2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
145 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
159 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173 s->version = s->method->version;
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
178 static int nid_list[] =
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
208 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
215 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
246 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
247 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
250 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
252 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
253 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
254 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
256 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
259 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
261 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
264 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
266 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
268 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
270 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
272 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
274 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
276 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
278 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
280 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
286 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
288 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
290 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
292 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
294 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
296 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
298 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
300 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
302 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
306 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
308 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
310 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
312 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
318 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
321 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
322 const unsigned char **pcurves,
327 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
328 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
331 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
332 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
334 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
335 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
336 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
339 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
340 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
344 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
345 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
349 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
350 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
354 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
355 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
358 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
359 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
361 const unsigned char *curves;
363 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
364 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
366 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
369 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
372 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
374 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
377 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
379 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
382 else /* Should never happen */
385 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
386 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
388 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
394 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
395 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
399 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
401 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
402 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
404 /* Can't do anything on client side */
411 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
412 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
415 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
416 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
418 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
419 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
420 /* Should never happen */
423 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
426 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
433 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
435 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
436 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
438 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
442 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
443 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
454 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
455 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
457 unsigned char *clist, *p;
459 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
460 * while curve ids < 32
462 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
463 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
466 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
468 unsigned long idmask;
470 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
472 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
483 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
487 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
492 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
495 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
497 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
501 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
503 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
505 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
507 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
508 if (nid == NID_undef)
509 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
510 if (nid == NID_undef)
511 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
512 if (nid == NID_undef)
514 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
515 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
517 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
520 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
521 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
526 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
530 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
532 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
533 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
539 const EC_METHOD *meth;
542 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
543 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
544 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
547 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
550 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
554 /* Determine curve ID */
555 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
556 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
557 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
561 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
573 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
576 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
578 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
581 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
585 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
586 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
587 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
589 const unsigned char *p;
592 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
593 * is supported (see RFC4492).
595 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
597 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
598 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
599 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
609 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
610 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
612 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
613 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
615 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
620 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
627 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
630 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
632 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
634 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
635 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
639 *pformats = ecformats_default;
640 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
642 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
644 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
648 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
649 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
651 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
653 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
656 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
659 /* If not EC nothing to do */
660 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
665 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
669 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
670 * supported curves extension.
672 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
675 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
676 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
678 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
685 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
686 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
687 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
688 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
689 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
691 return 0; /* Should never happen */
692 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
693 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
695 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
699 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
700 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
702 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
707 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
708 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
710 unsigned char curve_id[2];
711 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
712 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
713 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
714 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
717 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
718 * no other curves permitted.
722 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
723 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
724 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
725 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
726 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
730 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
731 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
733 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
734 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
736 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
739 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
742 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
744 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
750 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
752 /* Need a shared curve */
753 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
759 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
764 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
766 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
770 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
776 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
781 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
785 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
786 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
789 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
790 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
792 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
795 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
796 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
798 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
801 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
802 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
804 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
807 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
808 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
809 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
810 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
812 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
814 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
815 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
818 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
819 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
821 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
822 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
825 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
829 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
830 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
831 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
834 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
836 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
839 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
840 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
842 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
843 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
844 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
846 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
847 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
850 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
851 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
855 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
856 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
858 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
859 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
861 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
863 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
864 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
868 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
870 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
872 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
875 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
878 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
879 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
881 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
882 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
884 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
885 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
886 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
887 /* Should never happen */
890 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
891 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
897 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
899 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
900 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
901 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
903 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
908 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
913 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
915 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
917 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
918 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
922 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
924 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
927 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
935 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
939 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
940 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
941 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
943 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
946 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
947 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
952 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
955 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
958 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
961 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
962 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
965 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
966 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
967 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
968 * session and not global settings.
971 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
974 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
975 size_t i, sigalgslen;
976 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
979 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
980 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
981 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
984 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
985 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
988 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
989 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
994 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
999 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1004 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1010 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1011 * signature algorithms.
1015 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1016 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1020 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1021 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1025 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1026 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1029 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1031 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1032 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1036 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1037 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1039 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1040 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1042 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1046 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1047 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1049 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1050 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1059 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1062 unsigned char *ret = p;
1063 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1064 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1066 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1069 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1070 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1072 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1074 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1076 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1077 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1078 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1079 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1088 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1089 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1090 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1095 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1097 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1099 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1100 unsigned long size_str;
1103 /* check for enough space.
1104 4 for the servername type and entension length
1105 2 for servernamelist length
1106 1 for the hostname type
1107 2 for hostname length
1111 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1112 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1115 /* extension type and length */
1116 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1117 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1119 /* length of servername list */
1120 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1122 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1123 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1125 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1129 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1134 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1140 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1142 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1145 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1155 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1156 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1157 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1159 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1160 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1166 /* check for enough space.
1167 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1168 1 for the srp user identity
1169 + srp user identity length
1171 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1173 /* fill in the extension */
1174 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1175 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1176 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1177 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1185 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1187 const unsigned char *plist;
1190 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1192 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1193 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1200 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1201 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1202 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1203 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1206 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1207 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1208 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1210 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1211 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1212 if (plistlen > 65532)
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1218 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1219 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1221 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1222 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1223 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1224 * resolves this to two bytes.
1227 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1230 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1232 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1235 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1236 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1237 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1238 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1240 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1241 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1242 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1244 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1245 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1247 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1251 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1252 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1254 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1257 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1258 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1262 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1268 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1271 const unsigned char *salg;
1272 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1273 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1275 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1276 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1278 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1282 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1283 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1284 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1286 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1288 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1290 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1293 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1296 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1301 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1302 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1305 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1309 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1311 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1312 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1318 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1320 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1327 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1328 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1329 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1331 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1332 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1334 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1336 /* save position of id len */
1337 unsigned char *q = ret;
1338 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1339 /* skip over id len */
1341 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1347 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1351 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1352 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1355 * 1: peer may send requests
1356 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1358 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1359 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1361 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1365 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1367 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1368 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1369 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1371 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1376 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1380 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1382 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1384 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1387 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1395 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1396 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1397 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1398 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1399 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1400 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1402 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1403 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1405 if (limit < ret + 6)
1408 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1409 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1411 *(ret++) = list_len;
1412 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1415 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1416 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1419 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1421 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1423 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1424 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1426 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1427 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1428 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1432 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1436 return NULL; /* error */
1437 if (cb_retval == -1)
1438 continue; /* skip this extension */
1440 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1442 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1444 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1449 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1456 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1459 unsigned char *ret = p;
1460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1461 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1464 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1465 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1466 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1467 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1469 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1470 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1474 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1476 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1478 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1480 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1484 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1488 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1494 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1496 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1499 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1509 if (using_ecc && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1511 const unsigned char *plist;
1513 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1516 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1518 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1519 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1526 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1527 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1528 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1529 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1533 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1534 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1536 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1537 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1539 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1540 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1544 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1546 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1547 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1551 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1552 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1553 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1555 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1557 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1559 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1562 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1565 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1574 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1576 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1578 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1581 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1589 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1590 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1591 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1592 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1593 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1594 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1595 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1596 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1597 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1598 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1599 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1604 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1605 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1606 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1608 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1611 * 1: peer may send requests
1612 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1614 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1615 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1617 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1623 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1624 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1625 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1627 const unsigned char *npa;
1628 unsigned int npalen;
1631 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1632 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1634 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1635 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1637 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1639 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1644 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1646 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1648 size_t authz_length;
1649 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1650 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1651 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1652 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1653 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1655 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1657 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1658 * uint8_t authz_type
1660 * uint8_t data[length]
1662 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1663 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1665 unsigned short length;
1669 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1671 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1675 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1683 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1684 * 2 bytes for extension type
1685 * 2 bytes for extension length
1686 * 1 byte for the list length
1687 * n bytes for the list */
1688 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1690 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1691 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1693 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1694 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1698 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1700 unsigned short length;
1705 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1707 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1710 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1717 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1718 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1722 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1725 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1727 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1729 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1730 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1732 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1733 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1736 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1739 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1743 return NULL; /* error */
1744 if (cb_retval == -1)
1745 break; /* skip this extension */
1746 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1748 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1750 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1758 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1766 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1767 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1768 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1773 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1774 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1775 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1776 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1778 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1779 unsigned short type, size;
1780 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1781 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1782 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1783 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1784 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1785 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1786 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1788 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1789 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1790 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1791 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1794 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1795 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1796 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1797 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1798 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1799 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1800 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1801 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1802 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1803 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1806 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1815 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1818 if (data+size > d+n)
1822 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1824 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1825 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1827 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1829 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1831 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1836 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1838 if (data + len != d+n)
1840 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1844 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1846 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1848 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1850 unsigned short type;
1851 unsigned short size;
1853 unsigned char *data = *p;
1854 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1857 s->servername_done = 0;
1858 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1860 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1863 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1864 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1865 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1867 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
1868 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1872 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1873 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1877 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1878 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1879 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1881 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1882 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1884 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1885 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1887 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1888 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1890 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1891 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1893 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1894 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1896 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1897 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1900 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1904 if (data > (d+n-len))
1907 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1912 if (data+size > (d+n))
1915 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1917 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1918 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1919 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1920 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1922 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1923 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1924 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1925 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1926 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1927 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1928 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1929 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1930 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1931 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1932 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1933 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1934 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1935 the value of the Host: field.
1936 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1937 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1938 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1939 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1943 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1945 unsigned char *sdata;
1951 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1958 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1965 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1971 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1974 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1975 switch (servname_type)
1977 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1980 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1982 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1985 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1987 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1990 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1992 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1995 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1996 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1997 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1998 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1999 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2000 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2003 s->servername_done = 1;
2007 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2008 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2009 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2021 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2026 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2027 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2029 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2031 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2034 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2036 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2039 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2041 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2042 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2044 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2046 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2052 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2053 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2054 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2056 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2057 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2059 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2060 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2062 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2067 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2069 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2070 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2072 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2073 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2075 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2078 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2079 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2082 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2083 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2084 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2085 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2086 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2089 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
2090 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2092 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2093 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2094 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2096 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2097 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2099 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2104 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2106 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2109 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2110 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2112 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2115 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2116 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2119 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2120 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2121 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2122 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2123 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2126 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2127 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2128 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2129 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2131 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2135 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2138 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2139 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2141 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2145 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2146 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2147 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2148 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2150 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2151 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2153 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2158 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2160 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2161 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2163 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2167 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2169 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2171 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2173 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2176 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2178 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2183 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2185 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2188 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2190 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2193 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2196 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2199 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2200 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2204 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2205 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2210 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2214 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2216 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2218 const unsigned char *sdata;
2220 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2225 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2234 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2238 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2242 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2247 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2251 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2256 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2257 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2260 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2261 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2262 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2264 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2265 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2268 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2269 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2271 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2272 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2277 /* Read in request_extensions */
2280 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2287 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2293 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2295 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2296 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2299 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2300 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2302 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2303 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2305 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2310 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2314 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2317 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2321 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2322 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2324 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2325 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2326 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2328 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2334 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2335 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2337 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2340 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2341 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2342 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2343 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2344 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2345 * anything like that, but this might change).
2347 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2348 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2349 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2350 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2351 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2352 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2356 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2357 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2359 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2364 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2366 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2367 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2371 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2375 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2377 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2379 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2383 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2384 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2385 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2388 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2389 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2390 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2391 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2392 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2394 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2398 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2399 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2400 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2402 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2404 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2405 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2406 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2407 1 /* element size */,
2410 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2413 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2414 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2416 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2423 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2424 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2425 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2426 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2427 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2429 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2431 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2433 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2435 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2436 if (type == record->ext_type)
2440 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2441 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2443 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2445 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2450 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2451 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2454 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2455 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2456 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2457 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2458 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2459 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2461 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2462 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2465 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2466 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2478 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2480 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2481 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2483 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2485 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2488 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2489 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2490 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2495 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2498 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2500 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2504 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2513 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2514 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2515 * the length of the block. */
2516 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2518 unsigned int off = 0;
2532 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2534 unsigned short length;
2535 unsigned short type;
2536 unsigned short size;
2537 unsigned char *data = *p;
2538 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2539 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2542 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2546 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2547 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2550 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2554 if (data+length != d+n)
2556 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2560 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2565 if (data+size > (d+n))
2568 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2569 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2570 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2572 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2574 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2576 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2579 tlsext_servername = 1;
2582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2583 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2584 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2586 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2587 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2589 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2591 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2594 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2595 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2596 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2598 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2601 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2602 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2604 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2605 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2606 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2607 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2608 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2611 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2613 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2615 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2616 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2618 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2621 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2624 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2627 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2629 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2630 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2631 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2633 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2637 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2640 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2641 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2643 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2647 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2648 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2649 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2650 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2652 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2654 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2656 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2661 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2662 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2664 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2665 * a status request message.
2667 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2669 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2672 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2673 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2676 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2677 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2679 unsigned char *selected;
2680 unsigned char selected_len;
2682 /* We must have requested it. */
2683 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2685 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2688 /* The data must be valid */
2689 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2691 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2694 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2696 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2699 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2700 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2702 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2705 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2706 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2707 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2710 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2712 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2714 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2717 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2721 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2722 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2724 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2725 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2726 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2728 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2733 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2735 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2740 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2742 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2743 * an authz hello extension if the client
2744 * didn't request a proof. */
2745 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2746 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2748 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2750 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2756 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2760 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2761 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2763 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2767 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2768 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2769 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2770 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2772 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2776 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2779 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2780 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2782 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2785 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2787 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2789 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2790 if (record->ext_type == type)
2792 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2804 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2808 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2810 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2812 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2814 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2815 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2817 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2823 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2833 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2834 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2835 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2836 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2837 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2838 * absence on initial connect only.
2840 if (!renegotiate_seen
2841 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2842 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2844 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2846 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2854 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2857 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2861 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2863 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2868 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2870 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2871 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2873 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2874 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2876 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2877 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2882 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2886 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2887 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2894 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2899 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2901 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2902 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2905 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2906 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2908 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2909 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2913 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2914 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2915 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2916 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2918 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2920 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2921 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2922 * so this has to happen here in
2923 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2927 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2929 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2932 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2933 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2938 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2939 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2940 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2942 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2944 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2945 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2947 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2948 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2950 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2951 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2953 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2954 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2956 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2957 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2960 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2964 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2966 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2967 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2968 * abort the handshake.
2970 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2971 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2979 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2980 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2983 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2984 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2987 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2988 s->servername_done=0;
2994 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2996 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2999 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3000 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3001 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3002 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3004 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3007 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3008 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3009 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3010 if (certpkey == NULL)
3012 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3015 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3016 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3018 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3019 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3022 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3023 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3024 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3026 /* status request response should be sent */
3027 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3028 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3029 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3031 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3033 /* something bad happened */
3034 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3035 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3036 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3041 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3046 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3047 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3050 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3051 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3059 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3061 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3062 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3064 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3065 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3066 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3067 * it must contain uncompressed.
3069 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3070 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3071 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3072 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3073 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3075 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3077 unsigned char *list;
3078 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3079 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3080 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3082 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3084 found_uncompressed = 1;
3088 if (!found_uncompressed)
3090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3094 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3095 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3097 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3098 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3099 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3100 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3102 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3103 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3105 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3106 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3108 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3110 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3111 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3114 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3115 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3116 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3117 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3119 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3120 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3125 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3128 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3129 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3132 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3133 * there is no response.
3135 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3137 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3138 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3140 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3141 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3144 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3145 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3149 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3150 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3156 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3157 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3160 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3161 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3164 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3165 s->servername_done=0;
3171 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3174 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3176 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3178 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3182 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3190 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3191 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3192 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3194 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3195 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3196 * extension, if any.
3197 * len: the length of the session ID.
3198 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3199 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3200 * point to the resulting session.
3202 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3203 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3204 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3207 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3208 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3209 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3210 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3211 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3212 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3213 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3216 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3217 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3218 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3219 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3220 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3221 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3223 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3224 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3226 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3227 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3231 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3233 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3234 * to permit stateful resumption.
3236 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3238 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3242 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3243 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
3250 /* Skip past cipher list */
3255 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3260 /* Now at start of extensions */
3261 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3264 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3266 unsigned short type, size;
3269 if (p + size > limit)
3271 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3276 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3277 * currently have one. */
3278 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3281 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3283 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3284 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3285 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3286 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3287 * calculate the master secret later. */
3290 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3293 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3294 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3296 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3298 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3299 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3301 default: /* fatal error */
3310 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3312 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3313 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3314 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3315 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3316 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3317 * point to the resulting session.
3320 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3321 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3322 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3323 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3325 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3326 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3327 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3330 unsigned char *sdec;
3331 const unsigned char *p;
3332 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3333 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3336 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3337 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3340 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3341 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3342 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3343 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3345 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3346 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3357 /* Check key name matches */
3358 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3360 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3361 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3362 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3363 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3365 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3366 * integrity checks on ticket.
3368 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3371 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3375 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3376 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3377 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3378 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3379 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3381 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3382 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3383 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3384 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3385 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3388 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3391 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3392 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3395 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3398 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3402 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3403 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3404 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3405 * as required by standard.
3408 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3409 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3417 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3422 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3430 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3431 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3432 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3433 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3434 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3435 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3436 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3439 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3440 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3441 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3442 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3445 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3448 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3450 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3456 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3459 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3461 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3462 return table[i].nid;
3467 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3472 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3473 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3476 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3479 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3480 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3484 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3486 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3487 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3490 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3495 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3503 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3507 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3508 return EVP_sha224();
3510 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3511 return EVP_sha256();
3513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3514 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3515 return EVP_sha384();
3517 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3518 return EVP_sha512();
3526 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3531 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3532 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3535 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3536 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3539 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3540 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3546 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3547 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3548 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3550 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3551 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3553 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3555 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3556 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3558 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3560 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3562 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3563 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3565 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3569 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3570 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3571 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3573 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3576 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3577 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3578 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3579 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3581 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3582 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3583 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3585 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3586 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3588 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3590 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3592 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3597 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3598 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3599 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3601 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3612 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3613 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3615 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3616 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3618 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3620 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3621 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3622 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3624 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3625 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3627 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3629 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3630 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3633 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3634 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3638 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3639 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3645 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3646 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3648 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3651 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3654 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3655 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3656 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3661 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3663 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3669 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3670 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
3671 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3673 /* Should never happen */
3677 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3678 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3680 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3681 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3683 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3685 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3686 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3688 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3689 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3691 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3693 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3695 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3698 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3699 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3700 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3701 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3702 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3704 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3705 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3711 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3712 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3714 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3715 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3717 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3718 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3719 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3720 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3722 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3723 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3728 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3729 * use the certificate for signing.
3731 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3733 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3734 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3737 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3738 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3741 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3743 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3744 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3748 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3749 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3756 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3757 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3758 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3760 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3766 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3773 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3775 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3778 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3779 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3780 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3782 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3783 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3787 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3789 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3791 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3793 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3795 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3796 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3800 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3802 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3804 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3805 unsigned short hbtype;
3806 unsigned int payload;
3807 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3809 /* Read type and payload length first */
3814 if (s->msg_callback)
3815 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3816 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3817 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3819 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3821 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3824 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3825 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3826 * payload, plus padding
3828 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3831 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3832 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3834 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3836 /* Random padding */
3837 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3839 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3841 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3842 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3843 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3844 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3846 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3851 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3855 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3856 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3857 * sequence number */
3860 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3863 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3871 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3873 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3875 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3876 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3878 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3879 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3880 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3886 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3887 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3893 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3894 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3896 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3900 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3901 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3903 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3905 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3906 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3907 * some random stuff.
3908 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3909 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3910 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3911 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3914 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3917 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3918 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3920 /* Sequence number */
3921 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3922 /* 16 random bytes */
3923 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3925 /* Random padding */
3926 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3928 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3931 if (s->msg_callback)
3932 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3933 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3934 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3936 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3945 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3950 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3953 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3955 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3958 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3959 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3961 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3963 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3965 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3973 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3974 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3975 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3976 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3977 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3978 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3981 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3982 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3983 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3984 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3987 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3989 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3990 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3993 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3994 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3998 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3999 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4000 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4004 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4008 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4011 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4013 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4018 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4019 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4021 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4023 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4024 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4025 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4026 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4028 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4036 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4037 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4038 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4039 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4043 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4044 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4045 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4046 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4052 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4056 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4060 if (default_nid == -1)
4062 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4064 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4065 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4066 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4070 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4071 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4075 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4076 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4078 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4084 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4085 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4086 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4087 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4090 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4092 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4093 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4094 /* Strict mode flags */
4095 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4096 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4097 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4099 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4104 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4105 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4107 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4108 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4111 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4115 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4118 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4120 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4122 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4123 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4126 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4127 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4128 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4130 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4131 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4140 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4143 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4144 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4145 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4147 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4155 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4156 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4157 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4160 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4166 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4167 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4170 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4173 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4174 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4176 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4181 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4182 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4183 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4184 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4185 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4188 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4189 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4190 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4191 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4195 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4196 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4204 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4205 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4208 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4211 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4212 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4214 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4217 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4225 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4226 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4228 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4231 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4232 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4233 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4235 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4240 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4248 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4249 else if(check_flags)
4250 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4252 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4253 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4254 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4255 else if (!check_flags)
4258 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4259 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4260 else if (strict_mode)
4262 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4263 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4265 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4266 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4270 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4278 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4280 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4285 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4288 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4291 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4296 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4297 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4298 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4299 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4300 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4305 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4310 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4314 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4315 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4317 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4319 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4321 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4325 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4329 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4332 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4334 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4335 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4337 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4339 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4340 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4342 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4344 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4346 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4347 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4349 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4354 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4358 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4360 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4361 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4365 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4367 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4368 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4369 else if (cpk->digest)
4370 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4373 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4375 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4376 * if the chain is invalid.
4380 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4381 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4384 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4385 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4392 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4393 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4395 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4396 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4397 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4398 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4399 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4400 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4402 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4403 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4405 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);