1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
218 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->info_callback;
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
234 if (s->cert == NULL) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
269 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
272 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
274 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
275 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
277 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
283 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
296 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
310 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
315 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
316 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
317 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
322 * support secure renegotiation.
324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
326 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
328 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
344 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
347 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
348 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
355 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
363 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
364 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
371 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
373 * callback indicates firther work to be done
375 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
378 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
379 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
384 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
386 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
388 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
395 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
400 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
401 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
406 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
407 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
409 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
413 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
416 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
421 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
422 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
423 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
426 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
428 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
429 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
433 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
434 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
436 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
439 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
445 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
451 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
452 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
455 * clear this, it may get reset by
456 * send_server_key_exchange
458 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
461 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
462 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
463 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
464 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
465 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
470 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
474 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
477 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
478 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
480 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH))
481 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
482 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
483 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
484 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
485 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
486 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
487 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
492 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
498 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
504 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
505 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
507 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
508 * during re-negotiation:
510 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
511 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
513 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
514 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
517 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
519 * ... except when the application insists on
520 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
523 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
525 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
527 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
528 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
529 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
531 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
534 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
535 /* no cert request */
537 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
538 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
539 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
540 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
541 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
546 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
547 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
550 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
551 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
553 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
554 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
562 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
565 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
566 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
570 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
573 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
574 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
575 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
576 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
577 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
581 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
582 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
586 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
588 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
592 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
593 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
594 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
598 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
600 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
601 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
606 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
610 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
611 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
612 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
617 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
618 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
619 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
620 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
622 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
623 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
625 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
626 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
628 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
631 } else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
632 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
634 if (!s->session->peer)
637 * For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
638 * digest cached records.
640 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
642 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
645 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
646 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
647 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
654 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
658 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
659 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
660 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
663 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
664 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
665 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
669 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
670 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
673 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
682 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
684 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
696 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
697 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
698 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
699 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
701 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
702 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
703 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
704 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
708 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
709 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
711 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
712 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
714 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
719 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
720 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
721 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
723 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
724 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
725 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
726 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
727 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
728 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
729 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
730 * the client's Finished message is read.
732 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
733 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
735 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
739 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
743 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
744 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
746 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
747 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
748 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
749 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
750 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
751 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
752 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
753 * the client's Finished message is read.
755 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
756 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
757 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
758 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
762 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
764 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
765 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
768 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
773 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
774 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
775 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
778 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
782 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
783 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
784 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
787 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
793 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
794 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
796 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
797 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
799 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
803 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
805 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
809 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
812 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
813 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
816 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
822 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
823 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
824 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
825 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
826 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
828 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
830 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
833 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
835 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
836 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
838 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
839 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
841 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
844 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
849 /* clean a few things up */
850 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
852 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
855 /* remove buffering on output */
856 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
860 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
865 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
867 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
869 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
872 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
887 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
889 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
893 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
894 new_state = s->state;
896 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
897 s->state = new_state;
903 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
907 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
911 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
915 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
916 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
917 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
922 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
923 /* number of bytes to write */
928 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
929 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
932 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
938 * this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
939 * so permit appropriate message length
941 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
944 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
947 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
948 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
950 * We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
953 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) {
954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO,
955 SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
959 * Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
960 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
963 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
964 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
965 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
969 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
970 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
971 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
974 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
980 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
982 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1;
983 unsigned int cookie_len;
986 unsigned char *p, *d, *q;
988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
989 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
991 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
994 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
995 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
996 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
997 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
999 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
1000 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1002 s->first_packet = 1;
1003 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1004 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
1005 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
1006 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1007 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
1011 s->first_packet = 0;
1012 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1015 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
1016 * for session id length
1018 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
1019 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1025 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
1026 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
1028 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
1031 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
1032 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) {
1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1034 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
1035 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
1037 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1040 s->version = s->client_version;
1042 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1047 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
1048 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
1051 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1052 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1054 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1056 if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
1057 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1061 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1063 if (cookie_length == 0)
1067 /* load the client random */
1068 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1069 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1071 /* get the session-id */
1074 if (p + j > d + n) {
1075 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1082 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1083 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1084 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1085 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1086 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1087 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1088 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1089 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1090 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1091 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1094 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1095 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1098 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1100 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1102 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1103 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1104 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1105 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1106 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1108 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1115 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1122 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1124 if (p + 1 > d + n) {
1125 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1129 cookie_len = *(p++);
1131 if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
1132 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1138 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1139 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1140 * does not cause an overflow.
1142 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1144 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1149 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1150 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1151 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1153 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1154 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1156 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1158 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1161 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1163 /* default verification */
1164 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1165 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1166 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1177 if (p + 2 > d + n) {
1178 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1185 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1190 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1191 if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
1192 /* not enough data */
1193 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1197 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
1202 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1205 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1208 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1209 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1211 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1212 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1214 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1215 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1223 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1227 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1228 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1230 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1231 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1232 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1233 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1234 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1236 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1237 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1238 s->session->cipher = c;
1245 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1248 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1250 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1257 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
1258 /* not enough data */
1259 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1264 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1272 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1276 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1277 /* TLS extensions */
1278 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1279 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
1280 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1285 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
1286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1291 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1292 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1293 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1294 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1298 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1299 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1300 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1305 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1306 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1308 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1309 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1310 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1312 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1314 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1315 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1319 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1321 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1326 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1327 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1332 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1335 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1337 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1338 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1340 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1341 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1347 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1348 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1349 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1351 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1353 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1354 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1355 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1356 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1357 /* Can't disable compression */
1358 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1359 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1361 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1364 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1365 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1366 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1367 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1368 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1372 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1373 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1375 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1378 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1379 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1380 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1384 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1386 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1391 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1392 /* See if we have a match */
1393 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1395 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1396 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1397 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1399 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1409 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1415 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1416 * using compression.
1418 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1419 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1426 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1430 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1431 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1433 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1435 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1436 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1437 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1438 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1439 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1444 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1447 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1451 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1453 /* Session-id reuse */
1454 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1455 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1456 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
1457 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
1459 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
1460 sk = s->session->ciphers;
1461 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
1462 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1463 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1465 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1469 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
1470 else if (ec != NULL)
1471 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
1473 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1476 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1479 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION
1480 || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1481 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
1482 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1488 * we now have the following setup.
1490 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1491 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1492 * compression - basically ignored right now
1493 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1494 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1495 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1496 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1499 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1500 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1501 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1511 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1513 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1516 if (ciphers != NULL)
1517 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1521 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1524 unsigned char *p, *d;
1528 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1529 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1530 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1531 p = s->s3->server_random;
1532 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1533 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1537 /* Do the message type and length last */
1540 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1541 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1544 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1545 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1548 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1549 * back in the server hello:
1550 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1551 * we send back the old session ID.
1552 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1553 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1554 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1555 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1557 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1558 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1559 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1560 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1563 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1565 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1567 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1568 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1570 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1574 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1577 /* put the cipher */
1578 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1581 /* put the compression method */
1582 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1585 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1588 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1591 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1593 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1597 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p,
1598 buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
1600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1601 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1608 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1611 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1612 /* number of bytes to write */
1613 s->init_num = p - buf;
1617 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1618 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1621 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1625 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1626 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1629 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1634 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1635 /* number of bytes to write */
1640 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1641 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1644 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1650 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1654 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1657 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1658 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1661 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1664 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1665 unsigned char *p, *d;
1675 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1676 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1677 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1682 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1685 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1686 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1687 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1688 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1689 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1691 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1694 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1696 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1700 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1703 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1705 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1710 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1714 if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
1716 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1717 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1718 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1720 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1723 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1725 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1729 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1731 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1735 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1741 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1742 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1743 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1744 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1749 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1750 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1751 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1762 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1763 const EC_GROUP *group;
1765 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1766 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1767 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1768 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1770 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1771 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1773 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1774 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1776 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1780 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1782 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1786 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1787 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1791 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1796 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1797 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1798 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1799 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1800 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1807 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1808 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1809 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1814 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1815 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1817 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1822 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1823 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1827 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1830 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1835 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1836 * allocate memory accordingly.
1838 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1839 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1840 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1843 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1844 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1845 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1846 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1848 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1852 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1853 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1854 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1855 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1857 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1862 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1866 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1867 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1868 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1874 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1875 * can set these to NULLs
1882 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1884 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1886 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1888 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1890 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1892 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1893 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1894 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1895 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1897 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1900 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1901 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1902 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1903 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1907 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1909 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1912 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1913 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1915 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1922 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1923 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1924 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1926 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1929 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1935 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + 4 + kn)) {
1936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1939 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1942 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1944 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1955 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1957 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1958 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1959 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1960 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1962 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1970 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1971 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1972 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1973 encodedPoint = NULL;
1978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1979 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1980 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1981 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1982 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1983 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1984 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1991 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1992 * points to the space at the end.
1994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1995 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1996 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1999 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
2000 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
2001 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
2002 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
2003 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
2004 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2006 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2008 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n);
2009 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
2013 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2014 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
2015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
2024 * For TLS1.2 and later send signature algorithm
2026 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2027 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2028 /* Should never happen */
2029 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2031 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2037 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2039 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2040 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2042 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2044 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n);
2045 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2046 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
2047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2052 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2055 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2056 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2058 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2063 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2067 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
2069 s->init_num = n + 4;
2073 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2074 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2075 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2077 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2079 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2080 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2081 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2082 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2084 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2085 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2089 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2091 unsigned char *p, *d;
2092 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2093 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2097 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2100 d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2102 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2104 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2109 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2110 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2120 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2123 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2124 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2125 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2126 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 4 + n + j + 2)) {
2127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2131 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + n]);
2132 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
2134 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2139 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2148 /* else no CA names */
2149 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + off]);
2152 d = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
2153 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2157 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
2160 s->init_num = n + 4;
2162 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2163 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
2164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2167 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2170 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2177 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2180 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2181 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2183 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2187 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2191 unsigned long alg_k;
2193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2195 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2203 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2206 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2207 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2208 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2209 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2212 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2213 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2214 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2215 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2219 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2221 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2224 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2225 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2227 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2230 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2231 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2232 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2233 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2235 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2238 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2240 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2245 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2246 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2247 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2248 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2250 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2253 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2256 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2257 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2260 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2261 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2263 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2272 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2273 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2274 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2275 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2276 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2278 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2279 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2281 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2286 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2287 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2288 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2289 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2290 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2294 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2296 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2297 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2300 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2304 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2305 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2308 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2311 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2312 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2313 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2314 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2315 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2316 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2319 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2321 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2324 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2325 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2326 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2327 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2328 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2329 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2332 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2333 unsigned char workaround_good;
2335 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2337 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2338 version_good |= workaround_good;
2342 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2343 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2345 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2348 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2349 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2350 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2351 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2353 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2354 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2355 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2358 s->session->master_key_length =
2359 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2361 session->master_key,
2364 (rand_premaster_secret));
2365 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2369 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2372 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2374 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2382 if (n == 0L) { /* the parameters are in the cert */
2383 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2385 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2388 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2389 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2391 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2394 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2397 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2403 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2411 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2412 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2416 s->session->master_key_length =
2417 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2419 session->master_key,
2421 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2425 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2426 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2427 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2428 krb5_data authenticator;
2430 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2431 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2432 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2433 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2434 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2436 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2437 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2439 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2442 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2445 enc_ticket.length = i;
2447 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2449 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2453 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2454 p += enc_ticket.length;
2457 authenticator.length = i;
2459 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2461 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2465 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2466 p += authenticator.length;
2470 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2471 p += enc_pms.length;
2474 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2476 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2478 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2482 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2483 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2485 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2489 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2492 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2493 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2495 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2496 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2502 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2503 * return authtime == 0.
2505 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2506 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2508 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2509 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2511 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2512 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2517 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2522 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2523 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2525 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2529 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2531 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2533 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2536 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2537 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2540 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2543 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2545 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2548 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2550 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2554 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2556 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2559 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2560 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2562 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2563 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2564 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2565 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2566 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2567 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2568 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2571 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2573 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2578 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2580 s->session->master_key_length =
2581 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2583 session->master_key,
2586 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2587 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2588 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2589 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2590 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2595 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2596 * but it caused problems for apache.
2597 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2598 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2601 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2604 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2608 const EC_GROUP *group;
2609 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2611 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2612 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2617 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2618 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2619 /* use the certificate */
2620 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2623 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2624 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2626 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2629 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2630 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2632 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2633 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2638 /* Let's get client's public key */
2639 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2645 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2647 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
2648 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2650 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2653 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2654 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2656 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2657 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2658 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2659 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2660 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2661 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2663 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2665 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2669 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2670 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2675 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2678 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2679 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2681 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2683 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2687 /* Get encoded point length */
2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2694 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2699 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2702 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2705 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2706 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2707 if (field_size <= 0) {
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2711 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2718 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2719 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2720 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2721 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2722 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2723 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2725 /* Compute the master secret */
2726 s->session->master_key_length =
2727 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2729 session->master_key,
2732 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2737 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2738 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2739 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2740 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2742 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2744 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2751 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2753 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2756 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2758 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2763 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2765 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2766 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2767 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2769 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2770 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2772 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2775 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2777 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2780 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2781 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2785 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2786 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2788 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2790 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2794 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2795 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2796 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2797 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2802 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2803 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2804 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2805 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2806 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2811 s->session->master_key_length =
2812 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2814 session->master_key,
2819 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2825 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2830 if (param_len > n) {
2831 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2833 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2836 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2840 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2841 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2842 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2844 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2847 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2848 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2849 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2850 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2855 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2856 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2857 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2864 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2865 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2867 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2868 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2869 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2870 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2871 unsigned long alg_a;
2875 /* Get our certificate private key */
2876 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2877 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2878 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2879 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2880 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2882 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2883 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2885 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2886 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2887 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2888 * client certificate for authorization only.
2890 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2891 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2892 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2895 /* Decrypt session key */
2897 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2898 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2899 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2900 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2901 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2906 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2907 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2909 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2912 /* Generate master secret */
2913 s->session->master_key_length =
2914 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2916 session->master_key,
2917 premaster_secret, 32);
2918 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2919 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2920 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2925 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2926 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2932 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2939 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2940 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2944 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2945 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2946 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2947 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2948 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2950 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2954 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2956 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2958 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2962 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2964 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2966 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2967 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2968 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2969 -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2974 if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
2975 peer = s->session->peer;
2976 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2977 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2983 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
2984 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2986 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2996 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3000 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3002 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3003 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3007 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3009 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3013 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3014 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3015 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3017 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3020 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3021 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
3024 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3025 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
3026 /* Should never happen */
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3029 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3032 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3033 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
3034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3035 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3036 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3039 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3042 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3046 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3055 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3059 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3060 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3062 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3066 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3069 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3070 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3072 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3076 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3079 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3080 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3082 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3086 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
3087 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3093 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3094 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3095 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3098 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3103 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3110 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3111 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3112 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3113 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3116 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3123 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3124 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3125 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3126 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3129 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3135 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3136 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3137 unsigned char signature[64];
3139 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3140 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3142 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3144 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3145 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3147 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3149 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3151 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3157 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3164 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3165 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3168 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3169 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3170 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3171 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3173 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3174 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3178 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3180 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3182 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3183 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3185 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3187 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3190 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3195 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3196 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3197 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3199 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3200 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3204 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3206 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3208 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3209 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3212 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3216 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3217 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3221 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3223 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3229 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3230 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3234 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3236 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3237 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3239 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3244 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3250 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3252 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3255 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3263 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3264 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3265 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3266 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3268 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3271 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3272 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3273 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3275 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3276 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3279 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3280 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3281 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3285 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3287 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3289 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3294 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3295 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3296 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3297 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3300 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3303 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3304 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3305 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3310 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3311 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3312 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3314 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3315 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3323 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3325 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3331 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3335 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3340 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3341 x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3343 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3344 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3345 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3347 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3348 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3353 l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, x);
3355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3356 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3359 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3360 s->init_num = (int)l;
3364 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3365 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3369 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3370 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3372 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3376 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3377 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3378 const unsigned char *const_p;
3379 int len, slen_full, slen;
3382 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3383 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3384 unsigned char key_name[16];
3386 /* get session encoding length */
3387 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3389 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3392 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3393 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3396 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3398 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3402 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3403 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3406 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3410 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3413 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3416 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3418 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3419 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3420 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3424 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3425 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3428 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3431 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3432 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3433 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3434 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3435 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3436 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3438 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3439 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3440 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3443 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3445 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3446 /* Skip message length for now */
3449 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3450 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3452 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3453 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3457 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3459 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3460 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3462 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3463 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
3465 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3469 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3470 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3471 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3473 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3475 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3477 /* Output key name */
3479 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3482 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3483 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3484 /* Encrypt session data */
3485 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3488 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3492 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3494 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3497 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3498 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3501 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3503 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3504 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3505 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3507 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3509 /* number of bytes to write */
3511 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3516 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3517 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3521 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3522 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3523 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3527 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3529 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3532 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3533 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3534 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3537 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3538 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3542 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3545 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3546 /* message length */
3547 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3549 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3550 /* length of OCSP response */
3551 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3552 /* actual response */
3553 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3554 /* number of bytes to write */
3555 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3556 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3560 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3561 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3564 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3566 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3567 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3569 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3572 int proto_len, padding_len;
3574 const unsigned char *p;
3577 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3578 * extension in their ClientHello
3580 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3582 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3583 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3587 /* See the payload format below */
3588 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3589 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3590 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3591 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3597 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3598 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3599 * ssl3_get_finished).
3601 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3603 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3608 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3609 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3612 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3615 * The payload looks like:
3617 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3618 * uint8 padding_len;
3619 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3622 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
3623 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3626 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3627 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
3628 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3632 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3633 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3635 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3638 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3639 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;