2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
249 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
250 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
254 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
256 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
261 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
263 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
264 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
265 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
266 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
268 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
269 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
272 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
273 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
277 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
278 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
279 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
280 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
281 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
282 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
283 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
286 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
287 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
288 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
295 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
296 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
299 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
301 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
302 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
303 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
305 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
308 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
310 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
313 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
315 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
319 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
321 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
325 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
327 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
329 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
331 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
333 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
335 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
337 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
339 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
341 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
343 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
345 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
347 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
349 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
351 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
353 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
355 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
357 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
359 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
361 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
363 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
365 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
367 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
373 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
376 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
377 const unsigned char **pcurves,
382 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
383 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
386 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
387 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
389 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
390 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
391 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
394 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
395 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
399 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
400 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
404 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
405 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
409 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
410 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
413 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
414 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
416 const unsigned char *curves;
418 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
419 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
421 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
424 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
427 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
429 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
432 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
434 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
437 else /* Should never happen */
440 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
441 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
443 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
449 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
450 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
454 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
456 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
457 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
459 /* Can't do anything on client side */
466 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
467 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
470 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
472 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
473 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
474 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
475 /* Should never happen */
478 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
481 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
483 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
488 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
490 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
491 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
493 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
497 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
498 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
509 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
510 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
512 unsigned char *clist, *p;
514 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
515 * while curve ids < 32
517 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
518 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
521 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
523 unsigned long idmask;
525 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
527 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
538 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
542 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
547 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
550 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
552 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
556 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
558 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
560 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
562 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
563 if (nid == NID_undef)
564 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
565 if (nid == NID_undef)
566 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
567 if (nid == NID_undef)
569 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
570 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
572 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
575 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
576 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
581 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
585 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
587 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
588 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
593 const EC_METHOD *meth;
596 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
597 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
600 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
603 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
607 /* Determine curve ID */
608 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
610 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
614 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
626 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
628 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
631 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
633 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
636 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
640 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
641 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
642 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
644 const unsigned char *p;
647 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
648 * is supported (see RFC4492).
650 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
652 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
653 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
654 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
664 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
665 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
667 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
668 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
670 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
675 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
682 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
685 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
687 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
689 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
694 *pformats = ecformats_default;
695 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
697 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
699 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
703 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
704 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
706 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
708 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
711 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
714 /* If not EC nothing to do */
715 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
720 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
724 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
725 * supported curves extension.
727 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
730 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
731 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
733 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
740 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
741 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
742 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
743 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
744 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
746 return 0; /* Should never happen */
747 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
748 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
750 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
754 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
755 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
757 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
762 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
763 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
765 unsigned char curve_id[2];
766 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
767 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
768 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
769 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
772 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
773 * no other curves permitted.
777 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
778 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
779 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
780 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
781 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
785 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
786 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
788 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
789 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
791 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
794 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
797 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
799 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
805 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
807 /* Need a shared curve */
808 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
814 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
819 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
821 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
825 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
831 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
836 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
840 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
841 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
850 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
851 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
853 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
856 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
857 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
859 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
862 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
863 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
864 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
865 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
867 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
869 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
870 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
873 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
877 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
881 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
882 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
883 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
886 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
888 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
892 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
894 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
895 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
896 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
907 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
908 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
910 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
911 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
913 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
915 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
916 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
920 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
921 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
924 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
925 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
927 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
928 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
930 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
931 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
932 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
933 /* Should never happen */
936 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
937 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
943 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
945 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
946 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
947 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
949 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
954 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
959 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
961 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
964 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
968 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
970 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
973 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
981 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
985 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
986 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
987 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
989 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
992 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
993 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
998 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1004 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1007 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1008 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1011 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1012 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1013 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1014 * session and not global settings.
1017 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1020 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1021 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1022 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1025 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1026 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1027 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1030 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1031 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1034 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1040 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1045 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1050 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1056 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1057 * signature algorithms.
1061 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1066 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1067 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1071 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1075 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1077 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1078 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1082 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1083 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1085 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1086 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1088 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1092 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1093 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1095 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1096 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1105 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1108 unsigned char *ret = p;
1109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1110 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1112 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1115 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1116 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1118 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1120 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1122 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1123 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1124 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1125 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1134 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1135 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1136 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1141 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1143 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1145 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1146 unsigned long size_str;
1149 /* check for enough space.
1150 4 for the servername type and entension length
1151 2 for servernamelist length
1152 1 for the hostname type
1153 2 for hostname length
1157 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1158 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1161 /* extension type and length */
1162 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1163 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1165 /* length of servername list */
1166 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1168 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1169 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1171 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1175 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1180 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1186 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1188 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1191 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1201 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1202 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1203 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1205 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1206 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1212 /* check for enough space.
1213 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1214 1 for the srp user identity
1215 + srp user identity length
1217 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1219 /* fill in the extension */
1220 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1221 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1222 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1223 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1228 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1231 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1233 const unsigned char *plist;
1236 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1238 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1239 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1246 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1247 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1248 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1249 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1252 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1253 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1254 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1256 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1257 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1258 if (plistlen > 65532)
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1264 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1265 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1267 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1268 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1269 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1270 * resolves this to two bytes.
1273 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1276 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1278 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1281 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1282 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1283 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1284 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1286 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1287 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1288 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1290 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1291 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1293 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1297 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1298 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1300 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1303 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1304 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1308 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1314 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1317 const unsigned char *salg;
1318 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1319 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1321 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1322 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1324 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1328 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1329 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1331 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1333 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1335 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1338 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1341 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1346 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1349 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1353 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1355 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1356 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1362 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1364 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1371 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1372 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1373 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1375 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1376 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1378 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1380 /* save position of id len */
1381 unsigned char *q = ret;
1382 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1383 /* skip over id len */
1385 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1391 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1395 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1399 * 1: peer may send requests
1400 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1402 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1403 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1405 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1409 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1411 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1412 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1413 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1420 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1422 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1424 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1425 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1426 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1427 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1428 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1429 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1432 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1436 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1438 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1440 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1443 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1451 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1452 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1455 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1457 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1459 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1460 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1462 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1463 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1464 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1468 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1472 return NULL; /* error */
1473 if (cb_retval == -1)
1474 continue; /* skip this extension */
1476 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1478 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1480 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1485 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
1486 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1487 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02
1489 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1490 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1493 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1494 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1495 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
1497 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1499 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1501 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1507 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1509 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1515 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1522 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1525 unsigned char *ret = p;
1527 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1528 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1529 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1532 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1533 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1534 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1535 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1537 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1538 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1542 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1544 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1546 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1548 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1552 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1556 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1562 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1564 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1567 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1579 const unsigned char *plist;
1581 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1584 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1586 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1587 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1594 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1595 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1596 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1597 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1601 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1602 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1604 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1605 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1607 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1608 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1612 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1614 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1615 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1619 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1620 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1622 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1624 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1626 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1629 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1632 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1641 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1643 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1645 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1648 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1656 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1657 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1658 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1659 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1660 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1661 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1662 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1663 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1664 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1665 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1666 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1672 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1673 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1675 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1678 * 1: peer may send requests
1679 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1681 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1682 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1684 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1689 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1690 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1691 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1692 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1694 const unsigned char *npa;
1695 unsigned int npalen;
1698 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1699 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1701 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1702 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1704 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1706 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1711 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
1713 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
1714 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1715 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1718 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1721 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1725 return NULL; /* error */
1726 if (cb_retval == -1)
1727 break; /* skip this extension */
1728 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1730 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1732 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1736 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1738 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1739 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1741 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1743 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1747 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1751 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1759 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1760 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1761 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1766 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1767 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1768 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1769 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1771 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1772 unsigned short type, size;
1773 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1774 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1775 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1776 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1777 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1778 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1779 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1781 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1782 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1783 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1784 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1787 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1788 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1789 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1790 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1791 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1792 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1793 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1794 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1795 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1796 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1799 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1808 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1811 if (data+size > d+n)
1815 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1817 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1818 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1820 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1822 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1824 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1829 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1831 if (data + len != d+n)
1833 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1837 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1839 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1841 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1843 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1844 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1845 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1848 * returns: 0 on success. */
1849 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1850 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1854 const unsigned char *selected;
1855 unsigned char selected_len;
1858 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1864 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1865 * length-prefixed strings. */
1866 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1867 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1876 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1878 proto_len = data[i];
1884 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1890 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1891 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1892 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1893 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1894 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1895 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1896 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1898 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1901 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1902 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1907 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1911 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1913 unsigned short type;
1914 unsigned short size;
1916 unsigned char *data = *p;
1917 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1920 s->servername_done = 0;
1921 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1923 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1926 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1927 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1928 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1930 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1931 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1934 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1936 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1937 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1941 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1942 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1946 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1947 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1948 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1950 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1951 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1953 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1954 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1956 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1957 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1959 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1960 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1962 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1963 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1965 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1966 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1969 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1973 if (data > (d+n-len))
1976 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1981 if (data+size > (d+n))
1984 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1986 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1987 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1988 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1989 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1991 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1992 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1993 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1994 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1995 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1996 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1997 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1998 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1999 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2000 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2001 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2002 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2003 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2004 the value of the Host: field.
2005 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2006 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2007 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2008 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2012 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2014 unsigned char *sdata;
2020 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2027 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2034 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2040 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2043 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2044 switch (servname_type)
2046 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2049 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2051 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2054 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2056 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2059 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2061 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2064 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2065 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2066 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2067 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2068 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2069 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2072 s->servername_done = 1;
2076 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2077 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2078 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2090 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2095 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2096 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2098 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2100 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2103 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2105 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2108 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2110 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2111 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2113 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2115 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2122 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2124 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2125 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2127 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2128 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2130 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2135 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2137 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2138 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2140 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2141 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2143 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2146 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2147 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2150 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2151 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2152 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2153 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2154 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2157 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2159 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2160 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2161 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2163 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2164 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2166 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2171 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2173 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2176 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2177 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2179 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2182 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2183 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2186 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2187 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2188 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2189 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2190 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2193 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2194 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2195 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2197 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2201 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2204 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2205 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2207 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2211 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2212 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2213 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2214 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2216 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2217 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2219 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2224 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2226 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2227 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2229 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2233 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2235 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2237 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2239 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2242 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2244 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2249 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2251 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2254 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2256 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2259 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2262 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2265 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2266 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2270 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2275 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2279 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2281 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2283 const unsigned char *sdata;
2285 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2290 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2299 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2303 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2307 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2312 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2316 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2321 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2322 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2325 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2326 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2327 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2329 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2330 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2333 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2334 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2336 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2337 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2342 /* Read in request_extensions */
2345 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2352 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2358 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2360 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2361 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2364 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2365 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2367 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2368 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2370 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2375 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2379 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2382 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2386 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2387 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2389 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2390 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2391 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2393 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2399 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2400 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2401 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2403 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2406 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2407 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2408 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2409 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2410 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2411 * anything like that, but this might change).
2413 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2414 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2415 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2416 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2417 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2418 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2422 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2423 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2424 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2426 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2429 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2430 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2434 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2435 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2437 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2441 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2442 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2443 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2444 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2445 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2447 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2449 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2451 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2453 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2454 if (type == record->ext_type)
2456 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2469 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2471 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2472 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2474 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2476 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2479 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2480 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2481 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2486 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2489 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2491 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2495 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2504 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2505 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2506 * the length of the block. */
2507 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2509 unsigned int off = 0;
2523 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2525 unsigned short length;
2526 unsigned short type;
2527 unsigned short size;
2528 unsigned char *data = *p;
2529 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2530 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2533 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2536 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2538 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2539 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2543 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2544 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2547 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2551 if (data+length != d+n)
2553 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2557 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2562 if (data+size > (d+n))
2565 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2566 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2567 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2569 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2571 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2573 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2576 tlsext_servername = 1;
2579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2580 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2582 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2583 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2585 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2587 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2590 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2591 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2592 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2594 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2597 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2598 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2600 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2601 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2602 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2603 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2604 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2607 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2609 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2611 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2612 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2614 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2617 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2620 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2623 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2625 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2626 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2628 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2632 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2635 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2636 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2638 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2642 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2643 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2644 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2645 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2647 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2649 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2651 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2656 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2658 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2659 * a status request message.
2661 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2663 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2666 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2667 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2670 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2671 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2673 unsigned char *selected;
2674 unsigned char selected_len;
2676 /* We must have requested it. */
2677 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2679 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2682 /* The data must be valid */
2683 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2685 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2688 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2690 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2693 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2694 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2696 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2699 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2700 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2701 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2705 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2709 /* We must have requested it. */
2710 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2712 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2717 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2720 /* The extension data consists of:
2721 * uint16 list_length
2722 * uint8 proto_length;
2723 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2727 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2729 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2733 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2735 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2738 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2739 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2740 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2741 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2743 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2746 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2747 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2750 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2752 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2754 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2757 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2761 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2762 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2764 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2765 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2766 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2768 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2773 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2775 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2779 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2780 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2782 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2785 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2787 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2789 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2790 if (record->ext_type == type)
2792 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2804 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2808 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2810 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2812 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2814 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2815 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2817 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2823 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2833 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2834 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2835 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2836 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2837 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2838 * absence on initial connect only.
2840 if (!renegotiate_seen
2841 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2842 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2844 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2846 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2854 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2857 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2861 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2863 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2868 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2870 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2871 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2873 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2874 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2876 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2877 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2882 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2886 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2887 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2894 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2899 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2901 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2902 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2905 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2906 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2908 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2909 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2913 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2914 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2915 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2916 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2918 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2920 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2921 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2922 * so this has to happen here in
2923 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2927 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2929 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2932 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2933 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2938 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2939 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2940 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2942 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2944 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2945 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2947 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2948 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2950 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2951 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2953 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2954 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2956 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2957 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2960 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2964 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2966 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2967 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2968 * abort the handshake.
2970 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2971 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2979 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2980 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2983 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2984 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2987 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2988 s->servername_done=0;
2994 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2996 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2999 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3000 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3001 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3002 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3004 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3007 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3008 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3009 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3010 if (certpkey == NULL)
3012 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3015 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3016 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3018 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3019 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3022 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3023 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3024 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3026 /* status request response should be sent */
3027 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3028 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3029 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3031 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3033 /* something bad happened */
3034 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3035 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3036 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3041 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3046 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3047 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3050 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3051 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3059 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3061 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3062 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3064 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3065 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3066 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3067 * it must contain uncompressed.
3069 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3070 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3071 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3072 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3073 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3075 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3077 unsigned char *list;
3078 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3079 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3080 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3082 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3084 found_uncompressed = 1;
3088 if (!found_uncompressed)
3090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3094 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3095 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3097 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3098 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3099 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3100 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3102 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3103 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3105 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3106 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3108 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3110 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3111 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3114 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3115 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3116 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3117 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3119 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3120 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3125 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3128 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3129 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3132 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3133 * there is no response.
3135 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3137 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3138 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3140 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3141 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3144 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3145 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3149 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3150 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3156 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3157 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3160 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3161 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3164 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3165 s->servername_done=0;
3171 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3174 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3176 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3178 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3182 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3190 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3191 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3192 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3194 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3195 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3196 * extension, if any.
3197 * len: the length of the session ID.
3198 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3199 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3200 * point to the resulting session.
3202 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3203 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3204 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3207 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3208 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3209 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3210 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3211 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3212 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3213 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3216 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3217 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3218 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3219 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3220 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3221 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3223 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3224 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3226 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3227 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3231 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3233 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3234 * to permit stateful resumption.
3236 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3238 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3242 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3250 /* Skip past cipher list */
3255 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3260 /* Now at start of extensions */
3261 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3264 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3266 unsigned short type, size;
3269 if (p + size > limit)
3271 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3276 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3277 * currently have one. */
3278 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3281 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3283 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3284 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3285 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3286 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3287 * calculate the master secret later. */
3290 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3293 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3294 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3296 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3298 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3299 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3301 default: /* fatal error */
3310 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3312 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3313 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3314 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3315 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3316 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3317 * point to the resulting session.
3320 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3321 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3322 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3323 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3325 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3326 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3327 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3330 unsigned char *sdec;
3331 const unsigned char *p;
3332 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3333 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3336 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3337 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3340 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3341 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3342 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3343 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3345 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3346 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3357 /* Check key name matches */
3358 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3360 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3361 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3362 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3363 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3365 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3366 * integrity checks on ticket.
3368 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3371 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3375 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3376 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3377 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3378 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3379 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3381 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3382 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3383 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3384 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3385 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3388 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3391 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3392 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3395 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3398 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3402 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3403 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3404 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3405 * as required by standard.
3408 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3409 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3417 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3422 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3430 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3431 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3432 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3433 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3434 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3435 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3436 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3439 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3440 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3441 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3442 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3445 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3448 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3450 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3456 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3459 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3461 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3462 return table[i].nid;
3467 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3472 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3473 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3476 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3479 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3480 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3484 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3486 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3487 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3490 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3495 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3503 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3507 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3508 return EVP_sha224();
3510 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3511 return EVP_sha256();
3513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3514 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3515 return EVP_sha384();
3517 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3518 return EVP_sha512();
3526 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3531 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3532 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3535 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3536 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3539 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3540 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3546 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3547 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3548 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3550 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3551 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3553 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3555 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3556 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3558 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3560 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3562 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3563 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3565 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3569 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3570 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3571 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3573 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3576 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3577 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3578 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3579 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3581 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3582 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3583 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3585 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3586 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3588 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3590 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3592 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3597 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3598 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3599 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3601 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3612 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3613 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3615 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3616 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3618 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3620 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3621 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3622 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3624 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3625 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3627 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3629 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3630 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3633 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3634 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3638 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3639 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3645 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3646 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3648 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3651 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3654 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3655 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3656 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3661 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3663 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3669 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3670 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3671 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3673 /* Should never happen */
3677 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3678 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3680 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3681 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3683 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3685 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3686 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3688 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3689 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3691 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3693 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3695 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3698 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3699 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3700 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3701 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3702 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3704 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3705 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3711 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3712 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3714 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3715 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3717 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3718 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3719 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3720 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3722 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3723 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3728 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3729 * use the certificate for signing.
3731 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3733 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3734 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3737 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3738 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3741 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3743 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3744 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3748 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3749 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3756 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3757 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3758 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3760 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3766 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3773 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3775 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3778 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3779 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3780 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3782 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3783 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3787 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3789 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3791 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3793 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3795 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3796 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3800 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3802 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3804 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3805 unsigned short hbtype;
3806 unsigned int payload;
3807 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3809 /* Read type and payload length first */
3814 if (s->msg_callback)
3815 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3816 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3817 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3819 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3821 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3824 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3825 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3826 * payload, plus padding
3828 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3831 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3832 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3834 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3836 /* Random padding */
3837 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3839 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3841 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3842 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3843 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3844 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3846 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3851 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3855 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3856 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3857 * sequence number */
3860 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3863 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3871 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3873 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3875 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3876 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3878 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3879 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3880 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3886 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3887 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3893 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3894 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3896 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3900 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3901 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3903 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3905 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3906 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3907 * some random stuff.
3908 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3909 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3910 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3911 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3914 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3917 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3918 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3920 /* Sequence number */
3921 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3922 /* 16 random bytes */
3923 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3925 /* Random padding */
3926 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3928 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3931 if (s->msg_callback)
3932 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3933 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3934 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3936 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3945 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3950 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3953 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3955 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3958 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3959 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3961 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3963 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3965 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3973 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3974 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3975 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3976 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3977 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3978 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3981 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3982 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3983 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3984 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3987 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3989 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3990 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3993 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3994 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3998 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3999 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4000 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4004 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4008 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4011 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4013 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4018 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4019 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4021 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4023 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4024 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4025 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4026 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4028 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4036 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4037 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4038 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4039 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4043 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4044 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4045 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4046 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4052 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4056 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4060 if (default_nid == -1)
4062 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4064 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4065 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4066 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4070 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4071 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4075 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4076 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4078 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4084 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4085 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4086 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4087 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4090 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4092 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4093 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4094 /* Strict mode flags */
4095 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4096 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4097 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4099 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4104 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4105 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4107 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4108 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4111 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4115 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4118 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4120 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4122 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4123 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4126 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4127 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4128 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4130 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4131 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4140 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4143 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4144 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4145 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4147 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4155 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4156 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4157 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4160 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4166 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4167 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4170 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4173 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4174 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4176 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4181 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4182 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4183 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4184 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4185 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4188 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4189 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4190 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4191 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4195 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4196 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4204 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4205 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4208 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4211 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4212 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4214 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4217 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4225 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4226 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4228 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4231 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4232 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4233 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4235 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4240 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4248 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4249 else if(check_flags)
4250 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4252 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4253 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4254 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4255 else if (!check_flags)
4258 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4259 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4260 else if (strict_mode)
4262 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4263 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4265 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4266 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4270 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4278 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4280 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4285 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4288 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4291 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4296 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4297 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4298 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4299 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4300 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4305 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4310 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4314 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4315 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4317 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4319 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4321 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4325 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4329 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4332 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4334 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4335 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4337 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4339 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4340 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4342 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4344 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4346 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4347 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4349 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4354 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4358 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4360 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4361 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4365 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4367 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4368 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4369 else if (cpk->digest)
4370 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4373 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4375 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4376 * if the chain is invalid.
4380 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4381 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4384 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4385 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4392 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4393 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4395 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4396 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4397 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4398 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4399 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4400 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4402 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4403 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4405 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);