1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return(SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function,
187 ssl3_get_server_method)
190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
191 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
193 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
195 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
197 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
198 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
200 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
202 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
203 we do so if There is no srp login name */
205 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
209 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
216 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
219 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
220 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
222 int new_state,state,skip=0;
224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
228 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
233 /* init things to blank */
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
244 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
245 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
246 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
248 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
250 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
261 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
263 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
267 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
271 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
273 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
278 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
280 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
282 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
287 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
295 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
302 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
303 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
304 /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
305 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
307 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
309 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
310 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
312 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
315 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
316 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
318 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
319 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
321 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
322 * client that doesn't support secure
325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
326 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
332 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
333 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
334 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
335 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
339 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
343 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
344 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
345 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
346 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
349 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
352 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
356 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
357 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
361 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
363 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
364 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
369 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
371 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
372 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
375 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
377 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
378 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
379 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
380 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
382 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
390 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
394 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
395 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
396 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
397 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
401 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
404 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
408 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
411 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
416 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
417 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
418 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
419 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
420 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
422 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
423 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
425 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
426 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
428 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
440 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
445 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
446 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
447 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
449 /* clear this, it may get reset by
450 * send_server_key_exchange */
451 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
453 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
454 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
456 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
457 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
458 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
459 * be able to handle this) */
460 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
462 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
465 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
466 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
468 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
470 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
471 * message only if the cipher suite is either
472 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
473 * server certificate contains the server's
474 * public key for key exchange.
476 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
477 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
478 * hint if provided */
479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
480 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
482 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
483 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
484 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
486 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
487 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
488 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
489 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
490 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
491 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
497 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
498 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
503 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
507 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
508 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
509 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
510 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
511 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
512 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
513 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
514 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
515 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
516 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
517 * and in RFC 2246): */
518 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
519 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
520 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
521 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
522 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
523 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
524 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
525 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
526 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
527 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
528 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
530 /* no cert request */
532 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
533 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
534 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
535 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
540 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
541 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
542 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
543 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
544 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
546 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
547 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
553 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
554 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
555 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
556 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
557 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
558 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
562 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
564 /* This code originally checked to see if
565 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
566 * and then flushed. This caused problems
567 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
568 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
569 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
570 * still exist. So instead we just flush
574 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
575 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
580 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
582 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
585 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
586 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
587 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
588 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
592 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
594 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
596 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
597 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
600 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
604 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
605 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
606 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
611 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
612 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
613 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
614 * message is not sent.
615 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
616 * the client uses its key from the certificate
619 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
620 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
622 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
623 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
625 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
629 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
631 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
633 if (!s->session->peer)
635 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
636 * at this point and digest cached records.
638 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
643 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
644 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
652 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
655 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
656 * a client cert, it can be verified
657 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
658 * should be generalized. But it is next step
660 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
661 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
663 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
664 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
668 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
669 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
680 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
681 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
683 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
684 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
685 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
686 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
688 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
689 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
690 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
691 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
692 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
694 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
695 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
697 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
698 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
700 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
705 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
706 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
707 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
709 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
710 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
711 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
712 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
713 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
714 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
715 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
716 * the client's Finished message is read.
718 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
719 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
721 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
722 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
724 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
728 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
729 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
731 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
732 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
733 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
734 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
735 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
736 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
737 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
738 * the client's Finished message is read.
740 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
741 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
742 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
743 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
744 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
748 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
749 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
752 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
759 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
760 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
761 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
765 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
766 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
767 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
768 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
769 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
775 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
776 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
778 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
779 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
780 { ret= -1; goto end; }
782 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
783 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
785 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
786 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
789 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
790 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
798 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
799 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
800 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
801 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
802 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
803 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
804 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
805 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
808 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
809 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
811 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
813 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
816 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
820 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
825 /* clean a few things up */
826 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
828 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
831 /* remove buffering on output */
832 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
836 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
841 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
843 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
845 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
847 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
861 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
865 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
870 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
874 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
881 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
885 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
889 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
893 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
895 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
896 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
901 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
902 /* number of bytes to write */
907 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
908 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
911 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
916 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
917 * so permit appropriate message length */
918 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
924 if (!ok) return((int)n);
925 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
926 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
928 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
930 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
935 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
936 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
938 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
940 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
941 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
944 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
945 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
947 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
948 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
951 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
957 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
959 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
960 unsigned int cookie_len;
963 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
968 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
970 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
971 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
972 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
973 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
976 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
979 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
982 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
983 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
984 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
985 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
986 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
989 if (!ok) return((int)n);
991 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
993 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
994 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
995 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
998 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
999 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1002 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
1003 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
1005 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1006 s->version = s->client_version;
1008 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1012 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
1013 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
1014 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
1016 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
1018 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1020 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1021 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1023 if (cookie_length == 0)
1027 /* load the client random */
1028 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1029 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1031 /* get the session-id */
1035 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1036 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1037 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1038 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1039 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1041 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1042 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1043 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1044 * setting will be ignored.
1046 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1048 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1053 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1055 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1057 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1058 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1059 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1060 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1061 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1063 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version)
1064 { /* previous session */
1071 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1078 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1081 cookie_len = *(p++);
1084 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1085 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1086 * does not cause an overflow.
1088 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1091 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1096 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1097 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1100 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1102 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1104 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1107 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1109 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1112 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1114 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1115 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1117 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1119 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1130 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1132 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1133 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1139 /* not enough data */
1140 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1144 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1151 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1152 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1155 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1158 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1160 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1162 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1164 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1165 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1173 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1174 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1177 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1179 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1180 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1181 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1182 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1183 * enabled, though. */
1184 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1185 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1187 s->session->cipher = c;
1194 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1195 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1196 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1206 /* not enough data */
1207 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1214 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1221 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1228 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1230 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1232 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1237 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1242 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1243 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1244 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1245 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1248 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1249 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1251 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1256 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1258 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1260 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1261 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1262 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1265 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1266 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1270 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1271 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1272 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1274 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1279 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1282 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1284 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1285 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1287 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1288 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1293 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1294 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1295 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1296 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1298 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1299 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1301 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1302 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1303 /* Can't disable compression */
1304 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1306 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1310 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1311 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1313 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1314 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1316 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1320 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1322 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1326 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1327 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1329 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1334 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1341 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1342 { /* See if we have a match */
1343 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1345 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1346 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1348 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1361 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1366 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1367 * using compression.
1369 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1371 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1377 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1382 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1383 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1385 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1387 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1388 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1389 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1390 if (ciphers == NULL)
1392 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1397 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1398 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1402 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1406 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1410 /* Session-id reuse */
1411 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1412 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1413 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1414 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1416 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1418 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1419 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1421 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1422 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1424 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1428 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1429 else if (ec != NULL)
1430 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1432 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1436 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1439 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1441 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1443 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1448 /* we now have the following setup.
1450 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1451 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1452 * compression - basically ignored right now
1453 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1454 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1455 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1456 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1459 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1460 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1462 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1473 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1476 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1480 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1483 unsigned char *p,*d;
1487 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1489 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1490 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1491 p=s->s3->server_random;
1492 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1495 /* Do the message type and length last */
1498 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1499 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1502 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1503 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1505 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1506 * back in the server hello:
1507 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1508 * we send back the old session ID.
1509 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1510 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1511 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1512 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1514 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1515 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1516 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1517 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1520 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1522 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1524 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1525 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1531 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1534 /* put the cipher */
1535 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1538 /* put the compression method */
1539 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1542 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1545 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1548 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1553 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1562 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1565 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1566 /* number of bytes to write */
1571 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1572 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1575 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1579 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1581 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1584 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1589 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1590 /* number of bytes to write */
1595 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1596 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1599 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1605 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1612 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1613 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1616 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1619 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1620 unsigned char *p,*d;
1630 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1631 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1633 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1638 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1641 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1644 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1646 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1647 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1648 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1651 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1660 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1666 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1671 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1674 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1675 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1676 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1677 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1680 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1685 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1691 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1698 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1699 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1700 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1702 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1711 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1712 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1713 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1714 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1726 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1727 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1729 const EC_GROUP *group;
1731 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1732 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1734 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1735 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1736 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1740 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1745 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1751 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1757 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1763 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1764 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1765 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1766 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1768 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1775 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1776 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1777 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1783 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1784 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1790 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1791 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1792 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1795 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1802 /* Encode the public key.
1803 * First check the size of encoding and
1804 * allocate memory accordingly.
1806 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1807 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1808 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1811 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1812 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1813 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1814 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1821 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1822 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1823 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1824 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1826 if (encodedlen == 0)
1828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1832 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1834 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1835 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1836 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1837 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1842 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1843 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1851 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1853 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1855 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1856 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1859 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1861 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1863 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1864 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1865 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1866 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1879 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1883 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1885 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1887 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1894 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1895 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1897 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1900 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1903 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1911 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1916 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1919 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1922 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1935 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1937 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1938 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1939 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1940 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1941 * the actual encoded point itself
1943 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1951 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1952 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1954 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1955 encodedPoint = NULL;
1960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1961 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1963 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1964 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1965 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1966 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1973 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1974 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1975 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1976 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1977 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1981 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1983 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1984 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1985 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1986 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1987 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1988 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1989 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1990 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1991 (unsigned int *)&i);
1995 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1996 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2008 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
2010 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2012 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2014 /* Should never happen */
2015 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2022 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2025 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2026 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2027 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2028 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
2029 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2030 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2037 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2042 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2043 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2049 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2052 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2058 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2059 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2060 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2062 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2064 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2065 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2066 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2068 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2072 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2074 unsigned char *p,*d;
2076 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2080 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2084 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2086 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2088 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2093 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2095 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2105 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2109 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2111 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2112 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2113 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2118 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2119 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2122 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2129 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2130 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2136 /* else no CA names */
2137 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2140 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2141 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2144 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2149 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2150 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2155 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2158 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2165 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2168 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2169 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2174 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2178 unsigned long alg_k;
2180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2182 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2190 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2193 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2194 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2195 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2196 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2199 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2200 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2201 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2202 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2206 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2207 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2209 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2212 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2214 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2216 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2218 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2219 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2221 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2222 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2223 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2224 * be sent already */
2227 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2235 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2236 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2237 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2238 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2240 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2247 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2248 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2253 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2265 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2266 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2267 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2268 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2269 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2270 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2272 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2273 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2274 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2276 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2279 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2280 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
2281 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2283 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2284 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
2285 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2286 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2287 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2288 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2289 * decryption error. */
2290 version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
2291 version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
2293 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2294 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2295 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2296 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2297 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2298 * support the requested protocol version. If
2299 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2300 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2302 unsigned char workaround_good;
2303 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
2304 workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
2305 version_good |= workaround_good;
2308 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
2309 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
2310 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2312 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
2313 * decrypt_good_mask. */
2314 for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
2316 p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
2317 rand_premaster_secret[i]);
2320 s->session->master_key_length=
2321 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2322 s->session->master_key,
2324 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2329 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2334 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2346 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2348 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2354 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2356 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2361 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2364 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2371 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2380 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2385 s->session->master_key_length=
2386 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2387 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2388 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2393 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2395 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2396 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2397 krb5_data authenticator;
2399 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2400 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2401 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2402 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2403 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2404 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2406 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2407 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2409 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2411 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2414 enc_ticket.length = i;
2416 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2419 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2423 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2424 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2427 authenticator.length = i;
2429 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2432 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2436 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2437 p+=authenticator.length;
2441 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2444 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2447 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2450 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2454 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2455 enc_pms.length + 6))
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2458 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2462 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2466 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2467 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2469 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2470 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2476 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2477 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2479 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2480 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2483 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2484 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2486 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2487 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2493 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2500 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2501 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2503 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2507 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2509 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2512 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2515 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2516 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2519 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2522 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2525 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2528 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2531 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2535 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2538 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2541 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2543 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2544 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2545 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2546 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2547 * the protocol version.
2548 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2549 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2551 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2554 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2559 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2561 s->session->master_key_length=
2562 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2563 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2565 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2567 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2568 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2570 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2571 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2576 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2577 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2578 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2579 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2583 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2586 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2591 const EC_GROUP *group;
2592 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2594 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2595 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2598 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2602 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2603 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2605 /* use the certificate */
2606 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2610 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2611 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2613 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2616 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2617 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2619 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2620 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2627 /* Let's get client's public key */
2628 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2631 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2637 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2639 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2641 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2645 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2647 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2649 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2650 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2651 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2652 * never executed. When that support is
2653 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2654 * received in the certificate is
2655 * authorized for key agreement.
2656 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2657 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2660 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2662 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2666 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2667 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2673 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2677 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2678 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2680 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2683 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2687 /* Get encoded point length */
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2696 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2697 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2703 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2704 * currently, so set it to the start
2706 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2709 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2710 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2711 if (field_size <= 0)
2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2717 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2725 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2726 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2727 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2728 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2729 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2730 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2732 /* Compute the master secret */
2733 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2734 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2736 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2742 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2744 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2745 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2746 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2748 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2750 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2756 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2759 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2762 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2765 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2768 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2772 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2773 * string for the callback */
2774 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2775 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2776 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2777 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2778 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2780 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2783 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2786 else if (psk_len == 0)
2788 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2790 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2791 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2795 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2796 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2798 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2800 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2804 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2805 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2806 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2807 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2810 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2814 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2815 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2816 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2817 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2818 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2821 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2825 s->session->master_key_length=
2826 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2827 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2830 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2837 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2845 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2849 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2854 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2855 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
2857 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2861 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2862 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2863 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2864 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2867 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2871 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2880 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2881 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2884 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2885 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2886 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2887 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2888 unsigned long alg_a;
2892 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2893 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2894 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2895 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2896 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2897 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2899 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2900 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2901 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2902 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2903 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2904 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2905 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2906 if (client_pub_pkey)
2908 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2911 /* Decrypt session key */
2912 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2913 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2914 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2921 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2927 /* Generate master secret */
2928 s->session->master_key_length=
2929 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2930 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2931 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2932 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2937 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2938 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2946 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2948 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2954 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2955 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2959 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2960 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2961 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2962 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2963 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2968 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2970 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2976 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2978 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2980 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2981 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2982 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2984 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
2987 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2989 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2991 peer=s->session->peer;
2992 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2993 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3001 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3003 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3004 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3006 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3017 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3021 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3024 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3028 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3031 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3035 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3036 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3037 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3038 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3039 * signature without length field */
3040 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3041 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3047 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3049 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
3050 /* Should never happen */
3053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3054 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3057 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3058 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
3060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3061 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3064 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3068 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3072 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3082 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3086 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3087 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3090 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3094 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3098 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3102 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3106 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3109 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3110 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3113 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3117 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3119 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3126 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3128 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3129 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3133 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3139 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3147 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3149 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3150 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3151 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3155 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3163 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3165 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3166 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3167 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3171 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3173 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3179 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3180 { unsigned char signature[64];
3182 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3183 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3185 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3187 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3188 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3190 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3191 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3194 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3196 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3203 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3212 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3215 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3217 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3218 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3219 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3221 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3222 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3226 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3228 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3230 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3231 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3233 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3235 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3242 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3244 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3246 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3247 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3250 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3253 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3254 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3257 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3260 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3264 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3266 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3270 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3272 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3281 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3285 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3288 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3290 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3296 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3304 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3308 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3317 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3319 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3320 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3322 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3326 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3327 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3328 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3331 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3334 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3335 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3337 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3343 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3346 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3352 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3353 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3354 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3355 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3357 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3358 * when we arrive here. */
3359 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3361 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3362 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3368 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3369 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3370 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3371 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3372 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3380 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3383 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3384 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3388 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3393 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3395 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3398 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3399 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3400 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3407 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3408 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3413 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3414 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3418 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3419 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3421 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3423 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3424 const unsigned char *const_p;
3425 int len, slen_full, slen;
3430 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3431 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3432 unsigned char key_name[16];
3434 /* get session encoding length */
3435 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3436 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3439 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3441 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3445 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3447 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3449 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3455 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3457 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3458 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3464 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3465 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3467 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3468 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3469 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3470 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3471 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3472 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3474 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3475 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3476 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3479 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3481 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3482 /* Skip message length for now */
3484 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3485 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3486 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3487 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3490 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3492 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3501 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3502 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3503 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3504 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3505 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3506 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3509 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3510 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3511 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3512 * as their sessions. */
3513 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3515 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3517 /* Output key name */
3519 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3522 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3523 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3524 /* Encrypt session data */
3525 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3527 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3529 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3531 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3532 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3533 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3536 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3538 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3539 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3540 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3542 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3544 /* number of bytes to write */
3546 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3551 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3552 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3555 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3557 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3560 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3561 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3562 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3565 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3568 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3571 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3572 /* message length */
3573 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3575 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3576 /* length of OCSP response */
3577 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3578 /* actual response */
3579 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3580 /* number of bytes to write */
3581 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3582 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3586 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3587 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3590 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3591 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3592 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3593 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3596 int proto_len, padding_len;
3598 const unsigned char *p;
3600 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3601 * extension in their ClientHello */
3602 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3608 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3609 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3610 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3612 514, /* See the payload format below */
3618 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3619 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3620 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3621 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3628 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3630 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3632 /* The payload looks like:
3634 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3635 * uint8 padding_len;
3636 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3639 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3641 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3642 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3645 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3646 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3651 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3652 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;