2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
182 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
183 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
187 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
189 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
190 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
196 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
197 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
201 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
204 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
206 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
208 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
212 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
215 s->version = s->method->version;
218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
220 static int nid_list[] =
222 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
225 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
226 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
227 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
228 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
229 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
230 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
231 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
232 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
233 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
234 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
235 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
236 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
237 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
238 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
239 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
240 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
241 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
242 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
243 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
244 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
245 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
246 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
250 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
252 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
253 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
254 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
257 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
259 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
260 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
261 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
262 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
263 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
264 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
265 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
266 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
267 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
268 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
269 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
270 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
271 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
272 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
273 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
274 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
275 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
276 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
277 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
278 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
279 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
280 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
281 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
282 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
283 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
286 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
288 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
289 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
292 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
294 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
295 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
296 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
298 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
301 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
303 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
306 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
308 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
310 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
312 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
314 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
316 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
318 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
320 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
322 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
324 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
326 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
328 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
330 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
332 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
334 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
336 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
338 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
340 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
342 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
344 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
346 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
348 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
350 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
352 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
354 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
360 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
363 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
364 const unsigned char **pcurves,
369 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
370 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
373 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
374 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
376 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
377 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
378 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
381 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
382 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
386 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
387 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
391 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
392 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
396 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
397 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
400 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
401 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
403 const unsigned char *curves;
405 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
406 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
408 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
411 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
414 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
416 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
419 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
421 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
424 else /* Should never happen */
427 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
428 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
430 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
436 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
437 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
441 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
443 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
444 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
446 /* Can't do anything on client side */
453 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
454 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
457 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
458 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
459 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
460 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
461 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
462 /* Should never happen */
465 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
470 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
475 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
477 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
478 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
480 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
484 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
485 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
496 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
497 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
499 unsigned char *clist, *p;
501 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
502 * while curve ids < 32
504 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
505 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
508 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
510 unsigned long idmask;
512 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
514 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
525 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
529 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
534 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
537 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
539 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
543 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
545 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
547 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
549 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
550 if (nid == NID_undef)
551 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
552 if (nid == NID_undef)
553 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
554 if (nid == NID_undef)
556 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
557 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
559 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
562 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
563 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
568 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
572 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
574 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
575 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
581 const EC_METHOD *meth;
584 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
585 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
586 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
589 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
592 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
596 /* Determine curve ID */
597 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
598 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
599 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
603 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
615 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
618 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
620 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
623 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
627 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
628 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
629 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
631 const unsigned char *p;
634 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
635 * is supported (see RFC4492).
637 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
639 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
640 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
641 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
651 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
652 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
654 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
655 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
657 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
662 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
669 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
672 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
674 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
676 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
677 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
681 *pformats = ecformats_default;
682 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
684 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
686 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
690 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
691 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
693 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
695 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
698 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
701 /* If not EC nothing to do */
702 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
707 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
711 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
712 * supported curves extension.
714 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
717 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
718 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
720 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
727 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
728 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
729 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
730 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
731 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
733 return 0; /* Should never happen */
734 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
735 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
737 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
741 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
742 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
744 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
749 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
750 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
752 unsigned char curve_id[2];
753 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
754 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
755 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
756 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
759 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
760 * no other curves permitted.
764 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
765 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
766 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
767 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
768 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
772 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
773 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
775 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
776 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
778 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
781 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
784 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
786 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
792 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
794 /* Need a shared curve */
795 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
801 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
806 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
808 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
812 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
818 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
823 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
827 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
828 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
831 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
832 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
834 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
837 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
838 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
840 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
843 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
844 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
846 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
849 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
850 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
851 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
852 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
854 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
856 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
857 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
860 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
861 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
864 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
866 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
867 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
871 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
872 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
873 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
876 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
878 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
882 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
884 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
885 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
886 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
888 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
889 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
892 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
893 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
897 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
898 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
900 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
901 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
903 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
905 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
906 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
910 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
912 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
914 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
917 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
920 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
921 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
923 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
924 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
926 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
927 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
928 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
929 /* Should never happen */
932 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
933 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
939 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
941 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
942 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
943 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
945 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
950 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
955 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
957 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
960 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
964 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
966 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
969 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
977 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
981 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
982 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
983 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
985 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
988 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
989 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
991 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
994 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1000 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1003 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1004 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1007 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1008 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1009 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1010 * session and not global settings.
1013 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1016 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1017 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1018 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1021 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
1022 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1023 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1026 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1027 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1030 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1031 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1036 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1041 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1045 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1046 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1052 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1053 * signature algorithms.
1057 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1058 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1062 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1063 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1067 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1068 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1071 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1073 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1074 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1077 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1078 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1079 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1081 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1082 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1084 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1088 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1089 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1091 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1092 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1101 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1104 unsigned char *ret = p;
1105 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1106 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1108 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1111 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1112 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1114 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1116 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1118 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1119 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1120 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1121 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1130 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1131 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1132 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1137 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1139 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1141 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1142 unsigned long size_str;
1145 /* check for enough space.
1146 4 for the servername type and entension length
1147 2 for servernamelist length
1148 1 for the hostname type
1149 2 for hostname length
1153 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1154 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1157 /* extension type and length */
1158 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1159 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1161 /* length of servername list */
1162 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1164 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1165 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1167 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1171 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1176 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1182 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1184 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1187 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1197 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1198 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1199 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1201 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1202 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1208 /* check for enough space.
1209 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1210 1 for the srp user identity
1211 + srp user identity length
1213 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1215 /* fill in the extension */
1216 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1217 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1218 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1219 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1227 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1229 const unsigned char *plist;
1232 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1234 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1235 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1242 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1243 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1244 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1245 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1248 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1249 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1250 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1252 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1253 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1254 if (plistlen > 65532)
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1260 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1261 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1263 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1264 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1265 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1266 * resolves this to two bytes.
1269 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1272 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1274 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1277 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1278 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1279 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1280 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1282 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1283 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1284 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1286 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1287 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1289 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1293 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1294 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1296 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1299 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1300 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1304 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1310 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1313 const unsigned char *salg;
1314 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1315 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1317 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1318 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1320 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1324 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1325 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1327 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1329 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1331 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1334 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1337 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1342 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1345 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1349 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1351 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1352 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1358 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1360 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1367 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1368 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1369 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1371 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1372 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1374 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1376 /* save position of id len */
1377 unsigned char *q = ret;
1378 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1379 /* skip over id len */
1381 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1387 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1391 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1392 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1395 * 1: peer may send requests
1396 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1398 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1399 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1401 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1405 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1407 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1408 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1409 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1411 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1416 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1420 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1422 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1424 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1427 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1435 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1436 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1437 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1438 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1439 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1440 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1442 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1443 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1445 if (limit < ret + 6)
1448 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1449 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1451 *(ret++) = list_len;
1452 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1455 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1456 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1459 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1461 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1463 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1464 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1466 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1467 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1468 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1472 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1476 return NULL; /* error */
1477 if (cb_retval == -1)
1478 continue; /* skip this extension */
1480 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1482 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1484 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1489 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1496 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1499 unsigned char *ret = p;
1500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1501 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1504 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1505 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1506 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1507 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1509 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1510 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1514 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1516 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1518 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1520 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1524 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1528 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1534 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1536 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1539 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1548 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1551 const unsigned char *plist;
1553 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1556 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1558 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1559 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1566 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1567 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1568 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1569 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1573 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1574 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1576 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1577 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1579 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1580 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1584 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1586 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1587 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1591 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1592 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1594 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1596 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1598 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1601 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1604 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1613 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1615 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1617 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1620 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1628 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1629 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1630 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1631 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1632 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1633 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1634 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1635 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1636 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1637 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1638 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1644 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1645 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1647 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1650 * 1: peer may send requests
1651 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1653 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1654 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1656 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1661 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1662 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1663 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1664 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1666 const unsigned char *npa;
1667 unsigned int npalen;
1670 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1671 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1673 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1674 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1676 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1678 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1683 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1685 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1687 size_t authz_length;
1688 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1689 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1690 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1691 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1692 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1694 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1696 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1697 * uint8_t authz_type
1699 * uint8_t data[length]
1701 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1702 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1704 unsigned short length;
1708 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1710 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1714 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1722 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1723 * 2 bytes for extension type
1724 * 2 bytes for extension length
1725 * 1 byte for the list length
1726 * n bytes for the list */
1727 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1729 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1730 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1732 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1733 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1737 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1739 unsigned short length;
1744 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1746 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1749 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1756 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1757 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1761 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1764 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1766 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1768 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1769 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1771 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1772 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1775 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1778 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1782 return NULL; /* error */
1783 if (cb_retval == -1)
1784 break; /* skip this extension */
1785 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1787 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1789 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1797 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1805 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1806 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1807 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1812 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1813 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1814 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1815 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1817 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1818 unsigned short type, size;
1819 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1820 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1821 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1822 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1823 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1824 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1825 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1827 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1828 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1829 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1830 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1833 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1834 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1835 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1836 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1837 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1838 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1839 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1840 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1841 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1842 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1845 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1854 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1857 if (data+size > d+n)
1861 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1863 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1864 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1866 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1868 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1870 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1875 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1877 if (data + len != d+n)
1879 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1883 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1885 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1887 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1889 unsigned short type;
1890 unsigned short size;
1892 unsigned char *data = *p;
1893 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1896 s->servername_done = 0;
1897 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1899 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1902 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1903 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1904 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1906 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
1907 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1911 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1912 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1916 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1917 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1918 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1920 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1921 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1923 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1924 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1926 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1927 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1929 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1930 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1932 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1933 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1935 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1936 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1939 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1943 if (data > (d+n-len))
1946 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1951 if (data+size > (d+n))
1954 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1956 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1957 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1958 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1959 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1961 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1962 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1963 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1964 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1965 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1966 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1967 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1968 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1969 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1970 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1971 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1972 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1973 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1974 the value of the Host: field.
1975 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1976 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1977 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1978 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1982 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1984 unsigned char *sdata;
1990 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1997 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2004 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2010 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2013 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2014 switch (servname_type)
2016 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2019 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2021 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2024 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2026 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2029 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2031 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2034 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2035 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2036 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2037 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2038 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2039 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2042 s->servername_done = 1;
2046 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2047 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2048 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2060 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2065 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2066 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2068 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2070 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2073 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2075 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2078 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2080 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2081 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2083 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2085 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2092 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2094 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2095 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2097 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2098 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2100 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2105 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2107 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2108 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2110 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2111 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2113 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2116 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2117 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2120 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2121 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2122 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2123 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2124 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2127 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2129 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2130 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2131 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2133 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2134 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2136 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2141 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2143 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2146 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2147 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2149 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2152 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2153 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2156 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2157 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2158 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2159 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2160 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2163 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2164 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2165 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2167 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2171 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2174 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2175 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2177 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2181 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2182 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2183 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2184 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2186 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2187 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2189 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2194 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2196 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2197 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2199 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2203 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2205 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2207 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2209 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2212 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2214 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2219 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2221 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2224 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2226 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2229 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2232 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2235 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2236 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2240 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
2241 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2246 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2250 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2252 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2254 const unsigned char *sdata;
2256 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2261 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2270 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2274 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2278 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2283 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2287 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2292 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2293 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2296 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2297 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2298 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2300 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2301 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2304 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2305 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2307 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2308 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2313 /* Read in request_extensions */
2316 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2323 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2329 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2331 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2332 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2335 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2336 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2338 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2339 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2341 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2346 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2350 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2353 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2357 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2358 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2360 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2361 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2362 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2364 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2370 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2371 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2373 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2376 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2377 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2378 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2379 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2380 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2381 * anything like that, but this might change).
2383 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2384 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2385 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2386 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2387 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2388 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2392 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2393 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2395 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2400 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2402 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2403 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2407 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2411 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2413 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2415 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2419 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2420 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2421 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2424 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2425 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2426 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2427 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2428 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2430 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2434 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2435 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2436 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2438 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2440 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2441 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2442 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2443 1 /* element size */,
2446 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2449 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2450 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2452 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2459 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2460 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2461 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2462 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2463 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2465 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2467 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2469 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2471 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2472 if (type == record->ext_type)
2476 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2477 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2479 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2481 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2486 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2487 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2490 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2491 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2492 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2493 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2494 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2495 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2497 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2498 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2501 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2502 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2514 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2516 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2517 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2519 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2521 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2524 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2525 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2526 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2531 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2534 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2536 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2540 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2548 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2549 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2550 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2551 * the length of the block. */
2552 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2554 unsigned int off = 0;
2568 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2570 unsigned short length;
2571 unsigned short type;
2572 unsigned short size;
2573 unsigned char *data = *p;
2574 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2575 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2578 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2582 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2583 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2586 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2590 if (data+length != d+n)
2592 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2596 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2601 if (data+size > (d+n))
2604 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2605 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2606 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2608 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2610 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2612 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2615 tlsext_servername = 1;
2618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2619 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2621 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2622 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2624 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2626 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2629 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2630 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2631 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2633 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2636 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2637 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2639 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2640 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2641 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2642 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2643 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2646 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2648 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2650 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2651 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2653 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2656 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2659 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2662 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2664 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2665 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2667 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2671 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2674 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2675 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2677 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2681 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2682 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2683 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2684 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2686 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2688 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2690 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2695 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2697 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2698 * a status request message.
2700 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2702 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2705 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2706 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2709 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2710 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2712 unsigned char *selected;
2713 unsigned char selected_len;
2715 /* We must have requested it. */
2716 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2718 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2721 /* The data must be valid */
2722 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2724 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2727 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2729 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2732 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2733 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2735 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2738 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2739 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2740 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2743 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2745 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2747 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2750 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2754 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2755 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2757 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2758 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2759 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2761 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2766 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2768 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2773 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2775 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2776 * an authz hello extension if the client
2777 * didn't request a proof. */
2778 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2779 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2781 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2783 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2789 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2793 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2794 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2796 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2800 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2801 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2802 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2803 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2805 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2809 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2812 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2813 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2815 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2818 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2820 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2822 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2823 if (record->ext_type == type)
2825 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2837 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2841 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2843 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2845 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2847 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2848 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2850 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2856 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2866 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2867 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2868 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2869 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2870 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2871 * absence on initial connect only.
2873 if (!renegotiate_seen
2874 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2875 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2877 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2879 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2887 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2890 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2894 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2896 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2901 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2903 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2904 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2906 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2907 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2909 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2910 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2915 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2919 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2920 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2927 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2932 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2934 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2935 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2938 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2939 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2941 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2942 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2946 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2947 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2948 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2949 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2951 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2953 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2954 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2955 * so this has to happen here in
2956 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2960 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2962 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2965 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2966 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2971 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2972 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2973 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2975 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2977 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2978 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2980 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2981 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2983 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2984 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2986 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2987 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2989 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2990 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2993 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2997 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2999 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3000 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3001 * abort the handshake.
3003 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3004 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3012 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3013 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3016 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3017 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3020 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3021 s->servername_done=0;
3027 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3029 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3032 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3033 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3034 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3035 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3037 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3040 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3041 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3042 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3043 if (certpkey == NULL)
3045 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3048 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3049 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3051 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3052 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3055 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3056 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3057 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3059 /* status request response should be sent */
3060 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3061 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3062 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3064 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3066 /* something bad happened */
3067 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3068 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3069 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3074 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3079 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3080 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3083 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3084 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3092 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3094 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3095 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3098 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3099 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3100 * it must contain uncompressed.
3102 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3103 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3104 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3105 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3106 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3108 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3110 unsigned char *list;
3111 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3112 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3113 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3115 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3117 found_uncompressed = 1;
3121 if (!found_uncompressed)
3123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3127 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3128 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3130 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3131 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3132 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3133 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3135 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3136 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3138 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3139 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3141 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3143 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3144 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3147 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3148 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3149 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3150 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3152 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3153 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3158 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3161 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3162 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3165 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3166 * there is no response.
3168 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3170 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3171 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3173 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3174 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3177 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3178 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3182 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3183 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3189 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3190 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3193 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3194 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3197 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3198 s->servername_done=0;
3204 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3207 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3209 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3211 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3215 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3223 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3224 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3225 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3227 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3228 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3229 * extension, if any.
3230 * len: the length of the session ID.
3231 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3232 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3233 * point to the resulting session.
3235 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3236 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3237 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3240 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3241 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3242 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3243 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3244 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3245 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3246 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3249 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3250 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3251 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3252 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3253 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3254 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3256 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3257 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3259 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3260 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3264 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3266 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3267 * to permit stateful resumption.
3269 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3271 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3275 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3283 /* Skip past cipher list */
3288 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3293 /* Now at start of extensions */
3294 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3297 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3299 unsigned short type, size;
3302 if (p + size > limit)
3304 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3309 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3310 * currently have one. */
3311 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3314 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3316 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3317 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3318 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3319 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3320 * calculate the master secret later. */
3323 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3326 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3327 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3329 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3331 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3332 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3334 default: /* fatal error */
3343 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3345 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3346 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3347 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3348 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3349 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3350 * point to the resulting session.
3353 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3354 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3355 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3356 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3358 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3359 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3360 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3363 unsigned char *sdec;
3364 const unsigned char *p;
3365 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3366 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3369 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3370 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3373 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3374 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3375 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3376 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3378 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3379 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3390 /* Check key name matches */
3391 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3393 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3394 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3395 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3396 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3398 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3399 * integrity checks on ticket.
3401 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3404 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3408 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3409 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3410 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3411 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3412 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3414 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3415 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3416 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3417 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3418 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3421 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3424 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3425 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3428 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3431 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3435 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3436 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3437 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3438 * as required by standard.
3441 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3442 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3450 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3455 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3463 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3464 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3465 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3466 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3467 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3468 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3469 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3472 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3473 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3474 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3475 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3478 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3481 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3483 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3489 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3492 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3494 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3495 return table[i].nid;
3500 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3505 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3506 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3509 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3512 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3513 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3517 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3519 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3520 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3523 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3528 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3536 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3540 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3541 return EVP_sha224();
3543 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3544 return EVP_sha256();
3546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3547 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3548 return EVP_sha384();
3550 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3551 return EVP_sha512();
3559 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3564 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3565 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3568 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3569 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3571 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3572 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3573 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3579 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3580 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3581 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3583 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3584 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3586 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3588 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3589 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3591 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3593 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3595 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3596 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3598 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3602 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3603 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3604 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3606 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3609 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3610 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3611 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3612 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3614 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3615 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3616 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3618 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3619 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3621 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3623 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3625 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3630 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3631 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3632 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3634 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3645 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3646 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3648 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3649 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3651 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3653 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3654 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3655 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3657 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3658 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3660 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3662 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3663 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3666 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3667 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3671 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3672 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3678 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3679 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3681 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3684 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3687 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3688 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3689 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3694 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3696 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3702 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3703 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3704 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3706 /* Should never happen */
3710 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3711 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3713 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3714 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3716 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3718 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3719 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3721 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3722 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3724 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3726 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3728 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3731 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3732 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3733 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3734 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3735 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3737 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3738 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3744 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3745 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3747 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3748 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3750 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3751 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3752 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3753 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3755 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3756 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3761 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3762 * use the certificate for signing.
3764 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3766 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3767 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3769 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3770 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3771 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3774 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3776 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3777 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3780 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3781 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3782 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3789 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3790 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3791 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3793 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3799 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3806 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3808 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3811 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3812 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3813 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3815 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3816 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3820 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3822 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3824 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3826 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3828 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3829 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3835 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3837 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3838 unsigned short hbtype;
3839 unsigned int payload;
3840 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3842 /* Read type and payload length first */
3847 if (s->msg_callback)
3848 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3849 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3850 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3852 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3854 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3857 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3858 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3859 * payload, plus padding
3861 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3864 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3865 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3867 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3869 /* Random padding */
3870 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3872 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3874 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3875 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3876 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3877 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3879 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3884 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3888 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3889 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3890 * sequence number */
3893 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3896 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3904 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3906 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3908 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3909 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3911 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3912 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3913 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3919 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3920 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3926 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3927 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3929 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3933 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3934 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3936 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3938 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3939 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3940 * some random stuff.
3941 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3942 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3943 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3944 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3947 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3950 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3951 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3953 /* Sequence number */
3954 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3955 /* 16 random bytes */
3956 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3958 /* Random padding */
3959 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3961 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3964 if (s->msg_callback)
3965 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3966 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3967 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3969 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3978 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3983 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3986 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3988 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3991 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3992 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3994 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3996 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3998 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4006 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4007 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4008 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4009 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4010 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4011 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4014 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4015 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4016 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4017 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4020 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4022 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4023 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4026 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4027 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4031 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4032 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4033 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4037 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4041 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4044 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4046 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4051 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4052 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4054 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4056 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4057 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4058 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4059 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4061 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4069 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4070 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4071 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4072 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4076 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4077 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4078 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4079 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4085 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4089 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4093 if (default_nid == -1)
4095 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4097 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4098 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4099 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4103 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4104 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4108 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4109 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4111 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4117 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4118 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4119 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4120 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4123 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4125 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4126 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4127 /* Strict mode flags */
4128 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4129 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4130 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4132 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4137 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4138 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4140 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4141 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4144 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4148 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4151 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4153 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4155 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4156 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4159 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4160 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4161 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4163 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4164 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4173 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4176 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4177 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4178 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4180 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4188 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4189 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4190 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4193 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4199 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4200 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4203 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4206 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4207 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4209 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4214 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4215 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4216 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4217 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4218 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4221 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4222 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4223 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4224 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4228 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4229 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4237 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4238 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4241 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4244 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4245 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4247 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4250 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4258 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4259 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4261 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4264 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4265 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4266 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4268 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4273 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4281 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4282 else if(check_flags)
4283 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4285 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4286 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4287 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4288 else if (!check_flags)
4291 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4292 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4293 else if (strict_mode)
4295 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4296 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4298 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4299 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4303 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4311 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4313 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4318 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4321 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4324 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4329 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4330 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4331 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4332 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4333 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4338 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4343 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4347 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4348 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4350 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4352 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4354 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4358 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4362 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4365 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4367 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4368 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4370 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4372 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4373 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4375 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4377 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4379 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4380 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4382 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4387 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4391 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4393 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4394 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4398 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4400 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4401 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4402 else if (cpk->digest)
4403 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4406 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4408 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4409 * if the chain is invalid.
4413 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4414 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4417 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4418 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4425 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4426 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4428 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4429 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4430 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4431 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4432 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4433 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4435 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4436 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4438 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);