Fix for CVE-2014-0224

Only accept change cipher spec when it is expected instead of at any
time. This prevents premature setting of session keys before the master
secret is determined which an attacker could use as a MITM attack.

Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for reporting this issue
and providing the initial fix this patch is based on.

diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index a6b3c01afa18ae7c26e87f45296131cc4e092dd3..c99a4c495efe66c9e63319fdd8c022d1eb5979c3 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -559,6 +559,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
                case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
                case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
 
                case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
                case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
 

+                       s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;

                        ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
                                SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
                        if (ret <= 0) goto end;
                        ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
                                SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
                        if (ret <= 0) goto end;


@@ -915,6 +916,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
                goto f_err;
                }
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
                goto f_err;
                }

+           s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;

            s->hit=1;
            }
        else    /* a miss or crap from the other end */
            s->hit=1;
            }
        else    /* a miss or crap from the other end */

diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index 6bc8bf9c8b2726891dd949be94710c4542fd1aae..98c36e6b360a4da7ebd680271b75ede9bcd6eadd 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -1316,6 +1316,15 @@ start:
                        goto f_err;
                        }
 
                        goto f_err;
                        }
 

+               if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
+                       {
+                       al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+                       goto f_err;
+                       }
+
+               s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+

                rr->length=0;
 
                if (s->msg_callback)
                rr->length=0;
 
                if (s->msg_callback)

diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 5ac4119b9d85e3d99c0e27a68fd90e3c61e89183..503bed3fe0b496eac84bac015db81392c55acc8c 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -673,6 +673,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
                case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
 
                case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
                case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
 

+                       s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;

                        /* we should decide if we expected this one */
                        ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
                        if (ret <= 0) goto end;
                        /* we should decide if we expected this one */
                        ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
                        if (ret <= 0) goto end;


@@ -700,6 +701,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 
                case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
                case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
 
                case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
                case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:

+                       s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;

                        ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
                                SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
                        if (ret <= 0) goto end;
                        ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
                                SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
                        if (ret <= 0) goto end;


@@ -770,7 +772,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                                s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
 #else
                                if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
                                s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
 #else
                                if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)

+                                       {
+                                       s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;

                                        s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
                                        s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;

+                                       }

                                else
                                        s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
 #endif
                                else
                                        s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
 #endif

diff --git a/ssl/ssl3.h b/ssl/ssl3.h
index cb8b2492ec976704c89ecc32e8009f051398ead4..37f19e3ab505e3c63aed54281fb12d651817a0ab 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/ssl3.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl3.h
@@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG             0x0008
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY            0x0010
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE              0x0020
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG             0x0008
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY            0x0010
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE              0x0020

+#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK                      0x0080

  
 /* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
  * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
  
 /* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
  * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us