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) {
285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
288 pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
290 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, &md)) {
291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
295 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
301 /* Get the data to be signed */
302 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
303 /* SSLfatal() already called */
307 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
312 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx, &pctx,
313 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
314 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
320 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
321 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
322 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
323 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
328 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
330 * Here we use EVP_DigestSignUpdate followed by EVP_DigestSignFinal
331 * in order to add the EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET call between them.
333 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
334 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
335 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
336 s->session->master_key) <= 0
337 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) {
339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
342 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
344 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
345 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
350 * Here we *must* use EVP_DigestSign() because Ed25519/Ed448 does not
351 * support streaming via EVP_DigestSignUpdate/EVP_DigestSignFinal
353 if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, NULL, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
357 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
359 || EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
367 int pktype = lu->sig;
369 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
370 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
371 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
372 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
376 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
381 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
382 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
383 /* SSLfatal() already called */
388 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
389 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
392 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
393 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
396 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
398 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
399 const unsigned char *data;
400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
401 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
403 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
407 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
410 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
411 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
412 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
413 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
420 peer = s->session->peer;
421 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
427 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) {
428 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
429 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
433 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
436 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET);
440 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) {
441 /* SSLfatal() already called */
444 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
446 SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED);
450 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
451 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
455 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
456 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
457 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
459 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
461 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
462 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
465 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
466 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
467 && (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
468 || EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
469 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
470 && EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
471 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
474 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
479 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
480 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
484 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
485 /* SSLfatal() already called */
489 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n",
490 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
492 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(mctx, &pctx,
493 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
494 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
496 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
499 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
501 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
502 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
503 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
504 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
505 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL)
507 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
513 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
514 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
515 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
516 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
517 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
521 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
522 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
523 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
524 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
525 s->session->master_key) <= 0) {
526 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
529 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
530 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
534 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
536 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
542 * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
543 * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
544 * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
545 * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
546 * want to make sure that SSL_get1_peer_certificate() will return the actual
547 * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
549 if (!s->server && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1)
550 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
552 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
554 BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer);
555 s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL;
556 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
558 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
563 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
565 size_t finish_md_len;
568 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
570 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
571 if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
572 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
575 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
578 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
580 && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0
581 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
582 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {;
583 /* SSLfatal() already called */
584 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
588 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
589 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
591 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
592 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
595 finish_md_len = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
597 s->s3.tmp.finish_md);
598 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
599 /* SSLfatal() already called */
600 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
603 s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
605 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
606 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
607 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
611 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
612 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
614 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
615 && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->session->master_key,
616 s->session->master_key_length)) {
617 /* SSLfatal() already called */
618 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
622 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
624 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
625 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
626 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
629 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
631 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
633 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
635 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
638 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
641 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
643 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
644 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
645 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
648 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
649 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
652 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
654 unsigned int updatetype;
657 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
658 * be on a record boundary.
660 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
662 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
665 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
666 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
667 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
668 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
672 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
675 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
676 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
678 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
682 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
683 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
684 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
686 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
687 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
689 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
690 /* SSLfatal() already called */
691 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
694 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
698 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
701 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
705 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
708 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
709 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
711 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
712 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
715 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len =
716 ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
717 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md);
719 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) {
720 /* SSLfatal() already called */
727 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
732 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
734 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
735 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
736 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
738 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
739 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
740 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
741 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
742 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
743 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
744 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
748 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
749 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
753 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
754 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
755 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
756 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
759 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1;
760 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
761 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
762 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
765 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
766 dtls1_increment_epoch(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
768 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
769 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
771 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
773 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
774 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
777 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)),
778 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
782 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
785 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
788 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
789 int was_first = SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s);
792 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
795 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
796 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than
799 if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
800 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 0);
801 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
802 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
803 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
804 && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
805 /* SSLfatal() already called */
806 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
811 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
812 * message must be on a record boundary.
814 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
815 && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
816 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
817 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
820 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
821 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) {
822 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
823 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
825 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0;
827 md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
829 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
831 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
834 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
836 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
837 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
841 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
843 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
844 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
845 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
848 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
850 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
852 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
854 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
858 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
859 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
861 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
863 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED &&
864 !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
865 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
866 /* SSLfatal() already called */
867 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
870 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
872 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
873 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
875 /* SSLfatal() already called */
876 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
878 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
879 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
880 /* SSLfatal() already called */
881 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
883 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
884 /* SSLfatal() already called */
885 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
891 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
892 && s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake != NULL)
893 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake(s->rlayer.rrl, 0);
895 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
898 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
900 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
901 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
902 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
905 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
908 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
909 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
910 X509 *x, int chain, int for_comp)
913 unsigned char *outbytes;
914 int context = SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE;
917 context |= SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION;
919 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
925 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
926 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
928 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
932 if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || for_comp)
933 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, context, x, chain)) {
934 /* SSLfatal() already called */
941 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
942 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int for_comp)
946 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
947 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
948 X509_STORE *chain_store;
949 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
951 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
957 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
959 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
960 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
962 extra_certs = sctx->extra_certs;
964 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
966 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
967 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
969 chain_store = sctx->cert_store;
971 if (chain_store != NULL) {
972 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(sctx->libctx,
975 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
977 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
980 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
981 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
983 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
987 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
988 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
989 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
990 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
992 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
993 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
995 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
996 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
999 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
1000 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1001 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1002 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
1004 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1006 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i);
1009 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
1010 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
1011 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1013 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, for_comp)) {
1014 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1015 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1019 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1021 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
1024 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i);
1027 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, for_comp)) {
1028 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1031 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
1032 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
1033 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, for_comp)) {
1034 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1042 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1043 CERT_PKEY *cpk, int for_comp)
1045 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) {
1047 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1051 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, for_comp))
1054 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1056 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1064 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1065 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1068 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s, ossl_unused WORK_STATE wst,
1069 int clearbufs, int stop)
1071 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1072 int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand;
1073 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1074 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1077 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1078 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1080 * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS
1081 * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions
1083 * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used.
1085 || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl))
1089 * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf
1090 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1092 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1096 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) {
1097 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1103 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server
1104 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
1105 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1108 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
1109 * post handshake exchange
1112 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1115 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
1116 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1118 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1122 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
1125 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
1126 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1128 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1129 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
1130 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
1132 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1134 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
1135 * so we remove this one from the cache.
1137 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode
1138 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0)
1139 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1142 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1145 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
1148 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
1149 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit);
1151 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
1152 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
1153 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
1156 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1157 /* done with handshaking */
1158 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
1159 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
1160 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
1161 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1165 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1166 cb = s->info_callback;
1167 else if (sctx->info_callback != NULL)
1168 cb = sctx->info_callback;
1170 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
1171 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
1175 || !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1176 || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1177 cb(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
1181 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
1182 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1183 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1186 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1189 int tls_get_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *mt)
1191 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1192 int skip_message, i, recvd_type;
1194 size_t l, readbytes;
1195 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1197 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1200 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1201 i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1203 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1206 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1209 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1211 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1212 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1214 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1216 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1219 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
1220 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) {
1222 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1223 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1224 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1225 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1226 * with a valid cookie.
1230 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1231 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1232 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1233 s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1235 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1236 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1237 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1240 s->init_num += readbytes;
1245 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1246 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1248 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1249 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1250 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1253 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1257 if (s->msg_callback)
1258 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1259 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl,
1260 s->msg_callback_arg);
1262 } while (skip_message);
1263 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1266 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1268 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1270 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1273 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1274 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1276 l = s->rlayer.tlsrecs[0].length + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1277 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
1279 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1280 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1283 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1284 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1286 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1289 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
1291 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1298 int tls_get_message_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t *len)
1300 size_t n, readbytes;
1303 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1305 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1306 /* We've already read everything in */
1307 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1312 n = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1314 i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1315 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1317 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1321 s->init_num += readbytes;
1326 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1327 * Finished verification.
1329 if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
1330 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1335 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1336 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1337 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1339 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1343 if (s->msg_callback)
1344 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1345 (size_t)s->init_num, ssl, s->msg_callback_arg);
1348 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1349 * processing the message
1350 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1353 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1354 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1355 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1356 || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1357 && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) {
1358 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1359 || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1360 || memcmp(hrrrandom,
1361 s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET,
1362 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) {
1363 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1364 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1365 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1371 if (s->msg_callback)
1372 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1373 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl,
1374 s->msg_callback_arg);
1381 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = {
1382 {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE},
1383 {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1384 {X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1385 {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1386 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1387 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1388 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1389 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1390 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED},
1391 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1392 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1393 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1394 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1395 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1396 {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1397 {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1398 {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1399 {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1400 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1401 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1402 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1403 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1404 {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1405 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1406 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1407 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE},
1408 {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1409 {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1410 {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1411 {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1412 {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1413 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1414 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1415 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1416 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1417 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1418 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1419 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1420 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1421 {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1423 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
1424 {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN}
1427 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err)
1429 const X509ERR2ALERT *tp;
1431 for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp)
1432 if (tp->x509err == x509err)
1437 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1439 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1441 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1444 static int version_cmp(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int a, int b)
1446 int dtls = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s);
1451 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1452 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1457 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1458 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1461 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION
1462 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1465 /* Must be in order high to low */
1466 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1468 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1470 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1473 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1475 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1478 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1480 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1482 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1483 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1485 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1488 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1490 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1495 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1496 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1499 /* Must be in order high to low */
1500 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1502 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1504 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1507 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1508 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1510 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1511 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1517 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1519 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1520 * @method: the intended method.
1522 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1524 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1526 int version = method->version;
1528 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1529 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1530 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1531 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1533 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1534 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1535 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1537 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1538 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1539 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1540 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1546 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
1547 * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has
1548 * a servername callback configure. Otherwise returns 0.
1550 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1554 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1556 if (!ossl_assert(sctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL))
1560 * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername
1561 * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok
1563 if (sctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL
1564 || s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL)
1567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1568 if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL)
1572 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL)
1575 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1576 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
1578 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1579 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1580 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1581 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1586 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i))
1588 if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC)
1591 * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
1592 * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
1593 * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
1595 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
1596 if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve))
1604 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1607 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1608 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1610 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1612 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
1613 const SSL_METHOD **meth)
1615 const version_info *vent;
1616 const version_info *table;
1618 switch (SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version) {
1620 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1621 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1622 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1623 table = tls_version_table;
1625 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1626 table = dtls_version_table;
1631 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1633 if (vent->cmeth != NULL
1634 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0
1635 && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0
1637 || version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1638 || is_tls13_capable(s))) {
1640 *meth = vent->cmeth();
1648 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1649 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1650 * supported protocol version.
1652 * @s server SSL handle.
1654 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1656 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1658 const version_info *vent;
1659 const version_info *table;
1660 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1663 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1664 * (according to ssl->defltmethod, as version negotiation may have changed
1667 if (s->version == ssl->defltmeth->version)
1671 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1672 * highest protocol version).
1674 if (ssl->defltmeth->version == TLS_method()->version)
1675 table = tls_version_table;
1676 else if (ssl->defltmeth->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1677 table = dtls_version_table;
1679 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1683 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1684 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1685 return s->version == vent->version;
1691 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1692 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1693 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1694 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1696 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1697 * @version: the intended limit.
1698 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1700 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1702 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1712 valid_tls = version >= SSL3_VERSION && version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
1714 DTLS_VERSION_LE(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) &&
1715 DTLS_VERSION_GE(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER);
1717 if (!valid_tls && !valid_dtls)
1721 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1722 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1723 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1725 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1726 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1727 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1728 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1729 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1731 * We ignore attempts to set bounds on version-inflexible methods,
1732 * returning success.
1734 switch (method_version) {
1738 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1743 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1751 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1753 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
1754 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) {
1755 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
1756 } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1757 && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
1759 * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2
1760 * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still
1761 * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and
1762 * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is
1763 * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not.
1765 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) {
1766 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
1768 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1773 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1774 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1775 * the version specific method.
1777 * @s: server SSL handle.
1779 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1781 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1785 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1787 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1788 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL.
1790 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1793 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1794 int server_version = ssl->method->version;
1795 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1796 const version_info *vent;
1797 const version_info *table;
1799 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1801 s->client_version = client_version;
1803 switch (server_version) {
1805 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1806 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1807 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1808 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1810 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1811 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1812 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1813 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1814 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1819 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1820 * a HelloRetryRequest
1823 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1824 table = tls_version_table;
1826 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1827 table = dtls_version_table;
1831 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1833 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
1834 if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
1835 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1837 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1838 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1839 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1840 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1841 PACKET versionslist;
1843 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1845 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1846 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1847 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1851 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
1852 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
1853 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
1854 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
1855 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
1856 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
1857 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
1859 if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION)
1860 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION;
1862 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1863 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1865 if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method))
1866 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1868 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1869 /* Trailing data? */
1870 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1873 if (best_vers > 0) {
1874 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1876 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
1877 * negotiated TLSv1.3
1879 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
1880 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1883 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
1884 s->version = best_vers;
1885 ssl->method = best_method;
1886 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, best_vers))
1887 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1891 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1895 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1896 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1898 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1899 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1902 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1905 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1906 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1908 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1909 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1911 method = vent->smeth();
1912 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1913 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
1914 s->version = vent->version;
1915 ssl->method = method;
1916 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version))
1917 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1923 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1927 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1928 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1929 * the version specific method.
1931 * @s: client SSL handle.
1932 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1933 * @extensions: The extensions received
1935 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
1937 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
1938 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
1940 const version_info *vent;
1941 const version_info *table;
1942 int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv;
1943 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1946 s->version = version;
1948 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
1949 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions,
1950 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1951 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions,
1957 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
1958 && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1960 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1964 switch (ssl->method->version) {
1966 if (s->version != ssl->method->version) {
1968 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1972 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1973 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1974 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1975 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1976 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1978 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) {
1979 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1983 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1984 table = tls_version_table;
1986 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1987 table = dtls_version_table;
1991 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max);
1994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ret);
1997 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min)
1998 : s->version < ver_min) {
2000 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
2002 } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max)
2003 : s->version > ver_max) {
2005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
2009 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0)
2012 /* Check for downgrades */
2013 if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) {
2014 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
2015 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
2016 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
2017 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
2019 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2020 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
2023 } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
2024 && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION
2025 && real_max > s->version) {
2026 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
2027 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
2028 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
2029 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
2031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2032 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
2037 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2038 if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version)
2041 ssl->method = vent->cmeth();
2042 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) {
2043 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2050 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
2055 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
2056 * @s: The SSL connection
2057 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
2058 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
2059 * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole
2060 * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled
2063 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
2064 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
2065 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
2066 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
2067 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
2069 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
2070 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
2071 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
2073 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
2074 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
2076 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *min_version,
2077 int *max_version, int *real_max)
2079 int version, tmp_real_max;
2081 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
2082 const SSL_METHOD *method;
2083 const version_info *table;
2084 const version_info *vent;
2085 const SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2087 switch (ssl->method->version) {
2090 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2091 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2092 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2093 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2094 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2096 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
2098 * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version
2101 if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL))
2102 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2104 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
2105 table = tls_version_table;
2107 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
2108 table = dtls_version_table;
2113 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
2114 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
2115 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
2116 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
2118 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
2119 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
2120 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
2122 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
2123 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
2124 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
2126 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
2127 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
2128 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
2129 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
2130 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
2131 * selected, as we start from scratch.
2133 *min_version = version = 0;
2135 if (real_max != NULL)
2138 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2140 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
2141 * "version capability" vector.
2143 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
2148 method = vent->cmeth();
2150 if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0)
2151 tmp_real_max = vent->version;
2153 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
2157 *min_version = method->version;
2159 if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0)
2160 *real_max = tmp_real_max;
2161 version = (single = method)->version;
2162 *min_version = version;
2167 *max_version = version;
2169 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
2171 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
2177 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
2178 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2180 * @s: client SSL handle.
2182 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2184 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2186 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
2189 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
2190 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
2192 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
2195 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL);
2200 s->version = ver_max;
2202 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2203 if (ver_max == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2205 * Even though this is technically before version negotiation,
2206 * because we have asked for DTLS1_BAD_VER we will never negotiate
2207 * anything else, and this has impacts on the record layer for when
2208 * we read the ServerHello. So we need to tell the record layer
2209 * about this immediately.
2211 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, ver_max))
2214 } else if (ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2215 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2216 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
2219 s->client_version = ver_max;
2224 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2225 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2226 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2227 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2229 int check_in_list(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
2230 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
2234 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
2237 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
2238 uint16_t group = groups[i];
2240 if (group_id == group
2242 || tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
2250 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2251 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2252 const unsigned char *hashval,
2253 size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
2256 unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2257 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
2259 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
2261 if (hashval == NULL) {
2262 hashval = hashvaltmp;
2264 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2265 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
2266 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp),
2268 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2273 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2274 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
2275 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2279 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2280 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
2281 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen;
2282 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2283 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
2284 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2289 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2290 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2291 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2294 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen)
2295 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
2296 s->s3.tmp.message_size
2297 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) {
2298 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2305 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2307 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
2310 int parse_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2312 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
2313 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2316 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
2317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2320 /* get the CA RDNs */
2321 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2326 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2327 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2328 unsigned int name_len;
2330 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2331 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2332 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2336 namestart = namebytes;
2337 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2338 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2341 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2346 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2347 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2353 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2354 s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2359 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2364 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2366 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2367 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2370 ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl);
2371 if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
2376 ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(ssl);
2381 int construct_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk,
2384 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2385 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2390 if ((ca_sk != NULL) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES)) {
2393 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2394 unsigned char *namebytes;
2395 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2399 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2400 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2402 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2409 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2417 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2418 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
2419 const void *param, size_t paramlen)
2421 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
2422 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
2425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2428 memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2429 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2431 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);
2438 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2439 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2441 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2443 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2444 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1))
2445 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2448 s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2449 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2450 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2453 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst,
2454 s->s3.handshake_dgst)) {
2455 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2456 EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst);
2465 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2466 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2468 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2470 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2474 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst,
2476 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2482 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
2483 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls13_process_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
2488 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2490 COMP_METHOD *method = NULL;
2491 COMP_CTX *comp = NULL;
2492 size_t expected_length;
2498 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2501 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int*)&comp_alg)) {
2502 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2505 /* If we have a prefs list, make sure the algorithm is in it */
2506 if (sc->cert_comp_prefs[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none) {
2507 for (i = 0; sc->cert_comp_prefs[i] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; i++) {
2508 if (sc->cert_comp_prefs[i] == comp_alg) {
2514 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2518 if (!ossl_comp_has_alg(comp_alg)) {
2519 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2523 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib:
2524 method = COMP_zlib_oneshot();
2526 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli:
2527 method = COMP_brotli_oneshot();
2529 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd:
2530 method = COMP_zstd_oneshot();
2533 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2537 if ((comp = COMP_CTX_new(method)) == NULL
2538 || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &expected_length)
2539 || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &comp_length)
2540 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != comp_length
2541 || !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, expected_length)
2542 || !PACKET_buf_init(tmppkt, (unsigned char *)buf->data, expected_length)
2543 || COMP_expand_block(comp, (unsigned char *)buf->data, expected_length,
2544 (unsigned char*)PACKET_data(pkt), comp_length) != (int)expected_length) {
2545 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
2548 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2550 COMP_CTX_free(comp);