2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
235 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
315 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
324 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
387 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
390 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
391 const unsigned char **pcurves,
396 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
397 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
400 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
401 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
405 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
423 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
424 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
428 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
429 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
431 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
434 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
435 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
437 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
438 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
441 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
442 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
444 const unsigned char *curves;
446 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
447 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
449 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
452 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
455 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
457 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
460 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
465 else /* Should never happen */
468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
469 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
471 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
472 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
477 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
478 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
482 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
484 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
485 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
487 /* Can't do anything on client side */
494 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
495 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
498 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
499 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
500 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
501 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
502 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
503 /* Should never happen */
506 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
509 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
511 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
516 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
518 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
519 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
521 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
523 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
527 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
528 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
539 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
540 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
542 unsigned char *clist, *p;
544 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
545 * while curve ids < 32
547 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
548 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
551 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
553 unsigned long idmask;
555 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
557 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
568 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
572 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
577 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
580 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
582 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
586 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
588 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
590 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
592 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
593 if (nid == NID_undef)
594 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
595 if (nid == NID_undef)
596 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
597 if (nid == NID_undef)
599 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
600 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
602 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
605 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
606 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
611 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
615 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
617 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
618 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
623 const EC_METHOD *meth;
626 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
627 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
630 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
633 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
637 /* Determine curve ID */
638 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
639 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
640 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
644 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
656 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
658 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
661 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
663 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
666 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
670 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
671 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
672 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
674 const unsigned char *p;
677 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
678 * is supported (see RFC4492).
680 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
682 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
683 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
684 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
694 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
695 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
697 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
698 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
700 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
705 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
712 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
715 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
717 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
719 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
724 *pformats = ecformats_default;
725 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
727 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
729 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
733 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
734 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
736 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
738 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
741 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
744 /* If not EC nothing to do */
745 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
750 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
754 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
755 * supported curves extension.
757 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
760 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
761 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
763 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
770 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
771 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
772 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
773 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
774 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
776 return 0; /* Should never happen */
777 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
778 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
780 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
784 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
787 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
792 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
793 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
795 unsigned char curve_id[2];
796 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
797 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
798 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
799 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
802 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
803 * no other curves permitted.
807 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
808 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
809 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
810 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
811 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
815 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
816 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
818 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
819 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
821 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
824 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
829 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
835 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
837 /* Need a shared curve */
838 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
849 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
851 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
855 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
861 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
866 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
870 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
871 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
874 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
875 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
877 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
880 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
881 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
883 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
886 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
887 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
889 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
892 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
893 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
894 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
895 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
897 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
899 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
900 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
903 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
904 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
907 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
911 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
912 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
913 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
916 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
918 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
922 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
924 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
925 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
926 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
928 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
929 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
932 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
933 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
937 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
938 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
940 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
941 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
943 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
945 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
950 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
951 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
954 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
955 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
957 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
958 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
960 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
961 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
962 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
963 /* Should never happen */
966 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
967 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
973 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
975 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
976 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
977 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
979 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
989 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
991 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
994 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
998 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1000 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1003 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1011 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1015 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1016 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1017 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1019 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1022 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1023 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1028 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1034 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1035 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1036 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1042 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1045 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1046 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1050 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1051 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1052 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1053 * session and not global settings.
1056 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1061 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1062 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1063 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1066 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1067 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1068 * signature algorithms.
1070 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1071 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1072 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1074 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1077 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1079 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1080 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1084 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1085 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1087 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1088 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1090 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1092 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1094 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1095 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1101 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1104 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1106 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1109 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1111 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1113 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1116 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1119 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1120 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1122 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1124 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1127 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1128 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1130 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1132 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1134 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1135 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1136 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1137 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1146 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1147 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1148 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1153 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1155 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1157 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1158 unsigned long size_str;
1161 /* check for enough space.
1162 4 for the servername type and entension length
1163 2 for servernamelist length
1164 1 for the hostname type
1165 2 for hostname length
1169 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1170 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1173 /* extension type and length */
1174 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1175 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1177 /* length of servername list */
1178 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1180 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1181 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1183 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1187 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1192 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1200 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1203 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1213 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1214 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1215 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1217 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1218 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1224 /* check for enough space.
1225 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1226 1 for the srp user identity
1227 + srp user identity length
1229 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1231 /* fill in the extension */
1232 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1233 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1234 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1235 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1243 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1245 const unsigned char *plist;
1248 unsigned char *etmp;
1250 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1252 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1253 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1260 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1261 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1262 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1263 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1266 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1267 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1268 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1270 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1271 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1272 if (plistlen > 65532)
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1279 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1281 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1282 for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
1284 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1291 plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
1293 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1294 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1295 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1296 * resolves this to two bytes.
1298 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1304 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1307 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1308 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1309 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1310 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1312 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1313 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1314 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1316 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1317 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1319 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1323 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1324 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1326 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1329 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1330 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1334 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1340 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1343 const unsigned char *salg;
1344 unsigned char *etmp;
1345 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1346 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1348 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1350 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1352 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1353 /* Fill in lengths */
1354 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1359 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1360 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1362 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1364 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1366 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1372 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1377 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1380 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1384 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1386 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1387 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1393 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1395 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1402 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1403 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1404 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1406 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1407 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1409 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1411 /* save position of id len */
1412 unsigned char *q = ret;
1413 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1414 /* skip over id len */
1416 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1422 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1426 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1427 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1432 * 1: peer may send requests
1433 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1435 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1436 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1438 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1442 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1444 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1445 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1446 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1448 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1453 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1455 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1457 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1458 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1459 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1460 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1461 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1462 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1465 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1469 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1471 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1473 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1476 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1483 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1484 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1485 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1487 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1488 if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION)
1490 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1495 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1496 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1498 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1499 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1501 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1503 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1504 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1505 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1506 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1508 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1510 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1512 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1518 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1520 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1525 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1528 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1532 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1535 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1536 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1538 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1541 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1542 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1543 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1544 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1546 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1547 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1551 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1553 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1555 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1557 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1561 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1565 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1571 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1573 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1576 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1588 const unsigned char *plist;
1590 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1593 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1595 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1596 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1603 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1604 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1605 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1606 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1610 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1611 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1613 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1615 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1616 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1620 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1622 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1623 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1627 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1628 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1630 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1632 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1634 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1637 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1640 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1645 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
1649 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1651 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1653 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1656 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1664 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1665 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1666 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1667 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1668 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1669 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1670 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1671 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1672 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1673 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1674 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1680 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1681 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1683 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1685 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1688 * 1: peer may send requests
1689 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1691 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1692 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1694 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1700 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1701 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1702 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1704 const unsigned char *npa;
1705 unsigned int npalen;
1708 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1709 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1711 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1712 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1714 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1716 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1720 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1722 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1723 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1725 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD, RC4 or SSL 3.0:
1726 * might want to disable for other cases too.
1728 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1729 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1730 || s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1731 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1734 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1740 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1742 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1743 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1745 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1747 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1751 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1755 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1758 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1762 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1764 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1765 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1766 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1769 * returns: 0 on success. */
1770 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1771 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1775 const unsigned char *selected;
1776 unsigned char selected_len;
1779 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1785 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1786 * length-prefixed strings. */
1787 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1788 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1797 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1799 proto_len = data[i];
1805 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1811 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1812 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1813 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1814 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1815 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1816 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1817 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1819 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1822 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1823 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1828 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1833 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1834 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1835 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1840 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1841 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1842 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1843 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1845 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1846 unsigned short type, size;
1847 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1848 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1849 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1850 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1851 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1852 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1853 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1855 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1856 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1857 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1858 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1861 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1862 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1863 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1864 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1865 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1866 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1867 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1868 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1869 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1870 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1873 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1882 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1885 if (data+size > d+n)
1889 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1891 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1892 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1894 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1896 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1898 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1903 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1905 if (data + len != d+n)
1907 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1911 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1913 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1916 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1918 unsigned short type;
1919 unsigned short size;
1921 unsigned char *data = *p;
1922 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1924 s->servername_done = 0;
1925 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1927 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1930 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1932 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1933 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1937 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1938 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1941 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1942 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1943 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1944 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1946 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1947 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1949 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1950 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1953 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1954 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1957 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1961 if (data > (d+n-len))
1964 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1969 if (data+size > (d+n))
1972 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1974 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1975 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1976 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1977 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1979 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1980 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1981 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1982 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1983 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1984 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1985 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1986 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1987 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1988 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1989 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1990 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1991 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1992 the value of the Host: field.
1993 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1994 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1995 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1996 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2000 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2002 unsigned char *sdata;
2008 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2015 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2022 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2028 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2031 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2032 switch (servname_type)
2034 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2037 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2039 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2042 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2044 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2047 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2049 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2052 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2053 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2054 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2055 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2056 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2057 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2060 s->servername_done = 1;
2064 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2065 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2066 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2078 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2084 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2086 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2088 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2091 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2093 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2096 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2098 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2099 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2101 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2103 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2110 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2112 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2113 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2115 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2116 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2118 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2123 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2125 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2126 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2128 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2129 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2131 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2134 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2135 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2138 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2139 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2140 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2141 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2142 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2145 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2147 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2148 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2149 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2151 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2152 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2154 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2159 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2161 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2164 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2165 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2167 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2170 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2171 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2174 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2175 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2176 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2177 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2178 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2181 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2182 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2183 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2185 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2189 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2192 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2193 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2195 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2199 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2200 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2201 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2202 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2204 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2205 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2207 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2212 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2214 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2215 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2217 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2221 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2223 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2225 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2227 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2230 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2232 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2237 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2239 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2242 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2244 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2248 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2253 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2257 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2259 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2261 const unsigned char *sdata;
2263 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2268 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2277 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2281 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2285 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2290 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2294 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2299 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2300 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2303 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2304 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2305 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2307 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2308 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2311 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2312 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2314 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2315 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2320 /* Read in request_extensions */
2323 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2330 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2336 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2338 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2339 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2342 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2343 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2345 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2346 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2348 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2353 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2357 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2360 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2364 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2365 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2367 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2368 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2369 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2371 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2377 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2378 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2379 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2381 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2384 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2385 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2386 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2387 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2388 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2389 * anything like that, but this might change).
2391 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2392 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2393 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2394 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2395 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2396 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2400 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2401 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2402 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2404 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2407 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2408 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2412 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2413 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2414 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2416 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2420 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2421 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2423 if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION)
2424 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2427 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2428 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2429 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2430 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2431 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2435 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2446 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2448 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2449 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2451 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2453 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2460 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2463 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2464 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2466 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2470 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2479 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2480 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2481 * the length of the block. */
2482 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2484 unsigned int off = 0;
2498 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2500 unsigned short length;
2501 unsigned short type;
2502 unsigned short size;
2503 unsigned char *data = *p;
2504 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2505 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2507 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2508 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2511 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2513 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2514 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2517 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2518 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2519 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2522 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2523 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2526 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2530 if (data+length != d+n)
2532 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2536 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2541 if (data+size > (d+n))
2544 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2545 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2546 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2548 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2550 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2552 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2555 tlsext_servername = 1;
2558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2559 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2561 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2562 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2564 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2566 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2571 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2572 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2573 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2575 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2578 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2579 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2582 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2583 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2584 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2585 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2586 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2589 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2591 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2593 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2594 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2596 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2599 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2601 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2604 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2606 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2607 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2609 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2613 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2616 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2617 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2619 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2623 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2624 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2625 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2626 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2628 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2630 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2632 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2637 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2639 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2640 * a status request message.
2642 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2644 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2647 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2648 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2651 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2652 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2654 unsigned char *selected;
2655 unsigned char selected_len;
2657 /* We must have requested it. */
2658 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2660 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2663 /* The data must be valid */
2664 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2666 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2669 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2671 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2674 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2675 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2677 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2680 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2681 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2682 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2686 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2690 /* We must have requested it. */
2691 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2693 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2698 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2701 /* The extension data consists of:
2702 * uint16 list_length
2703 * uint8 proto_length;
2704 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2708 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2710 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2714 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2716 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2719 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2720 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2721 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2722 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2724 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2727 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2728 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2731 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2733 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2735 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2738 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2742 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2743 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2745 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2746 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2747 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2749 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2754 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2756 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2760 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2761 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2763 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite or SSL 3.0 */
2764 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2765 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4
2766 && s->version != SSL3_VERSION)
2767 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2770 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2771 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2773 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2781 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2785 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2787 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2789 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2791 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2792 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2794 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2800 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2810 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2811 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2812 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2813 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2814 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2815 * absence on initial connect only.
2817 if (!renegotiate_seen
2818 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2819 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2821 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2823 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2831 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2834 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2838 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2840 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2845 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2847 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2848 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2850 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2851 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2853 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2854 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2859 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2863 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2864 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2871 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2876 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2878 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2879 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2882 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2883 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2885 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2886 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2890 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2891 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2892 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2893 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2895 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2897 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2898 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2899 * so this has to happen here in
2900 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2904 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2906 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2909 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2910 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2915 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2916 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2917 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2919 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2921 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2922 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2924 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2925 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2927 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2928 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2930 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2931 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2933 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2934 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2937 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2941 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2943 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2944 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2945 * abort the handshake.
2947 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2948 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2956 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2957 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2960 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2961 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2964 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2965 s->servername_done=0;
2971 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2973 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2977 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2978 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2979 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2980 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2982 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2985 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2986 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2987 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2988 if (certpkey == NULL)
2990 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2993 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2994 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2996 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2997 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3000 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3001 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3002 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3004 /* status request response should be sent */
3005 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3006 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3007 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3009 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3011 /* something bad happened */
3012 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3013 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3014 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3019 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3021 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3022 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3024 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3025 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3027 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3028 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
3030 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3031 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3034 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3035 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
3037 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s))
3039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT_LATE,
3040 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3041 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3042 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3045 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3046 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT_LATE,
3049 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3050 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3051 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3056 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3061 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3062 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3065 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3066 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3074 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3076 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3077 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3079 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3080 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3081 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3082 * it must contain uncompressed.
3084 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3085 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3086 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3087 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3088 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3090 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3092 unsigned char *list;
3093 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3094 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3095 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3097 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3099 found_uncompressed = 1;
3103 if (!found_uncompressed)
3105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3109 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3110 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3112 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3113 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3114 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3115 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3117 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3118 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3120 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3121 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3123 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3125 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3126 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3129 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3130 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3131 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3132 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3134 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3135 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3140 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3143 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3144 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3147 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3148 * there is no response.
3150 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3152 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3153 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3155 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3156 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3159 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3160 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3164 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3165 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3171 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3172 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3175 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3176 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3179 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3180 s->servername_done=0;
3186 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3189 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3191 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3193 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3197 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3205 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3206 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3207 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3209 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3210 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3211 * extension, if any.
3212 * len: the length of the session ID.
3213 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3214 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3215 * point to the resulting session.
3217 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3218 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3219 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3222 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3223 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3224 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3225 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3226 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3227 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3228 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3231 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3232 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3233 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3234 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3235 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3236 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3238 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3239 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3241 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3242 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3246 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3248 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3249 * to permit stateful resumption.
3251 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3253 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3257 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3265 /* Skip past cipher list */
3270 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3275 /* Now at start of extensions */
3276 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3279 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3281 unsigned short type, size;
3284 if (p + size > limit)
3286 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3291 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3292 * currently have one. */
3293 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3296 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3298 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3299 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3300 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3301 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3302 * calculate the master secret later. */
3305 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3308 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3309 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3311 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3313 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3314 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3316 default: /* fatal error */
3325 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3327 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3328 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3329 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3330 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3331 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3332 * point to the resulting session.
3335 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3336 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3337 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3338 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3340 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3341 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3342 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3345 unsigned char *sdec;
3346 const unsigned char *p;
3347 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3348 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3351 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3352 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3355 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3356 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3357 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3358 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3360 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3361 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3372 /* Check key name matches */
3373 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3375 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3376 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3377 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3378 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3380 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3381 * integrity checks on ticket.
3383 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3386 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3390 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3391 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3392 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3393 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3394 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3396 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3399 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3400 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3401 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3402 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3403 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3406 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3409 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3410 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3412 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3417 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3420 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3424 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3425 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3426 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3427 * as required by standard.
3430 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3431 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3439 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3444 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3452 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3453 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3454 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3455 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3456 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3457 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3458 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3461 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3462 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3463 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3464 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3467 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3470 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3472 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3478 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3481 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3483 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3484 return table[i].nid;
3489 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3494 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3495 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3498 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3501 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3502 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3506 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3508 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3509 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3516 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3519 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3520 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3523 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3525 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3528 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3530 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3531 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3532 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3534 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3535 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3537 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3538 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3539 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3541 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3542 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3546 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3550 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3552 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3555 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3557 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3558 #ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
3559 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3562 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3563 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3565 return inf->mfunc();
3568 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3573 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3574 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3577 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3578 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3581 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3582 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3588 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3589 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3590 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3592 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3593 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3595 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3597 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3598 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3600 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3602 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3604 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3605 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3607 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3611 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3612 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3613 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3615 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3618 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3619 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3621 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3622 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3623 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3625 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3626 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3628 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3629 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3632 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3633 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3634 * then RSA is disabled.
3637 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3639 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3640 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3641 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3642 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3643 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3644 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3647 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3648 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3653 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3654 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3659 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3660 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3665 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3666 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3673 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3675 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3677 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3680 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3681 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3683 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3685 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3687 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3689 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3690 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3693 return tmpout - out;
3696 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3697 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3698 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3699 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3701 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3702 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3703 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3705 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3706 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3708 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3710 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3715 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3716 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3717 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3719 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3730 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3731 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3733 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3734 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3736 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3738 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3739 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3741 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3742 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3744 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3745 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3747 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3748 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3750 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3752 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3753 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3756 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3757 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3761 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3762 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3768 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3769 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3771 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3774 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3777 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3778 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3779 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3784 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3786 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3789 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3790 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3792 /* Should never happen */
3796 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3797 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3798 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3799 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3801 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3802 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3806 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3812 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3813 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3816 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3817 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3819 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3820 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3822 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3824 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3826 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3829 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3830 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3831 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3832 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3833 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3835 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3836 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3842 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3843 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3845 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3846 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3848 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3849 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3850 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3851 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3853 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3854 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3859 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3860 * use the certificate for signing.
3862 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3864 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3865 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3868 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3869 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3872 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3874 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3875 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3879 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3880 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3887 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3888 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3889 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3891 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3897 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3904 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3906 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3909 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3910 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3911 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3913 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3914 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3918 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3920 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3922 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3924 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3926 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3927 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3933 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3935 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3936 unsigned short hbtype;
3937 unsigned int payload;
3938 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3940 if (s->msg_callback)
3941 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3942 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3943 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3945 /* Read type and payload length first */
3946 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3947 return 0; /* silently discard */
3950 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3951 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3954 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3956 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3959 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3960 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3961 * payload, plus padding
3963 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3966 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3967 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3969 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3971 /* Random padding */
3972 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3974 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3976 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3977 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3978 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3979 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3981 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3986 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3990 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3991 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3992 * sequence number */
3995 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3998 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4006 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4008 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4010 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4011 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4013 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4014 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4015 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4021 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4022 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4028 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4029 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4035 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4036 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4038 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4040 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4041 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4042 * some random stuff.
4043 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4044 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4045 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4046 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4049 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4052 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4053 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4055 /* Sequence number */
4056 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4057 /* 16 random bytes */
4058 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4060 /* Random padding */
4061 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4063 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4066 if (s->msg_callback)
4067 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4068 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4069 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4071 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4080 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4085 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4088 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4090 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4093 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4094 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4096 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4098 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4100 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4108 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4109 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4110 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4111 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4112 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4113 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4116 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4117 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4118 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4119 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4122 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4124 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4125 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4128 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4129 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4133 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4134 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4135 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4139 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4143 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4146 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4148 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4153 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4154 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4156 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4158 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4159 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4160 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4161 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4163 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4171 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4172 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4173 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4174 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4178 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4179 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4180 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4181 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4187 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4191 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4195 if (default_nid == -1)
4197 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4199 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4200 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4201 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4205 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4206 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4210 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4211 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4213 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4219 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4220 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4221 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4222 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4225 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4227 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4228 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4229 /* Strict mode flags */
4230 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4231 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4232 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4234 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4239 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4240 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4242 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4243 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4246 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4250 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4253 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4255 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4257 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4258 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4261 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4262 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4263 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4265 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4266 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4275 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4278 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4279 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4280 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4282 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4290 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4291 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4292 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4295 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4301 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4302 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4305 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4308 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4309 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4311 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4316 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4317 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4318 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4319 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4320 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4323 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4324 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4325 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4326 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4330 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4331 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4339 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4340 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4343 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4346 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4347 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4349 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4352 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4360 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4361 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4363 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4366 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4367 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4368 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4370 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4375 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4383 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4384 else if(check_flags)
4385 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4387 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4388 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4389 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4390 else if (!check_flags)
4393 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4394 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4395 else if (strict_mode)
4397 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4398 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4400 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4401 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4405 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4413 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4415 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4420 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4423 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4426 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4431 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4432 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4433 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4434 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4435 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4440 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4445 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4449 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4450 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4452 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4454 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4456 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4460 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4464 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4467 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4469 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4470 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4472 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4474 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4475 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4477 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4479 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4481 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4482 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4484 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4489 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4493 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4495 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4496 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4500 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4502 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4503 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4504 else if (cpk->digest)
4505 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4508 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4510 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4511 * if the chain is invalid.
4515 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4516 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4519 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4520 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4527 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4528 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4530 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4531 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4532 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4533 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4534 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4535 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4537 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4538 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4540 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4546 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4548 int dh_secbits = 80;
4549 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4550 return DH_get_1024_160();
4551 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4553 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4560 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4561 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4564 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4571 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4572 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4573 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4575 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4576 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4583 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4584 return DH_get_2048_224();
4585 return DH_get_1024_160();
4589 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4592 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4595 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4596 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4601 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4603 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4606 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4608 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4609 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4610 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4611 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4614 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4615 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4618 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4620 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4623 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4626 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4629 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4630 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4634 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4635 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4637 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4638 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4642 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4643 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4644 * not sending one to the peer.
4645 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4648 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4650 int rv, start_idx, i;
4653 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4659 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4663 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4665 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4666 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);