From ad64a69e02f7dda422d0f4f53dce7b1278715380 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt Caswell Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2016 17:06:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Change usage of RAND_pseudo_bytes to RAND_bytes RAND_pseudo_bytes() allows random data to be returned even in low entropy conditions. Sometimes this is ok. Many times it is not. For the avoidance of any doubt, replace existing usage of RAND_pseudo_bytes() with RAND_bytes(). Reviewed-by: Rich Salz --- apps/enc.c | 2 +- apps/passwd.c | 4 ++-- apps/s_server.c | 2 +- crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c | 2 +- crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c | 2 +- crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c | 4 ++-- crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c | 4 ++-- crypto/bn/bn_rand.c | 10 +++------- crypto/cms/cms_enc.c | 2 +- crypto/cms/cms_ess.c | 3 +-- crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c | 4 ++-- crypto/des/des.c | 2 +- crypto/des/enc_writ.c | 2 +- crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c | 4 ++-- crypto/evp/bio_ok.c | 2 +- crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c | 2 +- crypto/pem/pem_lib.c | 2 +- crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c | 2 +- crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c | 2 +- crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c | 6 +++--- ssl/d1_both.c | 6 +++--- ssl/s23_clnt.c | 8 ++++---- ssl/s2_clnt.c | 4 ++-- ssl/s2_srvr.c | 12 ++++-------- ssl/s3_srvr.c | 7 ++----- ssl/ssl_lib.c | 2 +- ssl/ssl_sess.c | 2 +- ssl/t1_lib.c | 6 +++--- 28 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-) diff --git a/apps/enc.c b/apps/enc.c index 7b7c70b132..8e2ef27aca 100644 --- a/apps/enc.c +++ b/apps/enc.c @@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex salt value\n"); goto end; } - } else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(salt, sizeof salt) < 0) + } else if (RAND_bytes(salt, sizeof salt) <= 0) goto end; /* * If -P option then don't bother writing diff --git a/apps/passwd.c b/apps/passwd.c index 5ff53b5743..798a6d5936 100644 --- a/apps/passwd.c +++ b/apps/passwd.c @@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ static int do_passwd(int passed_salt, char **salt_p, char **salt_malloc_p, if (*salt_malloc_p == NULL) goto err; } - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 2) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 2) <= 0) goto err; (*salt_p)[0] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[0] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */ (*salt_p)[1] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[1] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */ @@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ static int do_passwd(int passed_salt, char **salt_p, char **salt_malloc_p, if (*salt_malloc_p == NULL) goto err; } - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 8) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 8) <= 0) goto err; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c index d6c53d9476..2c1e5ee9e6 100644 --- a/apps/s_server.c +++ b/apps/s_server.c @@ -3364,7 +3364,7 @@ static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, { unsigned int count = 0; do { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0) return 0; /* * Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our prefix diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c b/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c index 96110c540f..9fd5bef0fc 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c @@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ int SMIME_write_ASN1(BIO *bio, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *data, int flags, if ((flags & SMIME_DETACHED) && data) { /* We want multipart/signed */ /* Generate a random boundary */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32) <= 0) return 0; for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { c = bound[i] & 0xf; diff --git a/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c b/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c index bdbfdcd67c..e2a1def53f 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int PKCS5_pbe_set0_algor(X509_ALGOR *algor, int alg, int iter, sstr = ASN1_STRING_data(pbe->salt); if (salt) memcpy(sstr, salt, saltlen); - else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(sstr, saltlen) < 0) + else if (RAND_bytes(sstr, saltlen) <= 0) goto err; if (!ASN1_item_pack(pbe, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBEPARAM), &pbe_str)) { diff --git a/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c b/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c index 73ba4a3d67..388053e0a1 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iter, if (EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) { if (aiv) memcpy(iv, aiv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)); - else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) < 0) + else if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) <= 0) goto err; } @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, if (salt) memcpy(osalt->data, salt, saltlen); - else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(osalt->data, saltlen) < 0) + else if (RAND_bytes(osalt->data, saltlen) <= 0) goto merr; if (iter <= 0) diff --git a/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c b/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c index a04f32a008..4842bb4c82 100644 --- a/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c +++ b/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static int nbiof_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); #if 1 - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(&n, 1) <= 0) return -1; num = (n & 0x07); @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static int nbiof_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) num = nt->lwn; nt->lwn = 0; } else { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(&n, 1) <= 0) return -1; num = (n & 7); } diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c b/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c index f9fb2e9e45..2266d22b66 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c @@ -145,13 +145,9 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom) time(&tim); RAND_add(&tim, sizeof(tim), 0.0); - if (pseudorand) { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf, bytes) == -1) - goto err; - } else { - if (RAND_bytes(buf, bytes) <= 0) - goto err; - } + /* We ignore the value of pseudorand and always call RAND_bytes */ + if (RAND_bytes(buf, bytes) <= 0) + goto err; #if 1 if (pseudorand == 2) { diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c b/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c index e282c9dd28..90b1fcc750 100644 --- a/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c +++ b/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec) /* Generate a random IV if we need one */ ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); if (ivlen > 0) { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0) goto err; piv = iv; } diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c b/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c index 8631a2eb2b..8212560628 100644 --- a/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c +++ b/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c @@ -107,8 +107,7 @@ CMS_ReceiptRequest *CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0(unsigned char *id, int idlen, else { if (!ASN1_STRING_set(rr->signedContentIdentifier, NULL, 32)) goto merr; - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rr->signedContentIdentifier->data, 32) - <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(rr->signedContentIdentifier->data, 32) <= 0) goto err; } diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c b/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c index b91c01691f..5c817caf2f 100644 --- a/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c +++ b/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); if (ivlen > 0) { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); @@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ static int kek_wrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, memcpy(out + 4, in, inlen); /* Add random padding to end */ if (olen > inlen + 4 - && RAND_pseudo_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen) < 0) + && RAND_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen) <= 0) return 0; /* Encrypt twice */ EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen); diff --git a/crypto/des/des.c b/crypto/des/des.c index 586aed7237..d7374382d8 100644 --- a/crypto/des/des.c +++ b/crypto/des/des.c @@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ void doencryption(void) len = l - rem; if (feof(DES_IN)) { for (i = 7 - rem; i > 0; i--) { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf + l++, 1) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(buf + l++, 1) <= 0) goto problems; } buf[l++] = rem; diff --git a/crypto/des/enc_writ.c b/crypto/des/enc_writ.c index bfaabde516..c2aaa8e98c 100644 --- a/crypto/des/enc_writ.c +++ b/crypto/des/enc_writ.c @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ int DES_enc_write(int fd, const void *_buf, int len, if (len < 8) { cp = shortbuf; memcpy(shortbuf, buf, len); - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(shortbuf + len, 8 - len) < 0) { + if (RAND_bytes(shortbuf + len, 8 - len) <= 0) { return -1; } rnum = 8; diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c index 15f3bb4f3f..f6de68488c 100644 --- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c +++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits, goto err; if (!seed_len || !seed_in) { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(seed, qsize) <= 0) goto err; seed_is_random = 1; } else { @@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N, goto err; if (!seed_in) { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, seed_len) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(seed, seed_len) <= 0) goto err; } /* step 2 */ diff --git a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c index 5c32e35e17..16e151f110 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c +++ b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c @@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static int sig_out(BIO *b) * FIXME: there's absolutely no guarantee this makes any sense at all, * particularly now EVP_MD_CTX has been restructured. */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(md->md_data, md->digest->md_size) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(md->md_data, md->digest->md_size) <= 0) goto berr; memcpy(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), md->md_data, md->digest->md_size); longswap(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), md->digest->md_size); diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c index c19648c732..55af31b573 100644 --- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c +++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c @@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ static int ocsp_add1_nonce(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **exts, ASN1_put_object(&tmpval, 0, len, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL); if (val) memcpy(tmpval, val, len); - else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmpval, len) < 0) + else if (RAND_bytes(tmpval, len) <= 0) goto err; if (!X509V3_add1_i2d(exts, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce, &os, 0, X509V3_ADD_REPLACE)) diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c index ac4faae047..c82b3c0ae2 100644 --- a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c +++ b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c @@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, BIO *bp, } RAND_add(data, i, 0); /* put in the RSA key. */ OPENSSL_assert(enc->iv_len <= (int)sizeof(iv)); - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, enc->iv_len) < 0) /* Generate a salt */ + if (RAND_bytes(iv, enc->iv_len) <= 0) /* Generate a salt */ goto err; /* * The 'iv' is used as the iv and as a salt. It is NOT taken from diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c index a9277827ff..cbf34da05a 100644 --- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c +++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ int PKCS12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, } p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen; if (!salt) { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p12->mac->salt->data, saltlen) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(p12->mac->salt->data, saltlen) <= 0) return 0; } else memcpy(p12->mac->salt->data, salt, saltlen); diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c index 946aaa6543..1ab6d5ae71 100644 --- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c +++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c @@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(evp_cipher); xalg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_type(evp_cipher)); if (ivlen > 0) - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1) <= 0) goto err; diff --git a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c index 26ad3e07b4..986babfd49 100644 --- a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c @@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username) if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user, username, NULL)) goto err; - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0) goto err; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctxt); EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL); @@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt, } if (*salt == NULL) { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0) goto err; s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL); @@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt, srp_bn_print(g); if (*salt == NULL) { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0) goto err; salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL); diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c index 5d26c94926..b5900dea8f 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -1469,7 +1469,7 @@ int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) memcpy(bp, pl, payload); bp += payload; /* Random padding */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) { + if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) { OPENSSL_free(buffer); return -1; } @@ -1554,11 +1554,11 @@ int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) /* Sequence number */ s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); /* 16 random bytes */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) goto err; p += 16; /* Random padding */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) goto err; ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); diff --git a/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/ssl/s23_clnt.c index f782010c47..6850dc0c67 100644 --- a/ssl/s23_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/s23_clnt.c @@ -289,9 +289,9 @@ int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, int len) unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); unsigned char *p = result; l2n(Time, p); - return RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, len - 4); + return RAND_bytes(p, len - 4); } else - return RAND_pseudo_bytes(result, len); + return RAND_bytes(result, len); } static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s) @@ -466,8 +466,8 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s) i = ch_len; s2n(i, d); memset(&(s->s3->client_random[0]), 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes - (&(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i]), i) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes (&(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i]), i) + <= 0) return -1; memcpy(p, &(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i]), i); diff --git a/ssl/s2_clnt.c b/ssl/s2_clnt.c index 69da6b1421..20de1a8217 100644 --- a/ssl/s2_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/s2_clnt.c @@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ static int client_hello(SSL *s) /* * challenge id data */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(s->s2->challenge, SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(s->s2->challenge, SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0) return -1; memcpy(d, s->s2->challenge, SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH); d += SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH; @@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ static int client_master_key(SSL *s) return -1; } if (i > 0) - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(sess->key_arg, i) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(sess->key_arg, i) <= 0) return -1; /* make a master key */ diff --git a/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/ssl/s2_srvr.c index 07e9df8282..d3b243c27e 100644 --- a/ssl/s2_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/s2_srvr.c @@ -526,11 +526,8 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ - /* - * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. - */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, - (int)num_encrypted_key_bytes) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, + (int)num_encrypted_key_bytes) <= 0) return 0; i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc, @@ -822,8 +819,7 @@ static int server_hello(SSL *s) /* make and send conn_id */ s2n(SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH, p); /* add conn_id length */ s->s2->conn_id_length = SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH; - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(s->s2->conn_id, (int)s->s2->conn_id_length) <= - 0) + if (RAND_bytes(s->s2->conn_id, (int)s->s2->conn_id_length) <= 0) return -1; memcpy(d, s->s2->conn_id, SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH); d += SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH; @@ -962,7 +958,7 @@ static int request_certificate(SSL *s) p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; *(p++) = SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE; *(p++) = SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION; - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(ccd, SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(ccd, SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0) return -1; memcpy(p, ccd, SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH); diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c index ab7f6900d2..0c43c493ed 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -2229,11 +2229,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ - /* - * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. - */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, - sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, + sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) goto err; decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c index 714a31ec38..a707612fb0 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -2000,7 +2000,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0; ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL; /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */ - if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0) + if ((RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0) || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0) || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0)) ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c index 54ee78350b..ba5737f006 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, { unsigned int retry = 0; do - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0) return 0; while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) && (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)) ; diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c index cdac0118ca..8071b4ab7d 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -3906,7 +3906,7 @@ int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) memcpy(bp, pl, payload); bp += payload; /* Random padding */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) { + if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) { OPENSSL_free(buffer); return -1; } @@ -3992,13 +3992,13 @@ int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) /* Sequence number */ s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); /* 16 random bytes */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) { + if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } p += 16; /* Random padding */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) { + if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } -- 2.34.1