3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
125 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
127 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap,
129 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
130 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
131 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
133 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
134 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
136 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
138 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
139 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
140 static PQ_64BIT bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT *num);
142 static void dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s);
144 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
146 dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
148 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
150 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
152 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
153 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
155 s->packet = rdata->packet;
156 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
157 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
158 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
160 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
161 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
168 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, PQ_64BIT *priority)
170 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
173 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
174 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
177 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
178 item = pitem_new(*priority, rdata);
179 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
181 if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
182 if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
184 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
188 rdata->packet = s->packet;
189 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
190 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
191 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
195 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
196 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
204 s->packet_length = 0;
205 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
206 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
208 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
210 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
221 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
225 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
228 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
230 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
240 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
242 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
243 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
244 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
246 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
247 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
248 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
249 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
252 dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
256 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
259 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
260 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
262 /* Check if epoch is current. */
263 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
264 return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
266 /* Process all the records. */
267 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
269 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
270 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
272 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
273 &s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
277 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
278 * have been processed */
279 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
280 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
289 dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
293 (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
294 ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
296 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
301 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
302 if (item && item->priority == priority)
304 /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be
305 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
307 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
308 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
309 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
311 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
312 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
314 s->packet = rdata->packet;
315 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
316 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
317 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
319 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
322 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
332 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
339 unsigned int mac_size;
340 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
346 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
347 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
349 rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
351 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
352 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
353 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
354 * the decryption or by the decompression
355 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
356 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
358 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
359 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
361 /* check is not needed I believe */
362 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
364 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
365 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
369 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
372 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
376 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
379 /* otherwise enc_err == -1 */
380 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
384 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
385 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
389 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
390 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
391 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
392 (s->read_hash == NULL))
397 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
399 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
401 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
402 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
403 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
406 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
409 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
410 if (rr->length < mac_size)
412 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
413 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
414 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
417 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
420 rr->length-=mac_size;
421 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
422 if (memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
424 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
428 /* r->length is now just compressed */
429 if (s->expand != NULL)
431 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
433 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
434 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
437 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
439 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
440 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
445 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
447 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
448 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
453 /* So at this point the following is true
454 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
455 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
456 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
457 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
461 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
463 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
466 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac:
467 /* Separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
468 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
469 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
470 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
471 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via logfile) */
472 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
473 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
475 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
481 /* Call this to get a new input record.
482 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
483 * or non-blocking IO.
484 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
485 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
486 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
487 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
489 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
490 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
492 int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
496 unsigned char *p = NULL;
497 unsigned short version;
498 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
499 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
504 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
505 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
506 if ( ! dtls1_process_buffered_records(s))
509 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
510 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
513 /* get something from the wire */
515 /* check if we have the header */
516 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
517 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
519 n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
520 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
521 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
523 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
524 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
526 s->packet_length = 0;
530 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
534 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
538 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
540 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
543 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
548 /* Lets check version */
549 if (!s->first_packet)
551 if (version != s->version && version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
553 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
555 s->packet_length = 0;
560 if ((version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) &&
561 (version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))
563 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
565 s->packet_length = 0;
569 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
571 /* record too long, silently discard it */
573 s->packet_length = 0;
577 s->client_version = version;
578 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
581 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
583 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
585 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
587 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
588 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
590 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
594 s->packet_length = 0;
598 /* now n == rr->length,
599 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
601 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
603 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
604 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
608 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
609 goto again; /* get another record */
612 /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
613 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
614 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
615 * since they arrive from different connections and
616 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
618 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
619 *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
620 ! dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap, &(rr->seq_num)))
623 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
624 goto again; /* get another record */
627 /* just read a 0 length packet */
628 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
630 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
631 * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
632 * cannot be processed at this time. */
635 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
637 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), &rr->seq_num);
640 s->packet_length = 0;
644 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
647 dtls1_clear_timeouts(s); /* done waiting */
652 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
653 * 'type' is one of the following:
655 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
656 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
657 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
659 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
660 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
662 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
663 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
664 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
665 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
666 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
667 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
668 * Change cipher spec protocol
669 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
671 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
673 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
674 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
675 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
676 * Application data protocol
677 * none of our business
679 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
684 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
686 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
687 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
690 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
691 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
692 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
693 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
695 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
699 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
700 if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
703 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
705 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
707 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
708 i=s->handshake_func(s);
709 if (i < 0) return(i);
712 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
718 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
720 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
721 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
722 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
723 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
726 /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
727 * so process data buffered during the last handshake
728 * in advance, if any.
730 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
733 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
736 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
738 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
743 /* Check for timeout */
744 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
747 /* get new packet if necessary */
748 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
750 ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
753 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
754 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
762 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
764 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
765 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
766 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
768 /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
769 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
770 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
771 * than dropping the connection.
773 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), &rr->seq_num);
778 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
779 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
780 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
783 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
788 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
790 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
791 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
792 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
793 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
795 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
796 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
800 if (len <= 0) return(len);
802 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
805 n = (unsigned int)len;
807 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
814 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
822 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
823 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
825 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
826 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
829 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
830 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
831 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
833 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
835 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
836 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
837 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
839 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
841 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
842 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
843 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
845 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
846 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
848 /* Application data while renegotiating
849 * is allowed. Try again reading.
851 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
854 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
856 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
857 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
858 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
862 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
863 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
870 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
871 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
872 if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
874 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
876 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
877 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
878 * non-existing alert...
882 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
887 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
888 for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
890 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
893 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
897 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
898 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
899 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
901 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
903 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
904 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
905 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
907 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
909 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
910 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
911 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
913 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
918 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
921 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
922 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
924 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
925 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
929 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
931 i=s->handshake_func(s);
932 if (i < 0) return(i);
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
939 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
941 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
944 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
945 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
946 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
947 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
948 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
950 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
951 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
957 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
958 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
962 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
964 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
965 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
967 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
970 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
971 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
973 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
975 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
976 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
980 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
981 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
984 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
986 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
987 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
989 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
993 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
994 /* now check if it's a missing record */
995 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
998 unsigned int frag_off;
999 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1004 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1005 dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
1007 if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
1009 /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
1010 /* requested a message not yet sent,
1011 send an alert ourselves */
1012 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1013 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1018 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1022 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1023 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1025 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1026 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1027 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1028 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1033 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1041 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1043 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1048 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1050 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1051 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1053 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1055 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1056 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1057 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1058 if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1061 if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) || (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1063 i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1064 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1070 if (s->msg_callback)
1071 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1072 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1074 /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
1075 * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
1077 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
1082 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1084 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1085 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1088 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1089 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1091 if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1092 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1097 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1098 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1101 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1103 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1104 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1105 if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
1111 /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
1112 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1114 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1116 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1121 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1122 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1124 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1125 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1126 * protocol violations): */
1127 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1131 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1135 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1136 if (i < 0) return(i);
1139 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1143 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1145 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1148 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1149 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1150 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1151 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1152 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1153 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1154 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1155 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1166 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1167 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1173 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1176 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1178 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1179 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1180 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1181 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1182 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1185 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1186 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1187 * but have application data. If the library was
1188 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1189 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1190 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1191 * we will indulge it.
1193 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1194 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1196 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1197 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1198 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1200 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1201 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1202 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1206 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1211 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1219 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1225 dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1229 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1231 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1232 if (i < 0) return(i);
1235 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1240 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1246 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1251 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1254 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1258 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1259 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1261 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1262 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1267 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1270 len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1273 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1274 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1275 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1285 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1286 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1288 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1292 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1293 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1294 i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
1298 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1300 unsigned char *p,*pseq;
1301 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
1308 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1309 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1310 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
1312 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1313 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
1316 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1317 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
1319 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1322 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1325 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1332 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
1333 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
1334 (s->write_hash == NULL))
1340 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
1342 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1344 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
1345 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1346 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1348 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
1349 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1352 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1354 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
1355 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
1356 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
1357 * together with the actual payload) */
1358 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1359 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1362 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
1364 /* insufficient space */
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1370 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1374 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1376 /* write the header */
1381 if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1382 *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER>>8,
1383 *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER&0xff;
1385 *(p++)=(s->version>>8),
1386 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1388 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1392 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1394 /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
1395 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
1397 if ( s->enc_write_ctx &&
1398 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
1399 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
1403 wr->data=p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1404 wr->length=(int)len;
1405 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1407 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1410 /* first we compress */
1411 if (s->compress != NULL)
1413 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1421 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1425 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1426 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1427 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1431 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1);
1432 wr->length+=mac_size;
1435 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1440 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1441 if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
1443 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs);
1444 /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
1445 * the rest of randomness */
1449 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1451 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1452 /* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1453 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1455 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1457 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1461 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
1463 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1465 s2n(wr->length,pseq);
1467 /* we should now have
1468 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1469 * wr->length long */
1470 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1471 wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1473 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1474 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1475 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1476 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1477 *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1480 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1482 if (create_empty_fragment)
1484 /* we are in a recursive call;
1485 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1490 /* now let's set up wb */
1491 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1494 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1495 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1496 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1497 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1498 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1500 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1501 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1508 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap,
1511 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
1512 PQ_64BIT mask = 0x0000000000000001L;
1514 PQ_64BIT rcd_num, tmp;
1516 pq_64bit_init(&rcd_num);
1517 pq_64bit_init(&tmp);
1519 /* this is the sequence number for the record just read */
1520 pq_64bit_bin2num(&rcd_num, s->s3->read_sequence, 8);
1523 if (pq_64bit_gt(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)) ||
1524 pq_64bit_eq(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)))
1526 pq_64bit_assign(seq_num, &rcd_num);
1527 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1528 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1529 return 1; /* this record is new */
1532 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1534 if ( pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp) > bitmap->length)
1536 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1537 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1538 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1541 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_BIGNUM
1544 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1545 pq_64bit_sub_word(&tmp, 1);
1546 offset = pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp);
1547 if ( pq_64bit_is_bit_set(&(bitmap->map), offset))
1549 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1550 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1555 mask <<= (bitmap->max_seq_num - rcd_num - 1);
1556 if (bitmap->map & mask)
1557 return 0; /* record previously received */
1560 pq_64bit_assign(seq_num, &rcd_num);
1561 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1562 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1567 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1574 pq_64bit_init(&rcd_num);
1575 pq_64bit_init(&tmp);
1577 pq_64bit_bin2num(&rcd_num, s->s3->read_sequence, 8);
1579 /* unfortunate code complexity due to 64-bit manipulation support
1580 * on 32-bit machines */
1581 if ( pq_64bit_gt(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)) ||
1582 pq_64bit_eq(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)))
1584 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num));
1585 pq_64bit_add_word(&tmp, 1);
1587 shift = (unsigned int)pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp);
1589 pq_64bit_lshift(&(tmp), &(bitmap->map), shift);
1590 pq_64bit_assign(&(bitmap->map), &tmp);
1592 pq_64bit_set_bit(&(bitmap->map), 0);
1593 pq_64bit_add_word(&rcd_num, 1);
1594 pq_64bit_assign(&(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1596 pq_64bit_assign_word(&tmp, 1);
1597 pq_64bit_lshift(&tmp, &tmp, bitmap->length);
1598 ctx = pq_64bit_ctx_new(&ctx);
1599 pq_64bit_mod(&(bitmap->map), &(bitmap->map), &tmp, ctx);
1600 pq_64bit_ctx_free(ctx);
1604 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1605 pq_64bit_sub_word(&tmp, 1);
1606 shift = (unsigned int)pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp);
1608 pq_64bit_set_bit(&(bitmap->map), shift);
1611 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1612 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1616 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1619 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1620 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1621 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1623 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1625 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1626 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1627 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1629 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1630 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1632 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1634 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg */
1637 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1641 fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1643 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1647 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1650 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1651 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1655 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1656 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1657 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1660 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1662 if (s->msg_callback)
1663 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1664 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1666 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1667 cb=s->info_callback;
1668 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1669 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1673 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1674 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1681 static DTLS1_BITMAP *
1682 dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1687 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1688 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1689 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1691 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1692 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1693 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1694 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
1697 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1705 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority,
1706 unsigned long *offset)
1709 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1710 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1711 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1714 /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
1715 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
1717 if ( SSL_in_init(s))
1719 unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1720 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1721 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1722 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1724 unsigned short seq_num;
1725 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1726 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1728 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1730 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1731 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1732 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1736 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1737 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1741 /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
1742 * retransmit of something we happened to previously
1743 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
1744 if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1746 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1747 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1748 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1750 else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1751 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1752 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1756 *priority = seq_num;
1760 else /* unknown record type */
1769 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1772 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1774 if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
1776 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1779 pq_64bit_assign(&(s->d1->bitmap.map), &(s->d1->next_bitmap.map));
1780 s->d1->bitmap.length = s->d1->next_bitmap.length;
1781 pq_64bit_assign(&(s->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num),
1782 &(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
1784 pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.map));
1785 pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
1786 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1787 pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.map));
1788 pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
1792 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1793 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1797 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
1800 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
1802 bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT *num)
1806 _num = (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[0]) << 56) |
1807 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[1]) << 48) |
1808 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[2]) << 40) |
1809 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[3]) << 32) |
1810 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[4]) << 24) |
1811 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[5]) << 16) |
1812 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[6]) << 8) |
1813 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[7]) );
1822 dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s)
1824 memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0x00, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st));