From 4ca5efc2874e094d6382b30416824eda6dde52fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2015 17:34:56 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Make OCSP response verification more flexible. If a set of certificates is supplied to OCSP_basic_verify use those in addition to any present in the OCSP response as untrusted CAs when verifying a certificate chain. PR#3668 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell --- crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c index 8beadf7001..40a3b017b8 100644 --- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c @@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, { X509 *signer, *x; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; + STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL; X509_STORE_CTX ctx; int i, ret = 0; ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, st, flags); @@ -108,10 +109,20 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, } if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) { int init_res; - if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) - init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, NULL); - else - init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, bs->certs); + if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) { + untrusted = NULL; + } else if (bs->certs && certs) { + untrusted = sk_X509_dup(bs->certs); + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { + if (!sk_X509_push(untrusted, sk_X509_value(certs, i))) { + OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto end; + } + } + } else { + untrusted = bs->certs; + } + init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, untrusted); if (!init_res) { ret = -1; OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB); @@ -162,6 +173,8 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, end: if (chain) sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); + if (bs->certs && certs) + sk_X509_free(untrusted); return ret; } -- 2.34.1