2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_local.h"
15 #include "statem_local.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/trace.h>
25 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
27 typedef struct x509err2alert_st {
32 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
33 const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = {
34 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
35 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
36 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
40 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
41 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
43 int ssl3_do_write(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int type)
47 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
49 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
50 s->init_num, &written);
53 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
55 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
56 * ignore the result anyway
57 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
59 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
60 || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
61 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
62 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE))
63 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
64 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
67 if (written == s->init_num) {
69 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
70 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), ssl,
74 s->init_off += written;
75 s->init_num -= written;
79 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
83 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
84 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
87 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
93 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
95 int ver_min, ver_max, ok;
96 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
97 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
99 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
100 /* SSLfatal() already called */
104 /* Reset any extension flags */
105 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
107 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) {
108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
112 /* Sanity check that we have MD5-SHA1 if we need it */
113 if (sctx->ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) {
114 int md5sha1_needed = 0;
116 /* We don't have MD5-SHA1 - do we need it? */
117 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
118 if (DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, DTLS1_VERSION))
121 if (ver_max <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
124 if (md5sha1_needed) {
125 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
126 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,
127 "The max supported SSL/TLS version needs the"
128 " MD5-SHA1 digest but it is not available"
129 " in the loaded providers. Use (D)TLSv1.2 or"
130 " above, or load different providers");
135 /* Don't allow TLSv1.1 or below to be negotiated */
136 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
137 if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(ver_min, DTLS1_2_VERSION))
138 ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, DTLS1_2_VERSION);
140 if (ver_min < TLS1_2_VERSION)
141 ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_2_VERSION);
144 /* Shouldn't happen */
145 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
152 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
156 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
157 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
160 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
161 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
163 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
164 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
165 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
167 } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
174 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
175 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
176 "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
180 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
181 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
182 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
184 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
185 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
187 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0;
190 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
191 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect);
193 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
194 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
196 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
197 memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random));
200 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
202 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
203 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
210 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
211 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
213 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
214 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
216 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
217 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
219 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
220 static const char servercontext[] = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e,
221 0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65,
222 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72,
223 0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 };
224 static const char clientcontext[] = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e,
225 0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65,
226 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72,
227 0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 };
229 static const char servercontext[] = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
230 static const char clientcontext[] = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
233 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
236 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
237 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
238 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
239 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
240 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
241 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
243 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
246 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
247 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
248 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
250 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
251 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
252 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
253 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
254 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
255 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
256 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
257 /* SSLfatal() already called */
262 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
267 retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata);
269 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
278 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
280 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
281 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
282 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
283 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
284 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
286 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
287 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
288 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
289 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
291 if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) {
292 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
295 pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
297 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, &md)) {
298 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
302 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
304 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
308 /* Get the data to be signed */
309 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
310 /* SSLfatal() already called */
314 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
319 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx, &pctx,
320 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
321 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
327 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
328 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
329 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
330 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
331 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
335 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
337 * Here we use EVP_DigestSignUpdate followed by EVP_DigestSignFinal
338 * in order to add the EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET call between them.
340 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
341 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
342 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
343 s->session->master_key) <= 0
344 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) {
346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
349 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
351 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
357 * Here we *must* use EVP_DigestSign() because Ed25519/Ed448 does not
358 * support streaming via EVP_DigestSignUpdate/EVP_DigestSignFinal
360 if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, NULL, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
361 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
364 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
366 || EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
367 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
374 int pktype = lu->sig;
376 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
377 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
378 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
379 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
383 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
384 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
388 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
389 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
390 /* SSLfatal() already called */
395 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
399 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
403 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
405 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
406 const unsigned char *data;
407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
408 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
410 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
414 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
417 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
418 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
419 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
420 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
427 peer = s->session->peer;
428 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
434 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) {
435 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
436 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
440 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
443 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET);
447 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) {
448 /* SSLfatal() already called */
451 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
456 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
457 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
461 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
462 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
463 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
465 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
467 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
468 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
471 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
472 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
473 && (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
474 || EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
475 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
476 && EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
477 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
480 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
485 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
486 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
490 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
491 /* SSLfatal() already called */
495 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n",
496 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
498 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(mctx, &pctx,
499 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
500 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
507 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
508 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
509 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
510 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
511 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
515 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
521 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
522 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
523 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
524 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
529 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
530 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
531 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
532 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
533 s->session->master_key) <= 0) {
534 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
537 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
542 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
550 * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
551 * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
552 * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
553 * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
554 * want to make sure that SSL_get1_peer_certificate() will return the actual
555 * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
557 if (!s->server && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1)
558 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
560 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
562 BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer);
563 s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL;
564 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
566 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
571 int tls_construct_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
573 size_t finish_md_len;
576 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
578 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
579 if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
580 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
583 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
586 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
588 && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0
589 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
590 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {;
591 /* SSLfatal() already called */
596 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
597 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
599 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
600 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
603 finish_md_len = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
605 s->s3.tmp.finish_md);
606 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
607 /* SSLfatal() already called */
611 s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
613 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
614 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
619 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
620 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
622 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
623 && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->session->master_key,
624 s->session->master_key_length)) {
625 /* SSLfatal() already called */
630 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
632 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
637 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
639 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
641 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
643 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
649 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
651 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
656 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
660 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
662 unsigned int updatetype;
665 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
666 * be on a record boundary.
668 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
669 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
670 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
673 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
674 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
676 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
680 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
683 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
684 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
686 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
690 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
691 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
692 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
694 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
695 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
697 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
698 /* SSLfatal() already called */
699 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
702 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
706 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
709 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
713 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
716 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
717 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
719 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
720 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
723 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len =
724 ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
725 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md);
727 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) {
728 /* SSLfatal() already called */
735 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
740 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
742 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
743 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
744 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
746 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
747 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
748 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
749 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
750 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
751 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
752 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
757 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
761 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
762 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
764 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
767 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1;
768 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
769 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
770 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
773 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
774 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
776 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
777 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
779 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
781 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
782 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
785 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)),
786 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
790 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
793 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
796 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
799 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
802 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
803 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less
806 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
807 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
808 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
809 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
810 && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
811 /* SSLfatal() already called */
812 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
817 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
818 * message must be on a record boundary.
820 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
821 && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
822 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
823 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
826 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
827 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) {
828 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
829 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
831 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0;
833 md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
835 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
836 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
837 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
840 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
842 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
843 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
847 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
849 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
850 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
851 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
854 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
856 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
858 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
860 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
864 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
865 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
867 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
869 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED &&
870 !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
871 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
872 /* SSLfatal() already called */
873 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
876 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
878 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
879 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
881 /* SSLfatal() already called */
882 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
884 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
885 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
886 /* SSLfatal() already called */
887 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
889 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
890 /* SSLfatal() already called */
891 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
896 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
899 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
901 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
902 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
909 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
910 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
914 unsigned char *outbytes;
916 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
918 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
921 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
922 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
923 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
927 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
928 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
930 /* SSLfatal() already called */
937 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
938 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
942 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
943 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
944 X509_STORE *chain_store;
945 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
947 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
953 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
955 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
956 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
958 extra_certs = sctx->extra_certs;
960 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
962 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
963 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
965 chain_store = sctx->cert_store;
967 if (chain_store != NULL) {
968 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(sctx->libctx,
971 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
972 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
975 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
976 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
977 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
981 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
982 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
983 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
984 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
986 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
987 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
989 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
990 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
993 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
994 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
995 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
996 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
998 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
999 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i);
1002 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
1003 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
1004 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1006 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) {
1007 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1008 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1012 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1014 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
1016 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i);
1019 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) {
1020 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1023 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
1024 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
1025 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) {
1026 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1034 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1037 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) {
1038 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1042 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk))
1045 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1046 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1054 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1055 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1058 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s, ossl_unused WORK_STATE wst,
1059 int clearbufs, int stop)
1061 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1062 int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand;
1063 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1064 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1067 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1070 * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS
1071 * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions
1073 * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used.
1075 || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl))
1079 * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf
1080 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1082 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1086 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) {
1087 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1093 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server
1094 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
1095 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1098 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
1099 * post handshake exchange
1102 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1105 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
1106 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1108 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1112 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
1115 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
1116 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1118 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1119 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
1120 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
1122 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1124 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
1125 * so we remove this one from the cache.
1127 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode
1128 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0)
1129 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1132 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1135 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
1138 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
1139 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit);
1141 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
1142 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
1143 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
1146 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1147 /* done with handshaking */
1148 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
1149 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
1150 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
1151 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1155 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1156 cb = s->info_callback;
1157 else if (sctx->info_callback != NULL)
1158 cb = sctx->info_callback;
1160 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
1161 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
1165 || !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1166 || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1167 cb(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
1171 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
1172 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1173 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1176 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1179 int tls_get_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *mt)
1181 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1182 int skip_message, i, recvd_type;
1184 size_t l, readbytes;
1185 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1187 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1190 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1191 i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1193 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1196 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1199 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1201 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1202 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1204 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1205 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1206 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1209 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
1210 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) {
1212 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1213 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1214 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1215 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1216 * with a valid cookie.
1220 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1221 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1222 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1223 s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1225 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1226 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1227 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1230 s->init_num += readbytes;
1235 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1236 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1238 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1239 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1240 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1243 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1247 if (s->msg_callback)
1248 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1249 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl,
1250 s->msg_callback_arg);
1252 } while (skip_message);
1253 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1256 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1258 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1260 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1263 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1264 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1266 l = s->rlayer.tlsrecs[0].length + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1267 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
1269 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1270 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1273 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1274 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1275 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1276 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1279 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
1281 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1288 int tls_get_message_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t *len)
1290 size_t n, readbytes;
1293 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1295 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1296 /* We've already read everything in */
1297 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1302 n = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1304 i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1305 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1307 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1311 s->init_num += readbytes;
1316 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1317 * Finished verification.
1319 if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
1320 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1325 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1326 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1327 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1329 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1333 if (s->msg_callback)
1334 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1335 (size_t)s->init_num, ssl, s->msg_callback_arg);
1338 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1339 * processing the message
1340 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1343 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1344 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1345 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1346 || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1347 && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) {
1348 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1349 || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1350 || memcmp(hrrrandom,
1351 s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET,
1352 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) {
1353 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1354 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1355 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1361 if (s->msg_callback)
1362 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1363 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl,
1364 s->msg_callback_arg);
1371 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = {
1372 {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE},
1373 {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1374 {X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1375 {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1376 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1377 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1378 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1379 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1380 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED},
1381 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1382 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1383 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1384 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1385 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1386 {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1387 {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1388 {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1389 {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1390 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1391 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1392 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1393 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1394 {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1395 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1396 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1397 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE},
1398 {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1399 {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1400 {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1401 {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1402 {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1403 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1404 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1405 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1406 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1407 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1408 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1409 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1410 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1411 {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1413 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
1414 {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN}
1417 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err)
1419 const X509ERR2ALERT *tp;
1421 for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp)
1422 if (tp->x509err == x509err)
1427 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1429 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1431 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1434 static int version_cmp(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int a, int b)
1436 int dtls = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s);
1441 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1442 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1447 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1448 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1451 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION
1452 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1455 /* Must be in order high to low */
1456 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1457 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1458 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1460 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1463 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1465 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1468 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1470 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1473 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1475 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1478 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1480 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1485 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1486 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1489 /* Must be in order high to low */
1490 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1492 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1494 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1497 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1498 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1500 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1501 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1507 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1509 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1510 * @method: the intended method.
1512 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1514 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1516 int version = method->version;
1518 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1519 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1520 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1521 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1523 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1524 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1525 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1527 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1528 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1529 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1530 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1536 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
1537 * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has
1538 * a servername callback configure. Otherwise returns 0.
1540 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1544 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1546 if (!ossl_assert(sctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL))
1550 * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername
1551 * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok
1553 if (sctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL
1554 || s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL)
1557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1558 if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL)
1562 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL)
1565 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1566 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
1568 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1569 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1570 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1571 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1576 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i))
1578 if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC)
1581 * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
1582 * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
1583 * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
1585 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
1586 if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve))
1594 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1597 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1598 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1600 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1602 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
1603 const SSL_METHOD **meth)
1605 const version_info *vent;
1606 const version_info *table;
1608 switch (SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version) {
1610 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1611 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1612 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1613 table = tls_version_table;
1615 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1616 table = dtls_version_table;
1621 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1623 if (vent->cmeth != NULL
1624 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0
1625 && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0
1627 || version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1628 || is_tls13_capable(s))) {
1630 *meth = vent->cmeth();
1638 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1639 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1640 * supported protocol version.
1642 * @s server SSL handle.
1644 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1646 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1648 const version_info *vent;
1649 const version_info *table;
1650 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1653 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1654 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1657 if (s->version == sctx->method->version)
1661 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1662 * highest protocol version).
1664 if (sctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1665 table = tls_version_table;
1666 else if (sctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1667 table = dtls_version_table;
1669 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1673 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1674 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1675 return s->version == vent->version;
1681 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1682 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1683 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1684 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1686 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1687 * @version: the intended limit.
1688 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1690 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1692 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1702 valid_tls = version >= SSL3_VERSION && version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
1704 DTLS_VERSION_LE(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) &&
1705 DTLS_VERSION_GE(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER);
1707 if (!valid_tls && !valid_dtls)
1711 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1712 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1713 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1715 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1716 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1717 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1718 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1719 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1721 * We ignore attempts to set bounds on version-inflexible methods,
1722 * returning success.
1724 switch (method_version) {
1728 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1733 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1741 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1743 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
1744 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) {
1745 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
1746 } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1747 && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
1749 * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2
1750 * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still
1751 * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and
1752 * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is
1753 * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not.
1755 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) {
1756 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
1758 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1763 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1764 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1765 * the version specific method.
1767 * @s: server SSL handle.
1769 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1771 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1775 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1777 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1778 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL.
1780 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1783 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1784 int server_version = ssl->method->version;
1785 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1786 const version_info *vent;
1787 const version_info *table;
1789 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1791 s->client_version = client_version;
1793 switch (server_version) {
1795 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1796 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1797 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1798 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1800 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1801 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1802 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1803 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1804 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1809 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1810 * a HelloRetryRequest
1813 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1814 table = tls_version_table;
1816 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1817 table = dtls_version_table;
1821 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1823 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
1824 if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
1825 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1827 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1828 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1829 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1830 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1831 PACKET versionslist;
1833 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1835 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1836 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1837 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1841 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
1842 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
1843 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
1844 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
1845 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
1846 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
1847 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
1849 if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION)
1850 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION;
1852 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1853 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1855 if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method))
1856 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1858 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1859 /* Trailing data? */
1860 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1863 if (best_vers > 0) {
1864 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1866 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
1867 * negotiated TLSv1.3
1869 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
1870 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1873 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
1874 s->version = best_vers;
1875 ssl->method = best_method;
1878 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1882 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1883 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1885 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1886 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1889 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1892 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1893 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1895 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1896 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1898 method = vent->smeth();
1899 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1900 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
1901 s->version = vent->version;
1902 ssl->method = method;
1907 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1911 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1912 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1913 * the version specific method.
1915 * @s: client SSL handle.
1916 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1917 * @extensions: The extensions received
1919 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
1921 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
1922 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
1924 const version_info *vent;
1925 const version_info *table;
1926 int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv;
1927 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1930 s->version = version;
1932 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
1933 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions,
1934 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1935 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions,
1941 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
1942 && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1944 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1948 switch (ssl->method->version) {
1950 if (s->version != ssl->method->version) {
1952 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1956 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1957 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1958 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1959 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1960 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1963 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1964 table = tls_version_table;
1966 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1967 table = dtls_version_table;
1971 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max);
1974 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ret);
1977 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min)
1978 : s->version < ver_min) {
1980 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1982 } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max)
1983 : s->version > ver_max) {
1985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1989 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0)
1992 /* Check for downgrades */
1993 if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) {
1994 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
1995 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1996 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
1997 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
1999 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2000 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
2003 } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
2004 && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION
2005 && real_max > s->version) {
2006 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
2007 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
2008 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
2009 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
2011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2012 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
2017 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2018 if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version)
2021 ssl->method = vent->cmeth();
2026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
2031 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
2032 * @s: The SSL connection
2033 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
2034 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
2035 * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole
2036 * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled
2039 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
2040 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
2041 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
2042 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
2043 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
2045 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
2046 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
2047 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
2049 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
2050 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
2052 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *min_version,
2053 int *max_version, int *real_max)
2055 int version, tmp_real_max;
2057 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
2058 const SSL_METHOD *method;
2059 const version_info *table;
2060 const version_info *vent;
2061 const SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2063 switch (ssl->method->version) {
2066 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2067 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2068 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2069 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2070 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2072 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
2074 * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version
2077 if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL))
2078 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2080 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
2081 table = tls_version_table;
2083 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
2084 table = dtls_version_table;
2089 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
2090 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
2091 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
2092 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
2094 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
2095 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
2096 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
2098 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
2099 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
2100 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
2102 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
2103 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
2104 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
2105 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
2106 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
2107 * selected, as we start from scratch.
2109 *min_version = version = 0;
2111 if (real_max != NULL)
2114 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2116 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
2117 * "version capability" vector.
2119 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
2124 method = vent->cmeth();
2126 if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0)
2127 tmp_real_max = vent->version;
2129 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
2133 *min_version = method->version;
2135 if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0)
2136 *real_max = tmp_real_max;
2137 version = (single = method)->version;
2138 *min_version = version;
2143 *max_version = version;
2145 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
2147 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
2153 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
2154 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2156 * @s: client SSL handle.
2158 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2160 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2162 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
2165 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
2166 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
2168 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
2171 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL);
2176 s->version = ver_max;
2178 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2179 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
2180 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
2182 s->client_version = ver_max;
2187 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2188 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2189 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2190 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2192 int check_in_list(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
2193 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
2197 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
2200 if (checkallow == 1)
2201 group_id = ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(group_id);
2203 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
2204 uint16_t group = groups[i];
2206 if (checkallow == 2)
2207 group = ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(group);
2209 if (group_id == group
2211 || tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
2219 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2220 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2221 const unsigned char *hashval,
2222 size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
2225 unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2226 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
2228 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
2230 if (hashval == NULL) {
2231 hashval = hashvaltmp;
2233 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2234 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
2235 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp),
2237 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2242 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2243 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
2244 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2248 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2249 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
2250 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen;
2251 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2252 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
2253 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2258 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2259 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2260 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2263 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen)
2264 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
2265 s->s3.tmp.message_size
2266 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) {
2267 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2274 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2276 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
2279 int parse_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2281 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
2282 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2285 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
2286 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2289 /* get the CA RDNs */
2290 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2295 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2296 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2297 unsigned int name_len;
2299 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2300 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2301 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2305 namestart = namebytes;
2306 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2307 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2310 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2311 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2315 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2322 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2323 s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2328 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2333 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2335 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2336 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2339 ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl);
2340 if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
2345 ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(ssl);
2350 int construct_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk,
2353 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2354 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2359 if ((ca_sk != NULL) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES)) {
2362 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2363 unsigned char *namebytes;
2364 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2368 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2369 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2371 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2378 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2379 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2386 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2387 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
2388 const void *param, size_t paramlen)
2390 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
2391 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
2394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2397 memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2398 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2400 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);
2407 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2408 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2410 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2412 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2413 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1))
2414 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2417 s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2418 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2422 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst,
2423 s->s3.handshake_dgst)) {
2424 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2425 EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst);
2434 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2435 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2437 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2439 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2440 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2443 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst,
2445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);