crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

   1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
   2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
   3  * All rights reserved.
   4  *
   5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
   6  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
   7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
   8  *
   9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
  13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
  15  *
  16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  17  * the code are not to be removed.
  18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
  22  *
  23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  25  * are met:
  26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
  27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
  30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
  32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
  33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
  34  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
  37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
  40  *
  41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
  44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
  45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
  46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
  47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
  48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
  49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  52  *
  53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
  56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  57  */
  58
  59 #include <stdio.h>
  60 #include <time.h>
  61 #include <errno.h>
  62
  63 #include "cryptlib.h"
  64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
  65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
  66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
  67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
  68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
  69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
  70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
  71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
  72
  73 /* CRL score values */
  74
  75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
  76
  77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100
  78
  79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
  80
  81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080
  82
  83 /* CRL times valid */
  84
  85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040
  86
  87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
  88
  89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020
  90
  91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
  92
  93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
  94
  95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
  96
  97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018
  98
  99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
 100
 101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008
 102
 103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
 104
 105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004
 106
 107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
 108
 109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002
 110
 111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
 112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
 113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
 114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 116 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 117 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 118 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 119 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 120
 121 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
 122                         unsigned int *preasons,
 123                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
 124 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
 125                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
 126 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
 127                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
 128 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
 129                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
 130 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
 131                                 unsigned int *preasons);
 132 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
 133 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
 134                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
 135                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
 136
 137 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 138 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 139
 140
 141 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
 142         {
 143         return ok;
 144         }
 145
 146 #if 0
 147 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
 148         {
 149         return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
 150         }
 151 #endif
 152
 153 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 154         {
 155         X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
 156         X509_NAME *xn;
 157         int bad_chain = 0;
 158         X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
 159         int depth,i,ok=0;
 160         int num;
 161         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
 162         STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
 163         if (ctx->cert == NULL)
 164                 {
 165                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
 166                 return -1;
 167                 }
 168
 169         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
 170
 171         /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
 172          * present and that the first entry is in place */
 173         if (ctx->chain == NULL)
 174                 {
 175                 if (    ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
 176                         (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
 177                         {
 178                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 179                         goto end;
 180                         }
 181                 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
 182                 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
 183                 }
 184
 185         /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
 186         if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
 187             && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
 188                 {
 189                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 190                 goto end;
 191                 }
 192
 193         num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
 194         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
 195         depth=param->depth;
 196
 197
 198         for (;;)
 199                 {
 200                 /* If we have enough, we break */
 201                 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
 202                                          * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
 203                                          * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
 204                                          * code later.
 205                                          */
 206
 207                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
 208                 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
 209                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
 210
 211                 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
 212                 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
 213                         {
 214                         xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
 215                         if (xtmp != NULL)
 216                                 {
 217                                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
 218                                         {
 219                                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 220                                         goto end;
 221                                         }
 222                                 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
 223                                 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
 224                                 ctx->last_untrusted++;
 225                                 x=xtmp;
 226                                 num++;
 227                                 /* reparse the full chain for
 228                                  * the next one */
 229                                 continue;
 230                                 }
 231                         }
 232                 break;
 233                 }
 234
 235         /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
 236          * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
 237          * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
 238
 239         /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
 240          * is self signed.
 241          */
 242
 243         i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
 244         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
 245         xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
 246         if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
 247                 {
 248                 /* we have a self signed certificate */
 249                 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
 250                         {
 251                         /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
 252                          * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
 253                          * match to avoid possible impersonation.
 254                          */
 255                         ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
 256                         if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
 257                                 {
 258                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
 259                                 ctx->current_cert=x;
 260                                 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
 261                                 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
 262                                 bad_chain = 1;
 263                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 264                                 if (!ok) goto end;
 265                                 }
 266                         else
 267                                 {
 268                                 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
 269                                  * so we get any trust settings.
 270                                  */
 271                                 X509_free(x);
 272                                 x = xtmp;
 273                                 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
 274                                 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
 275                                 }
 276                         }
 277                 else
 278                         {
 279                         /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
 280                         chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
 281                         ctx->last_untrusted--;
 282                         num--;
 283                         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
 284                         }
 285                 }
 286
 287         /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
 288         for (;;)
 289                 {
 290                 /* If we have enough, we break */
 291                 if (depth < num) break;
 292
 293                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
 294                 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
 295                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
 296
 297                 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
 298
 299                 if (ok < 0) return ok;
 300                 if (ok == 0) break;
 301
 302                 x = xtmp;
 303                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
 304                         {
 305                         X509_free(xtmp);
 306                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 307                         return 0;
 308                         }
 309                 num++;
 310                 }
 311
 312         /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
 313         xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
 314
 315         i = check_trust(ctx);
 316
 317         /* If explicitly rejected error */
 318         if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
 319                 goto end;
 320         /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error */
 321         if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
 322                 {
 323                 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
 324                         {
 325                         if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
 326                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
 327                         else
 328                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
 329                         ctx->current_cert=x;
 330                         }
 331                 else
 332                         {
 333
 334                         sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
 335                         num++;
 336                         ctx->last_untrusted=num;
 337                         ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
 338                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
 339                         chain_ss=NULL;
 340                         }
 341
 342                 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
 343                 bad_chain = 1;
 344                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 345                 if (!ok) goto end;
 346                 }
 347
 348         /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
 349         ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
 350
 351         if (!ok) goto end;
 352
 353         /* Check name constraints */
 354
 355         ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
 356
 357         if (!ok) goto end;
 358
 359         /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
 360         X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
 361
 362         /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
 363          * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
 364          */
 365
 366         ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
 367         if(!ok) goto end;
 368
 369         /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
 370         if (ctx->verify != NULL)
 371                 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
 372         else
 373                 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
 374         if(!ok) goto end;
 375
 376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
 377         /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
 378         ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
 379         if (!ok) goto end;
 380         ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
 381         if (!ok) goto end;
 382 #endif
 383
 384         /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
 385         if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
 386                 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
 387         if(!ok) goto end;
 388         if (0)
 389                 {
 390 end:
 391                 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
 392                 }
 393         if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
 394         if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
 395         return ok;
 396         }
 397
 398
 399 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
 400  */
 401
 402 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
 403 {
 404         int i;
 405         X509 *issuer;
 406         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
 407                 {
 408                 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
 409                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
 410                         return issuer;
 411                 }
 412         return NULL;
 413 }
 414
 415 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
 416
 417 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
 418 {
 419         int ret;
 420         ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
 421         if (ret == X509_V_OK)
 422                 return 1;
 423         /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
 424         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
 425                 return 0;
 426
 427         ctx->error = ret;
 428         ctx->current_cert = x;
 429         ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
 430         return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
 431         return 0;
 432 }
 433
 434 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
 435
 436 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
 437 {
 438         *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
 439         if (*issuer)
 440                 {
 441                 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
 442                 return 1;
 443                 }
 444         else
 445                 return 0;
 446 }
 447
 448
 449 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
 450  * with the supplied purpose
 451  */
 452
 453 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 454 {
 455 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
 456         return 1;
 457 #else
 458         int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
 459         X509 *x;
 460         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
 461         int proxy_path_length = 0;
 462         int purpose;
 463         int allow_proxy_certs;
 464         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
 465
 466         /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
 467            -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
 468                use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
 469            0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
 470                used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
 471            1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
 472                all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
 473         */
 474         must_be_ca = -1;
 475
 476         /* CRL path validation */
 477         if (ctx->parent)
 478                 {
 479                 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
 480                 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
 481                 }
 482         else
 483                 {
 484                 allow_proxy_certs =
 485                         !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
 486                 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
 487                    software happy */
 488                 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
 489                         allow_proxy_certs = 1;
 490                 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
 491                 }
 492
 493         /* Check all untrusted certificates */
 494         for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
 495                 {
 496                 int ret;
 497                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
 498                 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
 499                         && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
 500                         {
 501                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
 502                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 503                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 504                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 505                         if (!ok) goto end;
 506                         }
 507                 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
 508                         {
 509                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
 510                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 511                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 512                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 513                         if (!ok) goto end;
 514                         }
 515                 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
 516                 switch(must_be_ca)
 517                         {
 518                 case -1:
 519                         if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
 520                                 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
 521                                 {
 522                                 ret = 0;
 523                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
 524                                 }
 525                         else
 526                                 ret = 1;
 527                         break;
 528                 case 0:
 529                         if (ret != 0)
 530                                 {
 531                                 ret = 0;
 532                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
 533                                 }
 534                         else
 535                                 ret = 1;
 536                         break;
 537                 default:
 538                         if ((ret == 0)
 539                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
 540                                         && (ret != 1)))
 541                                 {
 542                                 ret = 0;
 543                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
 544                                 }
 545                         else
 546                                 ret = 1;
 547                         break;
 548                         }
 549                 if (ret == 0)
 550                         {
 551                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 552                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 553                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 554                         if (!ok) goto end;
 555                         }
 556                 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
 557                         {
 558                         ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
 559                         if ((ret == 0)
 560                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
 561                                         && (ret != 1)))
 562                                 {
 563                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
 564                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
 565                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
 566                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 567                                 if (!ok) goto end;
 568                                 }
 569                         }
 570                 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
 571                 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
 572                            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
 573                            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
 574                         {
 575                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
 576                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 577                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 578                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 579                         if (!ok) goto end;
 580                         }
 581                 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
 582                 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
 583                         plen++;
 584                 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
 585                    certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
 586                    certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a
 587                    CA certificate.  */
 588                 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
 589                         {
 590                         if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
 591                                 {
 592                                 ctx->error =
 593                                         X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
 594                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
 595                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
 596                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 597                                 if (!ok) goto end;
 598                                 }
 599                         proxy_path_length++;
 600                         must_be_ca = 0;
 601                         }
 602                 else
 603                         must_be_ca = 1;
 604                 }
 605         ok = 1;
 606  end:
 607         return ok;
 608 #endif
 609 }
 610
 611 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 612         {
 613         X509 *x;
 614         int i, j, rv;
 615         /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
 616         for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
 617                 {
 618                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
 619                 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
 620                 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
 621                         continue;
 622                 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
 623                  * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
 624                  * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
 625                  * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
 626                  */
 627                 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
 628                         {
 629                         NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
 630                         if (nc)
 631                                 {
 632                                 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
 633                                 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
 634                                         {
 635                                         ctx->error = rv;
 636                                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 637                                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 638                                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
 639                                                 return 0;
 640                                         }
 641                                 }
 642                         }
 643                 }
 644         return 1;
 645         }
 646
 647 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 648 {
 649         int i, ok;
 650         X509 *x = NULL;
 651         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
 652         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
 653         /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
 654         for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
 655                 {
 656                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
 657                 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
 658                 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
 659                 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
 660                         return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
 661                 /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
 662                  * not overridden.
 663                  */
 664                 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
 665                         {
 666                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 667                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 668                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
 669                         ok = cb(0, ctx);
 670                         if (!ok)
 671                                 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
 672                         }
 673                 }
 674         /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
 675          * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
 676          */
 677         return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
 678 }
 679
 680 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 681         {
 682         int i, last, ok;
 683         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
 684                 return 1;
 685         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
 686                 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
 687         else
 688                 {
 689                 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
 690                 if (ctx->parent)
 691                         return 1;
 692                 last = 0;
 693                 }
 694         for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
 695                 {
 696                 ctx->error_depth = i;
 697                 ok = check_cert(ctx);
 698                 if (!ok) return ok;
 699                 }
 700         return 1;
 701         }
 702
 703 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 704         {
 705         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
 706         X509 *x;
 707         int ok, cnum;
 708         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
 709         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
 710         ctx->current_cert = x;
 711         ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
 712         ctx->current_reasons = 0;
 713         while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
 714                 {
 715                 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
 716                 if (ctx->get_crl)
 717                         ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
 718                 else
 719                         ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
 720                 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
 721                  * notify callback
 722                  */
 723                 if(!ok)
 724                         {
 725                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
 726                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
 727                         goto err;
 728                         }
 729                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
 730                 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
 731                 if (!ok)
 732                         goto err;
 733
 734                 if (dcrl)
 735                         {
 736                         ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
 737                         if (!ok)
 738                                 goto err;
 739                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
 740                         if (!ok)
 741                                 goto err;
 742                         }
 743                 else
 744                         ok = 1;
 745
 746                 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
 747                 if (ok != 2)
 748                         {
 749                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
 750                         if (!ok)
 751                                 goto err;
 752                         }
 753
 754                 X509_CRL_free(crl);
 755                 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
 756                 crl = NULL;
 757                 dcrl = NULL;
 758                 }
 759         err:
 760         X509_CRL_free(crl);
 761         X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
 762
 763         ctx->current_crl = NULL;
 764         return ok;
 765
 766         }
 767
 768 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
 769
 770 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
 771         {
 772         time_t *ptime;
 773         int i;
 774         if (notify)
 775                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
 776         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
 777                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
 778         else
 779                 ptime = NULL;
 780
 781         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
 782         if (i == 0)
 783                 {
 784                 if (!notify)
 785                         return 0;
 786                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
 787                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 788                         return 0;
 789                 }
 790
 791         if (i > 0)
 792                 {
 793                 if (!notify)
 794                         return 0;
 795                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
 796                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 797                         return 0;
 798                 }
 799
 800         if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
 801                 {
 802                 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
 803
 804                 if (i == 0)
 805                         {
 806                         if (!notify)
 807                                 return 0;
 808                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
 809                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 810                                 return 0;
 811                         }
 812                 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
 813                 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
 814                         {
 815                         if (!notify)
 816                                 return 0;
 817                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
 818                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 819                                 return 0;
 820                         }
 821                 }
 822
 823         if (notify)
 824                 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
 825
 826         return 1;
 827         }
 828
 829 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
 830                         X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
 831                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
 832         {
 833         int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
 834         unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
 835         X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
 836         X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
 837         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
 838
 839         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
 840                 {
 841                 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
 842                 reasons = *preasons;
 843                 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
 844
 845                 if (crl_score > best_score)
 846                         {
 847                         best_crl = crl;
 848                         best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
 849                         best_score = crl_score;
 850                         best_reasons = reasons;
 851                         }
 852                 }
 853
 854         if (best_crl)
 855                 {
 856                 if (*pcrl)
 857                         X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
 858                 *pcrl = best_crl;
 859                 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
 860                 *pscore = best_score;
 861                 *preasons = best_reasons;
 862                 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
 863                 if (*pdcrl)
 864                         {
 865                         X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
 866                         *pdcrl = NULL;
 867                         }
 868                 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
 869                 }
 870
 871         if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
 872                 return 1;
 873
 874         return 0;
 875         }
 876
 877 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
 878  * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
 879  */
 880
 881 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
 882         {
 883         ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
 884         int i;
 885         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0);
 886         if (i >= 0)
 887                 {
 888                 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
 889                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
 890                         return 0;
 891                 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
 892                 }
 893         else
 894                 exta = NULL;
 895
 896         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0);
 897
 898         if (i >= 0)
 899                 {
 900
 901                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
 902                         return 0;
 903                 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
 904                 }
 905         else
 906                 extb = NULL;
 907
 908         if (!exta && !extb)
 909                 return 1;
 910
 911         if (!exta || !extb)
 912                 return 0;
 913
 914
 915         if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
 916                 return 0;
 917
 918         return 1;
 919         }
 920
 921 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
 922
 923 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
 924         {
 925         /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
 926         if (!delta->base_crl_number)
 927                         return 0;
 928         /* Base must have a CRL number */
 929         if (!base->crl_number)
 930                         return 0;
 931         /* Issuer names must match */
 932         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
 933                                 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
 934                 return 0;
 935         /* AKID and IDP must match */
 936         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
 937                         return 0;
 938         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
 939                         return 0;
 940         /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
 941         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
 942                         return 0;
 943         /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
 944         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
 945                         return 1;
 946         return 0;
 947         }
 948
 949 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
 950  * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
 951  */
 952
 953 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
 954                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
 955         {
 956         X509_CRL *delta;
 957         int i;
 958         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
 959                 return;
 960         if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
 961                 return;
 962         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
 963                 {
 964                 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
 965                 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
 966                         {
 967                         if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
 968                                 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
 969                         CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
 970                         *dcrl = delta;
 971                         return;
 972                         }
 973                 }
 974         *dcrl = NULL;
 975         }
 976
 977 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
 978  * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
 979  * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
 980  * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
 981  * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
 982  */
 983
 984 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
 985                         unsigned int *preasons,
 986                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
 987         {
 988
 989         int crl_score = 0;
 990         unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
 991
 992         /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
 993
 994         /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
 995         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
 996                 return 0;
 997         /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
 998         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
 999                 {
1000                 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1001                         return 0;
1002                 }
1003         else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
1004                 {
1005                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1006                 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1007                         return 0;
1008                 }
1009         /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1010         else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1011                 return 0;
1012         /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1013         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1014                 {
1015                 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1016                         return 0;
1017                 }
1018         else
1019                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1020
1021         if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1022                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1023
1024         /* Check expiry */
1025         if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1026                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1027
1028         /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1029         crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1030
1031         /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1032
1033         if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1034                 return 0;
1035
1036         /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1037
1038         if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1039                 {
1040                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1041                 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1042                         return 0;
1043                 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1044                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1045                 }
1046
1047         *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1048
1049         return crl_score;
1050
1051         }
1052
1053 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1054                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1055         {
1056         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1057         X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1058         int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1059         int i;
1060
1061         if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1062                 cidx++;
1063
1064         crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1065
1066         if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1067                 {
1068                 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1069                         {
1070                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1071                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1072                         return;
1073                         }
1074                 }
1075
1076         for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1077                 {
1078                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1079                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1080                         continue;
1081                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1082                         {
1083                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1084                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1085                         return;
1086                         }
1087                 }
1088
1089         /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1090
1091         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1092                 return;
1093
1094         /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1095          * set of untrusted certificates.
1096          */
1097         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1098                 {
1099                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1100                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1101                         continue;
1102                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1103                         {
1104                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1105                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1106                         return;
1107                         }
1108                 }
1109         }
1110
1111 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1112  * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1113  * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1114  * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1115  * practice.
1116  */
1117
1118 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1119         {
1120         X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1121         int ret;
1122         /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1123         if (ctx->parent)
1124                 return 0;
1125         if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1126                 return -1;
1127
1128         crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1129         /* Copy verify params across */
1130         X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1131
1132         crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1133         crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1134
1135         /* Verify CRL issuer */
1136         ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1137
1138         if (ret <= 0)
1139                 goto err;
1140
1141         /* Check chain is acceptable */
1142
1143         ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1144         err:
1145         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1146         return ret;
1147         }
1148
1149 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1150  * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1151  * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1152  * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1153  * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1154  * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1155  */
1156
1157 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1158                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1159                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1160         {
1161         X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1162         cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1163         crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1164         if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1165                 return 1;
1166         return 0;
1167         }
1168
1169 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1170  * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1171  * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1172  * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1173  * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1174  */
1175
1176
1177 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1178         {
1179         X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1180         GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1181         GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1182         int i, j;
1183         if (!a || !b)
1184                 return 1;
1185         if (a->type == 1)
1186                 {
1187                 if (!a->dpname)
1188                         return 0;
1189                 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1190                 if (b->type == 1)
1191                         {
1192                         if (!b->dpname)
1193                                 return 0;
1194                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1195                                 return 1;
1196                         else
1197                                 return 0;
1198                         }
1199                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1200                 nm = a->dpname;
1201                 gens = b->name.fullname;
1202                 }
1203         else if (b->type == 1)
1204                 {
1205                 if (!b->dpname)
1206                         return 0;
1207                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1208                 gens = a->name.fullname;
1209                 nm = b->dpname;
1210                 }
1211
1212         /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1213         if (nm)
1214                 {
1215                 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1216                         {
1217                         gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1218                         if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1219                                 continue;
1220                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1221                                 return 1;
1222                         }
1223                 return 0;
1224                 }
1225
1226         /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1227
1228         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1229                 {
1230                 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1231                 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1232                         {
1233                         genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1234                         if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1235                                 return 1;
1236                         }
1237                 }
1238
1239         return 0;
1240
1241         }
1242
1243 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1244         {
1245         int i;
1246         X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1247         /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1248         if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1249                 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1250         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1251                 {
1252                 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1253                 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1254                         continue;
1255                 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1256                         return 1;
1257                 }
1258         return 0;
1259         }
1260
1261 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1262
1263 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1264                                 unsigned int *preasons)
1265         {
1266         int i;
1267         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1268                 return 0;
1269         if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1270                 {
1271                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1272                         return 0;
1273                 }
1274         else
1275                 {
1276                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1277                         return 0;
1278                 }
1279         *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1280         for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1281                 {
1282                 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1283                 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1284                         {
1285                         if (!crl->idp ||
1286                              idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1287                                 {
1288                                 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1289                                 return 1;
1290                                 }
1291                         }
1292                 }
1293         if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1294                 return 1;
1295         return 0;
1296         }
1297
1298 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1299  * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1300  */
1301
1302 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1303                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1304         {
1305         int ok;
1306         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1307         int crl_score = 0;
1308         unsigned int reasons;
1309         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1310         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1311         X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1312         reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1313         ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1314                                 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1315
1316         if (ok)
1317                 goto done;
1318
1319         /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1320
1321         skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1322
1323         /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1324         if (!skcrl && crl)
1325                 goto done;
1326
1327         get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1328
1329         sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1330
1331         done:
1332
1333         /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1334         if (crl)
1335                 {
1336                 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1337                 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1338                 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1339                 *pcrl = crl;
1340                 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1341                 return 1;
1342                 }
1343
1344         return 0;
1345         }
1346
1347 /* Check CRL validity */
1348 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1349         {
1350         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1351         EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1352         int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1353         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1354         chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1355         /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1356         if (ctx->current_issuer)
1357                 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1358
1359         /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1360          * is next certificate in chain.
1361          */
1362         else if (cnum < chnum)
1363                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1364         else
1365                 {
1366                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1367                 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1368                 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1369                         {
1370                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1371                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1372                         if(!ok) goto err;
1373                         }
1374                 }
1375
1376         if(issuer)
1377                 {
1378                 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1379                  * been done
1380                  */
1381                 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1382                         {
1383                         /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1384                         if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1385                                 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1386                                 {
1387                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1388                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1389                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1390                                 }
1391
1392                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1393                                 {
1394                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1395                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1396                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1397                                 }
1398
1399                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1400                                 {
1401                                 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1402                                         {
1403                                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1404                                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1405                                         if(!ok) goto err;
1406                                         }
1407                                 }
1408
1409                         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1410                                 {
1411                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1412                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1413                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1414                                 }
1415
1416
1417                         }
1418
1419                 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1420                         {
1421                         ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1422                         if (!ok)
1423                                 goto err;
1424                         }
1425
1426                 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1427                 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1428
1429                 if(!ikey)
1430                         {
1431                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1432                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1433                         if (!ok) goto err;
1434                         }
1435                 else
1436                         {
1437                         /* Verify CRL signature */
1438                         if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1439                                 {
1440                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1441                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1442                                 if (!ok) goto err;
1443                                 }
1444                         }
1445                 }
1446
1447         ok = 1;
1448
1449         err:
1450         EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1451         return ok;
1452         }
1453
1454 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1455 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1456         {
1457         int ok;
1458         X509_REVOKED *rev;
1459         /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1460          * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1461          * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1462          * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1463          */
1464         if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1465                 {
1466                 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1467                         return 1;
1468                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1469                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1470                 if(!ok)
1471                         return 0;
1472                 }
1473         /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1474          * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1475          */
1476         if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1477                 {
1478                 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1479                         return 2;
1480                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1481                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1482                 if (!ok)
1483                         return 0;
1484                 }
1485
1486         return 1;
1487         }
1488
1489 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1490         {
1491         int ret;
1492         if (ctx->parent)
1493                 return 1;
1494         ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1495                                 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1496         if (ret == 0)
1497                 {
1498                 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1499                 return 0;
1500                 }
1501         /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1502         if (ret == -1)
1503                 {
1504                 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1505                  * callback.
1506                  */
1507                 X509 *x;
1508                 int i;
1509                 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1510                         {
1511                         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1512                         if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1513                                 continue;
1514                         ctx->current_cert = x;
1515                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1516                         if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1517                                 return 0;
1518                         }
1519                 return 1;
1520                 }
1521         if (ret == -2)
1522                 {
1523                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1524                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1525                 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1526                 }
1527
1528         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1529                 {
1530                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1531                 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1532                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1533                         return 0;
1534                 }
1535
1536         return 1;
1537         }
1538
1539 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1540         {
1541         time_t *ptime;
1542         int i;
1543
1544         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1545                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1546         else
1547                 ptime = NULL;
1548
1549         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1550         if (i == 0)
1551                 {
1552                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1553                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1554                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1555                         return 0;
1556                 }
1557
1558         if (i > 0)
1559                 {
1560                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1561                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1562                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1563                         return 0;
1564                 }
1565
1566         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1567         if (i == 0)
1568                 {
1569                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1570                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1571                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1572                         return 0;
1573                 }
1574
1575         if (i < 0)
1576                 {
1577                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1578                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1579                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1580                         return 0;
1581                 }
1582
1583         return 1;
1584         }
1585
1586 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1587         {
1588         int ok=0,n;
1589         X509 *xs,*xi;
1590         EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1591         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1592
1593         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
1594
1595         n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1596         ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1597         n--;
1598         xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1599
1600         if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1601                 xs=xi;
1602         else
1603                 {
1604                 if (n <= 0)
1605                         {
1606                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1607                         ctx->current_cert=xi;
1608                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
1609                         goto end;
1610                         }
1611                 else
1612                         {
1613                         n--;
1614                         ctx->error_depth=n;
1615                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1616                         }
1617                 }
1618
1619 /*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
1620         while (n >= 0)
1621                 {
1622                 ctx->error_depth=n;
1623
1624                 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1625                  * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1626                  * just wastes time.
1627                  */
1628                 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1629                         {
1630                         if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1631                                 {
1632                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1633                                 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1634                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1635                                 if (!ok) goto end;
1636                                 }
1637                         else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1638                                 {
1639                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1640                                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1641                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1642                                 if (!ok)
1643                                         {
1644                                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1645                                         goto end;
1646                                         }
1647                                 }
1648                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1649                         pkey=NULL;
1650                         }
1651
1652                 xs->valid = 1;
1653
1654                 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1655                 if (!ok)
1656                         goto end;
1657
1658                 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1659                 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1660                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1661                 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
1662                 if (!ok) goto end;
1663
1664                 n--;
1665                 if (n >= 0)
1666                         {
1667                         xi=xs;
1668                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1669                         }
1670                 }
1671         ok=1;
1672 end:
1673         return ok;
1674         }
1675
1676 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1677 {
1678         return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1679 }
1680
1681 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1682         {
1683         char *str;
1684         ASN1_TIME atm;
1685         long offset;
1686         char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1687         int i,j;
1688
1689         p=buff1;
1690         i=ctm->length;
1691         str=(char *)ctm->data;
1692         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1693                 {
1694                 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1695                 memcpy(p,str,10);
1696                 p+=10;
1697                 str+=10;
1698                 }
1699         else
1700                 {
1701                 if (i < 13) return 0;
1702                 memcpy(p,str,12);
1703                 p+=12;
1704                 str+=12;
1705                 }
1706
1707         if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1708                 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1709         else
1710                 {
1711                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1712                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1713                 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1714                 if (*str == '.')
1715                         {
1716                         str++;
1717                         while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1718                         }
1719
1720                 }
1721         *(p++)='Z';
1722         *(p++)='\0';
1723
1724         if (*str == 'Z')
1725                 offset=0;
1726         else
1727                 {
1728                 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1729                         return 0;
1730                 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1731                 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1732                 if (*str == '-')
1733                         offset= -offset;
1734                 }
1735         atm.type=ctm->type;
1736         atm.flags = 0;
1737         atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1738         atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1739
1740         if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1741                 return 0;
1742
1743         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1744                 {
1745                 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1746                 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1747                 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1748                 if (j < 50) j+=100;
1749
1750                 if (i < j) return -1;
1751                 if (i > j) return 1;
1752                 }
1753         i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1754         if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1755                 return -1;
1756         else
1757                 return i;
1758         }
1759
1760 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1761 {
1762         return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1763 }
1764
1765 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1766         {
1767         return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1768         }
1769
1770 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1771                                 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1772         {
1773         time_t t;
1774
1775         if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1776         else time(&t);
1777
1778         if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1779                 {
1780                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1781                         return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1782                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1783                         return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1784                                                                 offset_sec);
1785                 }
1786         return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1787         }
1788
1789 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1790         {
1791         EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1792         int i,j;
1793
1794         if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1795
1796         for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1797                 {
1798                 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1799                 if (ktmp == NULL)
1800                         {
1801                         X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1802                         return 0;
1803                         }
1804                 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1805                         break;
1806                 else
1807                         {
1808                         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1809                         ktmp=NULL;
1810                         }
1811                 }
1812         if (ktmp == NULL)
1813                 {
1814                 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1815                 return 0;
1816                 }
1817
1818         /* first, populate the other certs */
1819         for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1820                 {
1821                 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1822                 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1823                 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1824                 }
1825
1826         if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1827         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1828         return 1;
1829         }
1830
1831 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1832              CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1833         {
1834         /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1835          * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1836         return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1837                         new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1838         }
1839
1840 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1841         {
1842         return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1843         }
1844
1845 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1846         {
1847         return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1848         }
1849
1850 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1851         {
1852         return ctx->error;
1853         }
1854
1855 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1856         {
1857         ctx->error=err;
1858         }
1859
1860 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1861         {
1862         return ctx->error_depth;
1863         }
1864
1865 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1866         {
1867         return ctx->current_cert;
1868         }
1869
1870 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1871         {
1872         return ctx->chain;
1873         }
1874
1875 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1876         {
1877         int i;
1878         X509 *x;
1879         STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1880         if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1881         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1882                 {
1883                 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1884                 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1885                 }
1886         return chain;
1887         }
1888
1889 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1890         {
1891         return ctx->current_issuer;
1892         }
1893
1894 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1895         {
1896         return ctx->current_crl;
1897         }
1898
1899 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1900         {
1901         return ctx->parent;
1902         }
1903
1904 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1905         {
1906         ctx->cert=x;
1907         }
1908
1909 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1910         {
1911         ctx->untrusted=sk;
1912         }
1913
1914 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1915         {
1916         ctx->crls=sk;
1917         }
1918
1919 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1920         {
1921         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1922         }
1923
1924 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1925         {
1926         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1927         }
1928
1929 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1930  * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1931  * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1932  * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1933  * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1934  * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1935  * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1936  * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1937  */
1938
1939 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1940                                 int purpose, int trust)
1941 {
1942         int idx;
1943         /* If purpose not set use default */
1944         if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1945         /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1946         if (purpose)
1947                 {
1948                 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
1949                 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1950                 if (idx == -1)
1951                         {
1952                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1953                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1954                         return 0;
1955                         }
1956                 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1957                 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1958                         {
1959                         idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1960                         if (idx == -1)
1961                                 {
1962                                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1963                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1964                                 return 0;
1965                                 }
1966                         ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1967                         }
1968                 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1969                 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1970                 }
1971         if (trust)
1972                 {
1973                 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1974                 if (idx == -1)
1975                         {
1976                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1977                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1978                         return 0;
1979                         }
1980                 }
1981
1982         if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1983         if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1984         return 1;
1985 }
1986
1987 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1988 {
1989         X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1990         ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1991         if (!ctx)
1992                 {
1993                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1994                 return NULL;
1995                 }
1996         memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1997         return ctx;
1998 }
1999
2000 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2001 {
2002         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2003         OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2004 }
2005
2006 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2007              STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2008         {
2009         int ret = 1;
2010         ctx->ctx=store;
2011         ctx->current_method=0;
2012         ctx->cert=x509;
2013         ctx->untrusted=chain;
2014         ctx->crls = NULL;
2015         ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2016         ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2017         ctx->valid=0;
2018         ctx->chain=NULL;
2019         ctx->error=0;
2020         ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2021         ctx->error_depth=0;
2022         ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2023         ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2024         ctx->tree = NULL;
2025         ctx->parent = NULL;
2026
2027         ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2028
2029         if (!ctx->param)
2030                 {
2031                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2032                 return 0;
2033                 }
2034
2035         /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2036          * use defaults.
2037          */
2038
2039
2040         if (store)
2041                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2042         else
2043                 ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2044
2045         if (store)
2046                 {
2047                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2048                 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2049                 }
2050         else
2051                 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2052
2053         if (ret)
2054                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2055                                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2056
2057         if (ret == 0)
2058                 {
2059                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2060                 return 0;
2061                 }
2062
2063         if (store && store->check_issued)
2064                 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2065         else
2066                 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2067
2068         if (store && store->get_issuer)
2069                 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2070         else
2071                 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2072
2073         if (store && store->verify_cb)
2074                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2075         else
2076                 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2077
2078         if (store && store->verify)
2079                 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2080         else
2081                 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2082
2083         if (store && store->check_revocation)
2084                 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2085         else
2086                 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2087
2088         if (store && store->get_crl)
2089                 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2090         else
2091                 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2092
2093         if (store && store->check_crl)
2094                 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2095         else
2096                 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2097
2098         if (store && store->cert_crl)
2099                 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2100         else
2101                 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2102
2103         if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2104                 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2105         else
2106                 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2107
2108         if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2109                 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2110         else
2111                 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2112
2113         ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2114
2115
2116         /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2117          * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2118          * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2119         /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2120         if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2121                                 &(ctx->ex_data)))
2122                 {
2123                 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2124                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2125                 return 0;
2126                 }
2127         return 1;
2128         }
2129
2130 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2131  * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2132  */
2133
2134 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2135 {
2136         ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2137         ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2138 }
2139
2140 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2141         {
2142         if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2143         if (ctx->param != NULL)
2144                 {
2145                 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2146                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2147                 ctx->param=NULL;
2148                 }
2149         if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2150                 {
2151                 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2152                 ctx->tree=NULL;
2153                 }
2154         if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2155                 {
2156                 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2157                 ctx->chain=NULL;
2158                 }
2159         CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2160         memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2161         }
2162
2163 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2164         {
2165         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2166         }
2167
2168 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2169         {
2170         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2171         }
2172
2173 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2174         {
2175         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2176         }
2177
2178 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2179                                   int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2180         {
2181         ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2182         }
2183
2184 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2185         {
2186         return ctx->tree;
2187         }
2188
2189 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2190         {
2191         return ctx->explicit_policy;
2192         }
2193
2194 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2195         {
2196         const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2197         param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2198         if (!param)
2199                 return 0;
2200         return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2201         }
2202
2203 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2204         {
2205         return ctx->param;
2206         }
2207
2208 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2209         {
2210         if (ctx->param)
2211                 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2212         ctx->param = param;
2213         }
2214
2215 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2216 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2217
2218 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2219
2220 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2221 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)