1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return(SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function,
187 ssl3_get_server_method)
190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
191 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
193 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
195 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
197 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
198 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
200 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
202 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
203 we do so if There is no srp login name */
205 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
209 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
216 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
219 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
220 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
222 int new_state,state,skip=0;
224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
228 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
233 /* init things to blank */
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
244 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
245 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
246 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
248 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
250 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
261 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
263 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
267 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
271 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
273 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
278 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
280 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
282 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
287 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
296 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
303 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
304 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
305 /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
306 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
308 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
310 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
311 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
313 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
315 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
316 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
317 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
319 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
320 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
322 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
323 * client that doesn't support secure
326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
327 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
333 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
334 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
336 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
344 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
345 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
346 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
347 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
350 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
353 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
357 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
362 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
363 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
365 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
366 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
369 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
371 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
372 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
375 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
377 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
378 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
379 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
380 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
382 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
390 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
394 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
395 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
396 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
397 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
401 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
404 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
408 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
411 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
416 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
417 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
418 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
419 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
420 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
422 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
423 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
425 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
426 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
428 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
440 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
445 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
446 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
447 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
449 /* clear this, it may get reset by
450 * send_server_key_exchange */
451 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
453 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
454 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
456 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
457 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
458 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
459 * be able to handle this) */
460 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
462 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
465 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
466 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
468 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
470 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
471 * message only if the cipher suite is either
472 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
473 * server certificate contains the server's
474 * public key for key exchange.
476 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
477 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
478 * hint if provided */
479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
480 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
482 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
483 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
484 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
486 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
487 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
488 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
489 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
490 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
491 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
497 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
498 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
503 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
507 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
508 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
509 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
510 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
511 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
512 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
513 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
514 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
515 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
516 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
517 * and in RFC 2246): */
518 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
519 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
520 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
521 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
522 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
523 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
524 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
525 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
526 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
527 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
528 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
530 /* no cert request */
532 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
533 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
534 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
535 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
540 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
541 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
542 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
543 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
544 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
546 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
547 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
553 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
554 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
555 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
556 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
557 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
558 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
562 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
564 /* This code originally checked to see if
565 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
566 * and then flushed. This caused problems
567 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
568 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
569 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
570 * still exist. So instead we just flush
574 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
575 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
580 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
582 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
585 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
586 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
587 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
589 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
590 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
593 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
596 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
597 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
598 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
603 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
604 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
605 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
606 * message is not sent.
607 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
608 * the client uses its key from the certificate
611 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
612 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
614 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
615 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
617 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
621 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
623 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
625 if (!s->session->peer)
627 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
628 * at this point and digest cached records.
630 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
635 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
636 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
644 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
647 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
648 * a client cert, it can be verified
649 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
650 * should be generalized. But it is next step
652 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
653 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
655 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
656 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
660 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
661 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
672 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
673 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
675 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
676 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
677 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
678 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
680 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
681 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
682 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
683 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
684 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
686 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
687 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
689 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
690 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
692 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
697 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
698 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
699 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
701 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
702 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
703 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
704 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
705 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
706 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
707 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
708 * the client's Finished message is read.
710 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
711 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
713 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
714 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
716 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
720 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
721 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
723 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
724 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
725 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
726 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
727 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
728 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
729 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
730 * the client's Finished message is read.
732 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
733 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
734 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
735 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
736 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
740 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
741 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
744 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
749 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
750 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
751 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
752 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
753 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
759 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
760 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
761 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
767 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
768 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
770 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
771 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
772 { ret= -1; goto end; }
774 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
775 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
777 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
778 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
781 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
782 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
790 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
791 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
792 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
793 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
794 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
795 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
796 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
797 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
800 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
801 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
803 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
805 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
808 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
812 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
817 /* clean a few things up */
818 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
820 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
823 /* remove buffering on output */
824 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
828 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
833 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
835 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
837 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
839 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
853 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
857 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
862 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
866 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
873 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
877 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
881 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
884 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
886 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
887 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
890 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
891 return ssl_do_write(s);
894 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
896 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
897 unsigned int cookie_len;
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
906 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
908 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
911 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
912 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
913 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
914 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
917 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
920 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
923 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
924 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
925 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
926 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
927 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
930 if (!ok) return((int)n);
932 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
934 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
935 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
936 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
939 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
940 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
941 : (s->client_version < s->version))
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
944 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
945 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
947 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
948 s->version = s->client_version;
950 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
954 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
955 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
956 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
958 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
960 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
962 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
963 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
965 if (cookie_length == 0)
969 /* load the client random */
970 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
973 /* get the session-id */
977 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
978 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
979 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
980 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
981 * won't even compile against older library versions).
983 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
984 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
985 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
986 * setting will be ignored.
988 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
990 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
995 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
997 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
999 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1000 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1001 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1002 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1003 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1005 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version)
1006 { /* previous session */
1013 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1023 cookie_len = *(p++);
1026 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1027 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1028 * does not cause an overflow.
1030 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1033 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1038 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1039 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1042 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1044 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1046 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1049 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1051 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1054 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1056 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1057 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1059 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1061 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1064 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1069 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1071 /* Select version to use */
1072 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1073 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1075 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1076 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1078 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1081 s->version = s->client_version;
1082 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1085 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1086 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1088 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1089 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1094 s->version = s->client_version;
1095 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1098 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1103 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1105 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1106 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1112 /* not enough data */
1113 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1117 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1124 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1125 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1128 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1131 fprintf(stderr,"client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1133 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1135 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1137 fprintf(stderr,"client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1138 i,sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers),
1139 SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1147 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1148 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1151 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1153 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1154 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1155 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1156 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1157 * enabled, though. */
1158 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1159 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1161 s->session->cipher = c;
1168 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1169 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1170 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1180 /* not enough data */
1181 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1190 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1197 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1204 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1206 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1213 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1214 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1215 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1216 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1219 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1220 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1226 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1228 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1230 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1231 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1232 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1235 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1236 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1240 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1241 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1242 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1244 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1249 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1252 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1254 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1255 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1257 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1258 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1263 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1264 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1265 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1266 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1268 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1269 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1271 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1272 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1273 /* Can't disable compression */
1274 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1279 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1280 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1282 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1283 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1285 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1289 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1294 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1295 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1297 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1302 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1309 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1310 { /* See if we have a match */
1311 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1313 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1314 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1316 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1329 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1334 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1335 * using compression.
1337 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1344 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1349 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1350 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1352 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1354 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1355 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1356 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1357 if (ciphers == NULL)
1359 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1364 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s))
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1369 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1371 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1373 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1376 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1382 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1385 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1387 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1388 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1392 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1396 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1400 /* Session-id reuse */
1401 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1402 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1403 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1404 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1406 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1408 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1409 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1411 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1412 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1414 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1418 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1419 else if (ec != NULL)
1420 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1422 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1426 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1429 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1431 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1435 /* we now have the following setup.
1437 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1438 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1439 * compression - basically ignored right now
1440 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1441 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1442 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1443 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1446 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1447 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1449 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1456 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1460 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1463 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1464 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1467 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1470 unsigned char *p,*d;
1475 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1477 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1478 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1479 p=s->s3->server_random;
1480 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1483 /* Do the message type and length last */
1484 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1486 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1487 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1490 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1491 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1493 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1494 * back in the server hello:
1495 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1496 * we send back the old session ID.
1497 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1498 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1499 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1500 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1502 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1503 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1504 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1505 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1508 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1510 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1512 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1513 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1519 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1522 /* put the cipher */
1523 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1526 /* put the compression method */
1527 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1530 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1533 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1536 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1541 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1543 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1550 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1551 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1554 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1555 return ssl_do_write(s);
1558 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1561 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1563 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1564 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1567 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1568 return ssl_do_write(s);
1571 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1573 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1577 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1584 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1585 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1588 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1591 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1592 unsigned char *p,*d;
1602 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1603 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1605 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1610 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1613 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1616 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1618 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1619 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1620 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1623 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1632 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1638 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1643 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1646 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1647 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1648 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1649 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1652 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1657 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1663 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1670 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1671 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1672 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1674 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1683 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1684 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1685 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1686 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1698 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1699 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1701 const EC_GROUP *group;
1703 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1704 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1706 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1707 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1708 if (nid != NID_undef)
1709 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1711 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1713 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1714 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1715 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1719 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1724 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1730 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1736 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1738 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1744 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1745 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1746 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1747 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1749 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1756 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1757 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1758 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1764 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1765 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1771 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1772 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1773 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1776 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1783 /* Encode the public key.
1784 * First check the size of encoding and
1785 * allocate memory accordingly.
1787 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1788 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1789 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1792 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1793 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1794 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1795 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1802 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1803 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1804 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1805 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1807 if (encodedlen == 0)
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1813 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1815 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1816 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1817 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1818 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1823 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1824 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1832 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1834 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1836 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1837 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1840 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1842 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1844 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1845 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1846 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1847 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1860 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1864 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1866 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1868 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1875 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1876 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1878 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1881 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1884 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1892 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1897 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1899 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1902 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1915 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1917 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1918 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1919 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1920 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1921 * the actual encoded point itself
1923 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1931 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1932 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1934 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1935 encodedPoint = NULL;
1940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1941 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1943 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1944 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1945 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1946 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1953 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1954 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1956 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1960 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1962 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1963 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1964 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1965 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1966 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1967 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1968 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
1969 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1970 (unsigned int *)&i);
1974 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1975 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1977 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1987 /* send signature algorithm */
1988 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1990 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1992 /* Should never happen */
1993 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2000 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2003 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2004 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2005 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2006 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2007 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2008 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2015 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2020 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2021 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2027 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2030 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2031 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2032 return ssl_do_write(s);
2034 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2037 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2038 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2040 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2044 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2046 unsigned char *p,*d;
2048 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2052 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2056 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2058 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2060 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2065 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2067 const unsigned char *psigs;
2068 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2070 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2079 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2083 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2085 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2086 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2087 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2092 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2093 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2096 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2103 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2104 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2110 /* else no CA names */
2111 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2114 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2116 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2117 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2119 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2124 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2126 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2134 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2137 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2138 return ssl_do_write(s);
2143 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2147 unsigned long alg_k;
2149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2151 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2153 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2155 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2159 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2162 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2163 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2164 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2165 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2168 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2169 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2170 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2171 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2175 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2176 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2178 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2181 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2183 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2185 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2188 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2189 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2191 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2192 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2193 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2194 * be sent already */
2197 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2205 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2206 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2207 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2208 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2210 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2217 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2218 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2223 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2225 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2237 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2238 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2239 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2240 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2241 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2243 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2245 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2250 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2251 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2252 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2253 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2254 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2255 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2257 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2258 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2259 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2261 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2264 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2265 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
2266 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2268 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2269 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
2270 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2271 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2272 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2273 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2274 * decryption error. */
2275 version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
2276 version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
2278 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2279 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2280 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2281 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2282 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2283 * support the requested protocol version. If
2284 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2285 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2287 unsigned char workaround_good;
2288 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
2289 workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
2290 version_good |= workaround_good;
2293 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
2294 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
2295 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2298 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2299 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2300 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2301 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2303 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++)
2305 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2306 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2309 s->session->master_key_length=
2310 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2311 s->session->master_key,
2312 p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2313 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2318 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2321 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2328 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2339 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2340 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2341 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2342 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2345 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2346 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2347 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2348 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2350 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2354 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2356 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2358 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2363 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2367 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2368 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2371 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2372 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2374 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2376 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2380 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2381 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2384 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2391 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2400 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2407 s->session->master_key_length=
2408 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2409 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2410 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2417 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2419 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2420 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2421 krb5_data authenticator;
2423 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2424 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2425 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2426 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2427 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2428 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2430 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2431 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2433 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2435 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2438 enc_ticket.length = i;
2440 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2443 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2447 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2448 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2451 authenticator.length = i;
2453 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2456 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2460 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2461 p+=authenticator.length;
2465 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2468 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2471 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2474 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2478 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2479 enc_pms.length + 6))
2481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2482 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2486 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2490 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2491 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2493 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2494 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2500 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2501 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2503 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2504 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2507 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2508 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2510 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2511 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2517 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2524 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2525 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2527 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2531 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2533 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2536 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2539 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2540 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2543 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2546 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2549 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2552 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2555 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2559 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2562 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2565 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2567 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2568 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2569 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2570 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2571 * the protocol version.
2572 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2573 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2575 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2578 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2583 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2585 s->session->master_key_length=
2586 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2587 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2589 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2591 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2592 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2594 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2595 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2600 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2601 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2602 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2603 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2607 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2610 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2615 const EC_GROUP *group;
2616 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2618 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2619 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2622 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2626 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2627 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2629 /* use the certificate */
2630 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2634 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2635 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2637 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2640 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2641 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2643 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2644 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2651 /* Let's get client's public key */
2652 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2655 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2661 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2663 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2665 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2669 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2671 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2673 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2674 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2675 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2676 * never executed. When that support is
2677 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2678 * received in the certificate is
2679 * authorized for key agreement.
2680 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2681 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2684 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2686 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2690 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2691 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2697 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2701 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2702 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2704 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2707 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2711 /* Get encoded point length */
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2720 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2721 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2727 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2728 * currently, so set it to the start
2730 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2733 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2734 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2735 if (field_size <= 0)
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2741 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2749 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2750 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2751 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2752 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2753 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2754 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2756 /* Compute the master secret */
2757 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2758 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2760 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2766 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2768 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2769 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2770 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2772 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2774 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2780 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2783 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2786 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2789 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2792 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2796 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2797 * string for the callback */
2798 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2799 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2800 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2801 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2802 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2804 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2807 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2810 else if (psk_len == 0)
2812 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2814 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2815 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2819 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2820 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2822 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2824 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2828 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2829 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2830 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2831 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2834 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2838 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2839 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2840 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2841 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2842 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2845 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2849 s->session->master_key_length=
2850 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2851 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2854 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2861 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2869 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2873 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2878 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2879 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
2881 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2885 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2886 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2887 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2888 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2890 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2891 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2895 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2904 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2905 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2908 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2909 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2910 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2911 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2912 unsigned long alg_a;
2916 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2917 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2918 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2919 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2920 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2921 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2923 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2924 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2925 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2926 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2927 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2928 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2929 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2930 if (client_pub_pkey)
2932 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2935 /* Decrypt session key */
2936 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2937 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2938 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2945 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2951 /* Generate master secret */
2952 s->session->master_key_length=
2953 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2954 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2955 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2956 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2961 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2962 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2970 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2972 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2978 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2979 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2983 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2984 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2985 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2986 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2987 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2992 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2994 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
3000 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3002 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3004 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3005 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3006 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3008 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
3011 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3013 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3015 peer=s->session->peer;
3016 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3017 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3025 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3027 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3028 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3030 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3041 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3045 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3048 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3052 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3055 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3059 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3060 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3061 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3062 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3063 * signature without length field */
3064 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3065 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3071 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3073 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3076 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3081 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3085 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3095 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3099 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3100 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3103 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3107 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3111 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3115 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3119 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3122 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3123 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3126 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3130 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3132 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3139 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3141 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3142 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3146 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3152 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3160 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3162 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3163 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3164 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3168 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3176 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3178 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3179 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3180 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3184 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3186 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3192 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3193 { unsigned char signature[64];
3195 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3196 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3198 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3200 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3201 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3203 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3204 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3207 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3209 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3216 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3225 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3228 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3230 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3231 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3232 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3234 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3235 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3239 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3241 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3243 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3244 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3246 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3248 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3255 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3257 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3259 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3260 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3263 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3266 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3267 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3270 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3273 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3277 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3279 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3283 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3285 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3294 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3298 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3301 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3303 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3309 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3317 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3321 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3330 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3332 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3333 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3335 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3339 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3340 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3341 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3344 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3347 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3348 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3350 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3356 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3359 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3365 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3366 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3367 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3368 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3370 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3371 * when we arrive here. */
3372 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3374 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3375 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3381 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3382 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3383 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3384 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3385 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3393 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3396 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3397 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3401 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3405 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3407 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3410 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3411 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3412 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3419 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk))
3421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3424 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3427 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3428 return ssl_do_write(s);
3431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3432 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3433 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3435 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3437 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3438 const unsigned char *const_p;
3439 int len, slen_full, slen;
3444 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3445 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3446 unsigned char key_name[16];
3448 /* get session encoding length */
3449 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3450 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3453 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3455 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3459 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3461 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3463 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3469 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3471 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3472 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3478 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3479 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3481 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3482 * follows handshake_header_length +
3483 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3484 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3485 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3486 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3488 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3489 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3490 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3492 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3493 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3494 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3495 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3496 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3499 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3501 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3510 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3511 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3512 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3513 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3514 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3515 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3518 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3519 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3520 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3521 * as their sessions. */
3522 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3524 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3526 /* Output key name */
3528 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3531 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3532 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3533 /* Encrypt session data */
3534 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3536 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3538 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3540 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3541 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3542 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3545 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3547 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3548 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3549 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3550 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3552 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3556 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3557 return ssl_do_write(s);
3560 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3562 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3565 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3566 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3567 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3570 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3573 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3576 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3577 /* message length */
3578 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3580 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3581 /* length of OCSP response */
3582 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3583 /* actual response */
3584 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3585 /* number of bytes to write */
3586 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3587 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3591 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3592 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3595 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3596 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3597 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3598 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3601 int proto_len, padding_len;
3603 const unsigned char *p;
3605 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3606 * extension in their ClientHello */
3607 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3613 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3614 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3615 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3617 514, /* See the payload format below */
3623 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3624 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3625 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3626 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3633 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3635 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3637 /* The payload looks like:
3639 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3640 * uint8 padding_len;
3641 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3644 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3646 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3647 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3650 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3651 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3656 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3657 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;