2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_local.h"
15 #include "statem_local.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/trace.h>
25 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
27 typedef struct x509err2alert_st {
32 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
33 const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = {
34 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
35 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
36 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
40 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
41 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
43 int ssl3_do_write(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int type)
47 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
49 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
50 s->init_num, &written);
53 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
55 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
56 * ignore the result anyway
57 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
59 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
60 || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
61 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
62 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE))
63 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
64 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
67 if (written == s->init_num) {
69 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
70 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), ssl,
74 s->init_off += written;
75 s->init_num -= written;
79 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
83 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
84 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
87 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
93 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
95 int ver_min, ver_max, ok;
96 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
97 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
99 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
100 /* SSLfatal() already called */
104 /* Reset any extension flags */
105 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
107 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) {
108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
112 /* Sanity check that we have MD5-SHA1 if we need it */
113 if (sctx->ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) {
114 int md5sha1_needed = 0;
116 /* We don't have MD5-SHA1 - do we need it? */
117 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
118 if (DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, DTLS1_VERSION))
121 if (ver_max <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
124 if (md5sha1_needed) {
125 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
126 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,
127 "The max supported SSL/TLS version needs the"
128 " MD5-SHA1 digest but it is not available"
129 " in the loaded providers. Use (D)TLSv1.2 or"
130 " above, or load different providers");
135 /* Don't allow TLSv1.1 or below to be negotiated */
136 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
137 if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(ver_min, DTLS1_2_VERSION))
138 ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, DTLS1_2_VERSION);
140 if (ver_min < TLS1_2_VERSION)
141 ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_2_VERSION);
144 /* Shouldn't happen */
145 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
152 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
156 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
157 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
160 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
161 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
163 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
164 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
165 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
167 } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
174 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
175 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
176 "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
180 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
181 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
182 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
184 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
185 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
187 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0;
190 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
191 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect);
193 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
194 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
196 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
197 memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random));
200 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
202 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
203 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
210 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
211 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
213 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
214 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
216 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
217 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
219 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
220 static const char servercontext[] = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e,
221 0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65,
222 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72,
223 0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 };
224 static const char clientcontext[] = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e,
225 0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65,
226 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72,
227 0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 };
229 static const char servercontext[] = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
230 static const char clientcontext[] = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
233 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
236 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
237 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
238 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
239 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
240 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
241 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
243 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
246 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
247 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
248 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
250 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
251 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
252 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
253 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
254 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
255 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
256 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
257 /* SSLfatal() already called */
262 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
267 retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata);
269 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
278 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
280 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
281 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
282 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
283 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
284 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
286 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
287 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
288 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
289 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
291 if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) {
292 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
295 pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
297 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, &md)) {
298 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
302 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
304 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
308 /* Get the data to be signed */
309 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
310 /* SSLfatal() already called */
314 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
319 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx, &pctx,
320 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
321 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
327 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
328 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
329 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
330 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
331 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
335 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
337 * Here we use EVP_DigestSignUpdate followed by EVP_DigestSignFinal
338 * in order to add the EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET call between them.
340 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
341 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
342 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
343 s->session->master_key) <= 0
344 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) {
346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
349 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
351 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
357 * Here we *must* use EVP_DigestSign() because Ed25519/Ed448 does not
358 * support streaming via EVP_DigestSignUpdate/EVP_DigestSignFinal
360 if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, NULL, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
361 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
364 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
366 || EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
367 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
374 int pktype = lu->sig;
376 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
377 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
378 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
379 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
383 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
384 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
388 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
389 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
390 /* SSLfatal() already called */
395 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
399 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
403 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
405 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
406 const unsigned char *data;
407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
408 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
410 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
414 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
417 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
418 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
419 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
420 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
427 peer = s->session->peer;
428 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
434 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) {
435 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
436 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
440 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
443 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET);
447 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) {
448 /* SSLfatal() already called */
451 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
456 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
457 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
461 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
462 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
463 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
465 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
467 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
468 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
471 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
472 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
473 && (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
474 || EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
475 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
476 && EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
477 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
480 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
485 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
486 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
490 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
491 /* SSLfatal() already called */
495 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n",
496 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
498 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(mctx, &pctx,
499 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
500 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
507 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
508 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
509 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
510 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
511 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
515 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
521 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
522 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
523 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
524 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
529 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
530 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
531 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
532 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
533 s->session->master_key) <= 0) {
534 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
537 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
542 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
550 * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
551 * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
552 * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
553 * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
554 * want to make sure that SSL_get1_peer_certificate() will return the actual
555 * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
557 if (!s->server && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1)
558 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
560 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
562 BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer);
563 s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL;
564 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
566 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
571 int tls_construct_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
573 size_t finish_md_len;
576 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
578 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
579 if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
580 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
583 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
586 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
588 && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0
589 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
590 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {;
591 /* SSLfatal() already called */
596 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
597 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
599 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
600 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
603 finish_md_len = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
605 s->s3.tmp.finish_md);
606 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
607 /* SSLfatal() already called */
611 s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
613 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
614 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
619 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
620 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
622 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
623 && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->session->master_key,
624 s->session->master_key_length)) {
625 /* SSLfatal() already called */
630 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
632 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
637 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
639 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
641 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
643 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
649 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
651 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
656 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
660 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
662 unsigned int updatetype;
665 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
666 * be on a record boundary.
668 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
669 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
670 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
673 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
674 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
676 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
680 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
683 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
684 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
686 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
690 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
691 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
692 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
694 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
695 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
697 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
698 /* SSLfatal() already called */
699 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
702 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
706 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
709 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
713 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
716 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
717 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
719 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
720 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
723 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len =
724 ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
725 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md);
727 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) {
728 /* SSLfatal() already called */
735 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
740 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
742 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
743 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
744 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
746 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
747 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
748 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
749 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
750 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
751 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
752 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
757 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
761 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
762 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
764 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
767 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1;
768 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
769 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
770 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
773 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
774 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
776 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
777 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
779 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
781 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
782 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
785 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)),
786 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
790 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
793 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
796 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
797 int was_first = SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s);
800 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
803 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
804 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than
807 if (s->rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
808 s->rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rrl, 0);
809 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
810 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
811 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
812 && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
813 /* SSLfatal() already called */
814 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
819 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
820 * message must be on a record boundary.
822 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
823 && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
824 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
825 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
828 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
829 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) {
830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
831 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
833 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0;
835 md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
837 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
839 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
842 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
844 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
845 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
849 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
851 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
852 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
853 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
856 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
858 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
860 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
862 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
866 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
867 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
869 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
871 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED &&
872 !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
873 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
874 /* SSLfatal() already called */
875 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
878 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
880 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
881 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
883 /* SSLfatal() already called */
884 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
886 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
887 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
888 /* SSLfatal() already called */
889 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
891 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
892 /* SSLfatal() already called */
893 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
899 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
900 && s->rrlmethod->set_first_handshake != NULL)
901 s->rrlmethod->set_first_handshake(s->rrl, 0);
903 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
906 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
908 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
909 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
916 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
917 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
921 unsigned char *outbytes;
923 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
925 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
928 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
929 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
934 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
935 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
937 /* SSLfatal() already called */
944 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
945 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
949 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
950 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
951 X509_STORE *chain_store;
952 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
954 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
960 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
962 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
963 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
965 extra_certs = sctx->extra_certs;
967 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
969 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
970 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
972 chain_store = sctx->cert_store;
974 if (chain_store != NULL) {
975 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(sctx->libctx,
978 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
979 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
982 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
983 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
984 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
988 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
989 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
990 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
991 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
993 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
994 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
996 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
997 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
1000 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
1001 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1002 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1003 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
1005 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1006 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i);
1009 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
1010 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
1011 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1013 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) {
1014 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1015 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1019 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1021 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
1023 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i);
1026 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) {
1027 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1030 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
1031 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
1032 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) {
1033 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1041 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1044 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) {
1045 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1049 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk))
1052 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1053 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1061 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1062 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1065 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s, ossl_unused WORK_STATE wst,
1066 int clearbufs, int stop)
1068 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1069 int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand;
1070 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1071 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1074 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1077 * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS
1078 * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions
1080 * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used.
1082 || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl))
1086 * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf
1087 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1089 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1093 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) {
1094 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1100 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server
1101 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
1102 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1105 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
1106 * post handshake exchange
1109 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1112 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
1113 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1115 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1119 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
1122 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
1123 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1125 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1126 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
1127 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
1129 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1131 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
1132 * so we remove this one from the cache.
1134 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode
1135 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0)
1136 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1139 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1142 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
1145 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
1146 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit);
1148 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
1149 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
1150 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
1153 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1154 /* done with handshaking */
1155 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
1156 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
1157 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
1158 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1162 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1163 cb = s->info_callback;
1164 else if (sctx->info_callback != NULL)
1165 cb = sctx->info_callback;
1167 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
1168 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
1172 || !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1173 || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1174 cb(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
1178 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
1179 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1180 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1183 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1186 int tls_get_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *mt)
1188 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1189 int skip_message, i, recvd_type;
1191 size_t l, readbytes;
1192 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1194 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1197 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1198 i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1200 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1203 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1206 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1208 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1209 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1211 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1212 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1213 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1216 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
1217 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) {
1219 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1220 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1221 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1222 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1223 * with a valid cookie.
1227 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1228 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1229 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1230 s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1232 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1234 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1237 s->init_num += readbytes;
1242 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1243 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1245 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1246 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1247 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1250 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1254 if (s->msg_callback)
1255 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1256 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl,
1257 s->msg_callback_arg);
1259 } while (skip_message);
1260 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1263 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1265 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1267 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1270 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1271 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1273 l = s->rlayer.tlsrecs[0].length + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1274 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
1276 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1277 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1280 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1281 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1282 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1283 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1286 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
1288 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1295 int tls_get_message_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t *len)
1297 size_t n, readbytes;
1300 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1302 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1303 /* We've already read everything in */
1304 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1309 n = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1311 i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1312 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1314 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1318 s->init_num += readbytes;
1323 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1324 * Finished verification.
1326 if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
1327 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1332 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1333 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1334 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1336 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1340 if (s->msg_callback)
1341 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1342 (size_t)s->init_num, ssl, s->msg_callback_arg);
1345 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1346 * processing the message
1347 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1350 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1351 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1352 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1353 || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1354 && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) {
1355 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1356 || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1357 || memcmp(hrrrandom,
1358 s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET,
1359 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) {
1360 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1361 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1362 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1368 if (s->msg_callback)
1369 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1370 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl,
1371 s->msg_callback_arg);
1378 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = {
1379 {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE},
1380 {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1381 {X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1382 {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1383 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1384 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1385 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1386 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1387 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED},
1388 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1389 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1390 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1391 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1392 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1393 {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1394 {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1395 {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1396 {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1397 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1398 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1399 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1400 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1401 {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1402 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1403 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1404 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE},
1405 {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1406 {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1407 {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1408 {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1409 {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1410 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1411 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1412 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1413 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1414 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1415 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1416 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1417 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1418 {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1420 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
1421 {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN}
1424 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err)
1426 const X509ERR2ALERT *tp;
1428 for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp)
1429 if (tp->x509err == x509err)
1434 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1436 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1438 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1441 static int version_cmp(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int a, int b)
1443 int dtls = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s);
1448 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1449 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1454 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1455 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1458 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION
1459 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1462 /* Must be in order high to low */
1463 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1465 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1467 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1470 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1472 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1475 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1477 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1480 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1482 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1485 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1487 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1492 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1493 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1496 /* Must be in order high to low */
1497 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1499 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1501 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1504 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1505 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1507 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1508 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1514 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1516 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1517 * @method: the intended method.
1519 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1521 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1523 int version = method->version;
1525 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1526 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1527 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1528 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1530 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1531 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1532 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1534 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1535 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1536 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1537 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1543 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
1544 * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has
1545 * a servername callback configure. Otherwise returns 0.
1547 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1551 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1553 if (!ossl_assert(sctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL))
1557 * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername
1558 * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok
1560 if (sctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL
1561 || s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL)
1564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1565 if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL)
1569 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL)
1572 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1573 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
1575 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1576 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1577 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1578 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1583 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i))
1585 if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC)
1588 * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
1589 * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
1590 * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
1592 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
1593 if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve))
1601 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1604 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1605 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1607 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1609 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
1610 const SSL_METHOD **meth)
1612 const version_info *vent;
1613 const version_info *table;
1615 switch (SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version) {
1617 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1618 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1619 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1620 table = tls_version_table;
1622 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1623 table = dtls_version_table;
1628 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1630 if (vent->cmeth != NULL
1631 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0
1632 && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0
1634 || version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1635 || is_tls13_capable(s))) {
1637 *meth = vent->cmeth();
1645 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1646 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1647 * supported protocol version.
1649 * @s server SSL handle.
1651 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1653 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1655 const version_info *vent;
1656 const version_info *table;
1657 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1660 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1661 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1664 if (s->version == sctx->method->version)
1668 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1669 * highest protocol version).
1671 if (sctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1672 table = tls_version_table;
1673 else if (sctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1674 table = dtls_version_table;
1676 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1680 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1681 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1682 return s->version == vent->version;
1688 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1689 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1690 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1691 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1693 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1694 * @version: the intended limit.
1695 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1697 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1699 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1709 valid_tls = version >= SSL3_VERSION && version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
1711 DTLS_VERSION_LE(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) &&
1712 DTLS_VERSION_GE(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER);
1714 if (!valid_tls && !valid_dtls)
1718 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1719 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1720 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1722 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1723 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1724 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1725 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1726 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1728 * We ignore attempts to set bounds on version-inflexible methods,
1729 * returning success.
1731 switch (method_version) {
1735 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1740 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1748 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1750 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
1751 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) {
1752 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
1753 } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1754 && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
1756 * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2
1757 * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still
1758 * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and
1759 * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is
1760 * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not.
1762 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) {
1763 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
1765 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1770 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1771 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1772 * the version specific method.
1774 * @s: server SSL handle.
1776 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1778 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1782 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1784 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1785 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL.
1787 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1790 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1791 int server_version = ssl->method->version;
1792 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1793 const version_info *vent;
1794 const version_info *table;
1796 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1798 s->client_version = client_version;
1800 switch (server_version) {
1802 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1803 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1804 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1805 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1807 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1808 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1809 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1810 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1811 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1816 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1817 * a HelloRetryRequest
1820 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1821 table = tls_version_table;
1823 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1824 table = dtls_version_table;
1828 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1830 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
1831 if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
1832 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1834 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1835 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1836 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1837 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1838 PACKET versionslist;
1840 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1842 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1843 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1844 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1848 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
1849 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
1850 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
1851 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
1852 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
1853 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
1854 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
1856 if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION)
1857 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION;
1859 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1860 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1862 if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method))
1863 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1865 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1866 /* Trailing data? */
1867 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1870 if (best_vers > 0) {
1871 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1873 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
1874 * negotiated TLSv1.3
1876 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
1877 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1880 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
1881 s->version = best_vers;
1882 ssl->method = best_method;
1883 if (!s->rrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rrl, best_vers))
1884 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1888 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1892 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1893 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1895 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1896 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1899 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1902 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1903 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1905 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1906 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1908 method = vent->smeth();
1909 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1910 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
1911 s->version = vent->version;
1912 ssl->method = method;
1913 if (!s->rrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rrl, s->version))
1914 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1920 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1924 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1925 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1926 * the version specific method.
1928 * @s: client SSL handle.
1929 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1930 * @extensions: The extensions received
1932 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
1934 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
1935 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
1937 const version_info *vent;
1938 const version_info *table;
1939 int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv;
1940 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1943 s->version = version;
1945 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
1946 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions,
1947 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1948 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions,
1954 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
1955 && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1957 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1961 switch (ssl->method->version) {
1963 if (s->version != ssl->method->version) {
1965 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1969 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1970 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1971 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1972 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1973 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1975 if (!s->rrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rrl, s->version)) {
1976 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1980 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1981 table = tls_version_table;
1983 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1984 table = dtls_version_table;
1988 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max);
1991 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ret);
1994 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min)
1995 : s->version < ver_min) {
1997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1999 } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max)
2000 : s->version > ver_max) {
2002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
2006 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0)
2009 /* Check for downgrades */
2010 if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) {
2011 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
2012 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
2013 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
2014 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
2016 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2017 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
2020 } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
2021 && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION
2022 && real_max > s->version) {
2023 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
2024 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
2025 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
2026 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
2028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2029 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
2034 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2035 if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version)
2038 ssl->method = vent->cmeth();
2039 if (!s->rrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rrl, s->version)) {
2040 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2047 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
2052 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
2053 * @s: The SSL connection
2054 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
2055 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
2056 * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole
2057 * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled
2060 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
2061 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
2062 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
2063 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
2064 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
2066 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
2067 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
2068 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
2070 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
2071 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
2073 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *min_version,
2074 int *max_version, int *real_max)
2076 int version, tmp_real_max;
2078 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
2079 const SSL_METHOD *method;
2080 const version_info *table;
2081 const version_info *vent;
2082 const SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2084 switch (ssl->method->version) {
2087 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2088 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2089 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2090 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2091 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2093 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
2095 * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version
2098 if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL))
2099 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2101 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
2102 table = tls_version_table;
2104 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
2105 table = dtls_version_table;
2110 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
2111 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
2112 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
2113 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
2115 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
2116 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
2117 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
2119 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
2120 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
2121 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
2123 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
2124 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
2125 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
2126 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
2127 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
2128 * selected, as we start from scratch.
2130 *min_version = version = 0;
2132 if (real_max != NULL)
2135 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2137 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
2138 * "version capability" vector.
2140 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
2145 method = vent->cmeth();
2147 if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0)
2148 tmp_real_max = vent->version;
2150 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
2154 *min_version = method->version;
2156 if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0)
2157 *real_max = tmp_real_max;
2158 version = (single = method)->version;
2159 *min_version = version;
2164 *max_version = version;
2166 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
2168 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
2174 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
2175 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2177 * @s: client SSL handle.
2179 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2181 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2183 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
2186 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
2187 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
2189 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
2192 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL);
2197 s->version = ver_max;
2199 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2200 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
2201 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
2203 s->client_version = ver_max;
2208 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2209 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2210 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2211 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2213 int check_in_list(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
2214 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
2218 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
2221 if (checkallow == 1)
2222 group_id = ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(group_id);
2224 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
2225 uint16_t group = groups[i];
2227 if (checkallow == 2)
2228 group = ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(group);
2230 if (group_id == group
2232 || tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
2240 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2241 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2242 const unsigned char *hashval,
2243 size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
2246 unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2247 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
2249 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
2251 if (hashval == NULL) {
2252 hashval = hashvaltmp;
2254 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2255 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
2256 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp),
2258 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2263 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2264 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
2265 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2269 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2270 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
2271 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen;
2272 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2273 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
2274 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2279 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2280 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2281 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2284 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen)
2285 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
2286 s->s3.tmp.message_size
2287 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) {
2288 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2295 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2297 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
2300 int parse_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2302 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
2303 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2306 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
2307 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2310 /* get the CA RDNs */
2311 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2312 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2316 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2317 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2318 unsigned int name_len;
2320 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2321 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2326 namestart = namebytes;
2327 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2328 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2331 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2332 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2336 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2337 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2343 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2344 s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2349 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2354 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2356 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2357 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2360 ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl);
2361 if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
2366 ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(ssl);
2371 int construct_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk,
2374 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2375 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2380 if ((ca_sk != NULL) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES)) {
2383 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2384 unsigned char *namebytes;
2385 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2389 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2390 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2392 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2399 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2407 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2408 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
2409 const void *param, size_t paramlen)
2411 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
2412 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
2415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2418 memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2419 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2421 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);
2428 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2429 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2431 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2433 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2434 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1))
2435 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2438 s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2439 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2440 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2443 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst,
2444 s->s3.handshake_dgst)) {
2445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2446 EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst);
2455 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2456 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2458 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2460 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2464 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst,
2466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);