2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
117 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
118 # include <openssl/ec.h>
121 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
122 #include <openssl/rand.h>
123 #include "ssl_locl.h"
125 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
128 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
129 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
130 SSL_SESSION **psess);
131 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
132 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
135 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
138 tls1_setup_key_block,
139 tls1_generate_master_secret,
140 tls1_change_cipher_state,
141 tls1_final_finish_mac,
142 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
143 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
144 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
147 tls1_export_keying_material,
149 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
150 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
154 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
157 tls1_setup_key_block,
158 tls1_generate_master_secret,
159 tls1_change_cipher_state,
160 tls1_final_finish_mac,
161 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
162 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
163 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
166 tls1_export_keying_material,
167 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
168 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
169 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
173 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
176 tls1_setup_key_block,
177 tls1_generate_master_secret,
178 tls1_change_cipher_state,
179 tls1_final_finish_mac,
180 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
181 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
182 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
185 tls1_export_keying_material,
186 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
187 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
188 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
189 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
193 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
196 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
197 * http, the cache would over fill
199 return (60 * 60 * 2);
206 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
210 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
213 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
214 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
216 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
220 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
223 s->version = s->method->version;
226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
228 static int nid_list[] = {
229 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
230 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
231 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
232 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
235 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
236 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
237 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
238 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
239 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
240 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
241 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
243 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
244 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
245 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
246 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
247 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
248 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
249 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
250 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
251 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
252 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
253 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
254 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
255 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
256 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
259 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
265 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
266 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
267 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
268 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
270 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
272 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
273 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
274 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
276 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
277 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
278 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
279 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
280 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
282 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
283 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
284 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
286 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
287 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
288 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
290 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
291 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
292 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
293 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
294 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
296 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
297 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
298 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
299 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
303 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
304 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
305 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
308 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
314 /* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */
315 static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] = {
316 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
317 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
318 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
320 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
321 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
322 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
323 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
325 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
326 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
327 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
328 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
330 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
331 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
332 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
333 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
334 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
335 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
337 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
338 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
339 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
340 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
341 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
343 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
344 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
345 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
346 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
347 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
348 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
350 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
351 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
352 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
356 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
358 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
359 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
360 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
362 return nid_list[curve_id - 1];
365 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
367 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
369 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
371 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
373 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
375 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
377 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
379 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
381 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
383 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
385 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
387 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
389 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
391 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
393 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
395 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
397 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
399 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
401 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
403 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
405 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
407 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
409 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
411 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
413 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
415 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
417 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
419 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
421 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
423 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
431 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
433 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
434 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
435 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
436 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
437 * lists in the first place.
438 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
439 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
440 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
442 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
443 const unsigned char **pcurves,
446 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
448 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
449 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
451 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
452 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
453 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
454 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
455 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
458 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
459 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
463 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
464 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
468 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
469 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
474 *pcurves = fips_curves_default;
475 pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
479 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
480 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
484 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
485 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
486 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
490 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
495 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
496 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
498 const unsigned char *curves;
499 size_t num_curves, i;
500 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
501 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
503 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
505 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
508 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
509 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
511 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
512 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
514 } else /* Should never happen */
517 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
519 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
520 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
527 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
528 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
529 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
530 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
532 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
534 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
535 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
537 /* Can't do anything on client side */
541 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
543 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
544 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
546 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
547 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
548 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
549 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
550 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
551 /* Should never happen */
554 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
558 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
559 * but s->options is a long...
561 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
562 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
564 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
565 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
566 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
567 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
569 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
571 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
572 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
573 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
574 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
576 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
577 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
585 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
589 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
590 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
592 unsigned char *clist, *p;
595 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
598 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
599 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
603 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
606 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
607 unsigned long idmask;
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
611 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */
612 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25) {
617 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
618 curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]);
619 if (!curve || EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve))
620 == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
622 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
626 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
629 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
639 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
643 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
647 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
650 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
652 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
658 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
660 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
662 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
664 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
665 if (nid == NID_undef)
666 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
667 if (nid == NID_undef)
668 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
669 if (nid == NID_undef)
671 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
672 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
674 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
678 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
679 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
684 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
688 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
691 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
692 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
697 const EC_METHOD *meth;
700 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
701 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
704 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
707 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
711 /* Determine curve ID */
712 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
713 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
714 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
717 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
726 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
728 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
730 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
732 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
734 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
739 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
740 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
741 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
743 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
744 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
747 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
748 * supported (see RFC4492).
750 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
751 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
752 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
753 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
754 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
757 if (i == num_formats)
762 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
763 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
764 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
766 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
768 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
769 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
770 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
771 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
772 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
776 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
777 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
782 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
789 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
793 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
795 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
796 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
797 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
799 *pformats = ecformats_default;
800 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
802 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
804 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
809 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
810 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
812 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
814 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
817 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
820 /* If not EC nothing to do */
821 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
825 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
830 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
833 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
837 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
838 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
840 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
846 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
847 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
848 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
849 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
850 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
852 return 0; /* Should never happen */
853 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
854 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
856 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
858 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
859 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
860 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
862 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
868 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
869 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
870 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
872 unsigned char curve_id[2];
873 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
874 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
875 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
876 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
880 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
883 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
884 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
885 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
886 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
887 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
888 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
892 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
893 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
895 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
896 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
898 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
900 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
903 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
905 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
911 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
912 /* Need a shared curve */
913 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
919 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
924 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
926 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
930 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
933 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
937 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
942 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
944 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
947 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
948 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
951 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
952 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
954 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
957 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
958 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
960 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
963 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
964 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
967 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
970 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
971 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
972 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
973 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
975 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
976 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
977 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
978 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
980 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
981 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
982 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
984 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
985 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
989 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
990 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
991 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
992 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
995 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
998 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1001 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1002 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1003 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1004 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1005 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
1007 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1008 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1011 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1012 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
1016 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
1017 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
1018 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1019 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1020 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1021 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1022 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1024 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1025 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1030 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1031 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1033 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1034 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1036 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1037 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1038 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1039 /* Should never happen */
1042 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1043 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1047 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1048 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1049 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1050 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1051 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1053 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1057 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1058 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1061 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1062 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1064 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1067 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1068 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1070 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1076 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1080 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1081 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1082 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1083 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1086 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1087 if (i == sent_sigslen
1088 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1089 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1093 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1099 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1101 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1102 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1107 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1108 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1109 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1112 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1115 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1116 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1117 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1120 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1121 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1122 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1126 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1127 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2.
1129 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1130 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
1131 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
1132 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1133 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1137 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1138 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1142 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1143 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1150 * Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1151 * signature algorithms.
1154 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1155 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1158 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1159 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1162 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1163 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1165 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1166 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1167 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1168 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1171 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1172 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1173 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1174 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1175 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1177 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1178 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1179 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1180 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1181 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1187 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1188 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1191 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1192 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1193 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1194 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1196 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1198 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1199 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1201 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1202 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1204 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1205 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1206 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1207 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1215 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1216 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1222 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1224 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1225 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1226 unsigned long size_str;
1230 * check for enough space.
1231 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1232 * 2 for servernamelist length
1233 * 1 for the hostname type
1234 * 2 for hostname length
1238 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1240 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1243 /* extension type and length */
1244 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1245 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1247 /* length of servername list */
1248 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1250 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1251 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1253 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1257 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1258 if (s->renegotiate) {
1261 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1266 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1269 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1272 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1279 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1280 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1281 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1282 * Client Hello message */
1284 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1285 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1291 * check for enough space.
1292 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1293 * 1 for the srp user identity
1294 * + srp user identity length
1296 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1299 /* fill in the extension */
1300 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1301 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1302 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1303 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1308 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1311 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1314 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1315 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1317 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1319 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1321 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1323 if (num_formats > 255) {
1324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1328 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1329 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1330 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1331 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1332 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1336 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1338 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1339 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1342 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1344 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1346 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1350 curves_list_len = 2 * num_curves;
1351 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1352 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1353 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1354 memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len);
1355 ret += curves_list_len;
1357 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1359 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1361 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1362 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1363 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1364 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1365 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1366 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1367 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1369 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1370 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1371 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1374 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1375 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1378 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1381 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1383 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1386 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1392 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1394 const unsigned char *salg;
1395 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1396 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1398 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1399 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1401 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1404 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1405 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1406 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1408 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1410 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1413 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1416 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1421 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1423 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1427 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1428 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1429 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1435 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1436 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1442 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1444 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1445 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1447 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1448 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1450 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1451 /* save position of id len */
1452 unsigned char *q = ret;
1453 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1454 /* skip over id len */
1456 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1462 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1464 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1465 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1466 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1468 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1472 * 1: peer may send requests
1473 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1475 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1476 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1478 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1481 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1482 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1484 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1485 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1487 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1489 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1494 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1495 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1497 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1498 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1499 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1500 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1501 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1503 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1504 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1507 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1509 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1512 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1515 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1522 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1523 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1524 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1528 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1529 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1530 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1533 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1534 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1536 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1537 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1540 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1542 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1543 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1549 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1551 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1556 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1559 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1563 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1564 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1567 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1568 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1569 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1570 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1572 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1573 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1574 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1575 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1576 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1577 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1580 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation
1582 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1587 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1589 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1590 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1591 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1594 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1598 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1601 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1606 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1609 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1612 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1619 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1621 const unsigned char *plist;
1624 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1628 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1630 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1632 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1634 if (plistlen > 255) {
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1639 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1640 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1641 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1642 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1647 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1650 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1652 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1653 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1655 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1659 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1660 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1662 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1665 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1666 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1667 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1669 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1671 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1674 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1677 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1682 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1683 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1686 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1688 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1691 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1694 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1702 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1703 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1704 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1705 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1706 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1707 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1708 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1709 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1710 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1711 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1713 if (limit - ret < 36)
1715 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1719 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1720 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1721 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1722 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1724 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1728 * 1: peer may send requests
1729 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1731 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1732 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1734 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1739 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1740 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1741 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1742 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1743 const unsigned char *npa;
1744 unsigned int npalen;
1747 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1749 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1750 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1751 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1753 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1755 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1757 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1761 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1764 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1765 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1766 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1768 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1770 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1774 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1778 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1781 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1785 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1787 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1788 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1789 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1794 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1795 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1796 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1797 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1799 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1800 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1802 unsigned short type, size;
1803 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1804 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1805 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1806 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1807 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1808 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1809 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1811 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1812 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1813 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1814 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1817 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1818 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1819 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1820 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1821 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1822 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1823 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1824 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1825 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1826 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1829 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1833 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1838 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1841 if (data + size > d + n)
1845 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1846 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1847 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1849 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1851 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1853 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1856 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1858 if (data + len != d + n)
1860 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1864 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1866 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1869 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1870 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1871 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1872 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1875 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1876 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1880 const unsigned char *selected;
1881 unsigned char selected_len;
1884 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1891 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1892 * length-prefixed strings.
1894 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1903 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1904 proto_len = data[i];
1910 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1916 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1917 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1918 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1919 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1920 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1921 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1922 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1923 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1926 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1927 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1932 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1936 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1937 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1939 unsigned short type;
1940 unsigned short size;
1942 unsigned char *data = *p;
1943 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1945 s->servername_done = 0;
1946 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1947 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1948 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1951 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1952 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1953 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1955 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1956 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1957 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1960 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1961 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1962 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1963 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1965 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1966 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
1967 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1968 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1970 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1971 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1972 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1973 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1977 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1979 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1983 if (data > (d + n - len))
1986 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1990 if (data + size > (d + n))
1993 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
1995 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1996 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1998 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2000 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2001 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2002 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2003 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2004 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2005 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2006 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2007 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2008 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2009 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2010 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2011 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2012 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2013 * the value of the Host: field.
2014 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2015 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2016 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2018 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2022 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2023 unsigned char *sdata;
2028 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2034 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2040 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2045 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2048 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2049 switch (servname_type) {
2050 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2052 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2053 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2056 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2057 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2060 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2061 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2062 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2065 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2066 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2067 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2068 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2069 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2070 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2073 s->servername_done = 1;
2076 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2077 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2078 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2079 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2090 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2095 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2096 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2097 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2098 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2101 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2102 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2105 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2107 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2108 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2110 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2111 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2117 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2118 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2119 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2120 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2122 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2123 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2124 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2128 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2129 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2130 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2132 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2133 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2134 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2135 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2138 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2139 ecpointformatlist_length;
2140 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2141 ecpointformatlist_length);
2145 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
2146 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2147 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2148 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2149 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2150 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2152 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2153 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2154 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2155 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2157 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2158 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2159 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2160 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2161 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2165 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2166 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2169 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2170 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2171 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2172 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2175 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2176 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2177 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2178 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2182 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
2183 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2184 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2185 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2186 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2187 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2190 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2191 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2192 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2193 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2196 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2199 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2200 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2201 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2205 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2206 /* shouldn't really happen */
2207 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2210 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2211 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2212 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2214 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2215 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2216 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2217 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2222 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2223 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2224 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2225 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2227 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2230 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2231 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2233 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2234 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2236 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2237 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2242 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2243 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2246 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2247 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2250 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2253 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2257 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2259 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2260 const unsigned char *sdata;
2262 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2266 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2273 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2277 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2280 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2285 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2287 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2290 if (data != sdata) {
2291 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2292 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2295 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2296 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2297 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2298 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2299 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2302 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2303 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2304 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2309 /* Read in request_extensions */
2311 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2316 if (dsize != size) {
2317 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2322 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2323 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2324 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2327 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2328 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2329 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2330 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2336 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2339 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2341 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2342 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2344 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2345 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2347 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2348 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2349 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2352 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2357 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2358 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2359 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2360 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2362 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2365 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2366 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2367 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2368 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2369 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2370 * anything like that, but this might change).
2372 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2373 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2374 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2375 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2376 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2378 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2382 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2383 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2384 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2386 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2387 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2388 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2392 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2393 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2394 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2395 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2396 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2408 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2410 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2411 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2412 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2414 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2422 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data
2423 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking.
2426 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
2427 const unsigned char *data,
2428 const unsigned char *limit,
2431 unsigned short type, size, len;
2432 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
2433 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
2436 if (data >= limit - 2)
2440 if (data > limit - len)
2443 while (data <= limit - 4) {
2447 if (data + size > limit)
2449 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2458 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2462 unsigned char *ptmp = *p;
2464 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled
2465 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically
2466 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions
2467 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure.
2469 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2470 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2474 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2479 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2480 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, d + n, &al) <= 0) {
2481 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2488 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2490 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2491 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2492 * fill the length of the block.
2494 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2496 unsigned int off = 0;
2509 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2510 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2512 unsigned short length;
2513 unsigned short type;
2514 unsigned short size;
2515 unsigned char *data = *p;
2516 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2517 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2519 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2520 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2522 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2524 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2525 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2526 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2528 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2529 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2530 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2533 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2537 if (data + length != d + n) {
2538 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2542 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2546 if (data + size > (d + n))
2549 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2550 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2552 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2553 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2554 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2557 tlsext_servername = 1;
2559 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2560 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2561 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2562 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2564 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2565 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2569 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2570 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2571 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2572 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2573 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2574 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2577 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2578 ecpointformatlist_length;
2579 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2580 ecpointformatlist_length);
2584 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2585 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2586 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2587 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2588 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2591 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2593 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2594 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2595 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2596 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2598 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2601 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2603 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2606 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2608 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2609 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2610 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2613 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2616 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2617 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2618 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2622 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2623 /* shouldn't really happen */
2624 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2626 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2627 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2628 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2630 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2631 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2634 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2635 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2640 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2642 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2645 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2646 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2649 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2650 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2652 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2653 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2654 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2655 unsigned char *selected;
2656 unsigned char selected_len;
2658 /* We must have requested it. */
2659 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2660 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2663 /* The data must be valid */
2664 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2665 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2669 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2671 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2672 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2673 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2676 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2677 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2678 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2681 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2682 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2683 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2687 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2690 /* We must have requested it. */
2691 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2692 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2696 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2700 * The extension data consists of:
2701 * uint16 list_length
2702 * uint8 proto_length;
2703 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2708 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2709 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2713 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2714 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2717 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2718 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2719 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2720 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2721 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2724 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2725 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2728 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2729 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2731 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2733 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2734 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2736 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2737 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2739 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2740 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2741 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2744 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2749 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2750 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2751 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2756 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2757 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2759 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2765 if (data != d + n) {
2766 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2770 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2771 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2772 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2773 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2774 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2775 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2779 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2790 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2791 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2792 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2793 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2794 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2795 * initial connect only.
2797 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2798 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2799 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2801 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2808 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2811 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2815 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2816 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2818 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2823 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2824 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2825 /* shouldn't really happen */
2826 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2829 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2830 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2831 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2833 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2834 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2835 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2837 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2839 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2842 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len =
2843 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2848 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate
2849 * server opaque PRF input
2851 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
2852 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2859 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2864 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2866 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2867 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2869 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2871 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2872 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2875 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2876 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2880 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2882 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2883 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2884 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2885 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2887 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2889 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2891 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2894 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we
2895 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this
2896 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early().
2901 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2902 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2904 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2906 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2907 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2912 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2913 /* shouldn't really happen */
2914 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2916 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2918 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2919 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2920 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
2921 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) {
2923 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF
2924 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input!
2927 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2928 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2929 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2931 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2932 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2933 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2935 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2936 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2937 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2940 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
2941 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2945 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2947 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we
2948 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the
2951 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2952 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2959 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2960 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2963 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2964 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2967 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2968 s->servername_done = 0;
2974 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2978 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2979 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2980 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2981 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2982 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2984 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2985 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2986 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2987 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2990 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2991 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2992 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2994 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2997 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2998 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3000 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3001 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3005 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3008 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3012 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3014 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3018 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
3019 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
3020 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
3021 * influence which certificate is sent
3023 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3025 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3026 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3027 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3028 if (certpkey == NULL) {
3029 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3033 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
3034 * et al can pick it up.
3036 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3037 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3039 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3040 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3041 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3043 /* status request response should be sent */
3044 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3045 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3046 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3048 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3050 /* something bad happened */
3051 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3052 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3053 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3057 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3061 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3062 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3065 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3066 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3074 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3076 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3077 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3079 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3081 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3082 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3083 * must contain uncompressed.
3085 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3086 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3087 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3088 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3089 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3090 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3091 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
3092 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3093 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3095 unsigned char *list;
3096 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3097 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3098 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3099 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3100 found_uncompressed = 1;
3104 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3106 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3110 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3111 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3113 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3115 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3116 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3117 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3118 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3120 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3122 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3124 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3125 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
3127 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on
3128 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a
3129 * value from the server too.
3132 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
3133 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3134 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3138 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to
3139 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size.
3141 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3142 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len !=
3143 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
3144 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3145 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3151 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
3154 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3155 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3158 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
3161 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
3162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3163 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3165 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3166 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3168 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3169 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3172 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3173 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3178 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3179 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3182 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3183 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3186 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3187 s->servername_done = 0;
3193 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
3197 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3199 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
3200 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3204 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3212 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3213 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3214 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3216 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3217 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3218 * extension, if any.
3219 * len: the length of the session ID.
3220 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3221 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3222 * point to the resulting session.
3224 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3225 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3226 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3229 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3230 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3231 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3232 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3233 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3234 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3235 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3238 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3239 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3240 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3241 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3242 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3243 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3245 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3246 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3248 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3249 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3253 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3256 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3259 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3261 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3265 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3266 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3272 /* Skip past cipher list */
3277 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3282 /* Now at start of extensions */
3283 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3286 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
3287 unsigned short type, size;
3290 if (p + size > limit)
3292 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3296 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3299 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3302 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3304 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3305 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3306 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3307 * calculate the master secret later.
3311 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3313 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3314 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3316 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3318 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3319 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3321 default: /* fatal error */
3331 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3333 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3334 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3335 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3336 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3337 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3338 * point to the resulting session.
3341 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3342 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3343 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3344 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3346 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3347 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3348 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3351 unsigned char *sdec;
3352 const unsigned char *p;
3353 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3354 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3357 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3358 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3361 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3362 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3363 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3364 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3365 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3366 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3375 /* Check key name matches */
3376 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3378 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3379 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3380 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3381 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3384 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3387 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3389 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3393 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3394 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3395 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3396 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3397 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3398 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3401 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3402 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3403 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3404 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3405 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3407 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3410 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3411 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3412 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3417 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3420 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3424 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3425 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3426 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3430 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3431 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3440 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3445 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3452 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3453 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3454 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3455 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3456 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3457 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3458 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3461 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3462 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3463 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3464 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3467 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3470 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3471 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3477 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3480 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3481 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3482 return table[i].nid;
3487 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3493 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3494 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3497 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3500 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3501 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3505 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3507 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3508 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3511 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3514 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3515 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3516 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
3522 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3523 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3526 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3527 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3528 return EVP_sha224();
3530 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3531 return EVP_sha256();
3533 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3534 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3535 return EVP_sha384();
3537 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3538 return EVP_sha512();
3546 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3549 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3550 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3551 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3553 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3554 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3555 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3557 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3558 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3559 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3565 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3566 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3567 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3569 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3570 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3572 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3573 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3574 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3576 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3578 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3579 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3580 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3582 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3584 if (psignhash_nid) {
3585 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3586 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3588 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3592 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3593 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3594 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3595 const unsigned char *allow,
3598 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3599 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3600 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3601 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3602 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3604 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3606 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3607 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3610 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3611 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3612 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3614 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3624 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3625 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3627 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3628 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3630 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3632 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3633 if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3634 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3635 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3636 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3638 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3639 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3640 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3641 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3642 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3643 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3644 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3646 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3647 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3650 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3651 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3655 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3656 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3658 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3660 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3663 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3667 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3668 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3672 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3674 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3677 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3678 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3680 /* Should never happen */
3684 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3685 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3686 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3687 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3689 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3690 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3694 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3700 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3701 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3704 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3705 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3707 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3708 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3710 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3712 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3714 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3716 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3717 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3718 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3719 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3720 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3721 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3722 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3723 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3729 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3730 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3731 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3732 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3733 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3734 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3735 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3736 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3737 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3738 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3739 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3745 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3746 * the certificate for signing.
3748 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3750 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3751 * supported it stays as NULL.
3753 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3754 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3755 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3757 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3758 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3759 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3760 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3763 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3764 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3765 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3771 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3772 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3773 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3775 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3780 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3787 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3789 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3792 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3793 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3794 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3796 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3797 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3801 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3803 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3805 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3807 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3809 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3810 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3813 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3814 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3816 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3817 unsigned short hbtype;
3818 unsigned int payload;
3819 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3821 if (s->msg_callback)
3822 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3823 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3824 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3826 /* Read type and payload length first */
3827 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3828 return 0; /* silently discard */
3831 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3832 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3835 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3836 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3840 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3841 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3843 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3846 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3847 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3849 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3851 /* Random padding */
3852 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3854 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3855 3 + payload + padding);
3857 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3858 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3859 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3860 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3862 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3866 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3870 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3871 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3875 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3877 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3884 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3886 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3888 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3889 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3891 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3892 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3893 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3894 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3898 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3899 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3900 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3904 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3905 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3906 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3911 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3912 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3914 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3917 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3918 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3919 * some random stuff.
3920 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3921 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3922 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3923 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3926 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3929 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3930 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3932 /* Sequence number */
3933 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3934 /* 16 random bytes */
3935 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3937 /* Random padding */
3938 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3940 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3942 if (s->msg_callback)
3943 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3944 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3945 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3947 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3956 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3960 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3963 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3965 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3968 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3971 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3973 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3975 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3977 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3985 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3986 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3987 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3988 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3989 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3990 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3994 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3995 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3996 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3997 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4000 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
4001 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4004 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4005 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4010 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
4011 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
4013 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4017 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4021 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4024 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
4027 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4032 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4033 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4035 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
4036 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4037 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4038 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4039 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4041 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4048 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4049 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4050 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4051 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4053 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4054 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4055 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4056 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4062 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4066 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4070 if (default_nid == -1)
4072 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4074 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4075 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4076 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4081 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4082 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4086 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4087 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
4088 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4095 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4096 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4097 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4098 * attempting to use them.
4101 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4103 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4104 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4105 /* Strict mode flags */
4106 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4107 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4108 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4110 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4115 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4116 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4118 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4119 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4121 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4124 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4126 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4128 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4130 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4131 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4134 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4135 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4136 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
4137 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
4138 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4139 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4146 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4149 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4150 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4151 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4153 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4160 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4161 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4162 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4163 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4164 else if (!check_flags)
4169 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4170 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4172 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4174 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4175 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4177 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4180 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4181 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4182 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4183 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4184 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4187 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4188 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4189 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4190 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4194 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4195 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4204 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4205 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4207 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4209 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4210 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4211 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4214 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4221 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4222 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4226 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4227 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4228 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4229 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4231 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4238 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4239 else if (check_flags)
4240 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4242 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4243 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4244 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4245 else if (!check_flags)
4248 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4249 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4250 else if (strict_mode) {
4251 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4252 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4253 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4254 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4256 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4263 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4264 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4268 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4271 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4274 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4279 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4280 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4281 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4282 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4283 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4287 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4291 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4293 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4294 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4296 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4297 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4298 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4302 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4305 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4307 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4309 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4310 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4312 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4313 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4314 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4316 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4317 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4318 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4319 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4320 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4325 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4328 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4330 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4331 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4335 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4336 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4337 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4338 else if (cpk->digest)
4339 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4341 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4344 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4348 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4349 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4351 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4352 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4359 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4360 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4362 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4363 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4364 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4365 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4366 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4367 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4370 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4371 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4373 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);