Update for 0.9.8s and 1.0.0f.

(While the 1.0.0f CHANGES entry on VOS PRNG seeding was missing
in the 1.0.1 branch, the actual code is here already.)

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index bc8d8ae0bcecad71d5fc61398f86528c3870c743..639eccdbacecb3408764ea064f350fa2e6e23747 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -298,6 +298,9 @@
      and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
      [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
 
+  *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS.
+     [Paul Green <Paul.Green@stratus.com>]
+
   *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
      [Adam Langley (Google)]
 
@@ -1226,7 +1229,36 @@
   *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
      [NTT]
   
- Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
+
+  *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
+     of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
+     which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
+     the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
+     differences arising during decryption processing. A research
+     paper describing this attack can be found at:
+                  http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
+     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
+     <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
+     for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
+     [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
+
+  *) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109)
+     [Ben Laurie, Kasper <ekasper@google.com>]
+
+  *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
+     (CVE-2011-4576)
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. (CVE-2011-4619)
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+ 
+  *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
+     Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
+     and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
+     [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
 
   *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
      [Adam Langley (Google)]

diff --git a/apps/cms.c b/apps/cms.c
index ee5445de29fb3286999c44e2535864d79457fcc8..d754140987330dd21e8f4665a8057f4702ddd959 100644 (file)
--- a/apps/cms.c
+++ b/apps/cms.c
@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
                BIO_printf (bio_err, "-certsout file certificate output file\n");
                BIO_printf (bio_err, "-signer file   signer certificate file\n");
                BIO_printf (bio_err, "-recip  file   recipient certificate file for decryption\n");
-               BIO_printf (bio_err, "-keyid        use subject key identifier\n");
+               BIO_printf (bio_err, "-keyid         use subject key identifier\n");
                BIO_printf (bio_err, "-in file       input file\n");
                BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inform arg    input format SMIME (default), PEM or DER\n");
                BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inkey file    input private key (if not signer or recipient)\n");