2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
120 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
121 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
122 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
124 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
126 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
127 * packet by another n bytes.
128 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
129 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
130 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
131 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
138 if (n <= 0) return n;
142 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
146 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
147 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
148 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
153 /* start with empty packet ... */
156 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
158 /* check if next packet length is large
159 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
160 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
161 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
162 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
164 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
165 * and its length field is insane, we can
166 * only be led to wrong decision about
167 * whether memmove will occur or not.
168 * Header values has no effect on memmove
169 * arguments and therefore no buffer
170 * overrun can be triggered. */
171 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
175 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
176 s->packet_length = 0;
177 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
180 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
181 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
182 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
183 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
185 if (left > 0 && n > left)
189 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
198 /* else we need to read more data */
200 len = s->packet_length;
202 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
203 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
204 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
205 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
207 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
209 rb->offset = len + align;
212 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
219 /* ignore max parameter */
225 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
226 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
231 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
232 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
233 * len+max if possible) */
238 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
239 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
250 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
251 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
253 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
257 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
258 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
259 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
260 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
263 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
267 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
270 s->packet_length += n;
271 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
275 /* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
276 * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
277 * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
278 * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
279 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
281 /* Call this to get a new input record.
282 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
283 * or non-blocking IO.
284 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
285 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
286 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
287 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
289 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
290 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
292 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
293 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
297 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
299 unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
301 unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
306 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
307 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
310 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
312 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
313 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
319 /* check if we have the header */
320 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
321 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
323 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
324 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
325 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
329 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
333 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
336 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
339 /* Lets check version */
340 if (!s->first_packet)
342 if (version != s->version)
344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
345 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
346 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
347 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
348 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
353 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
359 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
361 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
366 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
369 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
371 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
373 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
375 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
376 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
377 /* now n == rr->length,
378 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
381 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
383 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
384 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
386 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
388 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
389 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
390 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
391 * the decryption or by the decompression
392 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
393 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
395 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
396 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
398 /* check is not needed I believe */
399 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
401 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
406 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
409 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
411 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
412 * 1: if the padding is valid
413 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
416 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
422 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
423 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
427 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
428 if ((sess != NULL) &&
429 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
430 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
432 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
433 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
434 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
435 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
436 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
438 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
439 orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
441 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
442 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
443 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
444 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
446 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
447 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
448 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
449 orig_len < mac_size+1))
451 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
456 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
458 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
459 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
460 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
461 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
464 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
465 rr->length -= mac_size;
469 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
470 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
471 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
472 rr->length -= mac_size;
473 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
476 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
477 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
479 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
485 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
486 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
487 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
488 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
489 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
490 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
495 /* r->length is now just compressed */
496 if (s->expand != NULL)
498 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
500 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
504 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
506 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
512 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
514 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
520 /* So at this point the following is true
521 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
522 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
523 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
524 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
528 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
531 /* just read a 0 length packet */
534 empty_record_count++;
535 if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS)
537 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
545 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
551 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
556 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
562 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
563 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
564 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
574 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
580 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
581 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
582 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
583 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
594 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
595 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
597 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
599 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
603 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
604 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
608 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
610 i=s->handshake_func(s);
611 if (i < 0) return(i);
614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
619 /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write
620 * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete
621 * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding
622 * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
623 * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
624 * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
625 * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
638 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
639 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
643 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
651 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
652 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
654 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
655 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
656 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
666 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
667 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
669 unsigned char *p,*plen;
670 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
674 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
678 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
679 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
681 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
683 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
684 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
686 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
689 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
693 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
696 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
702 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
703 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
704 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
711 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
716 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
717 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
719 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
720 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
722 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
724 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
725 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
726 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
727 * together with the actual payload) */
728 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
733 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
735 /* insufficient space */
736 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
741 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
744 if (create_empty_fragment)
746 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
747 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
748 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
749 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
750 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
751 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
752 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
759 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
763 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
764 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
765 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
771 /* write the header */
776 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
777 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
779 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
783 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
786 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
788 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
791 /* first we compress */
792 if (s->compress != NULL)
794 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
796 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
802 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
806 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
807 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
808 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
812 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1) < 0)
814 wr->length+=mac_size;
819 if(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1)<1) goto err;
821 /* record length after mac and block padding */
822 s2n(wr->length,plen);
824 /* we should now have
825 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
827 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
828 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
830 if (create_empty_fragment)
832 /* we are in a recursive call;
833 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
838 /* now let's set up wb */
839 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
841 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
842 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
843 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
844 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
845 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
847 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
848 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
853 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
854 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
858 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
861 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
862 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
863 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
864 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
875 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
877 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
878 (unsigned int)wb->left);
882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
889 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
890 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
891 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
892 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
893 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
896 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
897 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
898 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
899 point in using a datagram service */
909 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
910 * 'type' is one of the following:
912 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
913 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
914 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
916 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
917 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
919 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
920 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
921 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
922 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
923 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
924 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
925 * Change cipher spec protocol
926 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
928 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
930 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
931 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
932 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
933 * Application data protocol
934 * none of our business
936 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
941 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
943 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
944 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
947 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
948 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
954 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
955 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
957 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
958 unsigned char *dst = buf;
963 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
966 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
969 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
970 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
971 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
975 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
977 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
979 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
980 i=s->handshake_func(s);
981 if (i < 0) return(i);
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
989 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
991 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
992 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
993 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
994 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
997 /* get new packet if necessary */
998 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
1000 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
1001 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
1004 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1006 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1007 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1008 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
1010 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1015 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1016 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1017 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1020 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1025 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1027 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1028 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1029 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1030 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1032 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1037 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1039 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1042 n = (unsigned int)len;
1044 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1049 if (rr->length == 0)
1051 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1053 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1054 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1061 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1062 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1064 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1065 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1068 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1069 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1070 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1072 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1074 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1075 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1076 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1078 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1080 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1081 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1082 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1085 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1087 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1089 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1091 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1094 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1098 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1099 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1103 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1104 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1105 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1107 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1109 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1110 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1111 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1113 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1115 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1116 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1117 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1119 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1124 if (s->msg_callback)
1125 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1127 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1128 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1129 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1131 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1132 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1134 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1135 if (i < 0) return(i);
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1142 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1144 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1147 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1148 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1149 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1150 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1151 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1152 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1153 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1154 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1160 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1161 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1164 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1165 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1166 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1169 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1170 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1171 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1172 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1173 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1174 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1175 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1178 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1180 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1183 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1185 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1186 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1188 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1190 if (s->msg_callback)
1191 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1193 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1194 cb=s->info_callback;
1195 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1196 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1200 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1201 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1204 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1206 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1207 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1209 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1212 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1213 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1214 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1215 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1216 * expects it to succeed.
1218 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1219 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1221 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1223 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1228 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1232 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1233 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1235 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1236 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1237 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1238 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1243 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1251 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1253 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1258 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1260 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1261 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1262 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1263 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1265 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1270 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1271 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1273 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1278 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
1280 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1285 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1289 if (s->msg_callback)
1290 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1292 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1293 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1299 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1300 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1302 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1303 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1305 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1306 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1307 * protocol violations): */
1308 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1312 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1316 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1317 if (i < 0) return(i);
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1324 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1326 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1329 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1330 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1331 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1332 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1333 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1334 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1335 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1336 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1347 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1348 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1354 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1357 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1359 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1360 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1361 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1362 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1363 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1366 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1367 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1368 * but have application data. If the library was
1369 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1370 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1371 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1372 * we will indulge it.
1374 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1375 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1377 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1378 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1379 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1381 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1382 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1383 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1387 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1392 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1400 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1405 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1411 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1412 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1414 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1416 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1418 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
1420 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1425 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1426 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1429 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1432 /* we have to record the message digest at
1433 * this point so we can get it before we read
1434 * the finished message */
1435 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1437 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1438 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1442 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1443 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1446 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1447 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1452 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1454 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1455 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1456 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1457 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1458 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1459 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1460 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1461 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1463 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1464 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1465 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1466 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1467 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1468 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1469 * some time in the future */
1473 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1476 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1478 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1479 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1482 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1486 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1487 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1488 * we will not worry too much. */
1489 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1490 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1492 if (s->msg_callback)
1493 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1495 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1496 cb=s->info_callback;
1497 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1498 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1502 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1503 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);