2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
249 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
250 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
254 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
256 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
261 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
263 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
264 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
265 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
266 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
268 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
269 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
272 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
273 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
277 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
278 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
279 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
280 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
281 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
282 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
283 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
286 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
287 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
288 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
295 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
296 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
300 /* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */
301 static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] =
303 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
304 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
305 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
306 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
307 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
308 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
309 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
310 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
311 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
312 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
313 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
314 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
315 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
316 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
317 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
318 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
319 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
320 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
321 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
322 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
323 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
324 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
325 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
326 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
327 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
331 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
333 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
334 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
335 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
337 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
340 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
342 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
345 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
347 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
349 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
351 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
353 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
355 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
357 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
359 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
361 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
363 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
365 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
367 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
369 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
371 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
373 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
375 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
377 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
379 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
381 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
383 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
385 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
387 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
389 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
391 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
393 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
395 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
397 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
399 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
405 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
408 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
409 const unsigned char **pcurves,
414 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
415 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
418 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
419 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
421 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
422 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
423 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
426 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
427 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
431 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
432 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
436 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
437 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
444 *pcurves = fips_curves_default;
445 *pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
449 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
450 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
453 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
454 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
456 const unsigned char *curves;
458 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
459 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
461 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
464 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
467 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
469 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
472 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
474 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
477 else /* Should never happen */
480 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
481 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
483 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
489 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
490 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
494 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
496 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
497 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
499 /* Can't do anything on client side */
506 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
507 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
510 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
511 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
512 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
513 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
514 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
515 /* Should never happen */
518 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
521 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
523 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
528 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
530 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
531 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
533 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
537 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
538 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
549 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
550 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
552 unsigned char *clist, *p;
554 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
555 * while curve ids < 32
557 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
558 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
561 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
563 unsigned long idmask;
565 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
567 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */
568 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25)
575 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
586 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
590 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
595 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
598 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
600 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
604 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
606 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
608 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
610 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
611 if (nid == NID_undef)
612 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
613 if (nid == NID_undef)
614 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
615 if (nid == NID_undef)
617 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
618 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
620 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
623 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
624 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
629 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
633 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
635 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
636 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
641 const EC_METHOD *meth;
644 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
645 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
648 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
651 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
655 /* Determine curve ID */
656 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
657 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
658 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
662 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
674 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
676 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
679 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
681 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
684 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
688 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
689 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
690 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
692 const unsigned char *p;
695 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
696 * is supported (see RFC4492).
698 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
700 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
701 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
702 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
712 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
713 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
715 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
716 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
718 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
723 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
730 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
733 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
735 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
737 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
738 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
742 *pformats = ecformats_default;
743 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
745 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
747 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
751 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
752 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
754 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
756 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
759 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
762 /* If not EC nothing to do */
763 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
768 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
772 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
773 * supported curves extension.
775 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
778 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
779 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
781 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
788 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
789 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
790 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
791 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
792 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
794 return 0; /* Should never happen */
795 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
796 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
798 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
802 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
803 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
805 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
810 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
811 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
813 unsigned char curve_id[2];
814 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
815 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
816 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
817 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
820 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
821 * no other curves permitted.
825 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
826 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
827 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
828 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
829 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
833 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
834 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
836 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
837 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
839 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
842 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
845 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
847 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
853 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
855 /* Need a shared curve */
856 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
862 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
867 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
869 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
873 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
879 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
884 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
888 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
889 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
892 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
893 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
895 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
898 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
899 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
901 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
904 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
905 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
907 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
910 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
911 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
912 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
913 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
915 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
917 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
918 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
921 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
922 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
925 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
929 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
930 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
931 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
934 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
936 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
940 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
942 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
943 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
944 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
946 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
947 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
950 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
951 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
955 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
956 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
958 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
959 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
961 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
963 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
964 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
968 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
969 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
972 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
973 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
975 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
976 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
978 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
979 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
980 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
981 /* Should never happen */
984 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
985 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
991 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
993 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
994 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
995 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
997 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1002 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1007 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
1009 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1012 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1016 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1018 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1021 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1029 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1033 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1034 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1037 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1040 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1041 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1046 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1052 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1055 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1056 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1059 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1060 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1061 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1062 * session and not global settings.
1065 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1068 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1069 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1070 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1073 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1074 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1075 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1078 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1079 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1082 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1083 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1087 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1088 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1093 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1098 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1104 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1105 * signature algorithms.
1109 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1110 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1114 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1115 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1119 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1120 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1123 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1125 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1126 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1129 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1130 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1131 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1133 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1134 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1136 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1138 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1140 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1141 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1147 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1150 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1151 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1152 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1153 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1155 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1158 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1159 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1161 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1163 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1165 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1166 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1167 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1168 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1177 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1178 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1179 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1184 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1186 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1188 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1189 unsigned long size_str;
1192 /* check for enough space.
1193 4 for the servername type and entension length
1194 2 for servernamelist length
1195 1 for the hostname type
1196 2 for hostname length
1200 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1201 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1204 /* extension type and length */
1205 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1206 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1208 /* length of servername list */
1209 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1211 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1212 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1214 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1218 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1223 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1229 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1231 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1234 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1244 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1245 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1246 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1248 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1249 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1255 /* check for enough space.
1256 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1257 1 for the srp user identity
1258 + srp user identity length
1260 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1262 /* fill in the extension */
1263 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1264 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1265 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1266 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1274 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1276 const unsigned char *plist;
1279 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1281 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1282 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1289 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1290 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1291 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1292 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1295 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1296 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1297 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1299 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1300 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1301 if (plistlen > 65532)
1303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1307 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1308 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1310 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1311 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1312 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1313 * resolves this to two bytes.
1316 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1319 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1321 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1324 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1325 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1326 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1327 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1329 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1330 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1331 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1333 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1334 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1336 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1340 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1341 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1343 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1346 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1347 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1351 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1357 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1360 const unsigned char *salg;
1361 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1362 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1364 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1365 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1367 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1371 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1372 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1374 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1376 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1378 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1381 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1384 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1389 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1392 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1396 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1398 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1399 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1405 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1407 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1414 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1416 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1418 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1419 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1421 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1423 /* save position of id len */
1424 unsigned char *q = ret;
1425 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1426 /* skip over id len */
1428 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1434 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1438 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1439 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1441 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1444 * 1: peer may send requests
1445 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1447 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1448 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1450 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1454 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1456 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1457 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1458 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1460 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1465 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1467 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1469 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1470 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1471 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1472 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1473 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1474 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1477 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1481 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1483 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1485 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1488 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1495 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1496 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1497 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1500 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1501 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1503 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1504 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1506 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1508 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1509 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1510 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1511 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1513 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1515 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1517 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1523 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1525 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1530 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1533 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1537 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1540 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1541 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1543 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1546 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1547 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1548 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1549 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1551 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1552 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1556 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1558 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1560 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1562 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1566 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1570 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1576 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1578 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1581 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1593 const unsigned char *plist;
1595 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1598 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1600 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1601 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1608 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1609 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1610 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1611 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1615 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1616 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1618 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1619 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1621 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1622 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1626 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1628 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1629 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1633 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1634 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1636 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1638 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1640 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1643 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1646 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1655 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1657 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1659 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1662 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1670 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1671 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1672 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1673 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1674 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1675 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1676 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1677 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1678 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1679 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1680 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1686 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1687 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1689 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1691 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1694 * 1: peer may send requests
1695 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1697 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1698 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1700 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1706 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1707 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1708 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1710 const unsigned char *npa;
1711 unsigned int npalen;
1714 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1715 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1717 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1718 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1720 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1722 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1726 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1729 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1731 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1732 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1734 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1736 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1740 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1744 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1747 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1752 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1753 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1754 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1759 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1760 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1761 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1762 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1764 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1765 unsigned short type, size;
1766 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1767 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1768 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1769 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1770 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1771 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1772 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1774 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1775 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1776 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1777 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1780 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1781 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1782 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1783 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1784 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1785 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1786 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1787 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1788 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1789 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1792 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1801 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1804 if (data+size > d+n)
1808 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1810 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1811 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1813 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1815 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1817 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1822 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1824 if (data + len != d+n)
1826 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1830 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1832 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1834 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1836 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1837 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1838 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1841 * returns: 0 on success. */
1842 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1843 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1847 const unsigned char *selected;
1848 unsigned char selected_len;
1851 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1857 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1858 * length-prefixed strings. */
1859 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1860 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1869 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1871 proto_len = data[i];
1877 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1883 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1884 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1885 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1886 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1887 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1888 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1889 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1891 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1894 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1895 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1900 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1904 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1906 unsigned short type;
1907 unsigned short size;
1909 unsigned char *data = *p;
1910 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1913 s->servername_done = 0;
1914 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1916 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1919 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1921 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1922 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1926 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1927 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1931 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1932 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1933 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1935 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1936 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1938 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1939 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1941 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1942 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1944 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1945 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1947 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1948 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1950 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1951 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1954 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1958 if (data > (d+n-len))
1961 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1966 if (data+size > (d+n))
1969 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1971 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1972 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1973 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1974 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1976 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1977 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1978 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1979 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1980 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1981 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1982 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1983 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1984 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1985 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1986 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1987 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1988 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1989 the value of the Host: field.
1990 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1991 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1992 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1993 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1997 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1999 unsigned char *sdata;
2005 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2012 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2019 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2025 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2028 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2029 switch (servname_type)
2031 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2034 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2036 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2039 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2041 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2044 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2046 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2049 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2050 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2051 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2052 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2053 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2054 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2057 s->servername_done = 1;
2061 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2062 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2063 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2075 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2080 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2081 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2083 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2085 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2088 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2090 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2093 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2095 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2096 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2098 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2100 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2107 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2109 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2110 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2112 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2113 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2115 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2120 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2122 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2123 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2125 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2126 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2128 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2131 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2132 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2135 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2136 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2137 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2138 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2139 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2142 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2144 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2145 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2146 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2148 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2149 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2151 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2156 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2158 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2161 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2162 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2164 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2167 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2168 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2171 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2172 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2173 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2174 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2175 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2178 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2179 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2180 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2182 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2186 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2189 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2190 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2192 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2196 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2197 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2198 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2199 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2201 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2202 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2204 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2209 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2211 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2212 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2214 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2218 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2220 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2222 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2224 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2227 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2229 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2234 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2236 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2239 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2241 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2244 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2247 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2250 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2251 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2255 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2260 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2264 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2266 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2268 const unsigned char *sdata;
2270 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2275 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2284 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2288 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2292 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2297 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2301 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2306 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2307 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2310 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2311 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2312 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2314 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2315 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2318 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2319 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2321 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2322 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2327 /* Read in request_extensions */
2330 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2337 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2343 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2345 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2346 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2349 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2350 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2352 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2353 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2355 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2360 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2364 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2367 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2371 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2372 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2374 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2375 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2376 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2378 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2384 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2385 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2386 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2388 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2391 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2392 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2393 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2394 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2395 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2396 * anything like that, but this might change).
2398 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2399 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2400 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2401 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2402 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2403 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2407 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2408 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2409 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2411 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2414 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2415 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2419 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2420 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2422 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2426 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2427 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2428 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2429 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2430 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2434 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2445 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2447 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2448 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2450 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2452 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2455 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2456 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2457 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2462 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2465 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2466 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2468 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2472 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2481 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2482 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2483 * the length of the block. */
2484 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2486 unsigned int off = 0;
2500 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2502 unsigned short length;
2503 unsigned short type;
2504 unsigned short size;
2505 unsigned char *data = *p;
2506 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2507 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2509 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2510 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2513 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2515 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2516 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2520 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2521 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2524 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2528 if (data+length != d+n)
2530 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2534 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2539 if (data+size > (d+n))
2542 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2543 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2544 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2546 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2548 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2550 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2553 tlsext_servername = 1;
2556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2557 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2559 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2560 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2562 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2564 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2569 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2570 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2571 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2573 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2576 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2577 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2580 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2581 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2582 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2583 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2584 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2587 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2589 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2591 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2592 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2594 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2597 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2600 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2603 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2605 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2606 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2608 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2612 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2615 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2616 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2618 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2622 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2623 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2624 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2625 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2627 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2629 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2631 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2636 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2638 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2639 * a status request message.
2641 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2643 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2646 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2647 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2650 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2651 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2653 unsigned char *selected;
2654 unsigned char selected_len;
2656 /* We must have requested it. */
2657 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2659 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2662 /* The data must be valid */
2663 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2665 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2668 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2670 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2673 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2674 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2676 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2679 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2680 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2681 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2685 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2689 /* We must have requested it. */
2690 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2692 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2697 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2700 /* The extension data consists of:
2701 * uint16 list_length
2702 * uint8 proto_length;
2703 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2707 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2709 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2713 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2715 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2718 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2719 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2720 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2721 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2723 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2726 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2727 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2730 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2732 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2734 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2737 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2741 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2742 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2744 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2745 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2746 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2748 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2753 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2755 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2759 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2760 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2762 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2770 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2774 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2776 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2778 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2780 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2781 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2783 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2789 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2799 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2800 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2801 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2802 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2803 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2804 * absence on initial connect only.
2806 if (!renegotiate_seen
2807 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2808 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2810 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2812 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2820 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2823 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2827 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2829 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2834 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2836 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2837 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2839 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2840 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2842 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2843 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2848 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2852 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2853 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2860 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2865 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2867 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2868 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2871 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2872 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2874 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2875 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2879 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2880 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2881 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2882 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2884 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2886 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2887 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2888 * so this has to happen here in
2889 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2893 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2895 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2898 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2899 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2904 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2905 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2906 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2908 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2910 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2911 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2913 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2914 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2916 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2917 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2919 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2920 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2922 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2923 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2926 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2930 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2932 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2933 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2934 * abort the handshake.
2936 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2937 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2945 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2946 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2949 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2950 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2953 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2954 s->servername_done=0;
2960 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2962 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2965 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2966 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2967 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2968 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2970 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2973 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2974 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2975 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2976 if (certpkey == NULL)
2978 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2981 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2982 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2984 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2985 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2988 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2989 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2990 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2992 /* status request response should be sent */
2993 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2994 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2995 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2997 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2999 /* something bad happened */
3000 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3001 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3002 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3007 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3012 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3013 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3016 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3017 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3025 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3027 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3028 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3031 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3032 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3033 * it must contain uncompressed.
3035 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3036 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3037 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3038 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3039 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3041 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3043 unsigned char *list;
3044 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3045 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3046 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3048 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3050 found_uncompressed = 1;
3054 if (!found_uncompressed)
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3060 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3061 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3063 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3064 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3065 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3066 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3068 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3069 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3071 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3072 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3074 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3076 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3077 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3080 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3081 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3082 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3083 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3085 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3086 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3091 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3094 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3095 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3098 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3099 * there is no response.
3101 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3103 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3104 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3106 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3107 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3110 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3111 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3115 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3116 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3122 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3123 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3126 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3127 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3130 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3131 s->servername_done=0;
3137 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3140 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3142 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3144 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3148 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3156 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3157 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3158 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3160 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3161 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3162 * extension, if any.
3163 * len: the length of the session ID.
3164 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3165 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3166 * point to the resulting session.
3168 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3169 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3170 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3173 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3174 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3175 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3176 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3177 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3178 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3179 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3182 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3183 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3184 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3185 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3186 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3187 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3189 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3190 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3192 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3193 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3197 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3199 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3200 * to permit stateful resumption.
3202 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3204 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3208 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3216 /* Skip past cipher list */
3221 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3226 /* Now at start of extensions */
3227 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3230 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3232 unsigned short type, size;
3235 if (p + size > limit)
3237 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3242 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3243 * currently have one. */
3244 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3247 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3249 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3250 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3251 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3252 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3253 * calculate the master secret later. */
3256 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3259 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3260 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3262 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3264 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3265 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3267 default: /* fatal error */
3276 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3278 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3279 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3280 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3281 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3282 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3283 * point to the resulting session.
3286 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3287 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3288 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3289 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3291 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3292 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3293 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3296 unsigned char *sdec;
3297 const unsigned char *p;
3298 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3299 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3302 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3303 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3306 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3307 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3308 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3309 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3311 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3312 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3323 /* Check key name matches */
3324 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3326 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3327 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3328 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3329 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3331 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3332 * integrity checks on ticket.
3334 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3337 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3341 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3342 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3343 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3344 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3345 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3347 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3348 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3349 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3350 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3351 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3354 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3357 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3358 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3360 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3365 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3368 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3372 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3373 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3374 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3375 * as required by standard.
3378 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3379 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3387 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3392 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3400 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3401 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3402 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3403 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3404 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3405 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3406 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3409 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3410 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3411 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3412 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3415 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3418 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3420 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3426 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3429 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3431 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3432 return table[i].nid;
3437 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3442 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3443 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3446 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3449 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3450 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3454 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3456 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3457 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3460 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3465 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3473 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3477 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3478 return EVP_sha224();
3480 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3481 return EVP_sha256();
3483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3484 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3485 return EVP_sha384();
3487 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3488 return EVP_sha512();
3496 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3501 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3502 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3505 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3506 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3509 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3510 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3516 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3517 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3518 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3520 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3521 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3523 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3525 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3526 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3528 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3530 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3532 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3533 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3535 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3539 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3540 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3541 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3543 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3546 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3547 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3548 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3549 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3551 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3552 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3553 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3555 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3556 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3558 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3560 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3562 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3567 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3568 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3569 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3571 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3582 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3583 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3585 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3586 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3588 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3590 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3591 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3593 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3594 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3596 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3597 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3599 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3600 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3602 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3604 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3605 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3608 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3609 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3613 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3614 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3620 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3621 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3623 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3626 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3629 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3630 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3631 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3636 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3638 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3644 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3645 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3646 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3648 /* Should never happen */
3652 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3653 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3654 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3655 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3657 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3658 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3660 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3662 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3663 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3665 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3666 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3668 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3670 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3672 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3675 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3676 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3677 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3678 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3679 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3681 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3682 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3688 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3689 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3691 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3692 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3694 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3695 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3696 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3697 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3699 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3700 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3705 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3706 * use the certificate for signing.
3708 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3710 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3711 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3714 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3715 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3718 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3720 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3721 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3725 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3726 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3733 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3734 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3735 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3737 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3743 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3750 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3752 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3755 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3756 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3757 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3759 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3760 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3764 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3766 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3768 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3770 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3772 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3773 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3779 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3781 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3782 unsigned short hbtype;
3783 unsigned int payload;
3784 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3786 if (s->msg_callback)
3787 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3788 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3789 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3791 /* Read type and payload length first */
3792 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3793 return 0; /* silently discard */
3796 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3797 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3800 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3802 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3805 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3806 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3807 * payload, plus padding
3809 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3812 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3813 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3815 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3817 /* Random padding */
3818 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3820 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3822 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3823 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3824 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3825 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3827 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3832 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3836 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3837 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3838 * sequence number */
3841 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3844 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3852 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3854 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3856 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3857 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3859 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3860 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3861 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3863 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3867 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3868 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3870 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3874 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3875 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3881 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3882 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3884 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3886 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3887 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3888 * some random stuff.
3889 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3890 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3891 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3892 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3895 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3898 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3899 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3901 /* Sequence number */
3902 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3903 /* 16 random bytes */
3904 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3906 /* Random padding */
3907 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3909 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3912 if (s->msg_callback)
3913 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3914 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3915 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3917 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3926 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3931 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3934 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3936 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3939 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3940 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3942 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3944 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3946 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3954 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3955 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3956 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3957 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3958 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3959 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3962 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3963 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3964 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3965 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3968 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3970 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3971 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3974 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3975 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3979 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3980 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3981 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3985 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3989 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3992 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3994 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3999 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4000 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4002 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4004 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4005 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4006 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4007 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4009 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4017 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4018 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4019 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4020 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4024 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4025 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4026 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4027 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4033 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4037 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4041 if (default_nid == -1)
4043 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4045 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4046 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4047 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4051 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4052 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4056 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4057 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4059 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4065 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4066 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4067 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4068 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4071 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4073 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4074 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4075 /* Strict mode flags */
4076 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4077 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4078 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4080 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4085 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4086 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4088 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4089 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4092 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4096 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4099 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4101 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4103 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4104 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4107 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4108 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4109 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4111 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4112 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4121 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4124 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4125 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4126 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4128 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4136 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4137 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4138 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4141 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4147 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4148 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4151 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4154 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4155 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4157 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4162 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4163 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4164 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4165 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4166 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4169 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4170 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4171 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4172 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4176 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4177 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4185 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4186 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4189 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4192 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4193 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4195 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4198 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4206 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4207 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4209 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4212 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4213 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4214 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4216 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4221 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4229 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4230 else if(check_flags)
4231 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4233 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4234 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4235 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4236 else if (!check_flags)
4239 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4240 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4241 else if (strict_mode)
4243 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4244 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4246 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4247 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4251 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4259 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4261 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4266 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4269 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4272 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4277 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4278 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4279 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4280 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4281 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4286 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4291 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4295 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4296 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4298 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4300 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4302 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4306 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4310 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4313 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4315 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4316 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4318 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4320 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4321 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4323 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4325 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4327 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4328 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4330 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4335 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4339 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4341 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4342 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4346 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4348 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4349 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4350 else if (cpk->digest)
4351 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4354 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4356 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4357 * if the chain is invalid.
4361 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4362 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4365 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4366 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4373 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4374 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4376 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4377 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4378 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4379 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4380 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4381 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4383 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4384 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4386 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);