2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
249 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
250 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
254 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
256 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
261 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
263 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
264 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
265 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
266 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
268 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
269 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
272 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
273 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
277 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
278 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
279 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
280 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
281 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
282 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
283 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
286 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
287 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
288 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
295 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
296 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
299 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
301 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
302 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
303 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
305 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
308 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
310 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
313 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
315 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
319 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
321 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
325 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
327 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
329 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
331 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
333 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
335 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
337 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
339 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
341 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
343 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
345 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
347 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
349 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
351 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
353 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
355 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
357 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
359 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
361 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
363 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
365 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
367 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
373 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
376 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
377 const unsigned char **pcurves,
382 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
383 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
386 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
387 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
389 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
390 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
391 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
394 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
395 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
399 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
400 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
404 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
405 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
409 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
410 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
413 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
414 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
416 const unsigned char *curves;
418 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
419 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
421 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
424 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
427 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
429 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
432 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
434 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
437 else /* Should never happen */
440 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
441 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
443 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
449 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
450 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
454 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
456 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
457 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
459 /* Can't do anything on client side */
466 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
467 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
470 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
472 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
473 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
474 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
475 /* Should never happen */
478 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
481 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
483 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
488 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
490 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
491 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
493 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
497 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
498 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
509 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
510 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
512 unsigned char *clist, *p;
514 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
515 * while curve ids < 32
517 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
518 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
521 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
523 unsigned long idmask;
525 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
527 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
538 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
542 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
547 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
550 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
552 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
556 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
558 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
560 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
562 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
563 if (nid == NID_undef)
564 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
565 if (nid == NID_undef)
566 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
567 if (nid == NID_undef)
569 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
570 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
572 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
575 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
576 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
581 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
585 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
587 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
588 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
593 const EC_METHOD *meth;
596 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
597 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
600 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
603 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
607 /* Determine curve ID */
608 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
610 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
614 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
626 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
628 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
631 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
633 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
636 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
640 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
641 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
642 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
644 const unsigned char *p;
647 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
648 * is supported (see RFC4492).
650 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
652 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
653 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
654 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
664 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
665 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
667 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
668 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
670 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
675 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
682 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
685 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
687 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
689 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
694 *pformats = ecformats_default;
695 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
697 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
699 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
703 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
704 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
706 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
708 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
711 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
714 /* If not EC nothing to do */
715 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
720 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
724 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
725 * supported curves extension.
727 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
730 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
731 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
733 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
740 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
741 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
742 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
743 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
744 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
746 return 0; /* Should never happen */
747 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
748 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
750 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
754 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
755 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
757 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
762 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
763 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
765 unsigned char curve_id[2];
766 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
767 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
768 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
769 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
772 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
773 * no other curves permitted.
777 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
778 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
779 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
780 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
781 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
785 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
786 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
788 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
789 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
791 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
794 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
797 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
799 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
805 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
807 /* Need a shared curve */
808 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
814 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
819 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
821 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
825 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
831 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
836 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
840 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
841 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
850 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
851 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
853 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
856 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
857 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
859 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
862 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
863 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
864 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
865 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
867 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
869 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
870 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
873 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
877 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
881 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
882 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
883 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
886 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
888 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
892 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
894 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
895 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
896 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
907 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
908 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
910 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
911 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
913 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
915 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
916 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
920 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
921 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
924 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
925 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
927 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
928 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
930 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
931 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
932 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
933 /* Should never happen */
936 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
937 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
943 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
945 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
946 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
947 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
949 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
954 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
959 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
961 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
964 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
968 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
970 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
973 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
981 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
985 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
986 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
987 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
989 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
992 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
993 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
998 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1004 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1007 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1008 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1011 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1012 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1013 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1014 * session and not global settings.
1017 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1020 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1021 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1022 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1025 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1026 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1027 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1030 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1031 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1034 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1040 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1045 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1050 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1056 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1057 * signature algorithms.
1061 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1066 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1067 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1071 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1075 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1077 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1078 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1082 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1083 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1085 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1086 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1088 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1092 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1095 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1096 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1098 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1100 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1103 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1104 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1106 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1108 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1110 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1111 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1112 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1113 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1122 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1123 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1124 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1129 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1131 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1133 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1134 unsigned long size_str;
1137 /* check for enough space.
1138 4 for the servername type and entension length
1139 2 for servernamelist length
1140 1 for the hostname type
1141 2 for hostname length
1145 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1146 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1149 /* extension type and length */
1150 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1151 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1153 /* length of servername list */
1154 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1156 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1157 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1159 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1163 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1168 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1174 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1176 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1179 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1189 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1190 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1191 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1193 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1194 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1200 /* check for enough space.
1201 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1202 1 for the srp user identity
1203 + srp user identity length
1205 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1207 /* fill in the extension */
1208 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1209 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1210 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1211 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1219 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1221 const unsigned char *plist;
1224 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1226 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1227 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1234 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1235 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1236 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1237 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1240 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1241 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1242 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1244 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1245 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1246 if (plistlen > 65532)
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1252 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1253 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1255 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1256 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1257 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1258 * resolves this to two bytes.
1261 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1264 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1266 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1269 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1270 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1271 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1272 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1274 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1275 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1276 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1278 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1279 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1281 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1285 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1286 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1288 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1291 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1292 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1296 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1302 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1305 const unsigned char *salg;
1306 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1307 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1309 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1310 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1312 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1316 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1317 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1319 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1321 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1323 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1326 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1329 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1334 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1337 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1341 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1343 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1344 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1350 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1352 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1359 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1360 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1361 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1363 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1364 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1366 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1368 /* save position of id len */
1369 unsigned char *q = ret;
1370 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1371 /* skip over id len */
1373 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1379 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1383 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1384 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1386 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1389 * 1: peer may send requests
1390 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1392 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1393 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1395 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1399 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1401 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1402 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1403 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1405 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1410 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1412 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1414 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1415 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1416 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1417 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1418 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1419 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1422 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1426 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1428 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1430 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1433 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1441 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1442 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1445 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1447 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1449 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1450 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1452 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1453 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1454 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1458 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1462 return NULL; /* error */
1463 if (cb_retval == -1)
1464 continue; /* skip this extension */
1466 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1468 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1470 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1474 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1475 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1477 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1478 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1480 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1482 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1483 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1484 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1485 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1487 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1489 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1491 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1497 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1499 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1504 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1507 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1511 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1514 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1515 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1517 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1518 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1519 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1522 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1523 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1524 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1525 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1527 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1528 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1532 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1534 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1536 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1538 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1542 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1546 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1552 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1554 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1557 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1569 const unsigned char *plist;
1571 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1574 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1576 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1577 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1584 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1585 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1586 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1587 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1591 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1592 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1594 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1595 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1597 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1598 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1602 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1604 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1605 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1609 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1610 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1612 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1614 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1616 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1619 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1622 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1631 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1633 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1635 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1638 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1646 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1647 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1648 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1649 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1650 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1651 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1652 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1653 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1654 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1655 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1656 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1661 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1662 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1663 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1665 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1667 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1670 * 1: peer may send requests
1671 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1673 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1674 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1676 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1681 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1682 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1683 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1684 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1686 const unsigned char *npa;
1687 unsigned int npalen;
1690 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1691 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1693 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1694 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1696 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1698 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1703 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
1705 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1706 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1709 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
1711 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1714 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1718 return NULL; /* error */
1719 if (cb_retval == -1)
1720 continue; /* skip this extension */
1721 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1723 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1725 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1729 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1731 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1732 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1734 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1736 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1740 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1744 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1747 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1752 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1753 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1754 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1759 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1760 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1761 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1762 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1764 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1765 unsigned short type, size;
1766 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1767 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1768 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1769 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1770 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1771 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1772 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1774 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1775 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1776 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1777 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1780 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1781 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1782 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1783 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1784 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1785 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1786 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1787 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1788 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1789 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1792 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1801 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1804 if (data+size > d+n)
1808 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1810 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1811 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1813 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1815 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1817 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1822 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1824 if (data + len != d+n)
1826 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1830 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1832 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1834 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1836 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1837 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1838 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1841 * returns: 0 on success. */
1842 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1843 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1847 const unsigned char *selected;
1848 unsigned char selected_len;
1851 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1857 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1858 * length-prefixed strings. */
1859 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1860 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1869 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1871 proto_len = data[i];
1877 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1883 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1884 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1885 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1886 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1887 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1888 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1889 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1891 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1894 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1895 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1900 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1904 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1906 unsigned short type;
1907 unsigned short size;
1909 unsigned char *data = *p;
1910 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1913 s->servername_done = 0;
1914 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1916 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1919 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1920 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1921 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1923 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1924 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1927 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1929 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1930 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1934 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1935 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1939 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1940 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1941 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1943 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1944 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1946 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1947 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1949 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1950 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1952 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1953 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1955 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1956 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1958 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1959 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1962 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1966 if (data > (d+n-len))
1969 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1974 if (data+size > (d+n))
1977 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1979 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1980 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1981 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1982 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1984 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1985 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1986 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1987 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1988 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1989 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1990 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1991 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1992 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1993 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1994 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1995 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1996 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1997 the value of the Host: field.
1998 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1999 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2000 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2001 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2005 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2007 unsigned char *sdata;
2013 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2020 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2027 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2033 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2036 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2037 switch (servname_type)
2039 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2042 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2044 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2047 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2049 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2052 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2054 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2057 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2058 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2059 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2060 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2061 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2062 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2065 s->servername_done = 1;
2069 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2070 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2071 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2083 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2088 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2089 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2091 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2093 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2096 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2098 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2101 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2103 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2104 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2106 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2108 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2115 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2117 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2118 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2120 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2121 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2123 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2128 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2130 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2131 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2133 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2134 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2136 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2139 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2140 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2143 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2144 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2145 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2146 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2147 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2150 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2152 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2153 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2154 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2156 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2157 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2159 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2164 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2166 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2169 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2170 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2172 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2175 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2176 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2179 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2180 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2181 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2182 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2183 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2186 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2187 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2188 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2190 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2194 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2197 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2198 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2200 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2204 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2205 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2206 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2207 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2209 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2210 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2212 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2217 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2219 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2220 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2222 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2226 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2228 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2230 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2232 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2235 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2237 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2242 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2244 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2247 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2249 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2252 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2255 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2258 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2259 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2263 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2268 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2272 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2274 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2276 const unsigned char *sdata;
2278 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2283 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2292 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2296 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2300 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2305 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2309 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2314 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2315 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2318 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2319 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2320 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2322 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2323 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2326 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2327 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2329 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2330 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2335 /* Read in request_extensions */
2338 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2345 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2351 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2353 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2354 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2357 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2358 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2360 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2361 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2363 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2368 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2372 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2375 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2379 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2380 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2382 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2383 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2384 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2386 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2392 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2393 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2394 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2396 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2399 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2400 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2401 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2402 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2403 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2404 * anything like that, but this might change).
2406 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2407 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2408 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2409 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2410 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2411 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2415 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2416 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2417 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2419 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2422 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2423 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2427 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2428 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2430 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2434 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2435 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2436 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2437 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2438 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2440 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2442 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2444 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2446 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2447 if (type == record->ext_type)
2449 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2462 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2464 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2465 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2467 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2469 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2472 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2473 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2474 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2479 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2482 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2484 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2488 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2497 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2498 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2499 * the length of the block. */
2500 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2502 unsigned int off = 0;
2516 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2518 unsigned short length;
2519 unsigned short type;
2520 unsigned short size;
2521 unsigned char *data = *p;
2522 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2523 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2526 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2529 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2531 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2532 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2536 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2537 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2540 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2544 if (data+length != d+n)
2546 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2550 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2555 if (data+size > (d+n))
2558 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2559 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2560 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2562 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2564 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2566 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2569 tlsext_servername = 1;
2572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2573 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2575 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2576 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2578 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2580 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2585 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2586 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2587 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2589 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2592 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2593 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2596 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2597 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2598 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2599 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2600 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2603 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2605 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2607 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2608 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2610 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2613 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2616 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2619 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2621 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2622 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2624 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2628 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2631 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2632 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2634 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2638 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2639 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2640 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2641 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2643 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2645 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2647 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2652 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2654 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2655 * a status request message.
2657 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2659 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2662 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2663 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2666 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2667 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2669 unsigned char *selected;
2670 unsigned char selected_len;
2672 /* We must have requested it. */
2673 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2675 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2678 /* The data must be valid */
2679 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2681 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2684 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2686 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2689 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2690 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2692 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2695 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2696 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2697 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2701 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2705 /* We must have requested it. */
2706 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2708 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2713 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2716 /* The extension data consists of:
2717 * uint16 list_length
2718 * uint8 proto_length;
2719 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2723 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2725 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2729 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2731 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2734 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2735 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2736 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2737 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2739 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2742 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2743 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2746 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2748 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2750 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2752 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2753 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2757 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2758 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2760 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2761 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2762 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2764 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2769 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2771 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2775 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2776 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2778 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2781 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2783 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2785 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2786 if (record->ext_type == type)
2788 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2800 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2804 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2806 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2808 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2810 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2811 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2813 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2819 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2829 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2830 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2831 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2832 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2833 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2834 * absence on initial connect only.
2836 if (!renegotiate_seen
2837 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2838 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2840 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2842 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2850 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2853 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2857 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2859 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2864 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2866 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2867 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2869 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2870 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2872 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2873 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2878 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2882 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2883 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2890 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2895 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2897 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2898 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2901 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2902 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2904 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2905 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2909 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2910 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2911 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2912 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2914 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2916 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2917 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2918 * so this has to happen here in
2919 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2923 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2925 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2928 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2929 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2934 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2935 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2936 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2938 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2940 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2941 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2943 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2944 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2946 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2947 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2949 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2950 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2952 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2953 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2956 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2960 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2962 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2963 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2964 * abort the handshake.
2966 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2967 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2975 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2976 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2979 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2980 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2983 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2984 s->servername_done=0;
2990 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2992 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2995 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2996 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2997 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2998 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3000 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3003 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3004 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3005 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3006 if (certpkey == NULL)
3008 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3011 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3012 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3014 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3015 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3018 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3019 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3020 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3022 /* status request response should be sent */
3023 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3024 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3025 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3027 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3029 /* something bad happened */
3030 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3031 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3032 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3037 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3042 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3043 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3046 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3047 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3055 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3057 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3058 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3060 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3061 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3062 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3063 * it must contain uncompressed.
3065 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3066 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3067 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3068 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3069 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3071 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3073 unsigned char *list;
3074 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3075 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3076 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3078 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3080 found_uncompressed = 1;
3084 if (!found_uncompressed)
3086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3090 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3091 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3093 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3094 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3095 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3096 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3098 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3099 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3101 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3102 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3104 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3106 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3107 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3110 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3111 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3112 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3113 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3115 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3116 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3121 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3124 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3125 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3128 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3129 * there is no response.
3131 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3133 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3134 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3136 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3137 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3140 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3141 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3145 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3146 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3152 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3153 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3156 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3157 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3160 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3161 s->servername_done=0;
3167 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3170 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3172 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3174 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3178 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3186 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3187 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3188 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3190 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3191 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3192 * extension, if any.
3193 * len: the length of the session ID.
3194 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3195 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3196 * point to the resulting session.
3198 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3199 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3200 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3203 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3204 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3205 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3206 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3207 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3208 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3209 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3212 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3213 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3214 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3215 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3216 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3217 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3219 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3220 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3222 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3223 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3227 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3229 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3230 * to permit stateful resumption.
3232 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3234 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3238 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3246 /* Skip past cipher list */
3251 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3256 /* Now at start of extensions */
3257 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3260 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3262 unsigned short type, size;
3265 if (p + size > limit)
3267 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3272 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3273 * currently have one. */
3274 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3277 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3279 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3280 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3281 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3282 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3283 * calculate the master secret later. */
3286 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3289 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3290 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3292 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3294 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3295 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3297 default: /* fatal error */
3306 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3308 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3309 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3310 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3311 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3312 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3313 * point to the resulting session.
3316 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3317 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3318 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3319 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3321 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3322 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3323 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3326 unsigned char *sdec;
3327 const unsigned char *p;
3328 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3329 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3332 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3333 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3336 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3337 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3338 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3339 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3341 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3342 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3353 /* Check key name matches */
3354 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3356 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3357 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3358 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3359 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3361 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3362 * integrity checks on ticket.
3364 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3367 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3371 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3372 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3373 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3374 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3375 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3377 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3378 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3379 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3380 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3381 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3384 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3387 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3388 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3390 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3395 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3398 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3402 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3403 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3404 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3405 * as required by standard.
3408 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3409 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3417 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3422 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3430 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3431 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3432 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3433 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3434 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3435 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3436 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3439 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3440 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3441 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3442 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3445 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3448 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3450 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3456 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3459 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3461 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3462 return table[i].nid;
3467 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3472 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3473 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3476 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3479 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3480 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3484 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3486 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3487 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3490 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3495 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3503 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3507 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3508 return EVP_sha224();
3510 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3511 return EVP_sha256();
3513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3514 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3515 return EVP_sha384();
3517 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3518 return EVP_sha512();
3526 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3531 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3532 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3535 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3536 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3539 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3540 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3546 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3547 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3548 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3550 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3551 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3553 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3555 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3556 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3558 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3560 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3562 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3563 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3565 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3569 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3570 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3571 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3573 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3576 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3577 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3578 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3579 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3581 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3582 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3583 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3585 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3586 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3588 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3590 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3592 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3597 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3598 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3599 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3601 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3612 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3613 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3615 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3616 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3618 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3620 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3621 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3623 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3624 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3626 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3627 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3629 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3630 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3632 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3634 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3635 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3638 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3639 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3643 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3644 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3650 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3651 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3653 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3656 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3659 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3660 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3661 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3666 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3668 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3674 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3675 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3676 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3678 /* Should never happen */
3682 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3683 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3684 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3685 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3687 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3688 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3690 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3692 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3693 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3695 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3696 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3698 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3700 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3702 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3705 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3706 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3707 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3708 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3709 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3711 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3712 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3718 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3719 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3721 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3722 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3724 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3725 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3726 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3727 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3729 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3730 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3735 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3736 * use the certificate for signing.
3738 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3740 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3741 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3744 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3745 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3748 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3750 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3751 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3755 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3756 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3763 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3764 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3765 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3767 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3773 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3780 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3782 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3785 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3786 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3787 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3789 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3790 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3794 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3796 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3798 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3800 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3802 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3803 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3809 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3811 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3812 unsigned short hbtype;
3813 unsigned int payload;
3814 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3816 if (s->msg_callback)
3817 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3818 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3819 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3821 /* Read type and payload length first */
3822 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3823 return 0; /* silently discard */
3826 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3827 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3830 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3832 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3835 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3836 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3837 * payload, plus padding
3839 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3842 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3843 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3845 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3847 /* Random padding */
3848 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3850 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3852 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3853 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3854 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3855 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3857 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3862 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3866 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3867 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3868 * sequence number */
3871 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3874 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3882 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3884 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3886 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3887 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3889 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3890 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3891 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3897 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3898 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3900 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3904 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3905 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3907 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3911 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3912 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3914 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3916 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3917 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3918 * some random stuff.
3919 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3920 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3921 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3922 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3925 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3928 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3929 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3931 /* Sequence number */
3932 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3933 /* 16 random bytes */
3934 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3936 /* Random padding */
3937 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3939 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3942 if (s->msg_callback)
3943 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3944 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3945 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3947 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3956 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3961 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3964 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3966 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3969 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3970 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3972 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3974 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3976 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3984 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3985 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3986 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3987 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3988 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3989 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3992 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3993 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3994 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3995 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3998 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4000 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4001 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4004 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4005 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4009 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4010 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4011 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4015 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4019 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4022 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4024 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4029 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4030 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4032 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4034 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4035 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4036 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4037 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4039 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4047 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4048 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4049 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4050 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4054 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4055 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4056 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4057 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4063 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4067 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4071 if (default_nid == -1)
4073 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4075 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4076 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4077 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4081 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4082 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4086 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4087 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4089 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4095 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4096 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4097 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4098 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4101 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4103 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4104 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4105 /* Strict mode flags */
4106 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4107 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4108 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4110 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4115 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4116 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4118 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4119 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4122 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4126 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4129 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4131 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4133 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4134 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4137 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4138 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4139 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4141 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4142 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4151 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4154 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4155 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4156 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4158 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4166 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4167 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4168 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4171 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4177 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4178 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4181 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4184 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4185 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4187 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4192 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4193 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4194 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4195 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4196 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4199 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4200 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4201 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4202 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4206 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4207 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4215 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4216 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4219 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4222 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4223 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4225 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4228 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4236 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4237 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4239 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4242 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4243 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4244 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4246 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4251 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4259 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4260 else if(check_flags)
4261 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4263 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4264 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4265 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4266 else if (!check_flags)
4269 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4270 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4271 else if (strict_mode)
4273 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4274 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4276 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4277 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4281 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4289 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4291 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4296 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4299 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4302 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4307 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4308 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4309 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4310 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4311 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4316 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4321 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4325 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4326 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4328 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4330 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4332 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4336 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4340 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4343 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4345 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4346 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4348 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4350 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4351 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4353 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4355 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4357 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4358 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4360 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4365 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4369 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4371 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4372 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4376 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4378 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4379 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4380 else if (cpk->digest)
4381 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4384 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4386 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4387 * if the chain is invalid.
4391 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4392 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4395 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4396 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4403 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4404 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4406 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4407 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4408 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4409 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4410 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4411 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4413 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4414 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4416 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);