2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
249 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
250 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
254 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
256 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
261 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
263 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
264 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
265 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
266 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
268 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
269 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
272 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
273 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
277 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
278 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
279 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
280 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
281 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
282 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
283 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
286 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
287 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
288 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
295 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
296 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
299 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
301 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
302 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
303 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
305 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
308 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
310 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
313 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
315 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
319 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
321 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
325 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
327 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
329 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
331 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
333 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
335 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
337 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
339 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
341 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
343 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
345 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
347 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
349 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
351 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
353 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
355 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
357 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
359 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
361 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
363 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
365 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
367 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
373 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
376 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
377 const unsigned char **pcurves,
382 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
383 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
386 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
387 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
389 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
390 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
391 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
394 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
395 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
399 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
400 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
404 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
405 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
409 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
410 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
413 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
414 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
416 const unsigned char *curves;
418 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
419 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
421 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
424 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
427 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
429 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
432 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
434 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
437 else /* Should never happen */
440 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
441 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
443 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
449 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
450 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
454 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
456 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
457 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
459 /* Can't do anything on client side */
466 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
467 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
470 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
472 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
473 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
474 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
475 /* Should never happen */
478 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
481 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
483 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
488 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
490 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
491 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
493 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
497 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
498 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
509 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
510 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
512 unsigned char *clist, *p;
514 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
515 * while curve ids < 32
517 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
518 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
521 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
523 unsigned long idmask;
525 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
527 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
538 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
542 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
547 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
550 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
552 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
556 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
558 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
560 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
562 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
563 if (nid == NID_undef)
564 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
565 if (nid == NID_undef)
566 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
567 if (nid == NID_undef)
569 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
570 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
572 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
575 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
576 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
581 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
585 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
587 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
588 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
593 const EC_METHOD *meth;
596 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
597 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
600 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
603 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
607 /* Determine curve ID */
608 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
610 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
614 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
626 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
628 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
631 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
633 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
636 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
640 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
641 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
642 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
644 const unsigned char *p;
647 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
648 * is supported (see RFC4492).
650 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
652 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
653 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
654 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
664 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
665 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
667 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
668 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
670 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
675 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
682 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
685 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
687 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
689 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
694 *pformats = ecformats_default;
695 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
697 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
699 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
703 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
704 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
706 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
708 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
711 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
714 /* If not EC nothing to do */
715 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
720 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
724 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
725 * supported curves extension.
727 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
730 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
731 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
733 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
740 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
741 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
742 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
743 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
744 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
746 return 0; /* Should never happen */
747 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
748 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
750 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
754 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
755 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
757 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
762 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
763 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
765 unsigned char curve_id[2];
766 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
767 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
768 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
769 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
772 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
773 * no other curves permitted.
777 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
778 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
779 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
780 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
781 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
785 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
786 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
788 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
789 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
791 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
794 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
797 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
799 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
805 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
807 /* Need a shared curve */
808 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
814 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
819 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
821 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
825 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
831 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
836 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
840 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
841 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
850 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
851 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
853 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
856 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
857 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
859 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
862 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
863 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
864 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
865 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
867 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
869 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
870 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
873 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
877 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
881 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
882 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
883 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
886 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
888 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
892 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
894 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
895 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
896 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
907 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
908 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
910 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
911 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
913 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
915 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
916 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
920 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
921 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
924 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
925 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
927 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
928 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
930 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
931 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
932 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
933 /* Should never happen */
936 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
937 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
943 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
945 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
946 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
947 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
949 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
954 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
959 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
961 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
964 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
968 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
970 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
973 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
981 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
985 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
986 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
987 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
989 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
992 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
993 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
998 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1004 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1007 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1008 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1011 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1012 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1013 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1014 * session and not global settings.
1017 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1020 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1021 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1022 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1025 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1026 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1027 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1030 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1031 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1034 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1040 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1045 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1050 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1056 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1057 * signature algorithms.
1061 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1066 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1067 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1071 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1075 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1077 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1078 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1082 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1083 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1085 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1086 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1088 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1092 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1095 unsigned char *ret = p;
1096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1097 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1099 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1102 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1103 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1105 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1107 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1109 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1110 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1111 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1112 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1121 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1122 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1123 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1128 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1130 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1132 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1133 unsigned long size_str;
1136 /* check for enough space.
1137 4 for the servername type and entension length
1138 2 for servernamelist length
1139 1 for the hostname type
1140 2 for hostname length
1144 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1145 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1148 /* extension type and length */
1149 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1150 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1152 /* length of servername list */
1153 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1155 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1156 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1158 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1162 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1167 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1173 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1175 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1178 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1188 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1189 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1190 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1192 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1193 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 /* check for enough space.
1200 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1201 1 for the srp user identity
1202 + srp user identity length
1204 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1206 /* fill in the extension */
1207 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1208 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1209 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1210 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1218 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1220 const unsigned char *plist;
1223 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1225 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1226 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1234 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1235 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1236 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1239 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1240 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1241 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1243 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1244 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1245 if (plistlen > 65532)
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1252 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1254 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1255 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1256 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1257 * resolves this to two bytes.
1260 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1263 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1265 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1268 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1269 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1270 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1271 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1273 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1274 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1275 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1277 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1278 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1280 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1284 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1285 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1287 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1290 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1291 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1295 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1301 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1304 const unsigned char *salg;
1305 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1306 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1308 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1309 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1311 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1315 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1316 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1318 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1320 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1322 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1325 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1328 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1333 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1336 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1340 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1342 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1343 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1349 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1351 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1358 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1360 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1362 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1363 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1365 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1367 /* save position of id len */
1368 unsigned char *q = ret;
1369 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1370 /* skip over id len */
1372 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1378 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1382 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1383 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1386 * 1: peer may send requests
1387 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1389 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1390 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1392 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1396 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1398 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1399 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1400 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1402 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1407 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1409 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1411 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1412 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1413 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1414 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1415 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1416 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1419 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1423 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1425 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1427 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1430 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1438 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1439 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1442 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1444 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1446 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1447 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1449 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1450 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1451 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1455 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1459 return NULL; /* error */
1460 if (cb_retval == -1)
1461 continue; /* skip this extension */
1463 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1465 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1467 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1472 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
1473 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1474 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1476 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1477 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1480 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1481 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1482 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
1484 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1486 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1488 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1494 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1496 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1502 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1509 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1512 unsigned char *ret = p;
1514 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1515 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1516 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1518 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1519 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1520 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1521 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1522 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1524 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1525 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1529 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1531 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1533 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1535 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1539 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1543 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1549 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1554 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1566 const unsigned char *plist;
1568 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1571 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1573 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1574 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1581 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1582 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1583 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1584 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1588 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1589 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1591 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1592 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1594 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1595 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1599 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1601 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1602 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1606 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1607 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1609 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1611 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1613 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1616 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1619 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1628 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1630 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1632 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1635 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1643 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1644 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1645 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1646 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1647 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1648 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1649 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1650 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1651 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1652 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1653 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1659 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1660 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1662 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1665 * 1: peer may send requests
1666 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1668 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1669 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1671 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1677 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1678 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1679 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1681 const unsigned char *npa;
1682 unsigned int npalen;
1685 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1686 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1688 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1689 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1691 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1693 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1698 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
1700 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1701 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1704 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
1706 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1709 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1713 return NULL; /* error */
1714 if (cb_retval == -1)
1715 continue; /* skip this extension */
1716 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1718 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1720 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1724 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1726 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1727 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1729 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1731 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1735 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1739 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1747 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1748 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1749 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1754 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1755 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1756 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1757 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1759 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1760 unsigned short type, size;
1761 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1762 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1763 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1764 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1765 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1766 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1767 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1769 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1770 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1771 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1772 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1775 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1776 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1777 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1778 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1779 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1780 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1781 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1782 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1783 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1784 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1787 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1796 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1799 if (data+size > d+n)
1803 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1805 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1806 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1808 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1810 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1812 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1817 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1819 if (data + len != d+n)
1821 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1825 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1827 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1829 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1831 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1832 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1833 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1836 * returns: 0 on success. */
1837 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1838 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1842 const unsigned char *selected;
1843 unsigned char selected_len;
1846 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1852 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1853 * length-prefixed strings. */
1854 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1855 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1864 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1866 proto_len = data[i];
1872 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1878 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1879 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1880 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1881 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1882 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1883 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1884 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1886 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1889 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1890 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1895 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1899 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1901 unsigned short type;
1902 unsigned short size;
1904 unsigned char *data = *p;
1905 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1908 s->servername_done = 0;
1909 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1911 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1914 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1915 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1916 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1918 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1919 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1922 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1924 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1925 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1929 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1930 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1934 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1935 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1936 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1938 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1939 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1941 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1942 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1944 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1945 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1947 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1948 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1950 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1951 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1953 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1954 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1957 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1961 if (data > (d+n-len))
1964 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1969 if (data+size > (d+n))
1972 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1974 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1975 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1976 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1977 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1979 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1980 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1981 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1982 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1983 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1984 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1985 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1986 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1987 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1988 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1989 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1990 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1991 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1992 the value of the Host: field.
1993 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1994 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1995 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1996 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2000 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2002 unsigned char *sdata;
2008 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2015 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2022 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2028 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2031 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2032 switch (servname_type)
2034 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2037 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2039 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2042 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2044 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2047 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2049 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2052 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2053 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2054 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2055 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2056 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2057 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2060 s->servername_done = 1;
2064 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2065 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2066 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2078 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2084 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2086 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2088 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2091 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2093 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2096 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2098 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2099 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2101 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2103 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2110 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2112 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2113 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2115 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2116 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2118 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2123 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2125 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2126 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2128 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2129 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2131 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2134 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2135 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2138 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2139 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2140 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2141 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2142 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2145 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2147 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2148 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2149 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2151 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2152 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2154 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2159 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2161 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2164 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2165 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2167 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2170 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2171 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2174 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2175 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2176 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2177 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2178 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2181 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2182 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2183 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2185 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2189 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2192 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2193 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2195 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2199 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2200 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2201 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2202 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2204 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2205 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2207 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2212 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2214 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2215 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2217 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2221 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2223 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2225 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2227 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2230 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2232 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2237 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2239 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2242 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2244 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2247 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2250 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2253 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2254 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2258 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2263 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2267 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2269 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2271 const unsigned char *sdata;
2273 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2278 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2287 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2291 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2295 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2300 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2304 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2309 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2310 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2313 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2314 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2315 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2317 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2318 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2321 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2322 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2324 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2325 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2330 /* Read in request_extensions */
2333 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2340 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2346 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2348 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2349 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2352 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2353 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2355 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2356 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2358 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2363 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2367 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2370 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2374 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2375 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2377 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2378 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2379 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2381 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2387 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2388 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2389 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2391 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2394 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2395 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2396 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2397 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2398 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2399 * anything like that, but this might change).
2401 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2402 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2403 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2404 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2405 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2406 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2410 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2411 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2412 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2414 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2417 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2418 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2422 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2423 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2425 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2429 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2430 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2431 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2432 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2433 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2435 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2437 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2439 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2441 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2442 if (type == record->ext_type)
2444 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2457 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2459 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2460 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2462 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2464 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2467 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2468 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2469 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2474 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2477 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2479 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2483 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2492 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2493 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2494 * the length of the block. */
2495 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2497 unsigned int off = 0;
2511 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2513 unsigned short length;
2514 unsigned short type;
2515 unsigned short size;
2516 unsigned char *data = *p;
2517 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2518 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2521 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2524 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2526 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2527 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2531 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2532 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2535 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2539 if (data+length != d+n)
2541 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2545 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2550 if (data+size > (d+n))
2553 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2554 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2555 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2557 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2559 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2561 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2564 tlsext_servername = 1;
2567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2568 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2570 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2571 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2573 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2575 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2578 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2579 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2580 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2582 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2585 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2586 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2588 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2589 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2590 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2591 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2592 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2595 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2597 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2599 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2600 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2602 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2605 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2608 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2611 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2613 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2614 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2616 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2620 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2623 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2624 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2626 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2630 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2631 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2632 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2633 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2635 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2637 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2639 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2644 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2646 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2647 * a status request message.
2649 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2651 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2654 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2655 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2658 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2659 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2661 unsigned char *selected;
2662 unsigned char selected_len;
2664 /* We must have requested it. */
2665 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2667 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2670 /* The data must be valid */
2671 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2673 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2676 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2678 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2681 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2682 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2684 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2687 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2688 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2689 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2693 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2697 /* We must have requested it. */
2698 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2700 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2705 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2708 /* The extension data consists of:
2709 * uint16 list_length
2710 * uint8 proto_length;
2711 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2715 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2717 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2721 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2723 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2726 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2727 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2728 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2729 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2731 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2734 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2735 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2738 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2740 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2742 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2745 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2749 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2750 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2752 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2753 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2754 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2756 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2761 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2763 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2767 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2768 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2770 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2773 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2775 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2777 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2778 if (record->ext_type == type)
2780 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2792 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2796 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2798 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2800 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2802 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2803 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2805 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2811 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2821 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2822 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2823 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2824 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2825 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2826 * absence on initial connect only.
2828 if (!renegotiate_seen
2829 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2830 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2832 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2834 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2842 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2845 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2849 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2851 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2856 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2858 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2859 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2861 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2862 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2864 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2865 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2870 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2874 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2875 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2882 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2887 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2889 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2890 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2893 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2894 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2896 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2897 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2901 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2902 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2903 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2904 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2906 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2908 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2909 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2910 * so this has to happen here in
2911 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2915 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2917 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2920 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2921 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2926 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2927 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2928 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2930 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2932 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2933 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2935 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2936 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2938 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2939 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2941 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2942 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2944 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2945 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2948 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2952 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2954 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2955 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2956 * abort the handshake.
2958 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2959 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2967 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2968 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2971 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2972 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2975 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2976 s->servername_done=0;
2982 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2984 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2987 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2988 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2989 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2990 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2992 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2995 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2996 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2997 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2998 if (certpkey == NULL)
3000 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3003 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3004 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3006 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3007 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3010 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3011 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3012 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3014 /* status request response should be sent */
3015 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3016 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3017 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3019 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3021 /* something bad happened */
3022 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3023 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3024 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3029 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3034 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3035 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3038 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3039 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3047 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3049 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3050 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3052 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3053 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3054 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3055 * it must contain uncompressed.
3057 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3058 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3059 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3060 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3061 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3063 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3065 unsigned char *list;
3066 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3067 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3068 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3070 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3072 found_uncompressed = 1;
3076 if (!found_uncompressed)
3078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3082 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3083 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3085 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3086 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3087 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3088 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3090 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3091 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3093 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3094 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3096 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3098 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3099 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3102 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3103 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3104 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3105 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3107 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3108 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3113 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3116 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3117 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3120 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3121 * there is no response.
3123 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3125 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3126 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3128 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3129 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3132 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3133 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3137 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3138 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3144 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3145 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3148 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3149 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3152 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3153 s->servername_done=0;
3159 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3162 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3164 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3166 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3170 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3178 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3179 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3180 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3182 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3183 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3184 * extension, if any.
3185 * len: the length of the session ID.
3186 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3187 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3188 * point to the resulting session.
3190 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3191 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3192 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3195 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3196 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3197 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3198 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3199 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3200 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3201 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3204 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3205 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3206 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3207 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3208 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3209 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3211 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3212 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3214 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3215 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3219 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3221 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3222 * to permit stateful resumption.
3224 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3226 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3230 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3238 /* Skip past cipher list */
3243 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3248 /* Now at start of extensions */
3249 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3252 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3254 unsigned short type, size;
3257 if (p + size > limit)
3259 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3264 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3265 * currently have one. */
3266 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3269 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3271 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3272 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3273 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3274 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3275 * calculate the master secret later. */
3278 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3281 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3282 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3284 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3286 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3287 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3289 default: /* fatal error */
3298 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3300 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3301 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3302 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3303 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3304 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3305 * point to the resulting session.
3308 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3309 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3310 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3311 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3313 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3314 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3315 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3318 unsigned char *sdec;
3319 const unsigned char *p;
3320 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3321 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3324 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3325 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3328 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3329 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3330 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3331 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3333 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3334 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3345 /* Check key name matches */
3346 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3348 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3349 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3350 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3351 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3353 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3354 * integrity checks on ticket.
3356 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3359 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3363 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3364 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3365 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3366 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3367 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3369 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3370 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3371 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3372 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3373 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3376 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3379 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3380 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3383 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3386 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3390 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3391 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3392 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3393 * as required by standard.
3396 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3397 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3405 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3410 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3418 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3419 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3420 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3421 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3422 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3423 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3424 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3427 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3428 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3429 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3430 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3433 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3436 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3438 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3444 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3447 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3449 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3450 return table[i].nid;
3455 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3460 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3461 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3464 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3467 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3468 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3472 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3474 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3475 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3478 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3482 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3483 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3491 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3495 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3496 return EVP_sha224();
3498 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3499 return EVP_sha256();
3501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3502 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3503 return EVP_sha384();
3505 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3506 return EVP_sha512();
3514 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3518 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3519 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3520 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3523 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3524 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3526 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3527 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3528 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3534 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3535 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3536 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3538 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3539 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3541 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3543 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3544 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3546 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3548 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3550 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3551 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3553 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3557 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3558 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3559 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3561 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3564 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3565 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3566 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3567 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3569 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3570 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3571 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3573 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3574 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3576 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3578 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3580 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3585 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3586 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3587 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3589 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3600 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3601 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3603 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3604 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3606 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3608 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3609 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3611 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3612 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3614 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3615 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3617 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3618 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3620 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3622 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3623 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3626 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3627 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3631 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3632 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3638 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3639 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3641 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3644 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3647 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3648 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3649 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3654 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3656 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3662 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3663 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3664 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3666 /* Should never happen */
3670 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3671 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3672 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3673 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3675 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3676 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3678 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3680 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3681 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3683 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3684 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3686 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3688 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3690 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3693 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3694 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3695 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3696 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3697 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3699 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3700 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3706 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3707 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3709 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3710 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3712 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3713 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3714 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3715 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3717 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3718 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3723 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3724 * use the certificate for signing.
3726 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3728 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3729 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3731 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3732 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3733 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3736 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3738 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3739 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3743 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3744 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3751 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3752 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3753 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3755 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3761 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3768 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3770 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3773 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3774 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3775 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3777 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3778 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3782 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3784 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3786 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3788 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3790 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3791 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3795 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3797 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3799 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3800 unsigned short hbtype;
3801 unsigned int payload;
3802 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3804 if (s->msg_callback)
3805 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3806 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3807 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3809 /* Read type and payload length first */
3810 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3811 return 0; /* silently discard */
3814 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3815 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3818 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3820 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3823 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3824 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3825 * payload, plus padding
3827 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3830 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3831 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3833 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3835 /* Random padding */
3836 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3838 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3840 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3841 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3842 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3843 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3845 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3850 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3854 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3855 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3856 * sequence number */
3859 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3862 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3870 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3872 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3874 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3875 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3877 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3878 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3879 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3881 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3885 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3886 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3888 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3892 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3893 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3895 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3899 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3900 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3902 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3904 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3905 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3906 * some random stuff.
3907 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3908 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3909 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3910 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3913 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3916 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3917 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3919 /* Sequence number */
3920 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3921 /* 16 random bytes */
3922 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3924 /* Random padding */
3925 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3927 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3930 if (s->msg_callback)
3931 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3932 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3933 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3935 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3944 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3949 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3952 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3954 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3957 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3958 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3960 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3962 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3964 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3972 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3973 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3974 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3975 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3976 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3977 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3980 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3981 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3982 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3983 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3986 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3988 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3989 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3992 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3993 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3997 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3998 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3999 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4003 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4007 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4010 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4012 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4017 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4018 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4020 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4022 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4023 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4024 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4025 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4027 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4035 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4036 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4037 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4038 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4042 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4043 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4044 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4045 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4051 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4055 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4059 if (default_nid == -1)
4061 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4063 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4064 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4065 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4069 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4070 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4074 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4075 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4077 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4083 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4084 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4085 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4086 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4089 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4091 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4092 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4093 /* Strict mode flags */
4094 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4095 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4096 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4098 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4103 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4104 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4106 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4107 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4110 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4114 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4117 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4119 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4121 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4122 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4125 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4126 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4127 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4129 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4130 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4139 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4142 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4143 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4144 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4146 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4154 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4155 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4156 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4159 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4165 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4166 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4169 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4172 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4173 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4175 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4180 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4181 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4182 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4183 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4184 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4187 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4188 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4189 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4190 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4194 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4195 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4203 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4204 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4207 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4210 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4211 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4213 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4216 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4224 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4225 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4227 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4230 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4231 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4232 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4234 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4239 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4247 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4248 else if(check_flags)
4249 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4251 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4252 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4253 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4254 else if (!check_flags)
4257 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4258 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4259 else if (strict_mode)
4261 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4262 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4264 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4265 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4269 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4277 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4279 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4284 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4287 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4290 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4295 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4296 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4297 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4298 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4299 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4304 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4309 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4313 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4314 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4316 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4318 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4320 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4324 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4328 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4331 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4333 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4334 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4336 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4338 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4339 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4341 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4343 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4345 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4346 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4348 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4353 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4357 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4359 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4360 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4364 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4366 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4367 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4368 else if (cpk->digest)
4369 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4372 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4374 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4375 * if the chain is invalid.
4379 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4380 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4383 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4384 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4391 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4392 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4394 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4395 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4396 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4397 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4398 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4399 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4401 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4402 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4404 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);