ssl/s3_pkt.c

   1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
   2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
   3  * All rights reserved.
   4  *
   5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
   6  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
   7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
   8  *
   9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
  13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
  15  *
  16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  17  * the code are not to be removed.
  18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
  22  *
  23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  25  * are met:
  26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
  27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
  30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
  32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
  33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
  34  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
  37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
  40  *
  41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
  44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
  45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
  46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
  47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
  48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
  49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  52  *
  53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
  56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  57  */
  58 /* ====================================================================
  59  * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  60  *
  61  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  62  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  63  * are met:
  64  *
  65  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
  66  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  67  *
  68  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  69  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
  70  *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
  71  *    distribution.
  72  *
  73  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
  74  *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
  75  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
  76  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
  77  *
  78  * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
  79  *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
  80  *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
  81  *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
  82  *
  83  * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
  84  *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
  85  *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
  86  *
  87  * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
  88  *    acknowledgment:
  89  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
  90  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
  91  *
  92  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
  93  * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  94  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
  95  * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
  96  * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
  97  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
  98  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
  99  * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 100  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
 101  * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 102  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
 103  * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 104  * ====================================================================
 105  *
 106  * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
 107  * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
 108  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 109  *
 110  */
 111
 112 #include <stdio.h>
 113 #include <limits.h>
 114 #include <errno.h>
 115 #define USE_SOCKETS
 116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 119
 120 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 121                          unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
 122 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
 123
 124 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
 125         {
 126         /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
 127          * packet by another n bytes.
 128          * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
 129          * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
 130          * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
 131          * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
 132          */
 133         int i,len,left;
 134         long align=0;
 135         unsigned char *pkt;
 136         SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
 137
 138         if (n <= 0) return n;
 139
 140         rb    = &(s->s3->rbuf);
 141         if (rb->buf == NULL)
 142                 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
 143                         return -1;
 144
 145         left  = rb->left;
 146 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
 147         align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
 148         align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
 149 #endif
 150
 151         if (!extend)
 152                 {
 153                 /* start with empty packet ... */
 154                 if (left == 0)
 155                         rb->offset = align;
 156                 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
 157                         {
 158                         /* check if next packet length is large
 159                          * enough to justify payload alignment... */
 160                         pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
 161                         if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
 162                             && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
 163                                 {
 164                                 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
 165                                  * and its length field is insane, we can
 166                                  * only be led to wrong decision about
 167                                  * whether memmove will occur or not.
 168                                  * Header values has no effect on memmove
 169                                  * arguments and therefore no buffer
 170                                  * overrun can be triggered. */
 171                                 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
 172                                 rb->offset = align;
 173                                 }
 174                         }
 175                 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
 176                 s->packet_length = 0;
 177                 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
 178                 }
 179
 180         /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
 181          * because the read operation returns the whole packet
 182          * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
 183         if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 184                 {
 185                 if (left > 0 && n > left)
 186                         n = left;
 187                 }
 188
 189         /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
 190         if (left >= n)
 191                 {
 192                 s->packet_length+=n;
 193                 rb->left=left-n;
 194                 rb->offset+=n;
 195                 return(n);
 196                 }
 197
 198         /* else we need to read more data */
 199
 200         len = s->packet_length;
 201         pkt = rb->buf+align;
 202         /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
 203          * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
 204          * 'left' extra ones at the end */
 205         if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
 206                 {
 207                 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
 208                 s->packet = pkt;
 209                 rb->offset = len + align;
 210                 }
 211
 212         if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
 213                 {
 214                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 215                 return -1;
 216                 }
 217
 218         if (!s->read_ahead)
 219                 /* ignore max parameter */
 220                 max = n;
 221         else
 222                 {
 223                 if (max < n)
 224                         max = n;
 225                 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
 226                         max = rb->len - rb->offset;
 227                 }
 228
 229         while (left < n)
 230                 {
 231                 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
 232                  * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
 233                  * len+max if possible) */
 234
 235                 clear_sys_error();
 236                 if (s->rbio != NULL)
 237                         {
 238                         s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
 239                         i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
 240                         }
 241                 else
 242                         {
 243                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
 244                         i = -1;
 245                         }
 246
 247                 if (i <= 0)
 248                         {
 249                         rb->left = left;
 250                         if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
 251                             SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 252                                 if (len+left == 0)
 253                                         ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
 254                         return(i);
 255                         }
 256                 left+=i;
 257                 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
 258                  * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
 259                  * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
 260                 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 261                         {
 262                         if (n > left)
 263                                 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
 264                         }
 265                 }
 266
 267         /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
 268         rb->offset += n;
 269         rb->left = left - n;
 270         s->packet_length += n;
 271         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
 272         return(n);
 273         }
 274
 275 /* Call this to get a new input record.
 276  * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
 277  * or non-blocking IO.
 278  * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
 279  * ssl->s3->rrec.type    - is the type of record
 280  * ssl->s3->rrec.data,   - data
 281  * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
 282  */
 283 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
 284 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
 285         {
 286         int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
 287         int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
 288         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
 289         SSL_SESSION *sess;
 290         unsigned char *p;
 291         unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 292         short version;
 293         unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
 294         size_t extra;
 295
 296         rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
 297         sess=s->session;
 298
 299         if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
 300                 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
 301         else
 302                 extra=0;
 303         if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
 304                 {
 305                 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
 306                  * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
 307                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 308                 return -1;
 309                 }
 310
 311 again:
 312         /* check if we have the header */
 313         if (    (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
 314                 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
 315                 {
 316                 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
 317                 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
 318                 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
 319
 320                 p=s->packet;
 321
 322                 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
 323                 rr->type= *(p++);
 324                 ssl_major= *(p++);
 325                 ssl_minor= *(p++);
 326                 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
 327                 n2s(p,rr->length);
 328 #if 0
 329 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
 330 #endif
 331
 332                 /* Lets check version */
 333                 if (!s->first_packet)
 334                         {
 335                         if (version != s->version)
 336                                 {
 337                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
 338                                 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
 339                                         /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
 340                                         s->version = (unsigned short)version;
 341                                 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
 342                                 goto f_err;
 343                                 }
 344                         }
 345
 346                 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
 347                         {
 348                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
 349                         goto err;
 350                         }
 351
 352                 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
 353                         {
 354                         al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
 355                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 356                         goto f_err;
 357                         }
 358
 359                 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
 360                 }
 361
 362         /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
 363
 364         if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
 365                 {
 366                 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
 367                 i=rr->length;
 368                 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
 369                 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
 370                 /* now n == rr->length,
 371                  * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
 372                 }
 373
 374         s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
 375
 376         /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
 377          * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
 378          */
 379         rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
 380
 381         /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
 382          * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
 383          * need to be copied into rr->data by either
 384          * the decryption or by the decompression
 385          * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
 386          * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
 387
 388         /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
 389          * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
 390
 391         /* check is not needed I believe */
 392         if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
 393                 {
 394                 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
 395                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 396                 goto f_err;
 397                 }
 398
 399         /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
 400         rr->data=rr->input;
 401
 402         enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
 403         /* enc_err is:
 404          *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
 405          *    1: if the padding is valid
 406          *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
 407         if (enc_err == 0)
 408                 {
 409                 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
 410                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
 411                 goto f_err;
 412                 }
 413
 414 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 415 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
 416 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
 417 printf("\n");
 418 #endif
 419
 420         /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
 421         if ((sess != NULL) &&
 422             (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
 423             (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
 424                 {
 425                 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
 426                 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
 427                 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 428                 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
 429                 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
 430
 431                 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
 432                 orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
 433
 434                 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
 435                  * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
 436                  * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
 437                  * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
 438                  */
 439                 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
 440                     /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
 441                     (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
 442                      orig_len < mac_size+1))
 443                         {
 444                         al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 445                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
 446                         goto f_err;
 447                         }
 448
 449                 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
 450                         {
 451                         /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
 452                          * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
 453                          * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
 454                          * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
 455                          * */
 456                         mac = mac_tmp;
 457                         ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
 458                         rr->length -= mac_size;
 459                         }
 460                 else
 461                         {
 462                         /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
 463                          * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
 464                          * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
 465                         rr->length -= mac_size;
 466                         mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
 467                         }
 468
 469                 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
 470                 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
 471                         enc_err = -1;
 472                 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
 473                         enc_err = -1;
 474                 }
 475
 476         if (enc_err < 0)
 477                 {
 478                 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
 479                  * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
 480                  * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
 481                  * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
 482                  * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
 483                 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
 484                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
 485                 goto f_err;
 486                 }
 487
 488         /* r->length is now just compressed */
 489         if (s->expand != NULL)
 490                 {
 491                 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
 492                         {
 493                         al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
 494                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 495                         goto f_err;
 496                         }
 497                 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
 498                         {
 499                         al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
 500                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
 501                         goto f_err;
 502                         }
 503                 }
 504
 505         if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
 506                 {
 507                 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
 508                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 509                 goto f_err;
 510                 }
 511
 512         rr->off=0;
 513         /* So at this point the following is true
 514          * ssl->s3->rrec.type   is the type of record
 515          * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
 516          * ssl->s3->rrec.off    == offset to first valid byte
 517          * ssl->s3->rrec.data   == where to take bytes from, increment
 518          *                         after use :-).
 519          */
 520
 521         /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
 522         s->packet_length=0;
 523
 524         /* just read a 0 length packet */
 525         if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
 526
 527 #if 0
 528 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
 529 #endif
 530
 531         return(1);
 532
 533 f_err:
 534         ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
 535 err:
 536         return(ret);
 537         }
 538
 539 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
 540         {
 541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 542         int i;
 543         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
 544
 545         rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
 546         i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
 547                 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
 548         if (i < 0)
 549                 return(0);
 550         else
 551                 rr->length=i;
 552         rr->data=rr->comp;
 553 #endif
 554         return(1);
 555         }
 556
 557 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
 558         {
 559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 560         int i;
 561         SSL3_RECORD *wr;
 562
 563         wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
 564         i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
 565                 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
 566                 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
 567         if (i < 0)
 568                 return(0);
 569         else
 570                 wr->length=i;
 571
 572         wr->input=wr->data;
 573 #endif
 574         return(1);
 575         }
 576
 577 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
 578  * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
 579  */
 580 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
 581         {
 582         const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
 583         unsigned int n,nw;
 584         int i,tot;
 585
 586         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
 587         OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
 588         tot=s->s3->wnum;
 589         s->s3->wnum=0;
 590
 591         if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
 592                 {
 593                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
 594                 if (i < 0) return(i);
 595                 if (i == 0)
 596                         {
 597                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
 598                         return -1;
 599                         }
 600                 }
 601
 602         /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write
 603          * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete
 604          * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding
 605          * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
 606          * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
 607          * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
 608          * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
 609          * will notice
 610          */
 611         if (len < tot)
 612                 {
 613                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
 614                 return(-1);
 615                 }
 616
 617
 618         n=(len-tot);
 619         for (;;)
 620                 {
 621                 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
 622                         nw=s->max_send_fragment;
 623                 else
 624                         nw=n;
 625
 626                 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
 627                 if (i <= 0)
 628                         {
 629                         s->s3->wnum=tot;
 630                         return i;
 631                         }
 632
 633                 if ((i == (int)n) ||
 634                         (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
 635                          (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
 636                         {
 637                         /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
 638                          * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
 639                         s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
 640
 641                         return tot+i;
 642                         }
 643
 644                 n-=i;
 645                 tot+=i;
 646                 }
 647         }
 648
 649 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 650                          unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
 651         {
 652         unsigned char *p,*plen;
 653         int i,mac_size,clear=0;
 654         int prefix_len=0;
 655         long align=0;
 656         SSL3_RECORD *wr;
 657         SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
 658         SSL_SESSION *sess;
 659
 660
 661         /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
 662          * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
 663         if (wb->left != 0)
 664                 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
 665
 666         /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
 667         if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
 668                 {
 669                 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
 670                 if (i <= 0)
 671                         return(i);
 672                 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
 673                 }
 674
 675         if (wb->buf == NULL)
 676                 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
 677                         return -1;
 678
 679         if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
 680                 return 0;
 681
 682         wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
 683         sess=s->session;
 684
 685         if (    (sess == NULL) ||
 686                 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
 687                 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
 688                 clear=1;
 689
 690         if (clear)
 691                 mac_size=0;
 692         else
 693                 {
 694                 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
 695                 if (mac_size < 0)
 696                         goto err;
 697                 }
 698
 699         /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
 700         if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
 701                 {
 702                 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
 703                  * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
 704
 705                 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
 706                         {
 707                         /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
 708                          * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
 709                          * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
 710                          * together with the actual payload) */
 711                         prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
 712                         if (prefix_len <= 0)
 713                                 goto err;
 714
 715                         if (prefix_len >
 716                 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
 717                                 {
 718                                 /* insufficient space */
 719                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 720                                 goto err;
 721                                 }
 722                         }
 723
 724                 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
 725                 }
 726
 727         if (create_empty_fragment)
 728                 {
 729 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
 730                 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
 731                  * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
 732                  * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
 733                  * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
 734                 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
 735                 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
 736 #endif
 737                 p = wb->buf + align;
 738                 wb->offset  = align;
 739                 }
 740         else if (prefix_len)
 741                 {
 742                 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
 743                 }
 744         else
 745                 {
 746 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
 747                 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
 748                 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
 749 #endif
 750                 p = wb->buf + align;
 751                 wb->offset  = align;
 752                 }
 753
 754         /* write the header */
 755
 756         *(p++)=type&0xff;
 757         wr->type=type;
 758
 759         *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
 760         *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
 761
 762         /* field where we are to write out packet length */
 763         plen=p;
 764         p+=2;
 765
 766         /* lets setup the record stuff. */
 767         wr->data=p;
 768         wr->length=(int)len;
 769         wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
 770
 771         /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
 772          * wr->data */
 773
 774         /* first we compress */
 775         if (s->compress != NULL)
 776                 {
 777                 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
 778                         {
 779                         SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
 780                         goto err;
 781                         }
 782                 }
 783         else
 784                 {
 785                 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
 786                 wr->input=wr->data;
 787                 }
 788
 789         /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
 790          * from wr->input.  Length should be wr->length.
 791          * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
 792
 793         if (mac_size != 0)
 794                 {
 795                 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1) < 0)
 796                         goto err;
 797                 wr->length+=mac_size;
 798                 wr->input=p;
 799                 wr->data=p;
 800                 }
 801
 802         /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
 803         s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
 804
 805         /* record length after mac and block padding */
 806         s2n(wr->length,plen);
 807
 808         /* we should now have
 809          * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
 810          * wr->length long */
 811         wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
 812         wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
 813
 814         if (create_empty_fragment)
 815                 {
 816                 /* we are in a recursive call;
 817                  * just return the length, don't write out anything here
 818                  */
 819                 return wr->length;
 820                 }
 821
 822         /* now let's set up wb */
 823         wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
 824
 825         /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
 826         s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
 827         s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
 828         s->s3->wpend_type=type;
 829         s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
 830
 831         /* we now just need to write the buffer */
 832         return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
 833 err:
 834         return -1;
 835         }
 836
 837 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
 838 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 839         unsigned int len)
 840         {
 841         int i;
 842         SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
 843
 844 /* XXXX */
 845         if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
 846                 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
 847                         !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
 848                 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
 849                 {
 850                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
 851                 return(-1);
 852                 }
 853
 854         for (;;)
 855                 {
 856                 clear_sys_error();
 857                 if (s->wbio != NULL)
 858                         {
 859                         s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
 860                         i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
 861                                 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
 862                                 (unsigned int)wb->left);
 863                         }
 864                 else
 865                         {
 866                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
 867                         i= -1;
 868                         }
 869                 if (i == wb->left)
 870                         {
 871                         wb->left=0;
 872                         wb->offset+=i;
 873                         if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
 874                             SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 875                                 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
 876                         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
 877                         return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
 878                         }
 879                 else if (i <= 0) {
 880                         if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
 881                             s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
 882                                 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
 883                                    point in using a datagram service */
 884                                 wb->left = 0;
 885                         }
 886                         return(i);
 887                 }
 888                 wb->offset+=i;
 889                 wb->left-=i;
 890                 }
 891         }
 892
 893 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
 894  * 'type' is one of the following:
 895  *
 896  *   -  SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
 897  *   -  SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
 898  *   -  0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
 899  *
 900  * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
 901  * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
 902  *
 903  * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
 904  * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
 905  * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
 906  * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
 907  * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
 908  * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
 909  *     Change cipher spec protocol
 910  *             just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
 911  *     Alert protocol
 912  *             2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
 913  *     Handshake protocol
 914  *             4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
 915  *             to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
 916  *             here, anything else is handled by higher layers
 917  *     Application data protocol
 918  *             none of our business
 919  */
 920 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
 921         {
 922         int al,i,j,ret;
 923         unsigned int n;
 924         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
 925         void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
 926
 927         if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
 928                 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
 929                         return(-1);
 930
 931         if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
 932             (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
 933                 {
 934                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 935                 return -1;
 936                 }
 937
 938         if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
 939                 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
 940                 {
 941                 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
 942                 unsigned char *dst = buf;
 943                 unsigned int k;
 944
 945                 /* peek == 0 */
 946                 n = 0;
 947                 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
 948                         {
 949                         *dst++ = *src++;
 950                         len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
 951                         n++;
 952                         }
 953                 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
 954                 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
 955                         s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
 956                 return n;
 957         }
 958
 959         /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
 960
 961         if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
 962                 {
 963                 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
 964                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
 965                 if (i < 0) return(i);
 966                 if (i == 0)
 967                         {
 968                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
 969                         return(-1);
 970                         }
 971                 }
 972 start:
 973         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
 974
 975         /* s->s3->rrec.type         - is the type of record
 976          * s->s3->rrec.data,    - data
 977          * s->s3->rrec.off,     - offset into 'data' for next read
 978          * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes. */
 979         rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
 980
 981         /* get new packet if necessary */
 982         if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
 983                 {
 984                 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
 985                 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
 986                 }
 987
 988         /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
 989
 990         if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
 991                                        * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
 992                 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
 993                 {
 994                 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
 995                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
 996                 goto f_err;
 997                 }
 998
 999         /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1000          * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1001         if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1002                 {
1003                 rr->length=0;
1004                 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1005                 return(0);
1006                 }
1007
1008
1009         if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1010                 {
1011                 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1012                  * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1013                 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1014                         (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1015                         {
1016                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1017                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1018                         goto f_err;
1019                         }
1020
1021                 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1022
1023                 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1024                         n = rr->length;
1025                 else
1026                         n = (unsigned int)len;
1027
1028                 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1029                 if (!peek)
1030                         {
1031                         rr->length-=n;
1032                         rr->off+=n;
1033                         if (rr->length == 0)
1034                                 {
1035                                 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1036                                 rr->off=0;
1037                                 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1038                                         ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1039                                 }
1040                         }
1041                 return(n);
1042                 }
1043
1044
1045         /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1046          * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1047
1048         /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1049          * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1050          */
1051                 {
1052                 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1053                 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1054                 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1055
1056                 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1057                         {
1058                         dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1059                         dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1060                         dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1061                         }
1062                 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1063                         {
1064                         dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1065                         dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1066                         dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1067                         }
1068
1069                 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1070                         {
1071                         n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1072                         if (rr->length < n)
1073                                 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1074
1075                         /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1076                         while (n-- > 0)
1077                                 {
1078                                 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1079                                 rr->length--;
1080                                 }
1081
1082                         if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1083                                 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1084                         }
1085                 }
1086
1087         /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1088          * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1089          * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1090
1091         /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1092         if ((!s->server) &&
1093                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1094                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1095                 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1096                 {
1097                 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1098
1099                 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1100                         (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1101                         (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1102                         {
1103                         al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1104                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1105                         goto f_err;
1106                         }
1107
1108                 if (s->msg_callback)
1109                         s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1110
1111                 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1112                         !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1113                         !s->s3->renegotiate)
1114                         {
1115                         ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1116                         if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1117                                 {
1118                                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1119                                 if (i < 0) return(i);
1120                                 if (i == 0)
1121                                         {
1122                                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1123                                         return(-1);
1124                                         }
1125
1126                                 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1127                                         {
1128                                         if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1129                                                 {
1130                                                 BIO *bio;
1131                                                 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1132                                                  * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1133                                                  * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
1134                                                  * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1135                                                 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1136                                                 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1137                                                 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1138                                                 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1139                                                 return(-1);
1140                                                 }
1141                                         }
1142                                 }
1143                         }
1144                 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1145                  * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1146                 goto start;
1147                 }
1148         /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1149          * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1150          * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1151          */
1152         if (s->server &&
1153                 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1154                 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1155                 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1156                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1157                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1158                 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1159                 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1160
1161                 {
1162                 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1163                 rr->length = 0;
1164                 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1165                 goto start;
1166                 }
1167         if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1168                 {
1169                 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1170                 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1171
1172                 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1173
1174                 if (s->msg_callback)
1175                         s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1176
1177                 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1178                         cb=s->info_callback;
1179                 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1180                         cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1181
1182                 if (cb != NULL)
1183                         {
1184                         j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1185                         cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1186                         }
1187
1188                 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1189                         {
1190                         s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1191                         if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1192                                 {
1193                                 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1194                                 return(0);
1195                                 }
1196                         /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1197                          * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1198                          * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1199                          * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1200                          * expects it to succeed.
1201                          *
1202                          * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1203                          * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1204                          */
1205                         else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1206                                 {
1207                                 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1208                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1209                                 goto f_err;
1210                                 }
1211                         }
1212                 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1213                         {
1214                         char tmp[16];
1215
1216                         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1217                         s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1218                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1219                         BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1220                         ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1221                         s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1222                         SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1223                         return(0);
1224                         }
1225                 else
1226                         {
1227                         al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1228                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1229                         goto f_err;
1230                         }
1231
1232                 goto start;
1233                 }
1234
1235         if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1236                 {
1237                 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1238                 rr->length=0;
1239                 return(0);
1240                 }
1241
1242         if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1243                 {
1244                 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1245                  * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1246                 if (    (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1247                         (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1248                         {
1249                         al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1250                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1251                         goto f_err;
1252                         }
1253
1254                 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1255                 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1256                         {
1257                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1258                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1259                         goto f_err;
1260                         }
1261
1262                 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
1263                         {
1264                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1265                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1266                         goto f_err;
1267                         }
1268
1269                 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1270
1271                 rr->length=0;
1272
1273                 if (s->msg_callback)
1274                         s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1275
1276                 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1277                 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1278                         goto err;
1279                 else
1280                         goto start;
1281                 }
1282
1283         /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1284         if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&     !s->in_handshake)
1285                 {
1286                 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1287                         !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1288                         {
1289 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1290        * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1291        * protocol violations): */
1292                         s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1293                                 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1294                                 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1295 #else
1296                         s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1297 #endif
1298                         s->new_session=1;
1299                         }
1300                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1301                 if (i < 0) return(i);
1302                 if (i == 0)
1303                         {
1304                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1305                         return(-1);
1306                         }
1307
1308                 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1309                         {
1310                         if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1311                                 {
1312                                 BIO *bio;
1313                                 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1314                                  * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1315                                  * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
1316                                  * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1317                                 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1318                                 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1319                                 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1320                                 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1321                                 return(-1);
1322                                 }
1323                         }
1324                 goto start;
1325                 }
1326
1327         switch (rr->type)
1328                 {
1329         default:
1330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1331                 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1332                 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1333                         {
1334                         rr->length = 0;
1335                         goto start;
1336                         }
1337 #endif
1338                 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1339                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1340                 goto f_err;
1341         case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1342         case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1343         case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1344                 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1345                  * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1346                  * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1347                 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1348                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1349                 goto f_err;
1350         case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1351                 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1352                  * but have application data.  If the library was
1353                  * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1354                  * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1355                  * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1356                  * we will indulge it.
1357                  */
1358                 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1359                         (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1360                         ((
1361                                 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1362                                 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1363                                 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1364                                 ) || (
1365                                         (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1366                                         (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1367                                         (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1368                                         )
1369                                 ))
1370                         {
1371                         s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1372                         return(-1);
1373                         }
1374                 else
1375                         {
1376                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1377                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1378                         goto f_err;
1379                         }
1380                 }
1381         /* not reached */
1382
1383 f_err:
1384         ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1385 err:
1386         return(-1);
1387         }
1388
1389 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1390         {
1391         int i;
1392         const char *sender;
1393         int slen;
1394
1395         if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1396                 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1397         else
1398                 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1399
1400         if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1401                 {
1402                 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
1403                         {
1404                         /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1405                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1406                         return (0);
1407                         }
1408
1409                 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1410                 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1411                 }
1412
1413         if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1414                 return(0);
1415
1416         /* we have to record the message digest at
1417          * this point so we can get it before we read
1418          * the finished message */
1419         if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1420                 {
1421                 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1422                 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1423                 }
1424         else
1425                 {
1426                 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1427                 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1428                 }
1429
1430         s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1431                 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1432
1433         return(1);
1434         }
1435
1436 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1437         {
1438         /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1439         desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1440         if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1441                 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1442         if (desc < 0) return -1;
1443         /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1444         if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1445                 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1446
1447         s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1448         s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1449         s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1450         if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1451                 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1452         /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1453          * some time in the future */
1454         return -1;
1455         }
1456
1457 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1458         {
1459         int i,j;
1460         void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1461
1462         s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1463         i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1464         if (i <= 0)
1465                 {
1466                 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1467                 }
1468         else
1469                 {
1470                 /* Alert sent to BIO.  If it is important, flush it now.
1471                  * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1472                  * we will not worry too much. */
1473                 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1474                         (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1475
1476                 if (s->msg_callback)
1477                         s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1478
1479                 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1480                         cb=s->info_callback;
1481                 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1482                         cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1483
1484                 if (cb != NULL)
1485                         {
1486                         j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1487                         cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1488                         }
1489                 }
1490         return(i);
1491         }