From 3986b9bb6bb319ff4b2365a7d570308d0e70cd54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Veres Lajos Date: Sat, 30 Nov 2019 23:18:47 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Fix some typos Reported-by: misspell-fixer CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10544) (cherry picked from commit 79c44b4e3044aee9dc9618850d4f1ce067757b4b) --- Configurations/10-main.conf | 2 +- INSTALL | 2 +- apps/passwd.c | 2 +- crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl | 2 +- crypto/des/asm/des_enc.m4 | 8 ++++---- crypto/evp/e_aes.c | 2 +- crypto/rand/rand_vms.c | 2 +- crypto/rand/rand_win.c | 2 +- doc/man3/RAND_set_rand_method.pod | 2 +- ssl/record/ssl3_record.c | 8 ++++---- ssl/record/ssl3_record_tls13.c | 2 +- ssl/t1_enc.c | 2 +- util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm | 2 +- 13 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/Configurations/10-main.conf b/Configurations/10-main.conf index fc04f8e661..df1cc00529 100644 --- a/Configurations/10-main.conf +++ b/Configurations/10-main.conf @@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ my %targets = ( # primarily because vendor assembler can't assemble our modules # with -KPIC flag. As result it, assembly support, was not even # available as option. But its lack means lack of side-channel - # resistant code, which is incompatible with security by todays + # resistant code, which is incompatible with security by today's # standards. Fortunately gcc is readily available prepackaged # option, which we can firmly point at... # diff --git a/INSTALL b/INSTALL index c4c65c113b..328ad2baf4 100644 --- a/INSTALL +++ b/INSTALL @@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@ HASHBANGPERL The command string for the Perl executable to insert in the - #! line of perl scripts that will be publically installed. + #! line of perl scripts that will be publicly installed. Default: /usr/bin/env perl Note: the value of this variable is added to the same scripts on all platforms, but it's only relevant on Unix-like platforms. diff --git a/apps/passwd.c b/apps/passwd.c index aa516c874e..d741d05335 100644 --- a/apps/passwd.c +++ b/apps/passwd.c @@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ static int do_passwd(int passed_salt, char **salt_p, char **salt_malloc_p, (*salt_p)[i] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[i] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */ (*salt_p)[i] = 0; # ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC - /* The password encryption funtion will convert back to ASCII */ + /* The password encryption function will convert back to ASCII */ ascii2ebcdic(*salt_p, *salt_p, saltlen); # endif } diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl index b68c14da60..7beb7cf309 100644 --- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl +++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ # nothing one can do and the result appears optimal. CCM result is # identical to CBC, because CBC-MAC is essentially CBC encrypt without # saving output. CCM CTR "stays invisible," because it's neatly -# interleaved wih CBC-MAC. This provides ~30% improvement over +# interleaved with CBC-MAC. This provides ~30% improvement over # "straightforward" CCM implementation with CTR and CBC-MAC performed # disjointly. Parallelizable modes practically achieve the theoretical # limit. diff --git a/crypto/des/asm/des_enc.m4 b/crypto/des/asm/des_enc.m4 index 4ada97b175..ebb5e7cd1d 100644 --- a/crypto/des/asm/des_enc.m4 +++ b/crypto/des/asm/des_enc.m4 @@ -106,15 +106,15 @@ changequote({,}) ! technique. ! ! The macro also loads address sbox 1 to 5 to global 1 to 5, address -! sbox 6 to local6, and addres sbox 8 to out3. +! sbox 6 to local6, and address sbox 8 to out3. ! -! Rotates the halfs 3 left to bring the sbox bits in convenient positions. +! Rotates the halves 3 left to bring the sbox bits in convenient positions. ! ! Loads key first round from address in parameter 5 to out0, out1. ! ! After the original LibDES initial permutation, the resulting left ! is in the variable initially used for right and vice versa. The macro -! implements the possibility to keep the halfs in the original registers. +! implements the possibility to keep the halves in the original registers. ! ! parameter 1 left ! parameter 2 right @@ -1184,7 +1184,7 @@ DES_encrypt2: add %o7,global1,global1 sub global1,.PIC.DES_SPtrans-.des_and,out2 - ! Set sbox address 1 to 6 and rotate halfs 3 left + ! Set sbox address 1 to 6 and rotate halves 3 left ! Errors caught by destest? Yes. Still? *NO* !sethi %hi(DES_SPtrans), global1 ! address sbox 1 diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c index 4b738b928e..f25f7cfb9e 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c +++ b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c @@ -1127,7 +1127,7 @@ typedef struct { } icv; unsigned char k[32]; } kmac_param; - /* KMAC-AES paramater block - end */ + /* KMAC-AES parameter block - end */ union { unsigned long long g[2]; diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c index b24d10a122..ba8386e30e 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c @@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool) /* * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp * (where available, which is OpenVMS v8.4 and up) to ensure that - * the nonce is unique whith high probability for different process + * the nonce is unique with high probability for different process * instances. */ data.pid = getpid(); diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_win.c b/crypto/rand/rand_win.c index 2743ee7bf8..9036546008 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_win.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_win.c @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool) /* * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to - * ensure that the nonce is unique whith high probability for + * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for * different process instances. */ data.pid = GetCurrentProcessId(); diff --git a/doc/man3/RAND_set_rand_method.pod b/doc/man3/RAND_set_rand_method.pod index 83a6cac17a..b120e712e6 100644 --- a/doc/man3/RAND_set_rand_method.pod +++ b/doc/man3/RAND_set_rand_method.pod @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Each pointer may be NULL if the function is not implemented. =head1 RETURN VALUES -RAND_set_rand_method() returns 1 on success and 0 on failue. +RAND_set_rand_method() returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. RAND_get_rand_method() and RAND_OpenSSL() return pointers to the respective methods. diff --git a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c index d406adfb93..8b43805e81 100644 --- a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c +++ b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c @@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr) * SSLfatal() for internal errors, but not otherwise. * * Returns: - * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too + * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid (i.e. too * short etc). * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error @@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int sending) * internal errors, but not otherwise. * * Returns: - * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too + * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid (i.e. too * short etc). * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, @@ -1075,7 +1075,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending) } else if ((bs != 1) && sending) { padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs); - /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ + /* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */ if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, @@ -1669,7 +1669,7 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0); /*- * enc_err is: - * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. + * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. * 1: if the padding is valid * -1: if the padding is invalid */ diff --git a/ssl/record/ssl3_record_tls13.c b/ssl/record/ssl3_record_tls13.c index 89d789cb23..ab50e37624 100644 --- a/ssl/record/ssl3_record_tls13.c +++ b/ssl/record/ssl3_record_tls13.c @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ * internal errors, but not otherwise. * * Returns: - * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too + * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid (i.e. too * short etc). * 1: if the record encryption was successful. * -1: if the record's AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c index 9a9cbe1835..c85c0b0310 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_enc.c +++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c @@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; size_t hashlen; /* - * Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this wont + * Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this won't * affect client auth because we're freezing the buffer at the same * point (after client key exchange and before certificate verify) */ diff --git a/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm b/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm index 71acaff9b4..6f983b3281 100644 --- a/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm +++ b/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm @@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ sub clientstart } else { # It's a bit counter-intuitive spot to make next connection to # the s_server. Rationale is that established connection works - # as syncronization point, in sense that this way we know that + # as synchronization point, in sense that this way we know that # s_server is actually done with current session... $self->connect_to_server(); } -- 2.34.1