3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
121 #include <openssl/rand.h>
122 #include <openssl/objects.h>
123 #include <openssl/evp.h>
124 #include <openssl/x509.h>
126 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(msg_len) (((msg_len) + 7) / 8)
128 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(bitmask, start, end) { \
129 if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \
131 for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \
134 bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \
135 for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \
136 bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \
139 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \
141 OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \
143 if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \
144 if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \
145 if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } }
148 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_PRINT(bitmask, msg_len) { \
150 printf("bitmask: "); for (ii = 0; ii < (msg_len); ii++) \
151 printf("%d ", (bitmask[ii >> 3] & (1 << (ii & 7))) >> (ii & 7)); \
155 static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] = {0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80};
156 static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f};
158 /* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
159 static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28};
161 static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu);
162 static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
163 unsigned long frag_len);
164 static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s,
166 static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
167 unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
168 unsigned long frag_len);
169 static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn,
173 dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly)
175 hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
176 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
177 unsigned char *bitmask = NULL;
179 frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment));
185 buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
193 /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
194 frag->fragment = buf;
196 /* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */
199 bitmask = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
202 if (buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buf);
206 memset(bitmask, 0, RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
209 frag->reassembly = bitmask;
214 void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
217 if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
219 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx);
220 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash);
222 if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
223 if (frag->reassembly) OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
227 static void dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s)
229 /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
230 if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
233 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
235 /* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
236 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
237 if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
240 s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);
241 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
247 /* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
248 int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
252 unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
258 fprintf(stderr, "using MTU = %d\n", mtu);
260 mtu -= (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
262 curr_mtu = mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s));
266 else if ( ( ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0)
269 if ( BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu)
271 ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
274 mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
278 OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()); /* should have something reasonable now */
280 if ( s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
281 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
282 (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
285 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
289 if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
290 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
291 blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
298 curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) -
299 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - mac_size - blocksize;
301 if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
303 /* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */
304 ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
307 curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH -
308 mac_size - blocksize;
311 if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
317 /* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part */
318 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
320 if ( s->init_off != 0)
322 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
323 s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
324 s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
326 if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
332 if ( len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH )
335 * len is so small that we really can't do anything sensible
340 dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,
341 len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
343 dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]);
346 ret=dtls1_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
350 /* might need to update MTU here, but we don't know
351 * which previous packet caused the failure -- so can't
352 * really retransmit anything. continue as if everything
353 * is fine and wait for an alert to handle the
356 if ( BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
357 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0 )
359 if(!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
372 /* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake
373 * message got sent. but why would this happen? */
374 OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
376 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting)
378 /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
379 * we'll ignore the result anyway */
380 unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
381 const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
384 if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
386 /* reconstruct message header is if it
387 * is being sent in single fragment */
388 *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
389 l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
390 s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
392 l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
393 p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
398 p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
399 xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
402 ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
405 if (ret == s->init_num)
408 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
409 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
410 s->msg_callback_arg);
412 s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
419 frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
426 /* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
427 * maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
428 * Read an entire handshake message. Handshake messages arrive in
431 long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
434 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
436 unsigned long msg_len;
438 /* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused
439 * by the absence of an optional handshake message */
440 if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message)
442 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0;
443 if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt))
445 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
446 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
450 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
451 s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
455 msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
456 memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
459 i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
460 if ( i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT ||
461 i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) /* bad fragment received */
463 else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok)
466 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
467 msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
469 /* reconstruct message header */
470 *(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
472 s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
475 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
476 p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
477 msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
480 ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
482 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
484 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
486 memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
488 /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
490 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
492 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
496 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
502 static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s,struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,int max)
504 size_t frag_off,frag_len,msg_len;
506 msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
507 frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
508 frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
510 /* sanity checking */
511 if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > msg_len)
513 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
514 return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
517 if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > (unsigned long)max)
519 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
520 return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
523 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
525 /* msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked
526 * against max above */
527 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
529 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
530 return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
533 s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len;
534 s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
535 s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type;
536 s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type;
537 s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq;
539 else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len)
541 /* They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce
542 * upper limit would open possibility for buffer overrun. */
543 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
544 return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
547 return 0; /* no error */
552 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
554 /* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
556 * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
557 * (2) update s->init_num
564 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
568 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
570 /* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
571 if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
574 if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq)
576 unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len;
577 pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
579 al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&frag->msg_header,max);
581 if (al==0) /* no alert */
583 unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
584 memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off],
585 frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len);
588 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
597 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
606 /* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
607 * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
608 * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
609 static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
611 unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
612 if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
613 return s->max_cert_list;
618 dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
620 hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
622 int i = -1, is_complete;
623 unsigned char seq64be[8];
624 unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
626 if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
627 msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
631 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
633 /* Try to find item in queue */
634 memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
635 seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
636 seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
637 item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
641 frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1);
644 memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
645 frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
646 frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
650 frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
651 if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
660 /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
661 * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag
662 * does not need to be freed.
664 if (frag->reassembly == NULL)
666 unsigned char devnull [256];
670 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
672 frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
676 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
679 /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
680 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
681 frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
682 if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
687 RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
688 (long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len));
690 RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len,
695 OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
696 frag->reassembly = NULL;
701 item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
708 item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
709 /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
710 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
711 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
712 * would never have reached this branch. */
713 OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
716 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
719 if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
726 dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
729 hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
731 unsigned char seq64be[8];
732 unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
734 if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
737 /* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */
738 memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
739 seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
740 seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
741 item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
743 /* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment,
744 * don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it.
746 if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
749 /* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
750 * too far in the future, already in the queue or if we received
751 * a FINISHED before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale
754 if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
755 msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL ||
756 (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED))
758 unsigned char devnull [256];
762 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
764 frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
771 if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
772 return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
774 if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
777 frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
781 memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
785 /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
786 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
787 frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
788 if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
794 item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
798 item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
799 /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
800 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
801 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
802 * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
803 * to NULL and it will have been processed with
804 * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
806 OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
809 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
812 if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
819 dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
821 unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
822 unsigned long len, frag_off, frag_len;
824 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
827 /* see if we have the required fragment already */
828 if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
830 if (*ok) s->init_num = frag_len;
834 /* read handshake message header */
835 i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,wire,
836 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
837 if (i <= 0) /* nbio, or an error */
839 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
843 /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
844 if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
846 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
847 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
851 /* parse the message fragment header */
852 dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
855 * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
856 * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time
857 * While listening, we accept seq 1 (ClientHello with cookie)
858 * although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello)
860 if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq && !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1))
861 return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
863 len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
864 frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
865 frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
867 if (frag_len && frag_len < len)
868 return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
870 if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
871 wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
873 /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
874 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
875 * if their format is correct. Does not count for
877 if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0)
880 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
881 wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
882 s->msg_callback_arg);
887 else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
889 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
890 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
895 if ((al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&msg_hdr,max)))
898 /* XDTLS: ressurect this when restart is in place */
903 unsigned char *p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
905 i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
906 &p[frag_off],frag_len,0);
907 /* XDTLS: fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */
910 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
918 /* XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the
919 * handshake to fail */
920 if (i != (int)frag_len)
922 al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
923 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
929 /* Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
930 * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments'
931 * lengths: as soon as they sum up to handshake packet
932 * length, we assume we have got all the fragments. */
933 s->init_num = frag_len;
937 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
944 int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
952 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
953 p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
955 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
956 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
957 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
958 memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
962 /* Copy the finished so we can use it for
963 * renegotiation checks
965 if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
967 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
968 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished,
969 s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
970 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
974 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
975 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished,
976 s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
977 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
980 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
981 /* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless
987 d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l, 0, l);
988 s->init_num=(int)l+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
991 /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
992 dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
997 /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
998 return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1001 /* for these 2 messages, we need to
1002 * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
1003 * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero
1004 * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
1005 * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
1006 * ssl->session->read_compression assign
1007 * ssl->session->read_hash assign
1009 int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
1015 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1017 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
1018 s->init_num=DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1020 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1021 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
1022 s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,p);
1028 dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0,
1029 s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
1031 /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
1032 dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1);
1037 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
1038 return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
1041 static int dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
1047 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3)))
1049 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1052 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
1059 unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
1063 unsigned long l= 3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1066 /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
1068 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10))
1070 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1075 X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
1077 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,NULL))
1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
1083 X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
1084 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
1086 for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++)
1088 x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
1090 if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
1092 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
1096 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
1098 /* Thawte special :-) */
1099 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++)
1101 x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i);
1102 if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
1106 l-= (3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
1108 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
1111 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]);
1112 p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l, 0, l);
1114 l+=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1118 int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
1122 fprintf( stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
1126 if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s))
1128 /* not a timeout, none of our business,
1129 let higher layers handle this. in fact it's probably an error */
1133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1134 if (!SSL_in_init(s) && !s->tlsext_hb_pending) /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
1136 if (!SSL_in_init(s)) /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
1139 BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ);
1143 #if 0 /* for now, each alert contains only one record number */
1144 item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records);
1147 /* send an alert immediately for all the missing records */
1152 #if 0 /* no more alert sending, just retransmit the last set of messages */
1153 if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts >= DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
1154 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1155 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1158 return dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
1162 dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs)
1164 /* The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence number,
1165 * since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake. However, the
1166 * ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so using only the sequence
1167 * will result in the CCS and Finished having the same index. To prevent this,
1168 * the sequence number is multiplied by 2. In case of a CCS 1 is subtracted.
1169 * This does not only differ CSS and Finished, it also maintains the order of the
1170 * index (important for priority queues) and fits in the unsigned short variable.
1172 return seq * 2 - is_ccs;
1176 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
1178 pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
1184 iter = pqueue_iterator(sent);
1186 for ( item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter))
1188 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
1189 if ( dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1190 (unsigned short)dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs),
1191 0, &found) <= 0 && found)
1193 fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n");
1202 dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
1206 unsigned char seq64be[8];
1208 /* this function is called immediately after a message has
1209 * been serialized */
1210 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
1212 frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
1216 memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
1220 OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
1221 ((s->version==DTLS1_VERSION)?DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH:3) == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
1225 OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
1226 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
1229 frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
1230 frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq;
1231 frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type;
1232 frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
1233 frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
1234 frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs;
1236 /* save current state*/
1237 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
1238 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
1239 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress;
1240 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session;
1241 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
1243 memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
1244 seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
1245 frag->msg_header.is_ccs)>>8);
1246 seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
1247 frag->msg_header.is_ccs));
1249 item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
1252 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
1257 fprintf( stderr, "buffered messge: \ttype = %xx\n", msg_buf->type);
1258 fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = %d\n", msg_buf->len);
1259 fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tseq_num = %d\n", msg_buf->seq_num);
1262 pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item);
1267 dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
1271 /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */
1274 unsigned long header_length;
1275 unsigned char seq64be[8];
1276 struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
1277 unsigned char save_write_sequence[8];
1280 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
1281 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
1284 /* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
1285 memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
1286 seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq>>8);
1287 seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)seq;
1289 item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be);
1292 fprintf(stderr, "retransmit: message %d non-existant\n", seq);
1298 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
1300 if ( frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
1301 header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1303 header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1305 memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment,
1306 frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length);
1307 s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length;
1309 dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type,
1310 frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, 0,
1311 frag->msg_header.frag_len);
1313 /* save current state */
1314 saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
1315 saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
1316 saved_state.compress = s->compress;
1317 saved_state.session = s->session;
1318 saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
1319 saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
1321 s->d1->retransmitting = 1;
1323 /* restore state in which the message was originally sent */
1324 s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx;
1325 s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash;
1326 s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress;
1327 s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session;
1328 s->d1->w_epoch = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch;
1330 if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
1332 memcpy(save_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1333 memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->d1->last_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1336 ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ?
1337 SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
1339 /* restore current state */
1340 s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx;
1341 s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash;
1342 s->compress = saved_state.compress;
1343 s->session = saved_state.session;
1344 s->d1->w_epoch = saved_state.epoch;
1346 if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
1348 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1349 memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, save_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1352 s->d1->retransmitting = 0;
1354 (void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
1358 /* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */
1360 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s)
1364 for(item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages);
1365 item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages))
1367 dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data);
1374 dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt,
1375 unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len)
1377 /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
1378 if (frag_off == 0 && !s->d1->listen)
1380 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
1381 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
1384 dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq,
1385 frag_off, frag_len);
1387 return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1391 /* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */
1393 dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
1394 unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
1395 unsigned long frag_len)
1397 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
1400 msg_hdr->msg_len = len;
1401 msg_hdr->seq = seq_num;
1402 msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
1403 msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
1407 dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
1408 unsigned long frag_len)
1410 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
1412 msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
1413 msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
1416 static unsigned char *
1417 dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
1419 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
1421 *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
1422 l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
1424 s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
1425 l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p);
1426 l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p);
1434 return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
1435 sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
1439 dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu)
1443 if ( curr_mtu == 0 )
1444 return g_probable_mtu[0] ;
1446 for ( i = 0; i < sizeof(g_probable_mtu)/sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0]); i++)
1447 if ( curr_mtu > g_probable_mtu[i])
1448 return g_probable_mtu[i];
1454 dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
1456 memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
1457 msg_hdr->type = *(data++);
1458 n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len);
1460 n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq);
1461 n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off);
1462 n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len);
1466 dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr)
1468 memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st));
1470 ccs_hdr->type = *(data++);
1473 int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
1476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1477 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
1478 !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN))
1480 ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
1481 if (ret < 0) return -1;
1484 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1, NULL);
1487 ret = ssl3_shutdown(s);
1488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1489 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL);
1494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1496 dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
1498 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
1499 unsigned short hbtype;
1500 unsigned int payload;
1501 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
1503 if (s->msg_callback)
1504 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1505 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
1506 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1508 /* Read type and payload length first */
1509 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
1510 return 0; /* silently discard */
1511 if (s->s3->rrec.length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1512 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
1516 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
1517 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
1520 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
1522 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
1523 unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
1524 2 /* heartbeat length */ +
1528 if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1531 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
1532 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
1533 * payload, plus padding
1535 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
1538 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
1539 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
1541 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
1543 /* Random padding */
1544 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
1546 r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
1548 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
1549 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1550 buffer, write_length,
1551 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1553 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
1558 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
1562 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
1563 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
1564 * sequence number */
1567 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
1569 dtls1_stop_timer(s);
1571 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
1579 dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
1581 unsigned char *buf, *p;
1583 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
1584 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
1586 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
1587 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
1588 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
1594 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
1595 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
1601 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
1602 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1608 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
1609 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
1611 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
1613 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
1614 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
1615 * some random stuff.
1616 * - Message Type, 1 byte
1617 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
1618 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
1619 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
1622 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
1625 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
1626 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
1628 /* Sequence number */
1629 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
1630 /* 16 random bytes */
1631 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
1633 /* Random padding */
1634 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
1636 ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
1639 if (s->msg_callback)
1640 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1641 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
1642 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1644 dtls1_start_timer(s);
1645 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;