1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return(SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function,
187 ssl3_get_server_method)
190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
191 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
193 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
195 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
197 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
198 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
200 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
202 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
203 we do so if There is no srp login name */
205 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
209 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
216 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
219 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
220 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
222 int new_state,state,skip=0;
224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
228 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
233 /* init things to blank */
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
244 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
245 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
246 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
248 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
250 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
261 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
263 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
267 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
271 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
273 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
278 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
280 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
282 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
287 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
296 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
303 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
304 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
305 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
306 /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
307 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
309 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
311 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
312 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
314 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
316 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
317 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
318 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
320 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
321 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
323 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
324 * client that doesn't support secure
327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
328 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
334 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
335 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
336 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
337 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
342 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
345 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
346 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
347 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
348 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
363 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
364 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
366 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
367 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
370 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
372 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
373 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
376 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
378 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
379 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
380 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
381 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
383 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
391 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
395 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
396 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
397 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
398 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
402 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
409 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
412 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
416 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
417 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
418 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
419 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
420 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
421 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
423 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
424 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
426 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
427 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
429 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
434 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
441 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
446 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
447 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
448 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
450 /* clear this, it may get reset by
451 * send_server_key_exchange */
452 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
454 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
455 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
457 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
458 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
459 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
460 * be able to handle this) */
461 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
463 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
466 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
467 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
469 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
471 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
472 * message only if the cipher suite is either
473 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
474 * server certificate contains the server's
475 * public key for key exchange.
477 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
478 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
479 * hint if provided */
480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
481 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
484 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
485 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
487 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
488 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
489 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
490 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
491 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
492 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
498 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
499 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
504 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
508 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
509 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
510 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
511 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
512 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
513 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
514 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
515 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
516 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
517 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
518 * and in RFC 2246): */
519 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
520 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
521 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
522 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
523 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
524 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
525 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
526 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
527 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
528 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
529 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
531 /* no cert request */
533 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
534 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
535 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
536 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
541 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
542 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
543 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
544 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
545 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
547 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
548 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
554 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
555 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
556 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
557 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
558 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
559 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
563 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
565 /* This code originally checked to see if
566 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
567 * and then flushed. This caused problems
568 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
569 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
570 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
571 * still exist. So instead we just flush
575 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
576 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
581 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
583 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
586 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
587 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
588 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
589 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
593 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
595 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
597 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
598 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
601 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
605 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
606 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
607 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
612 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
613 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
614 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
615 * message is not sent.
616 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
617 * the client uses its key from the certificate
620 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
621 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
623 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
624 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
626 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
630 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
632 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
634 if (!s->session->peer)
636 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
637 * at this point and digest cached records.
639 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
644 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
645 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
653 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
656 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
657 * a client cert, it can be verified
658 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
659 * should be generalized. But it is next step
661 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
662 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
664 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
665 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
669 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
670 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
681 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
682 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
684 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
685 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
686 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
687 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
689 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
690 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
691 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
692 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
693 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
695 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
696 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
698 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
699 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
701 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
706 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
707 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
708 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
710 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
711 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
712 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
713 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
714 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
715 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
716 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
717 * the client's Finished message is read.
719 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
720 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
722 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
723 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
725 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
729 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
730 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
732 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
733 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
734 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
735 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
736 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
737 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
738 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
739 * the client's Finished message is read.
741 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
742 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
743 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
744 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
745 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
749 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
750 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
753 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
759 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
760 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
761 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
762 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
766 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
767 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
768 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
769 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
770 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
776 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
777 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
779 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
780 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
781 { ret= -1; goto end; }
783 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
784 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
786 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
787 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
790 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
791 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
799 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
800 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
801 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
802 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
803 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
804 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
805 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
806 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
809 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
810 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
812 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
814 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
817 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
821 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
826 /* clean a few things up */
827 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
829 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
832 /* remove buffering on output */
833 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
837 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
842 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
844 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
846 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
848 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
862 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
866 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
871 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
875 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
882 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
886 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
890 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
893 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
895 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
896 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
899 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
900 return ssl_do_write(s);
903 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
908 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
909 * so permit appropriate message length */
910 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
916 if (!ok) return((int)n);
917 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
918 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
920 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
922 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
927 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
928 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
930 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
932 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
933 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
937 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
939 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
940 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
943 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
949 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
951 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
952 unsigned int cookie_len;
957 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
961 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
963 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
966 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
967 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
968 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
969 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
972 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
975 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
978 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
979 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
980 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
981 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
982 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
985 if (!ok) return((int)n);
987 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
989 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
990 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
991 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
994 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
995 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
996 : (s->client_version < s->version))
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
999 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
1000 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
1002 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1003 s->version = s->client_version;
1005 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1009 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
1010 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
1011 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
1013 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
1015 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1017 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1018 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1020 if (cookie_length == 0)
1024 /* load the client random */
1025 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1026 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1028 /* get the session-id */
1032 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1033 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1034 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1035 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1036 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1038 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1039 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1040 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1041 * setting will be ignored.
1043 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1045 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1050 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1052 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1054 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1055 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1056 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1057 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1058 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1060 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version)
1061 { /* previous session */
1068 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1078 cookie_len = *(p++);
1081 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1082 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1083 * does not cause an overflow.
1085 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1088 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1093 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1094 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1097 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1099 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1101 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1104 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1106 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1109 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1111 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1112 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1114 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1116 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1119 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1124 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1126 /* Select version to use */
1127 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1128 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1130 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1131 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1133 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1136 s->version = s->client_version;
1137 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1140 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1141 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1143 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1144 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1149 s->version = s->client_version;
1150 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1153 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1158 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1160 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1161 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1167 /* not enough data */
1168 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1172 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1179 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1180 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1183 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1186 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1188 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1190 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1192 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1193 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1201 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1202 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1205 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1207 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1208 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1209 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1210 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1211 * enabled, though. */
1212 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1213 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1215 s->session->cipher = c;
1222 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1223 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1224 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1234 /* not enough data */
1235 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1244 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1251 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1258 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1260 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1267 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1268 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1269 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1270 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1273 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1274 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1280 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1282 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1284 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1285 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1286 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1289 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1290 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1294 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1295 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1296 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1298 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1303 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1306 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1308 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1309 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1311 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1312 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1317 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1318 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1319 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1320 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1322 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1323 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1325 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1326 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1327 /* Can't disable compression */
1328 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1333 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1334 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1336 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1337 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1339 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1343 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1348 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1349 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1351 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1356 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1363 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1364 { /* See if we have a match */
1365 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1367 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1368 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1370 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1383 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1388 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1389 * using compression.
1391 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1398 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1403 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1404 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1406 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1408 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1409 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1410 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1411 if (ciphers == NULL)
1413 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1418 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s))
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1423 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1425 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1427 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1430 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1436 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1439 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1441 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1442 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1446 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1450 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1454 /* Session-id reuse */
1455 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1456 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1457 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1458 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1460 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1462 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1463 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1465 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1466 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1468 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1472 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1473 else if (ec != NULL)
1474 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1476 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1480 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1483 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1485 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1489 /* we now have the following setup.
1491 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1492 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1493 * compression - basically ignored right now
1494 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1495 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1496 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1497 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1500 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1501 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1503 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1510 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1514 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1517 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1518 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1521 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1524 unsigned char *p,*d;
1529 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1531 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1532 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1533 p=s->s3->server_random;
1534 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1537 /* Do the message type and length last */
1538 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1540 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1541 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1544 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1545 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1547 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1548 * back in the server hello:
1549 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1550 * we send back the old session ID.
1551 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1552 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1553 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1554 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1556 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1557 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1558 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1559 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1562 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1564 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1566 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1567 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1573 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1576 /* put the cipher */
1577 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1580 /* put the compression method */
1581 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1584 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1587 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1590 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1595 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1597 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1604 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1605 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1608 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1609 return ssl_do_write(s);
1612 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1615 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1617 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1618 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1621 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1622 return ssl_do_write(s);
1625 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1631 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1638 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1639 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1642 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1645 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1646 unsigned char *p,*d;
1656 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1657 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1659 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1664 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1666 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1667 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1670 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1672 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1673 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1674 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1677 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1686 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1692 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1697 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1700 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1701 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1702 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1703 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1706 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1711 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1717 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1724 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1725 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1726 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1728 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1737 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1738 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1739 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1740 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1752 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1753 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1755 const EC_GROUP *group;
1757 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1758 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1760 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1761 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1762 if (nid != NID_undef)
1763 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1765 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1767 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1768 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1769 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1773 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1778 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1784 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1790 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1792 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1794 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1798 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1799 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1800 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1801 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1803 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1810 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1811 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1812 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1818 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1819 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1825 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1826 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1827 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1830 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1837 /* Encode the public key.
1838 * First check the size of encoding and
1839 * allocate memory accordingly.
1841 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1842 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1843 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1846 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1847 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1848 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1849 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1856 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1857 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1858 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1859 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1861 if (encodedlen == 0)
1863 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1867 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1869 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1870 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1871 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1872 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1877 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1878 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1886 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1887 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1888 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1890 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1891 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1894 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1896 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1898 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1899 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1900 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1901 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1914 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1918 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1920 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1922 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1929 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1930 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1932 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1935 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1938 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1946 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1951 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1953 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1956 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1969 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1971 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1972 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1973 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1974 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1975 * the actual encoded point itself
1977 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1985 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1986 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1988 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1989 encodedPoint = NULL;
1994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1995 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1997 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1998 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1999 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
2000 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2007 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
2008 * and p points to the space at the end. */
2009 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2010 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2014 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
2016 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
2017 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
2018 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
2019 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
2020 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2021 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2022 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2023 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
2024 (unsigned int *)&i);
2028 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2029 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
2031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2041 /* send signature algorithm */
2042 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2044 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2046 /* Should never happen */
2047 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2054 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2057 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2058 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2059 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2060 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2061 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2062 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2069 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2074 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2075 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2081 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2084 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2085 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2086 return ssl_do_write(s);
2088 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2091 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2092 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2094 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2098 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2100 unsigned char *p,*d;
2102 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2106 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2110 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2112 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2114 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2119 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2121 const unsigned char *psigs;
2122 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2124 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2133 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2137 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2139 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2140 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2141 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2146 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2147 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2150 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2157 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2158 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2164 /* else no CA names */
2165 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2168 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2170 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2171 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2173 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2178 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2180 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2188 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2191 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2192 return ssl_do_write(s);
2197 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2201 unsigned long alg_k;
2203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2205 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2209 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2216 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2217 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2218 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2219 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2222 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2223 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2224 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2225 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2229 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2230 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2232 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2235 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2237 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2239 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2241 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2242 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2244 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2245 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2246 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2247 * be sent already */
2250 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2258 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2259 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2260 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2261 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2263 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2270 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2271 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2276 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2288 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2289 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2290 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2291 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2292 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2293 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2295 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2296 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2297 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2299 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2302 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2303 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
2304 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2306 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2307 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
2308 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2309 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2310 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2311 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2312 * decryption error. */
2313 version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
2314 version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
2316 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2317 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2318 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2319 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2320 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2321 * support the requested protocol version. If
2322 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2323 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2325 unsigned char workaround_good;
2326 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
2327 workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
2328 version_good |= workaround_good;
2331 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
2332 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
2333 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2335 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
2336 * decrypt_good_mask. */
2337 for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
2339 p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
2340 rand_premaster_secret[i]);
2343 s->session->master_key_length=
2344 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2345 s->session->master_key,
2347 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2351 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2352 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2355 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2362 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2373 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2374 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2375 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2376 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2379 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2380 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2381 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2382 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2384 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2388 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2390 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2392 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2397 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2401 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2402 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2405 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2406 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2408 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2410 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2414 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2415 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2418 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2425 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2434 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2441 s->session->master_key_length=
2442 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2443 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2444 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2451 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2453 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2454 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2455 krb5_data authenticator;
2457 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2458 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2459 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2460 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2461 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2462 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2464 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2465 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2467 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2469 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2472 enc_ticket.length = i;
2474 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2477 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2481 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2482 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2485 authenticator.length = i;
2487 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2490 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2494 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2495 p+=authenticator.length;
2499 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2502 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2505 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2508 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2512 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2513 enc_pms.length + 6))
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2516 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2520 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2524 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2525 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2527 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2528 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2534 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2535 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2537 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2538 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2541 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2542 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2544 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2545 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2551 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2558 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2559 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2561 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2565 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2567 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2570 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2573 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2574 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2577 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2580 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2582 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2583 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2586 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2589 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2593 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2596 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2599 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2601 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2602 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2603 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2604 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2605 * the protocol version.
2606 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2607 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2609 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2611 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2612 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2617 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2619 s->session->master_key_length=
2620 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2621 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2623 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2625 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2626 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2628 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2629 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2634 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2635 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2636 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2637 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2641 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2644 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2649 const EC_GROUP *group;
2650 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2652 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2653 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2656 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2660 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2661 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2663 /* use the certificate */
2664 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2668 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2669 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2671 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2674 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2675 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2677 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2678 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2685 /* Let's get client's public key */
2686 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2689 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2695 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2697 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2699 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2703 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2705 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2707 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2708 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2709 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2710 * never executed. When that support is
2711 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2712 * received in the certificate is
2713 * authorized for key agreement.
2714 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2715 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2718 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2720 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2724 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2725 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2731 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2735 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2736 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2738 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2741 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2745 /* Get encoded point length */
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2754 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2755 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2761 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2762 * currently, so set it to the start
2764 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2767 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2768 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2769 if (field_size <= 0)
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2775 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2783 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2784 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2785 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2786 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2787 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2788 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2790 /* Compute the master secret */
2791 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2792 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2794 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2799 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2800 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2802 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2803 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2804 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2806 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2808 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2814 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2817 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2820 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2823 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2825 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2826 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2830 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2831 * string for the callback */
2832 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2833 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2834 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2835 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2836 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2838 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2841 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2844 else if (psk_len == 0)
2846 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2848 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2849 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2853 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2854 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2856 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2858 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2862 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2863 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2864 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2865 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2868 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2872 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2873 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2874 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2875 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2876 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2879 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2883 s->session->master_key_length=
2884 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2885 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2888 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2895 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2903 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2907 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2912 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2913 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
2915 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2919 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2920 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2921 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2922 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2925 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2929 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2938 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2939 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2942 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2943 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2944 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2945 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2946 unsigned long alg_a;
2950 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2951 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2952 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2953 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2954 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2955 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2957 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2958 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2959 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2960 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2961 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2962 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2963 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2964 if (client_pub_pkey)
2966 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2969 /* Decrypt session key */
2970 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2971 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2972 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2979 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2985 /* Generate master secret */
2986 s->session->master_key_length=
2987 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2988 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2989 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2990 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2995 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2996 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3004 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3006 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3012 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3013 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
3016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3017 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
3018 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
3019 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
3020 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
3021 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3026 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
3028 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
3034 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3036 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3038 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3039 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3040 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3042 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
3045 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3047 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3049 peer=s->session->peer;
3050 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3051 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3059 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3061 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3062 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3064 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3075 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3079 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3082 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3086 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3089 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3093 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3094 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3095 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3096 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3097 * signature without length field */
3098 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3099 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3105 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3107 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3110 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3115 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3119 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3129 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3133 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3134 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3137 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3141 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3145 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3149 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3153 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3156 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3157 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3160 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3164 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3166 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3173 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3175 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3176 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3180 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3186 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3194 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3196 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3197 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3198 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3202 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3210 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3212 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3213 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3214 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3218 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3220 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3226 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3227 { unsigned char signature[64];
3229 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3230 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3232 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3234 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3235 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3237 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3238 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3241 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3243 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3250 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3259 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3262 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3264 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3265 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3266 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3268 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3269 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3273 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3275 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3277 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3278 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3280 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3282 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3289 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3291 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3293 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3294 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3297 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3300 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3301 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3304 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3307 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3311 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3313 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3317 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3319 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3328 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3332 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3335 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3337 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3343 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3351 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3355 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3364 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3366 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3367 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3369 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3373 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3374 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3375 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3378 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3381 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3382 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3384 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3390 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3393 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3399 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3400 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3401 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3402 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3404 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3405 * when we arrive here. */
3406 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3408 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3409 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3415 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3416 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3417 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3418 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3419 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3427 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3430 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3431 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3435 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3439 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3441 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3444 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3445 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3446 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3453 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk))
3455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3458 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3461 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3462 return ssl_do_write(s);
3465 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3466 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3467 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3469 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3471 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3472 const unsigned char *const_p;
3473 int len, slen_full, slen;
3478 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3479 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3480 unsigned char key_name[16];
3482 /* get session encoding length */
3483 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3484 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3487 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3489 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3493 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3495 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3497 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3503 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3505 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3506 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3512 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3513 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3515 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3516 * follows handshake_header_length +
3517 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3518 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3519 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3520 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3522 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3523 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3524 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3526 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3527 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3528 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3529 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3530 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3533 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3535 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3544 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3545 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3546 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3547 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3548 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3549 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3552 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3553 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3554 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3555 * as their sessions. */
3556 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3558 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3560 /* Output key name */
3562 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3565 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3566 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3567 /* Encrypt session data */
3568 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3570 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3572 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3574 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3575 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3576 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3579 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3581 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3582 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3583 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3584 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3586 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3590 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3591 return ssl_do_write(s);
3594 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3596 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3599 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3600 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3601 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3604 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3607 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3610 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3611 /* message length */
3612 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3614 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3615 /* length of OCSP response */
3616 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3617 /* actual response */
3618 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3619 /* number of bytes to write */
3620 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3621 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3625 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3626 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3629 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3630 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3631 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3632 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3635 int proto_len, padding_len;
3637 const unsigned char *p;
3639 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3640 * extension in their ClientHello */
3641 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3647 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3648 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3649 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3651 514, /* See the payload format below */
3657 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3658 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3659 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3660 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3667 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3669 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3671 /* The payload looks like:
3673 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3674 * uint8 padding_len;
3675 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3678 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3680 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3681 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3684 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3685 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3690 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3691 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;