1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
218 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->info_callback;
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
234 if (s->cert == NULL) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
271 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
273 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
274 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
278 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
286 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
292 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
293 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
295 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
297 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
299 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
301 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
302 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
304 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
312 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
316 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
317 * support secure renegotiation.
319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
320 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
326 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
338 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
341 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
342 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
345 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
348 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
349 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
354 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
357 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
358 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
365 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
367 * callback indicates firther work to be done
369 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
372 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
373 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
375 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
376 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
378 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
380 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
388 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
392 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
393 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
394 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
399 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
400 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
402 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
409 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
413 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
415 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
416 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
419 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
421 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
422 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
426 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
427 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
429 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
432 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
438 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
443 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
444 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
445 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
448 * clear this, it may get reset by
449 * send_server_key_exchange
451 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
454 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
455 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
456 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
457 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
458 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
463 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
467 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
470 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
471 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
473 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH))
474 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
475 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
476 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
477 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
478 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
479 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
480 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
485 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
491 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
495 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
496 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
497 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
498 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
500 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
501 * during re-negotiation:
503 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
504 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
506 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
507 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
510 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
512 * ... except when the application insists on
513 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
516 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
518 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
520 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
521 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
522 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
524 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
527 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
528 /* no cert request */
530 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
531 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
532 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
533 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
536 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
537 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
540 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
541 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
543 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
544 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
550 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
551 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
552 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
555 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
556 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
563 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
564 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
565 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
566 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
567 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
571 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
572 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
576 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
578 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
581 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
582 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
583 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
584 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
588 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
590 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
591 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
596 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
600 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
601 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
602 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
607 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
608 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
609 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
610 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
612 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
613 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
615 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
616 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
618 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
621 } else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
622 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
624 if (!s->session->peer)
627 * For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
628 * digest cached records.
630 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
634 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
635 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
641 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
645 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
646 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
647 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
650 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
651 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
653 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
654 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
657 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
666 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
676 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
677 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
679 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
680 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
681 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
682 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
684 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
685 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
686 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
687 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
691 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
692 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
694 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
695 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
697 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
702 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
703 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
704 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
706 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
707 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
708 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
709 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
710 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
711 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
712 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
713 * the client's Finished message is read.
715 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
716 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
718 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
722 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
726 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
727 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
729 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
730 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
731 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
732 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
733 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
734 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
735 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
736 * the client's Finished message is read.
738 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
739 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
740 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
741 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
745 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
747 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
748 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
751 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
756 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
758 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
761 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
765 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
766 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
767 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
770 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
776 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
777 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
779 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
780 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
785 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
787 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
791 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
794 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
795 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
803 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
804 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
805 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
806 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
807 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
809 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
811 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
814 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
816 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
817 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
819 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
820 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
822 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
825 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
830 /* clean a few things up */
831 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
833 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
836 /* remove buffering on output */
837 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
841 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
846 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
848 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
850 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
853 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
867 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
869 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
873 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
874 new_state = s->state;
876 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
877 s->state = new_state;
883 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
887 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
891 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
895 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
896 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
897 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
902 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
903 /* number of bytes to write */
908 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
909 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
912 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
918 * this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
919 * so permit appropriate message length
921 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
924 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
927 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
928 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
930 * We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
933 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) {
934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO,
935 SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
939 * Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
940 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
943 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
944 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
945 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
948 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
949 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
950 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
951 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
954 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
960 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
962 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1;
963 unsigned int cookie_len;
966 unsigned char *p, *d, *q;
968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
969 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
971 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
974 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
975 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
976 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
977 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
979 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
980 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
983 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
984 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
985 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
986 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
987 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
992 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
995 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
996 * for session id length
998 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
999 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1005 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
1006 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
1008 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
1011 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
1012 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) {
1013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1014 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
1015 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
1017 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1020 s->version = s->client_version;
1022 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1027 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
1028 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
1031 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1032 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1034 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1036 if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
1037 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1041 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1043 if (cookie_length == 0)
1047 /* load the client random */
1048 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1049 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1051 /* get the session-id */
1054 if (p + j > d + n) {
1055 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1062 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1063 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1064 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1065 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1066 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1067 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1068 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1069 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1070 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1071 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1074 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1075 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1078 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1080 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1082 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1083 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1084 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1085 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1086 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1088 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1095 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1102 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1104 if (p + 1 > d + n) {
1105 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1109 cookie_len = *(p++);
1111 if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
1112 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1118 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1119 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1120 * does not cause an overflow.
1122 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1124 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1129 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1130 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1131 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1133 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1134 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1136 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1138 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1141 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1143 /* default verification */
1144 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1145 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1146 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1157 if (p + 2 > d + n) {
1158 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1163 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) {
1164 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1165 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1170 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1171 if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
1172 /* not enough data */
1173 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1177 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers))
1183 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1184 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) {
1186 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1189 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1190 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1192 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1193 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1195 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1196 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1204 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1208 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1209 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1211 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1212 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1213 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1214 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1215 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1217 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1218 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1219 s->session->cipher = c;
1226 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1229 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1231 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1238 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
1239 /* not enough data */
1240 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1245 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1253 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1258 /* TLS extensions */
1259 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1260 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
1261 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1266 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1272 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1273 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1274 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1275 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1279 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1280 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1281 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1286 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1287 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1289 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1290 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1291 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1293 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1295 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1296 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1300 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1302 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1307 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1308 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1313 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1316 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1318 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1319 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1321 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1322 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1328 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1329 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1330 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1332 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1334 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1335 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1336 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1337 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1338 /* Can't disable compression */
1339 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1340 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1342 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1345 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1346 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1347 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1348 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1349 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1353 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1354 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1356 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1359 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1360 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1361 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1365 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1367 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1372 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1373 /* See if we have a match */
1374 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1376 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1377 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1378 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1380 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1390 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1396 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1397 * using compression.
1399 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1400 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1407 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1411 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1412 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1414 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1416 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1417 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1418 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1419 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1420 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1425 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1428 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1432 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1434 /* Session-id reuse */
1435 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1436 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1437 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
1438 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
1440 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
1441 sk = s->session->ciphers;
1442 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
1443 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1444 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1446 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1450 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
1451 else if (ec != NULL)
1452 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
1454 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1457 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1460 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION
1461 || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1462 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
1463 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1469 * we now have the following setup.
1471 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1472 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1473 * compression - basically ignored right now
1474 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1475 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1476 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1477 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1480 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1481 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1482 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1492 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1495 if (ciphers != NULL)
1496 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1500 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1503 unsigned char *p, *d;
1507 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1508 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1509 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1510 p = s->s3->server_random;
1511 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1514 /* Do the message type and length last */
1517 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1518 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1521 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1522 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1525 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1526 * back in the server hello:
1527 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1528 * we send back the old session ID.
1529 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1530 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1531 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1532 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1534 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1535 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1536 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1537 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1540 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1542 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1544 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1545 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1550 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1553 /* put the cipher */
1554 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1557 /* put the compression method */
1558 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1561 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1564 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1567 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1572 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p,
1573 buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1582 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1585 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1586 /* number of bytes to write */
1587 s->init_num = p - buf;
1591 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1592 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1595 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1599 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1600 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1603 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1608 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1609 /* number of bytes to write */
1614 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1615 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1618 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1624 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1628 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1631 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1632 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1635 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1638 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1639 unsigned char *p, *d;
1649 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1650 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1651 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1656 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1659 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1660 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1661 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1662 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1663 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1665 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1668 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1670 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1674 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1677 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1679 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1684 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1688 if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
1690 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1691 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1692 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1694 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1697 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1699 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1703 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1705 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1709 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1715 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1716 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1717 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1718 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1723 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1724 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1725 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1736 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1737 const EC_GROUP *group;
1739 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1740 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1741 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1742 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1744 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1745 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1747 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1748 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1749 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1750 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1754 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1756 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1760 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1761 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1762 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1765 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1770 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1771 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1772 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1773 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1774 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1781 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1782 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1783 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1788 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1789 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1791 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1796 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1797 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1801 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1804 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1809 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1810 * allocate memory accordingly.
1812 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1813 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1814 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1817 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1818 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1819 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1820 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1822 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1826 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1827 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1828 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1829 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1831 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1836 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1840 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1841 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1842 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1848 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1849 * can set these to NULLs
1856 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1858 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1860 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1862 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1864 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1865 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1866 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1867 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1868 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1869 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1871 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1874 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1875 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1876 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1877 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1881 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1883 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1886 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1887 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1888 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1889 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1896 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1897 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1898 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1900 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1903 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1909 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + 4 + kn)) {
1910 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1913 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1916 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1918 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1929 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1931 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1932 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1933 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1934 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1936 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1944 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1945 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1946 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1947 encodedPoint = NULL;
1952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1953 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1954 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1955 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1956 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1957 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1958 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1965 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1966 * points to the space at the end.
1968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1969 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1970 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1973 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1974 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1975 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1976 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1977 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1978 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1980 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1982 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n);
1983 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
1987 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1988 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
1998 * For TLS1.2 and later send signature algorithm
2000 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2001 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2002 /* Should never happen */
2003 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2005 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2011 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2013 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2014 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2016 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2018 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n);
2019 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2020 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
2021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2026 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2029 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2030 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2032 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2037 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2041 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
2043 s->init_num = n + 4;
2047 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2048 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2049 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2051 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2054 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2055 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2056 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2058 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2062 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2064 unsigned char *p, *d;
2065 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2066 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2070 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2073 d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2075 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2077 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2082 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2083 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2093 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2096 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2097 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2098 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2099 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 4 + n + j + 2)) {
2100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2104 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + n]);
2105 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
2107 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2112 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2121 /* else no CA names */
2122 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + off]);
2125 d = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
2126 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2130 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
2133 s->init_num = n + 4;
2135 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2136 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
2137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2140 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2143 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2150 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2153 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2154 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2159 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2163 unsigned long alg_k;
2165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2167 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2175 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2177 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2178 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2179 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2180 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2181 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2184 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2185 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2186 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2187 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2191 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2193 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2196 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2197 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2199 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2202 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2203 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2204 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2205 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2207 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2210 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2212 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2217 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2218 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2219 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2220 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2222 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2225 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2228 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2229 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2232 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2233 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2235 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2244 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2245 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2246 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2247 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2248 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2250 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2251 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2253 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2258 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2259 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2260 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2261 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2262 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2266 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2268 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2269 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2272 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2276 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2277 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2280 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2283 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2284 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2285 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2286 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2287 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2288 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2291 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2293 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2296 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2297 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2298 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2299 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2300 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2301 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2304 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2305 unsigned char workaround_good;
2307 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2309 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2310 version_good |= workaround_good;
2314 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2315 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2317 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2320 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2321 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2322 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2323 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2325 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2326 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2327 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2330 s->session->master_key_length =
2331 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2333 session->master_key,
2336 (rand_premaster_secret));
2337 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2341 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2344 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2346 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2354 if (n == 0L) { /* the parameters are in the cert */
2355 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2357 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2360 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2361 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2363 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2366 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2369 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2375 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2383 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2384 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2388 s->session->master_key_length =
2389 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2391 session->master_key,
2393 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2397 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2398 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2399 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2400 krb5_data authenticator;
2402 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2403 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2404 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2405 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2406 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2408 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2409 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2411 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2414 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2417 enc_ticket.length = i;
2419 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2421 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2425 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2426 p += enc_ticket.length;
2429 authenticator.length = i;
2431 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2433 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2437 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2438 p += authenticator.length;
2442 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2443 p += enc_pms.length;
2446 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2448 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2450 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2454 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2455 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2457 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2461 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2464 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2465 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2467 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2468 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2474 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2475 * return authtime == 0.
2477 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2478 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2480 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2481 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2483 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2484 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2489 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2494 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2495 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2497 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2501 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2503 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2505 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2508 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2509 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2512 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2515 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2517 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2520 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2522 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2526 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2528 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2531 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2532 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2534 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2535 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2536 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2537 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2538 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2539 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2540 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2543 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2545 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2550 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2552 s->session->master_key_length =
2553 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2555 session->master_key,
2558 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2559 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2560 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2561 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2562 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2567 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2568 * but it caused problems for apache.
2569 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2570 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2573 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2576 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2580 const EC_GROUP *group;
2581 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2583 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2584 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2589 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2590 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2591 /* use the certificate */
2592 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2595 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2596 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2598 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2601 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2602 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2604 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2605 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2610 /* Let's get client's public key */
2611 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2617 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2619 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
2620 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2622 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2625 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2626 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2628 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2629 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2630 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2631 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2632 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2633 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2635 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2637 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2641 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2642 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2647 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2650 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2651 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2653 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2655 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2659 /* Get encoded point length */
2663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2666 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2671 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2674 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2677 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2678 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2679 if (field_size <= 0) {
2680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2683 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2690 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2691 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2692 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2693 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2694 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2695 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2697 /* Compute the master secret */
2698 s->session->master_key_length =
2699 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2701 session->master_key,
2704 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2709 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2710 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2711 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2712 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2714 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2716 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2723 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2725 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2728 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2730 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2735 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2737 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2738 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2739 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2741 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2742 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2744 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2747 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2749 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2752 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2753 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2757 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2758 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2760 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2762 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2766 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2767 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2768 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2769 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2774 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2775 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2776 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2777 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2778 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2783 s->session->master_key_length =
2784 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2786 session->master_key,
2791 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2797 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2802 if (param_len > n) {
2803 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2805 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2808 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2812 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2813 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2814 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2816 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2819 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2820 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2821 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2822 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2827 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2828 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2829 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2836 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2837 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2839 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2840 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2841 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2842 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2843 unsigned long alg_a;
2847 /* Get our certificate private key */
2848 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2849 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2850 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2851 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2852 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2854 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2855 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2857 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2858 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2859 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2860 * client certificate for authorization only.
2862 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2863 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2864 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2867 /* Decrypt session key */
2869 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2870 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2871 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2873 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2878 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2879 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2881 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2884 /* Generate master secret */
2885 s->session->master_key_length =
2886 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2888 session->master_key,
2889 premaster_secret, 32);
2890 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2891 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2892 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2897 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2898 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2904 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2911 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2912 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2916 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2917 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2918 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2919 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2920 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2925 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2927 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2929 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2933 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2935 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2937 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2938 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2939 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2940 -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2945 if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
2946 peer = s->session->peer;
2947 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2948 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2954 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
2955 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2957 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2967 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2971 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2972 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2973 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2974 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2978 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
2979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2980 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2984 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2985 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2986 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2988 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2991 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2992 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
2995 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2996 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
2997 /* Should never happen */
2999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3000 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3003 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3004 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
3005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3006 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3007 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3010 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3013 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3017 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3026 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3030 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3031 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
3032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3033 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3037 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3040 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3041 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3043 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3047 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3050 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3051 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3053 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3057 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
3058 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3063 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3064 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3065 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3066 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3069 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3074 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3080 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3081 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3082 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3083 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3084 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3087 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3094 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3095 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3096 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3097 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3100 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3106 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3107 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3108 unsigned char signature[64];
3110 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3111 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3113 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3115 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3116 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3118 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3120 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3122 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3128 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3135 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3138 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3139 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3140 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3141 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3143 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3144 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3148 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3150 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3152 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3153 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3155 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3157 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3160 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3165 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3166 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3167 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3169 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3170 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3174 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3176 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3178 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3179 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3182 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3186 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3187 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3191 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3193 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3199 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3200 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3204 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3206 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3207 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3209 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3214 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3220 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3222 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3225 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3233 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3234 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3235 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3236 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3238 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3241 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3242 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3243 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3245 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3246 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3249 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3250 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3251 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3255 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3257 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3259 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3264 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3265 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3266 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3267 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3270 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3273 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3274 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3275 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3280 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3281 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3282 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3284 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3285 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3293 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3299 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3303 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3308 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3309 x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3311 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3312 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3313 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3315 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3320 l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, x);
3322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3325 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3326 s->init_num = (int)l;
3330 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3331 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3335 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3336 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3338 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3342 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3343 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3344 const unsigned char *const_p;
3345 int len, slen_full, slen;
3348 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3349 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3350 unsigned char key_name[16];
3352 /* get session encoding length */
3353 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3355 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3358 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00)
3360 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3364 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3365 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3368 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3372 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3375 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3378 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3380 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3381 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3382 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3386 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3387 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3390 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3393 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3394 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3395 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3396 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3397 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3398 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3400 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3401 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3402 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3405 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3407 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3408 /* Skip message length for now */
3411 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3412 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3414 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3415 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3419 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3421 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3422 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3424 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3425 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
3427 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3431 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3432 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3433 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3435 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3437 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3439 /* Output key name */
3441 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3444 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3445 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3446 /* Encrypt session data */
3447 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3450 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3454 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3456 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3459 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3460 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3463 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3465 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3466 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3467 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3469 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3471 /* number of bytes to write */
3473 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3478 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3479 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3483 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3484 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3488 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3490 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3493 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3494 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3495 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3498 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3501 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3504 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3505 /* message length */
3506 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3508 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3509 /* length of OCSP response */
3510 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3511 /* actual response */
3512 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3513 /* number of bytes to write */
3514 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3515 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3519 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3520 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3523 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3525 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3526 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3528 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3531 int proto_len, padding_len;
3533 const unsigned char *p;
3536 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3537 * extension in their ClientHello
3539 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3541 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3545 /* See the payload format below */
3546 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3547 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3548 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3549 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3555 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3556 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3557 * ssl3_get_finished).
3559 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3565 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3567 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3570 * The payload looks like:
3572 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3573 * uint8 padding_len;
3574 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3577 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3579 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3580 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3583 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3584 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3588 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3589 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;