2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
16 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
17 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
18 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
23 #include <openssl/objects.h>
24 #include <internal/dane.h>
25 #include <internal/x509_int.h>
28 /* CRL score values */
30 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
32 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
34 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
36 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
40 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
42 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
44 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
46 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
48 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
50 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
52 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
54 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
56 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
58 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
60 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
62 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
64 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
66 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
67 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
68 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
69 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
70 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
71 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
72 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
73 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
74 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
75 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted);
76 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
80 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
81 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
82 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
84 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
85 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
86 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
87 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
88 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
89 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
90 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
91 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
93 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
94 unsigned int *preasons);
95 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
96 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
97 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
98 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
100 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
102 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
107 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
108 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
111 * FIXME: x509v3_cache_extensions() needs to detect more failures and not
112 * set EXFLAG_SET when that happens. Especially, if the failures are
113 * parse errors, rather than memory pressure!
115 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
116 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
122 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
124 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
126 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
129 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
130 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
133 /* Look for exact match */
134 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
135 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
136 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
139 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
143 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
148 * Inform the verify callback of an error.
149 * If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
151 * If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
152 * unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
154 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
156 static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err)
158 ctx->error_depth = depth;
159 ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
160 if (err != X509_V_OK)
162 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
166 * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the
167 * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
170 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
172 static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
175 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
178 static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
181 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
183 if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0)
186 for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
187 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
190 * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
191 * check the security of issuer keys.
193 if (i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert) &&
194 verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL) == 0)
197 * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
198 * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
200 if (i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert) &&
201 verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK) == 0)
207 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
213 * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
214 * instantiate chain public key parameters.
216 if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 ||
217 (ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 ||
218 (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) == 0 ||
219 (ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0 ||
220 (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1)
221 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
222 if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0)
225 err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
227 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
228 if ((ok = verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err)) == 0)
232 /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
233 ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx);
237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
238 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
239 if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
241 if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
245 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
246 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)
247 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
251 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
253 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
256 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
257 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
258 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
262 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
264 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
265 * cannot do another one.
267 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
268 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
273 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
274 * the first entry is in place
276 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
277 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
278 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
279 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
282 X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
283 ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
285 /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
286 if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert) &&
287 !verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL))
290 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
291 ret = dane_verify(ctx);
293 ret = verify_chain(ctx);
296 * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
297 * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
298 * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
300 if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
301 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
306 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
308 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
312 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
313 X509 *issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
315 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
317 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, issuer, -1))
323 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
325 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
329 return cert_self_signed(x);
330 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
331 if (ret == X509_V_OK) {
334 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
335 if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
337 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
338 ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
339 if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) {
340 ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
346 return (ret == X509_V_OK);
349 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
351 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
353 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
355 X509_up_ref(*issuer);
361 static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
363 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
366 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) {
367 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i);
368 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) {
370 sk = sk_X509_new_null();
371 if (sk == NULL || sk_X509_push(sk, x) == 0) {
372 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
382 * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local
383 * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
385 static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth,
388 int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
391 * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
392 * settings trump the purpose constraints.
394 * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
395 * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
396 * ctx->param->purpose!
398 * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
399 * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
400 * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however
401 * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
402 * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
404 * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
405 * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
408 if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose)
409 tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT);
412 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
414 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
417 switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) {
423 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0)
429 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE);
433 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
437 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
439 int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
441 int proxy_path_length = 0;
443 int allow_proxy_certs;
444 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
447 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
448 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
449 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
450 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
451 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
452 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
453 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
457 /* CRL path validation */
459 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
460 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
463 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
465 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
468 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
469 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
470 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
473 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
475 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
476 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
477 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
478 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
479 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION))
482 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
483 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
484 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED))
487 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
488 switch (must_be_ca) {
490 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
491 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
493 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
500 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
505 /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
507 || ((i + 1 < num || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
510 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
515 if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK))
517 /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
518 if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca))
520 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
521 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
522 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
523 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
524 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
527 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
528 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
531 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
532 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
533 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
535 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
536 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
537 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
538 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
549 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
553 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
554 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
555 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
558 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
559 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
563 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
564 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
566 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
568 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
569 X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
570 X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
571 X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
572 int last_object_nid = 0;
574 int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
576 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
577 if (last_object_loc < 1) {
578 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
579 goto proxy_name_done;
583 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
584 * there is in issuer.
586 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
587 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
588 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
589 goto proxy_name_done;
593 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
596 if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
598 == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
599 last_object_loc - 1))) {
600 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
601 goto proxy_name_done;
605 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
606 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
608 tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
609 if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
610 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
611 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
616 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
618 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
620 if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
621 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
622 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
625 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
626 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
630 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, err))
635 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
636 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
637 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
640 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
641 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
644 int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
649 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
652 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, rv))
662 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
664 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode);
667 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
670 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts);
673 if (vpm->peername != NULL) {
674 OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername);
675 vpm->peername = NULL;
677 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
678 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i);
679 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0)
685 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
687 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
689 if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
690 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
693 if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
694 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
697 if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
698 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
704 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
709 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
710 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
714 * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
715 * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
717 if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) {
718 switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) {
719 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
720 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
726 * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
727 * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
728 * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
729 * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
731 for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) {
732 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
733 trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
734 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
735 if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
737 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
742 * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
743 * the chain is PKIX trusted.
745 if (num_untrusted < num) {
746 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
748 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
751 if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
753 * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
754 * for a direct trust store match.
757 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
758 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
760 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
763 * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set,
764 * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
766 trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0);
767 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
772 /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
773 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
775 ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
780 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
781 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
783 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
786 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED))
787 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
788 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
791 if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
792 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
794 dane->pdpth = num_untrusted;
795 /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
796 if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
797 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
798 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
801 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
803 int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0;
804 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
806 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
807 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
809 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
814 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
815 ctx->error_depth = i;
816 ok = check_cert(ctx);
823 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
825 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
827 int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
828 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
830 ctx->current_cert = x;
831 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
832 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
833 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
835 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
836 unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
838 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
840 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
842 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
844 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
847 ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
850 ctx->current_crl = crl;
851 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
856 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
859 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
865 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
867 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
877 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
880 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
881 ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
889 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
893 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
895 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
901 ctx->current_crl = crl;
902 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
903 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
904 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
909 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
913 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD))
920 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID))
924 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
925 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
930 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD))
933 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
934 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
937 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED))
943 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
948 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
949 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
950 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
952 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
953 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
954 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
955 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
956 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
958 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
959 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
961 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
963 if (crl_score > best_score) {
965 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
966 best_score = crl_score;
967 best_reasons = reasons;
972 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
974 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
975 *pscore = best_score;
976 *preasons = best_reasons;
977 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
978 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
980 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
983 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
990 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
991 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
994 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
996 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
998 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1000 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1001 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1003 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1007 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1011 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1013 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1023 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1029 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1031 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1033 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1034 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1036 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1037 if (!base->crl_number)
1039 /* Issuer names must match */
1040 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1042 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1043 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1045 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1047 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1048 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1050 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1051 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1057 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1058 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1061 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1062 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1066 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1068 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1070 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1071 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1072 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1073 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1074 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1075 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
1084 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1085 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1086 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1087 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1088 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1091 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1092 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1096 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1098 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1100 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1101 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1103 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1104 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1105 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1107 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1108 /* If no new reasons reject */
1109 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1112 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1113 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1115 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1116 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1117 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1120 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1122 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1123 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1126 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1127 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1129 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1130 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1132 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1134 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1137 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1139 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1140 /* If no new reasons reject */
1141 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1143 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1144 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1147 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1153 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1154 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1156 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1157 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1158 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1161 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1164 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1166 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1167 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1168 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1169 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1174 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1175 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1176 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1178 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1179 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1180 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1185 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1187 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1191 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1192 * untrusted certificates.
1194 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1195 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1196 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1198 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1199 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1200 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1207 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1208 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1209 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1210 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1213 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1215 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1218 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1221 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1224 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1225 /* Copy verify params across */
1226 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1228 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1229 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1231 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1232 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1236 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1237 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1239 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1244 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1245 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1246 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1247 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1248 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1252 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1253 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1254 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1256 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1257 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1258 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1259 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1265 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1266 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1267 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1268 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1269 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1272 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1274 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1275 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1276 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1283 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1287 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1292 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1294 gens = b->name.fullname;
1295 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1298 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1299 gens = a->name.fullname;
1303 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1305 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1306 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1307 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1309 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1315 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1317 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1318 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1319 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1320 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1321 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1330 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1333 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1334 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1336 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1337 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1338 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1339 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1341 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1347 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1349 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1350 unsigned int *preasons)
1353 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1355 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1356 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1359 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1362 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1363 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1364 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1365 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1366 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1367 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1372 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1373 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1379 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1380 * to find a delta CRL too
1383 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1384 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1387 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1389 unsigned int reasons;
1390 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1391 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1392 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1394 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1395 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1396 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1400 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1402 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1404 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1408 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1410 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1413 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1415 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1416 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1417 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1425 /* Check CRL validity */
1426 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1428 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1429 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1430 int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1431 int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1433 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1434 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1435 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1437 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1438 * certificate in chain.
1440 else if (cnum < chnum)
1441 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1443 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1444 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1445 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) &&
1446 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER))
1454 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1456 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1457 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1458 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1459 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) &&
1460 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN))
1463 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) &&
1464 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE))
1467 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) &&
1468 check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 &&
1469 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR))
1472 if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) &&
1473 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION))
1477 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) &&
1478 !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1))
1481 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1482 ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
1485 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
1489 int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1491 if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv))
1493 /* Verify CRL signature */
1494 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 &&
1495 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
1501 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1502 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1507 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1508 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1509 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
1510 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1512 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1513 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) &&
1514 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION))
1517 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure
1518 * reason is not removeFromCRL.
1520 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1521 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1523 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED))
1530 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1537 * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
1538 * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
1539 * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
1540 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
1541 * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
1542 * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
1543 * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
1544 * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
1545 * X509_policy_check() call.
1547 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) {
1548 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1549 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1552 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1553 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1554 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed)
1555 sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
1557 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) {
1558 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1559 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1562 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1563 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
1566 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
1567 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1568 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1570 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1572 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
1573 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION))
1578 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
1579 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1580 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1581 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1583 if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) {
1584 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1588 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1589 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1591 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1592 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1593 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1594 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1596 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1604 * Check certificate validity times.
1605 * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
1606 * the validation status.
1608 * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
1610 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
1615 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1616 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1617 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
1622 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1623 if (i >= 0 && depth < 0)
1625 if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1626 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD))
1628 if (i > 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID))
1631 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1632 if (i <= 0 && depth < 0)
1634 if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1635 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD))
1637 if (i < 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED))
1642 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1644 int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1645 X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1649 * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
1650 * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
1651 * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
1653 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) {
1659 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1662 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1667 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0,
1668 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE);
1670 ctx->error_depth = n;
1671 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1675 * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
1676 * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
1682 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless explicitly
1683 * asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes time. If
1684 * the issuer's public key is unusable, report the issuer certificate
1685 * and its depth (rather than the depth of the subject).
1687 if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
1688 if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1689 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, xi != xs ? n+1 : n,
1690 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
1692 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1693 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n,
1694 X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
1700 /* Calls verify callback as needed */
1701 if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
1705 * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any)
1708 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1709 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1710 ctx->error_depth = n;
1711 if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx))
1716 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1722 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1724 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1727 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1732 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1733 int i, j, remaining;
1736 remaining = ctm->length;
1737 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1739 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1740 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1741 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1742 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1744 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1745 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1746 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1747 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1748 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1755 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1756 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1757 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1758 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1766 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1777 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1778 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1779 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1781 if (remaining && *str == '.') {
1784 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
1785 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
1794 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1803 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1805 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
1808 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
1809 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
1811 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
1812 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
1816 atm.type = ctm->type;
1818 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
1819 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
1821 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1824 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1825 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
1827 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1828 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
1837 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
1838 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1844 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1846 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1849 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1851 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1854 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1855 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1864 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1865 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1866 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1867 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1868 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1870 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1873 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1875 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
1878 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
1881 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1882 ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
1884 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1885 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1888 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1892 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1893 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1897 /* first, populate the other certs */
1898 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
1899 ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
1900 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
1904 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
1908 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1910 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1911 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1913 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1915 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1916 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1917 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
1918 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1921 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1922 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
1923 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1926 /* Issuer names must match */
1927 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
1928 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
1931 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1932 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
1933 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
1936 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
1937 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
1940 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1941 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
1942 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
1945 /* CRLs must verify */
1946 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
1947 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
1948 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
1951 /* Create new CRL */
1952 crl = X509_CRL_new();
1953 if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
1955 /* Set issuer name */
1956 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1959 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
1961 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
1964 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
1966 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
1970 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
1971 * number to correct value too.
1974 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
1975 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
1976 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
1977 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
1981 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
1983 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
1985 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
1986 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
1987 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
1989 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
1990 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
1992 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) {
1993 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
1996 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
1997 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2002 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2004 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2010 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2015 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2017 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2020 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2022 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2025 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2030 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2035 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2037 return ctx->error_depth;
2040 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2042 ctx->error_depth = depth;
2045 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2047 return ctx->current_cert;
2050 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2052 ctx->current_cert = x;
2055 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2060 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2064 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2067 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2069 return ctx->current_issuer;
2072 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2074 return ctx->current_crl;
2077 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2082 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2087 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2092 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2095 * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
2096 * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust
2097 * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
2099 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2102 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2105 * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
2106 * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
2108 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2112 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2113 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2114 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2115 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2116 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2117 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2118 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2122 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2123 int purpose, int trust)
2126 /* If purpose not set use default */
2128 purpose = def_purpose;
2129 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2132 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2134 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2135 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2138 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2139 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2140 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2142 * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is
2143 * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the
2144 * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled?
2147 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2148 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2151 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2153 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2155 trust = ptmp->trust;
2158 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2160 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2161 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2166 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2167 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2168 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2169 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2173 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2175 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
2178 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2184 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2189 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2193 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2194 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2199 ctx->current_method = 0;
2201 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2203 ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
2204 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2208 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2209 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2210 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2211 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2212 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2213 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2214 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2218 ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0;
2219 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2220 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2222 /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
2224 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2228 if (store && store->check_issued)
2229 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2231 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2233 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2234 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2236 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2238 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2239 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2241 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2243 if (store && store->verify)
2244 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2246 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2248 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2249 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2251 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2253 if (store && store->get_crl)
2254 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2256 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2258 if (store && store->check_crl)
2259 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2261 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2263 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2264 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2266 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2268 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2269 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2271 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs;
2273 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2274 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2276 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls;
2278 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2280 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2281 if (ctx->param == NULL) {
2282 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2287 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2290 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2292 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2295 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2296 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2299 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2304 * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
2305 * purpose if this still yields the default value.
2307 if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2308 int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose);
2309 X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2312 ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp);
2315 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2318 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2322 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2323 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2325 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2330 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2331 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2333 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2335 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2336 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2337 ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk;
2340 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2343 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2344 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2345 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2346 * pointers below after they're freed!
2348 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2349 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2351 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2353 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2354 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2355 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2358 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2360 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2362 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2363 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2366 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2368 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2371 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2373 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2376 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2379 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2382 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2383 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb)
2385 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2388 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2390 return ctx->verify_cb;
2393 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2398 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2400 return ctx->untrusted;
2403 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2405 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2408 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2410 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2414 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2415 X509_STORE_CTX_verify verify)
2417 ctx->verify = verify;
2420 X509_STORE_CTX_verify X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2425 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2430 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2432 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2435 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2437 return ctx->num_untrusted;
2440 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2442 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2443 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2446 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2449 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2454 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2456 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2460 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane)
2465 static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
2468 unsigned int *i2dlen)
2470 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
2474 * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
2477 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT:
2478 len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf);
2480 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI:
2481 len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf);
2484 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR);
2488 if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) {
2489 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2493 *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len;
2497 #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
2499 static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
2501 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2502 unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE;
2503 unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE;
2504 unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE;
2505 unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2506 unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL;
2507 unsigned int i2dlen = 0;
2508 unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2509 unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL;
2510 unsigned int cmplen = 0;
2514 danetls_record *t = NULL;
2517 mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK;
2520 * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
2522 if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
2523 mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2526 * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
2527 * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
2528 * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
2530 if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
2531 mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2534 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
2535 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
2536 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
2537 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
2539 * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
2540 * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
2541 * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
2542 * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
2544 * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
2545 * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
2546 * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
2548 * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
2549 * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
2550 * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
2551 * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
2552 * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
2553 * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
2554 * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
2556 * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
2557 * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
2558 * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
2559 * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
2561 recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
2562 for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) {
2563 t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
2564 if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0)
2566 if (t->usage != usage) {
2569 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2570 mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2571 ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2573 if (t->selector != selector) {
2574 selector = t->selector;
2576 /* Update per-selector state */
2577 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2578 i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen);
2582 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2583 mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2584 ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2585 } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
2589 * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
2591 * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
2592 * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
2593 * other than "Full".
2595 if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal)
2600 * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
2601 * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
2603 if (t->mtype != mtype) {
2604 const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype];
2610 if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) {
2618 * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
2619 * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
2622 if (cmplen == t->dlen &&
2623 memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) {
2624 if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK)
2626 if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) {
2627 dane->mdpth = depth;
2629 OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert);
2637 /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
2638 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2642 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2644 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2648 if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0)
2649 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2652 * Record any DANE trust-anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
2653 * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
2654 * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
2656 cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
2657 if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0)
2658 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
2660 ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1;
2661 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
2664 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2667 static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2669 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2671 int num = ctx->num_untrusted;
2672 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
2673 int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs);
2676 for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) {
2677 t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
2678 if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA ||
2679 t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI ||
2680 t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL ||
2681 X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0)
2684 /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
2685 X509_free(dane->mcert);
2688 /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
2689 ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1;
2690 dane->mdpth = num - 1;
2693 /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
2694 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2695 for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num)
2696 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
2698 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
2701 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2704 static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane)
2707 * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
2709 X509_free(dane->mcert);
2716 static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2718 int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags);
2720 if (err == X509_V_OK)
2722 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, err);
2725 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2727 X509 *cert = ctx->cert;
2728 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2735 * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record,
2736 * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1)
2737 * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the
2738 * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust-anchor.
2739 * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done
2741 * + matched < 0, internal error.
2742 * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record
2743 * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no
2744 * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test.
2746 matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0);
2747 done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0);
2750 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
2753 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2754 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
2756 /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
2757 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2758 ctx->current_cert = cert;
2759 return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx);
2763 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2764 ctx->current_cert = cert;
2765 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2770 /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
2771 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
2773 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
2777 * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
2778 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
2780 return verify_chain(ctx);
2783 /* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */
2784 static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2786 STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain;
2790 ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert);
2791 ctx->chain = saved_chain;
2796 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2798 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2799 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2800 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
2801 int ss = cert_self_signed(cert);
2802 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
2803 unsigned int search;
2804 int may_trusted = 0;
2805 int may_alternate = 0;
2806 int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2807 int alt_untrusted = 0;
2812 /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
2813 OPENSSL_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num);
2815 #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
2816 #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
2817 #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
2819 * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
2820 * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
2821 * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
2822 * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
2823 * if no luck with untrusted first.
2825 search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0;
2826 if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) {
2827 if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
2828 search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
2829 else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
2835 * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
2836 * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
2837 * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
2839 if (ctx->untrusted && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
2840 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2841 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2846 * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust-anchors from DNS, add
2847 * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the
2848 * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with
2849 * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create
2850 * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE
2851 * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack
2852 * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for
2855 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) {
2856 if (sktmp == NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2857 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2858 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2861 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dane->certs); ++i) {
2862 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, sk_X509_value(dane->certs, i))) {
2863 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
2864 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2865 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2872 * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
2873 * might be reasonable.
2875 if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2)
2876 ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2;
2879 * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
2880 * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
2881 * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
2883 depth = ctx->param->depth + 1;
2885 while (search != 0) {
2890 * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
2891 * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we
2892 * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
2893 * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
2895 * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
2896 * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
2897 * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0,
2898 * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
2899 * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be
2900 * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
2901 * would be a-priori too long.
2903 if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) {
2904 i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2905 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
2907 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
2908 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
2909 * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable
2910 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It
2911 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
2912 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
2913 * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a
2914 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
2915 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
2916 * ctx->num_untrusted.
2918 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
2919 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
2923 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1);
2925 ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
2928 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
2929 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
2936 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
2937 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
2938 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note
2939 * that despite the current trust-store match we might still
2940 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which
2941 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
2942 * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
2943 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
2945 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
2946 * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
2947 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
2949 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
2950 OPENSSL_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0);
2951 search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE;
2952 for (; num > i; --num)
2953 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
2954 ctx->num_untrusted = num;
2956 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
2957 dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) {
2959 X509_free(dane->mcert);
2962 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
2963 dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
2968 * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
2969 * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
2972 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) {
2974 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2975 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
2976 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2980 ss = cert_self_signed(x);
2981 } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) {
2983 * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
2984 * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
2985 * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
2986 * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
2988 if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) {
2989 /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
2994 ctx->num_untrusted = --num;
2995 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp);
3000 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
3001 * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
3002 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
3003 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
3005 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
3006 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
3007 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
3008 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
3009 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
3010 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
3013 OPENSSL_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num);
3014 search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
3015 switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) {
3016 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3017 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3027 * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
3028 * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
3029 * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
3030 * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
3032 if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) {
3033 /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
3034 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0)
3036 /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
3037 if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 ||
3038 ctx->num_untrusted < 2)
3040 /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
3041 search |= S_DOALTERNATE;
3042 alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1;
3048 * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
3050 if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) {
3051 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3052 OPENSSL_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted);
3053 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1);
3056 * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
3057 * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
3059 xtmp = (ss || depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
3061 search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
3063 search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
3067 /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
3068 (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
3070 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
3071 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3072 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3073 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
3078 X509_up_ref(x = xtmp);
3079 ++ctx->num_untrusted;
3080 ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp);
3083 * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
3085 switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) {
3086 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3087 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3093 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
3096 * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
3097 * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
3099 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3101 if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane))
3102 trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx);
3103 if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted)
3104 trust = check_trust(ctx, num);
3108 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3110 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3111 /* Callback already issued */
3113 case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED:
3115 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3117 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3118 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
3119 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3120 (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0))
3121 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
3122 if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
3123 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3124 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT);
3126 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3127 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN);
3128 if (ctx->num_untrusted < num)
3129 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3130 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT);
3131 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3132 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY);
3136 static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
3137 static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table);
3140 * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of
3143 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3145 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3147 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
3148 int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3150 /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
3156 if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3157 level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3159 return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1];
3163 * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
3164 * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
3165 * self-signed or otherwise).
3167 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3169 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3171 int nid = X509_get_signature_nid(cert);
3172 int mdnid = NID_undef;
3174 int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3178 if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3179 level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3181 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3182 if (nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid, &mdnid, NULL)) {
3185 /* Assume 4 bits of collision resistance for each hash octet */
3186 if (mdnid != NID_undef && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid)) != NULL)
3187 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
3190 return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];