1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
218 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->info_callback;
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
234 if (s->cert == NULL) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
269 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
272 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
274 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
275 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
277 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
283 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
296 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
310 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
315 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
316 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
317 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
322 * support secure renegotiation.
324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
326 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
328 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
344 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
347 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
348 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
355 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
363 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
367 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
368 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
371 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
373 * callback indicates firther work to be done
375 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
378 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
379 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
384 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
386 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
388 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
395 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
400 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
401 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
406 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
407 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
409 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
413 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
416 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
421 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
422 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
423 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
426 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
428 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
429 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
433 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
434 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
436 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
439 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
445 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
451 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
452 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
455 * clear this, it may get reset by
456 * send_server_key_exchange
458 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
461 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
462 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
463 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
464 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
465 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
470 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
474 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
477 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
478 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
480 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
481 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
482 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
483 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
484 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
485 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
486 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
487 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
492 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
498 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
504 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
505 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
507 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
508 * during re-negotiation:
510 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
511 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
513 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
514 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
517 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
519 * ... except when the application insists on
520 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
523 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
525 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
527 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
528 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
529 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
531 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
534 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
535 /* no cert request */
537 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
538 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
539 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
540 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
541 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
546 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
547 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
550 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
551 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
553 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
554 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
562 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
565 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
566 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
570 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
573 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
574 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
575 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
576 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
577 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
581 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
582 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
586 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
588 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
592 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
593 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
594 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
599 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
602 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
603 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
604 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
609 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
610 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
611 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
612 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
614 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
615 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
617 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
618 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
620 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
623 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
624 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
626 if (!s->session->peer)
629 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
630 * digest cached records.
632 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
634 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
637 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
638 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
639 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
646 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
650 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
651 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
652 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
655 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
656 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
657 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
661 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
662 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
665 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
674 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
676 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
685 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
686 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
688 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
689 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
690 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
691 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
693 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
694 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
695 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
696 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
700 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
701 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
703 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
704 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
706 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
711 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
712 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
713 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
715 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
716 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
717 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
718 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
719 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
720 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
721 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
722 * the client's Finished message is read.
724 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
725 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
727 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
731 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
735 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
736 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
738 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
739 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
740 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
741 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
742 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
743 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
744 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
745 * the client's Finished message is read.
747 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
748 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
749 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
750 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
754 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
756 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
757 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
760 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
765 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
766 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
767 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
770 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
774 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
775 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
776 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
779 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
785 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
786 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
788 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
789 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
791 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
795 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
797 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
801 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
804 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
805 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
808 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
814 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
815 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
816 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
817 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
818 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
820 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
822 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
825 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
827 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
828 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
830 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
831 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
833 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
836 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
841 /* clean a few things up */
842 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
844 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
847 /* remove buffering on output */
848 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
852 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
857 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
859 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
861 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
864 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
879 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
881 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
885 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
886 new_state = s->state;
888 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
889 s->state = new_state;
895 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
899 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
903 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
906 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
907 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
908 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
911 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
912 return ssl_do_write(s);
915 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
917 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
918 unsigned int cookie_len;
921 unsigned char *p, *d;
923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
925 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
927 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
929 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
933 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
934 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
935 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
936 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
938 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
939 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
942 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
943 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
944 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
945 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
946 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
951 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
954 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
955 * for session id length
957 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
958 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
964 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
965 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
967 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
970 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
971 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
972 : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
974 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
975 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
977 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
980 s->version = s->client_version;
982 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
987 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
988 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
991 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
992 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
994 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
996 if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
997 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1001 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1003 if (cookie_length == 0)
1007 /* load the client random */
1008 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1009 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1011 /* get the session-id */
1014 if (p + j > d + n) {
1015 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1022 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1023 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1024 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1025 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1026 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1027 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1028 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1029 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1030 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1031 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1034 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1035 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1038 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1040 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1042 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1043 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1044 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1045 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1046 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1048 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1055 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1062 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1064 if (p + 1 > d + n) {
1065 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1069 cookie_len = *(p++);
1071 if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
1072 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1078 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1079 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1080 * does not cause an overflow.
1082 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1084 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1089 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1090 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1091 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1093 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1094 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1096 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1098 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1101 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1103 /* default verification */
1104 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1105 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1106 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1110 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1115 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1116 /* Select version to use */
1117 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1118 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1119 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1120 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1121 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1123 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1124 s->version = s->client_version;
1125 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1127 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1128 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1129 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1130 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1133 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1134 s->version = s->client_version;
1135 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1138 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1142 if (p + 2 > d + n) {
1143 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1150 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1155 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1156 if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
1157 /* not enough data */
1158 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1162 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
1167 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1170 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1173 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1174 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1176 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1177 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1179 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1180 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1188 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1192 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1193 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1195 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1196 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1197 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1198 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1199 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1201 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1202 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1203 s->session->cipher = c;
1210 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1213 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1215 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1222 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
1223 /* not enough data */
1224 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1228 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1231 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1239 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1244 /* TLS extensions */
1245 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1246 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1253 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1254 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1255 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1256 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1260 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1261 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1266 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1267 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1269 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1270 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1271 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1273 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1275 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1276 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1280 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1282 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1287 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1288 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1293 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1296 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1298 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1299 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1301 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1302 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1308 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1309 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1310 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1312 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1314 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1315 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1316 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1317 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1318 /* Can't disable compression */
1319 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1321 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1324 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1325 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1326 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1327 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1328 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1332 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1334 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1337 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1338 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1339 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1343 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1345 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1350 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1351 /* See if we have a match */
1352 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1354 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1355 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1356 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1358 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1368 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1374 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1375 * using compression.
1377 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1384 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1388 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1389 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1391 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1393 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1394 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1395 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1396 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1397 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1402 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1406 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1408 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1409 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1411 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1416 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1419 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1421 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1424 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1428 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1430 /* Session-id reuse */
1431 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1432 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1433 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
1434 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
1436 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
1437 sk = s->session->ciphers;
1438 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
1439 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1440 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1442 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1446 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
1447 else if (ec != NULL)
1448 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
1450 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1453 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1456 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1457 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1462 * we now have the following setup.
1464 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1465 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1466 * compression - basically ignored right now
1467 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1468 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1469 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1470 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1473 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1474 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1475 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1485 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1487 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1490 if (ciphers != NULL)
1491 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1492 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1495 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1498 unsigned char *p, *d;
1503 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1504 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1505 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1506 p = s->s3->server_random;
1507 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1508 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1512 /* Do the message type and length last */
1513 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1515 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1516 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1519 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1520 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1523 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1524 * back in the server hello:
1525 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1526 * we send back the old session ID.
1527 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1528 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1529 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1530 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1532 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1533 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1534 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1535 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1538 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1540 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1542 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1543 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1545 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1549 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1552 /* put the cipher */
1553 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1556 /* put the compression method */
1557 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1560 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1563 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1566 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1568 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1572 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1574 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1576 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1582 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1583 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1586 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1587 return ssl_do_write(s);
1590 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1593 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1594 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1595 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1598 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1599 return ssl_do_write(s);
1602 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1604 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1608 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1612 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1615 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1616 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1619 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1622 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1623 unsigned char *p, *d;
1633 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1634 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1635 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1640 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1643 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1644 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1645 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1646 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1647 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1649 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1652 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1654 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1658 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1661 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1663 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1668 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1672 if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
1674 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1675 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1676 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1678 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1681 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1683 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1687 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1689 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1693 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1699 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1700 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1701 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1702 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1707 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1708 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1709 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1720 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1721 const EC_GROUP *group;
1723 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1724 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1725 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1726 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1727 if (nid != NID_undef)
1728 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1729 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1730 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1731 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1733 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1734 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1736 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1737 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1739 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1743 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1745 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1749 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1750 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1754 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1756 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1761 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1762 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1763 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1764 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1765 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1772 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1773 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1774 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1779 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1780 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1782 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1787 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1788 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1792 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1794 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1795 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1800 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1801 * allocate memory accordingly.
1803 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1804 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1805 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1808 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1809 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1810 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1811 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1813 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1817 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1818 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1819 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1820 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1822 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1827 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1831 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1832 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1833 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1839 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1840 * can set these to NULLs
1847 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1848 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1849 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1851 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1853 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1855 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1857 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1858 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1859 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1860 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1862 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1865 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1866 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1867 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1868 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1872 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1874 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1877 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1878 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1879 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1880 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1887 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1888 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1889 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1891 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1894 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1900 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1901 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1904 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1906 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1907 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1908 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1919 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1921 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1922 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1923 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1924 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1926 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1934 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1935 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1936 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1937 encodedPoint = NULL;
1942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1943 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1944 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1945 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1946 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1947 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1948 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1955 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1956 * points to the space at the end.
1958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1959 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1962 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1963 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1964 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1965 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1966 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1967 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1969 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1971 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1972 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
1976 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1977 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1978 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
1986 /* send signature algorithm */
1987 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1988 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1989 /* Should never happen */
1990 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1992 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1998 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2000 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2001 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2003 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2005 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
2006 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2007 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2013 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2016 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2017 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2019 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2024 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2027 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2028 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2029 return ssl_do_write(s);
2031 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2033 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2034 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2035 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2036 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2038 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2039 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2043 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2045 unsigned char *p, *d;
2046 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2047 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2051 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2054 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2056 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2058 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2063 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2064 const unsigned char *psigs;
2065 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2067 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2076 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2079 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2080 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2081 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2082 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2083 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2088 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2089 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
2091 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2096 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2105 /* else no CA names */
2106 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2109 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2111 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2112 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2113 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
2114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2117 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2119 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2127 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2130 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2131 return ssl_do_write(s);
2133 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2137 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2141 unsigned long alg_k;
2143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2145 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2149 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2151 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2153 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2156 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2157 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2158 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2159 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2162 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2163 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2164 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2165 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2169 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2171 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2174 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2175 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2177 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2180 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2181 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2182 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2183 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2185 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2188 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2190 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2195 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2196 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2197 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2198 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2200 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2203 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2206 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2207 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2210 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2211 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2213 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2222 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2223 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2224 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2225 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2226 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2228 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2229 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2231 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2236 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2237 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2238 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2239 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2240 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2244 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2246 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2247 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2250 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2254 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2255 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2258 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2261 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2262 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2263 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2264 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2265 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2266 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2269 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2271 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2274 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2275 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2276 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2277 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2278 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2279 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2282 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2283 unsigned char workaround_good;
2285 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2287 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2288 version_good |= workaround_good;
2292 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2293 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2295 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2298 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2299 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2300 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2301 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2303 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2304 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2305 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2308 s->session->master_key_length =
2309 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2311 session->master_key,
2314 (rand_premaster_secret));
2315 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2319 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2321 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2325 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
2326 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2328 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2333 if (n && n != i + 2) {
2334 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2336 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2343 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2344 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2345 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2346 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2348 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2349 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2350 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2351 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2353 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2356 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2357 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2358 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2360 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2363 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2366 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2367 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2369 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2370 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2372 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2373 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2375 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2378 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2379 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2381 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2387 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2395 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2396 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2402 s->session->master_key_length =
2403 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2405 session->master_key,
2407 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2413 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2414 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2415 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2416 krb5_data authenticator;
2418 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2419 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2420 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2421 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2422 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2424 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2425 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2427 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2430 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2433 enc_ticket.length = i;
2435 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2437 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2441 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2442 p += enc_ticket.length;
2445 authenticator.length = i;
2447 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2449 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2453 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2454 p += authenticator.length;
2458 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2459 p += enc_pms.length;
2462 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2464 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2466 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2470 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2471 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2473 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2477 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2480 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2481 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2483 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2484 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2490 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2491 * return authtime == 0.
2493 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2494 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2496 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2497 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2499 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2500 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2505 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2510 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2511 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2513 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2517 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2519 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2521 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2524 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2525 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2528 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2531 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2533 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2536 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2538 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2542 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2544 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2547 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2548 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2550 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2551 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2552 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2553 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2554 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2555 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2556 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2559 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2561 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2566 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2568 s->session->master_key_length =
2569 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2571 session->master_key,
2574 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2575 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2576 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2577 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2578 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2583 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2584 * but it caused problems for apache.
2585 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2586 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2589 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2592 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2596 const EC_GROUP *group;
2597 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2599 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2600 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2605 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2606 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2607 /* use the certificate */
2608 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2611 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2612 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2614 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2617 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2618 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2620 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2621 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2626 /* Let's get client's public key */
2627 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2633 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2635 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
2636 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2638 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2641 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2642 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2644 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2645 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2646 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2647 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2648 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2649 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2651 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2653 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2657 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2658 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2663 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2666 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2667 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2669 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2671 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2675 /* Get encoded point length */
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2682 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2687 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2690 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2693 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2694 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2695 if (field_size <= 0) {
2696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2699 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2706 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2707 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2708 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2709 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2710 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2711 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2713 /* Compute the master secret */
2714 s->session->master_key_length =
2715 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2717 session->master_key,
2720 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2725 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2726 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2727 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2728 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2730 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2732 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2739 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2741 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2744 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2746 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2751 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2753 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2754 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2755 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2757 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2758 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2760 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2763 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2765 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2768 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2769 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2773 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2774 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2776 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2778 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2782 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2783 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2784 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2785 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2790 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2791 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2792 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2793 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2794 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2799 s->session->master_key_length =
2800 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2802 session->master_key,
2807 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2812 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2813 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2818 if (param_len > n) {
2819 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2821 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2824 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2825 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2828 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2829 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2830 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2832 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2835 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2836 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2837 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2838 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2843 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2844 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2845 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2852 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2853 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2855 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2856 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2857 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2858 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2859 unsigned long alg_a;
2863 /* Get our certificate private key */
2864 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2865 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2866 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2867 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2868 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2870 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2871 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2873 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2874 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2875 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2876 * client certificate for authorization only.
2878 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2879 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2880 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2883 /* Decrypt session key */
2885 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2886 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2887 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2889 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2894 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2895 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2897 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2900 /* Generate master secret */
2901 s->session->master_key_length =
2902 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2904 session->master_key,
2905 premaster_secret, 32);
2906 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2907 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2908 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2913 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2914 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2920 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2927 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2928 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2932 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2933 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2934 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2935 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2936 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2938 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2942 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2944 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2946 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2950 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2952 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2954 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2955 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2956 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2957 -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2962 if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
2963 peer = s->session->peer;
2964 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2965 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2971 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
2972 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2974 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2983 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2984 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2988 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2990 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2991 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2995 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
2996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2997 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3001 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3002 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3003 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3005 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3008 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3009 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
3012 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3013 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3015 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3017 } else if (rv == 0) {
3018 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3022 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3031 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3035 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3036 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
3037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3038 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3042 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3045 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3046 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3048 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3052 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3055 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3056 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3058 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3062 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
3063 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3069 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3070 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3071 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3074 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3079 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3086 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3087 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3088 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3089 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3092 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3098 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3099 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3100 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3101 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3102 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3105 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3111 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3112 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3113 unsigned char signature[64];
3115 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3116 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3118 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3120 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3121 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3123 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3125 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3127 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3133 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3140 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3141 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3144 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3145 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3146 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3147 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3149 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3150 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3154 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3156 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3158 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3159 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3161 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3163 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3166 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3171 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3172 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3173 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3175 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3176 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3180 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3182 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3184 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3185 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3188 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3192 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3193 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3197 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3199 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3205 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3206 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3210 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3212 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3213 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3215 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3220 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3226 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3228 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3231 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3239 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3240 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3241 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3242 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3244 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3247 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3248 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3249 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3251 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3252 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3255 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3256 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3257 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3261 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3263 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3265 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3270 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3271 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3272 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3273 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3276 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3279 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3280 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3281 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3286 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3287 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3288 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3290 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3291 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3299 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3301 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3307 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3311 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3315 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3316 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3318 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3319 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3320 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3322 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3323 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3328 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3330 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3333 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3336 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3337 return ssl_do_write(s);
3340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3341 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3342 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3344 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3348 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3349 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3350 const unsigned char *const_p;
3351 int len, slen_full, slen;
3354 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3355 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3356 unsigned char key_name[16];
3358 /* get session encoding length */
3359 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3361 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3364 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3365 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3368 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3370 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3374 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3375 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3378 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3382 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3385 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3388 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3390 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3391 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3392 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3396 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3397 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3400 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3403 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3404 * follows handshake_header_length +
3405 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3406 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3407 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3408 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3410 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3411 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3412 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3415 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3417 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3418 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3420 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3421 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3425 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3427 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3428 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3430 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3431 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
3433 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3437 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3438 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3439 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3441 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3443 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3445 /* Output key name */
3447 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3450 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3451 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3452 /* Encrypt session data */
3453 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3456 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3460 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3462 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3465 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3466 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3469 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3471 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3472 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3473 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3475 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3476 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3480 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3481 return ssl_do_write(s);
3485 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3486 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3487 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3491 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3493 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3496 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3497 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3498 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3501 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3502 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3506 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3509 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3510 /* message length */
3511 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3513 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3514 /* length of OCSP response */
3515 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3516 /* actual response */
3517 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3518 /* number of bytes to write */
3519 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3520 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3524 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3525 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3528 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3530 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3531 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3533 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3536 int proto_len, padding_len;
3538 const unsigned char *p;
3541 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3542 * extension in their ClientHello
3544 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3546 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3547 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3551 /* See the payload format below */
3552 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3553 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3554 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3555 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3561 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3562 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3563 * ssl3_get_finished).
3565 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3567 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3572 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3573 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3576 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3579 * The payload looks like:
3581 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3582 * uint8 padding_len;
3583 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3586 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
3587 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3590 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3591 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
3592 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3596 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3597 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3599 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3602 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3603 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;