2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include "record_locl.h"
21 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
22 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
23 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
24 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
26 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
27 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
30 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
33 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
34 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
37 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
39 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
42 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
43 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
48 rl->packet_length = 0;
50 memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
51 rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
52 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
53 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
59 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
60 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
62 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
64 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
65 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
68 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
71 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
73 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
74 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
75 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
76 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
77 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
80 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
81 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
83 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
86 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
87 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
89 size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl);
90 const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec;
92 while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]))
95 return curr_rec < num_recs;
98 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
100 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
101 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
104 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
106 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
109 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
111 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
114 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
118 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
121 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
122 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
123 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
125 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
131 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
133 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
136 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
138 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
141 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
143 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
144 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
145 return "read header";
146 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
148 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
155 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
157 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
158 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
160 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
162 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
170 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
172 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
176 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
177 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
178 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
179 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
180 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
181 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
182 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
184 size_t len, left, align = 0;
191 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
193 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
197 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
198 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
199 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
203 /* start with empty packet ... */
206 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
208 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
211 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
212 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
213 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
215 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
216 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
217 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
218 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
219 * overrun can be triggered.
221 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
225 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
226 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
227 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
230 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
231 pkt = rb->buf + align;
233 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
234 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
236 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
237 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
238 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
239 rb->offset = len + align;
243 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
244 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
247 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
248 if (left == 0 && extend)
250 if (left > 0 && n > left)
254 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
256 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
263 /* else we need to read more data */
265 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { /* does not happen */
266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
270 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
271 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
272 /* ignore max parameter */
277 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
278 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
286 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
287 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
292 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
293 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
294 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
295 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
305 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
307 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
312 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
313 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
314 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
316 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
318 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
322 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
325 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
326 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
332 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
333 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
335 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
338 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
340 size_t n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
341 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
342 size_t max_send_fragment, nw;
344 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
348 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
349 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
351 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
352 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
353 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
354 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
355 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
356 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
357 * report the error in a way the user will notice
359 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum)
360 || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
365 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
366 && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, NULL))
372 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
373 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
376 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
377 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
378 i = s->handshake_func(s);
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
388 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
389 * will happen with non blocking IO
392 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
395 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
396 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
399 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
401 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
403 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
404 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
405 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
406 * compromise is considered worthy.
408 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
409 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
410 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
411 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
412 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
413 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
414 unsigned char aad[13];
415 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
419 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
420 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
421 max_send_fragment -= 512;
423 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
424 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
426 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
427 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
428 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
430 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
435 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
439 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
440 /* free jumbo buffer */
441 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
448 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
449 /* free jumbo buffer */
450 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
454 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
455 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
457 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
462 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
463 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
465 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
467 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
469 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
470 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
477 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
478 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
479 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
480 packlen = (size_t)packleni;
481 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
482 /* free jumbo buffer */
483 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
487 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
488 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
491 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
492 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
493 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
496 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
497 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
499 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
505 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
506 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
507 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
508 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
510 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
512 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
513 /* free jumbo buffer */
514 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
516 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
520 /* free jumbo buffer */
521 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
522 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
530 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
531 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
532 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
540 split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
542 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
543 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
544 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
547 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
548 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
550 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
557 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
558 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
559 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
560 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
562 if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
563 || split_send_fragment == 0) {
565 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
566 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
573 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
579 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
580 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
583 if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
585 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
588 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
589 pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
592 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
593 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
594 remain = n % numpipes;
595 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
596 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
602 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
605 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
606 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
611 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
612 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
614 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
615 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
617 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
619 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
621 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
623 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
632 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
633 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
634 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
636 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
637 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
640 unsigned char *recordstart;
641 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
642 size_t prefix_len = 0;
647 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
650 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
651 totlen += pipelens[j];
653 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
654 * will happen with non blocking IO
656 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
657 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
659 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
660 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
661 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
664 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
667 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
668 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
671 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
676 if ((sess == NULL) ||
677 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
678 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
681 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
682 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
688 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
690 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
692 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
693 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
696 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
698 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
699 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
700 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
703 size_t tmppipelen = 0;
706 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
711 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
712 /* insufficient space */
713 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
718 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
721 if (create_empty_fragment) {
722 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
723 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
725 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
726 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
727 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
729 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
730 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
732 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
733 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
734 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
735 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
736 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
740 } else if (prefix_len) {
741 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
742 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
743 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
744 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
745 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
746 + prefix_len, NULL)) {
747 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
752 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
755 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
756 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
757 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
758 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
760 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
761 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
762 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
763 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
764 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
771 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
772 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) {
773 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
774 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
775 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
776 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
779 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
780 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
781 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
782 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
783 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
788 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
789 memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
790 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
791 unsigned int version = SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_VERSION : s->version;
792 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
794 unsigned int rectype;
799 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type);
801 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
804 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
805 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
809 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
810 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
812 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
813 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
814 version = TLS1_VERSION;
816 maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
817 if (s->compress != NULL)
818 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
820 /* write the header */
821 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
822 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
823 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
825 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
827 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
829 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
833 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
834 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
835 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
836 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
837 totlen += pipelens[j];
840 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
844 /* first we compress */
845 if (s->compress != NULL) {
847 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we prevent compression!!!
849 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
850 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
851 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
855 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
856 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
859 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
862 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
865 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
866 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
869 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
871 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
872 rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
873 if (rlen < SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
875 size_t max_padding = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH - rlen;
876 if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) {
877 padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg);
878 } else if (s->block_padding > 0) {
879 size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1;
882 /* optimize for power of 2 */
883 if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0)
884 remainder = rlen & mask;
886 remainder = rlen % s->block_padding;
887 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
891 padding = s->block_padding - remainder;
894 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
895 if (padding > max_padding)
896 padding = max_padding;
897 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) {
898 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
901 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding);
907 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
908 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
912 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
915 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
916 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
917 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
923 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
924 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
925 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
927 if(!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
930 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
933 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
934 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
938 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
939 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
941 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
942 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
943 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
946 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
947 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY) {
949 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
950 * send early data - so we need to use the the tls13enc function.
952 if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
955 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
959 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
965 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
966 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
967 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
968 || origlen > thiswr->length
969 || (thiswr->length > origlen
970 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
971 thiswr->length - origlen, NULL))) {
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
975 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
978 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
979 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
983 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
986 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
987 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
988 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
992 if (s->msg_callback) {
993 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
994 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
995 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
996 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
997 s->msg_callback_arg);
1000 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1006 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
1007 * is thiswr->length long
1009 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
1011 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
1013 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1015 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1019 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1023 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
1027 /* now let's set up wb */
1028 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
1029 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
1033 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1036 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
1037 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
1038 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
1039 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
1041 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1042 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
1044 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
1045 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
1049 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1051 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1053 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
1057 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
1061 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
1062 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
1063 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1064 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1070 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1071 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1072 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1077 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1078 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1079 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1080 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
1081 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
1082 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1083 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1090 if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1091 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1092 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1093 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1095 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1096 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
1098 } else if (i <= 0) {
1099 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1101 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1102 * using a datagram service
1104 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1108 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1109 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1114 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1115 * 'type' is one of the following:
1117 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1118 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1119 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1121 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1122 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1124 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1125 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1126 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1127 * argument is non NULL.
1128 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1129 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1130 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1131 * Change cipher spec protocol
1132 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1134 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1135 * Handshake protocol
1136 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1137 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1138 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1139 * Application data protocol
1140 * none of our business
1142 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1143 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
1146 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
1149 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1151 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
1153 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1154 /* Not initialized yet */
1155 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1159 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1160 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1162 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1167 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1168 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1170 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1171 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1176 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1179 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1182 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1183 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1184 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1186 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1187 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1194 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1197 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1198 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1199 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1208 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1211 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1212 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1213 * rr[i].data, - data
1214 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1215 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1217 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1218 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1221 /* get new records if necessary */
1222 if (num_recs == 0) {
1223 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1226 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1227 if (num_recs == 0) {
1228 /* Shouldn't happen */
1229 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1234 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1236 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1238 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1239 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1243 } while (num_recs == 0);
1247 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1248 * record that isn't an alert.
1250 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1251 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1252 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1254 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1256 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1257 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1258 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1259 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1265 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1268 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1269 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1270 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1274 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1275 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1276 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
1277 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1279 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1280 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1281 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1284 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1285 * doing a handshake for the first time
1287 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1288 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1289 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1294 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1295 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1296 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1297 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1302 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1303 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1310 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1311 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1313 n = len - totalbytes;
1315 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1318 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1319 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1320 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1322 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1323 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1324 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1325 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1326 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1327 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1330 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1331 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1336 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1337 && totalbytes < len);
1338 if (totalbytes == 0) {
1339 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1342 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1343 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1344 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1345 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1346 *readbytes = totalbytes;
1351 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1352 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1353 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1357 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1359 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1361 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1362 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1363 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1364 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1366 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1371 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1372 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1374 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1375 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1376 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1377 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1379 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1380 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1386 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1387 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1390 size_t dest_maxlen = 0;
1391 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1392 size_t *dest_len = NULL;
1394 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1395 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1396 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1397 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1398 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1399 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1400 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1401 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1404 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1405 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1406 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1407 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1409 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1410 memcpy(dest + *dest_len,
1411 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n);
1412 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1413 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -n);
1415 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1416 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1418 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1419 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1424 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1425 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1426 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1430 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1431 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1432 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1435 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1436 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1437 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1439 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1440 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1441 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1442 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1443 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1444 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1445 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1448 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1449 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1450 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1452 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1454 if (s->msg_callback)
1455 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1456 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1457 s->msg_callback_arg);
1459 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1460 cb = s->info_callback;
1461 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1462 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1465 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1466 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1469 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1470 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1471 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1473 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1474 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1475 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1480 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1481 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1485 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1486 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1487 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1488 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1489 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1490 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1492 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1493 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1497 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1500 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1501 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1503 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1504 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1505 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1506 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1507 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1510 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1518 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1520 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1521 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1522 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1526 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1527 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1533 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1534 * protocol violation)
1536 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1537 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1538 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING);
1540 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1541 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1543 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1552 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1553 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1554 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1559 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1560 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1561 /* no read-ahead left? */
1564 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1565 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1566 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1567 * problems in the blocking world
1569 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1570 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1571 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1572 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1579 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1582 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1583 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1584 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1585 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1586 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1588 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1591 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1593 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1595 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1596 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1597 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1599 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1602 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1604 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1605 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1606 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1607 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1608 * started), we will indulge it.
1610 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1611 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1613 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
1615 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1616 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1617 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1618 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1619 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1620 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1623 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
1624 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, &al))
1626 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1629 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1637 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1641 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1645 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1653 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1654 * format and false otherwise.
1656 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1658 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1662 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1664 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1666 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);