openssl.git
3 years agoAdds copyright section to ct.pod
Rob Percival [Thu, 4 Aug 2016 10:29:36 +0000 (11:29 +0100)]
Adds copyright section to ct.pod

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdds newline after =cut in PODs
Rob Percival [Thu, 4 Aug 2016 10:29:23 +0000 (11:29 +0100)]
Adds newline after =cut in PODs

util/find-doc-nits.pl complains that the file "doesn't end with =cut".

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdds missing function names to NAME section of PODs
Rob Percival [Thu, 4 Aug 2016 10:28:04 +0000 (11:28 +0100)]
Adds missing function names to NAME section of PODs

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd enum definitions to CT pods
Rob Percival [Tue, 2 Aug 2016 14:39:41 +0000 (15:39 +0100)]
Add enum definitions to CT pods

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoRemove unnecessary bold tags in CT pods
Rob Percival [Tue, 2 Aug 2016 14:39:23 +0000 (15:39 +0100)]
Remove unnecessary bold tags in CT pods

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd comment about calling CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free
Rob Percival [Mon, 1 Aug 2016 19:08:11 +0000 (20:08 +0100)]
Add comment about calling CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix comment about what SCT_LIST_validate does.
Rob Percival [Mon, 1 Aug 2016 19:07:15 +0000 (20:07 +0100)]
Fix comment about what SCT_LIST_validate does.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd SSL_get0_peer_scts to ssl.pod
Rob Percival [Mon, 1 Aug 2016 14:37:10 +0000 (15:37 +0100)]
Add SSL_get0_peer_scts to ssl.pod

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix comment about return value of ct_extract_tls_extension_scts
Rob Percival [Mon, 1 Aug 2016 14:36:38 +0000 (15:36 +0100)]
Fix comment about return value of ct_extract_tls_extension_scts

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoFirst draft of CT documentation
Rob Percival [Thu, 28 Apr 2016 06:37:24 +0000 (07:37 +0100)]
First draft of CT documentation

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoRemove some dead code from rec_layer_s3.c
Matt Caswell [Wed, 24 Aug 2016 10:28:58 +0000 (11:28 +0100)]
Remove some dead code from rec_layer_s3.c

It is never valid to call ssl3_read_bytes with
type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, and in fact we check for valid values
for type near the beginning of the function. Therefore this check will never
be true and can be removed.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoRemove useless assignment
Matt Caswell [Wed, 24 Aug 2016 10:25:23 +0000 (11:25 +0100)]
Remove useless assignment

The variable assignment c1 is never read before it is overwritten.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix some resource leaks in the apps
Matt Caswell [Wed, 24 Aug 2016 10:22:47 +0000 (11:22 +0100)]
Fix some resource leaks in the apps

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoec/ecp_nistz256: harmonize is_infinity with ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity.
Andy Polyakov [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 21:18:35 +0000 (23:18 +0200)]
ec/ecp_nistz256: harmonize is_infinity with ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity.

RT#4625

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoec/ecp_nistz256: harmonize is_infinity with ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity.
Andy Polyakov [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 21:16:04 +0000 (23:16 +0200)]
ec/ecp_nistz256: harmonize is_infinity with ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity.

RT#4625

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoec/asm/ecp_nistz256-*.pl: addition to perform stricter reduction.
Andy Polyakov [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 20:10:24 +0000 (22:10 +0200)]
ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-*.pl: addition to perform stricter reduction.

Addition was not preserving inputs' property of being fully reduced.

Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl: addition to perform stricter reduction.
Andy Polyakov [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 20:04:21 +0000 (22:04 +0200)]
ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl: addition to perform stricter reduction.

Addition was not preserving inputs' property of being fully reduced.

Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoevp/bio_enc.c: stop using pointer arithmetic for error detection.
Andy Polyakov [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 11:31:36 +0000 (13:31 +0200)]
evp/bio_enc.c: stop using pointer arithmetic for error detection.

Thanks to David Benjamin for reporting this.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix no-sock
Matt Caswell [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 19:49:26 +0000 (20:49 +0100)]
Fix no-sock

The declaration of bio_type_lock is independent of no-sock so should not be
inside OPENSSL_NO_SOCK guards.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoSanity check ticket length.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 16:20:01 +0000 (17:20 +0100)]
Sanity check ticket length.

If a ticket callback changes the HMAC digest to SHA512 the existing
sanity checks are not sufficient and an attacker could perform a DoS
attack with a malformed ticket. Add additional checks based on
HMAC size.

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.

CVE-2016-6302

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
3 years ago80-test_pkcs12.t: skip the test on Windows with non-Greek locale.
Andy Polyakov [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 07:45:03 +0000 (09:45 +0200)]
80-test_pkcs12.t: skip the test on Windows with non-Greek locale.

Test doesn't work on Windows with non-Greek locale, because of
Win32 perl[!] limitation, not OpenSSL. For example it passes on
Cygwin and MSYS...

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix math in BN_bn2dec comment.
David Benjamin [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 05:39:24 +0000 (22:39 -0700)]
Fix math in BN_bn2dec comment.

The bound on log(2)/3 on the second line is incorrect and has an extra
zero compared to the divisions in the third line. log(2)/3 = 0.10034...
which is bounded by 0.101 and not 0.1001. The divisions actually
correspond to 0.101 which is fine. The third line also dropped a factor
of three.

The actual code appears to be fine. Just the comments are wrong.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoSCT_set_source resets validation_status
Rob Percival [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 17:31:16 +0000 (18:31 +0100)]
SCT_set_source resets validation_status

This makes it consistent with all of the other SCT setters.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoDocument that o2i_SCT_signature can leave the SCT in an inconsistent state
Rob Percival [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:35:14 +0000 (17:35 +0100)]
Document that o2i_SCT_signature can leave the SCT in an inconsistent state

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoRemoves {i2o,o2i}_SCT_signature from the CT public API
Rob Percival [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:27:35 +0000 (17:27 +0100)]
Removes {i2o,o2i}_SCT_signature from the CT public API

They may return if an SCT_signature struct is added in the future that
allows them to be refactored to conform to the i2d/d2i function signature
conventions.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoPrevent double-free of CTLOG public key
Rob Percival [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 15:55:09 +0000 (16:55 +0100)]
Prevent double-free of CTLOG public key

Previously, if ct_v1_log_id_from_pkey failed, public_key would be freed by
CTLOG_free at the end of the function, and then again by the caller (who
would assume ownership was not transferred when CTLOG_new returned NULL).

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoInternalizes SCT_verify and removes SCT_verify_v1
Rob Percival [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 11:52:43 +0000 (12:52 +0100)]
Internalizes SCT_verify and removes SCT_verify_v1

SCT_verify is impossible to call through the public API (SCT_CTX_new() is
not part of the public API), so rename it to SCT_CTX_verify and move it
out of the public API.

SCT_verify_v1 is redundant, since SCT_validate does the same verification
(by calling SCT_verify) and more. The API is less confusing with a single
verification function (SCT_validate).

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoUpdate fuzz corpora
Kurt Roeckx [Fri, 12 Aug 2016 16:54:11 +0000 (18:54 +0200)]
Update fuzz corpora

This is a new minimal corpus with the following changes:
- asn1: files: 1135 (+474), tuples: 27236 (+7496)
- asn1parse: files: 305 (-3), tuples: 8758 (+11)
- bignum: files: 370 (-1), tuples: 9547 (+10)
- bndiv: files: 160 (+0), tuples: 2416 (+6)
- cms: files: 155 (-1), tuples: 3408 (+0)
- conf: files: 231 (-11), tuples: 4668 (+3)
- crl: files: 905 (+188), tuples: 22876 (+4096)
- ct: files: 117 (+35), tuples: 3557 (+908)
- x509: files: 920, tuples: 28334

Note that tuple count depends on the binary and is random.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify a bit X509_NAME_get_entry
FdaSilvaYY [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 17:44:10 +0000 (19:44 +0200)]
Constify a bit X509_NAME_get_entry

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify some X509_NAME, ASN1 printing code
FdaSilvaYY [Thu, 7 Jul 2016 21:45:55 +0000 (23:45 +0200)]
Constify some X509_NAME, ASN1 printing code

 ASN1_buf_print, asn1_print_*, X509_NAME_oneline, X509_NAME_print

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify some input parameters.
FdaSilvaYY [Thu, 11 Aug 2016 22:40:49 +0000 (00:40 +0200)]
Constify some input parameters.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify some inputs buffers
FdaSilvaYY [Sat, 6 Aug 2016 15:54:32 +0000 (17:54 +0200)]
Constify some inputs buffers

remove useless cast to call ASN1_STRING_set

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify ASN1_PCTX_*
FdaSilvaYY [Tue, 2 Aug 2016 18:19:00 +0000 (20:19 +0200)]
Constify ASN1_PCTX_*

... add a static keyword.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix bio_enc_test
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 15:11:55 +0000 (16:11 +0100)]
Fix bio_enc_test

There was a block of code at the start that used the Camellia cipher. The
original idea behind this was to fill the buffer with non-zero data so that
oversteps can be detected. However this block failed when using no-camellia.
This has been replaced with a RAND_bytes() call.

I also updated the the CTR test section, since it seems to be using a CBC
cipher instead of a CTR cipher.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd some sanity checks when checking CRL scores
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 23:01:57 +0000 (00:01 +0100)]
Add some sanity checks when checking CRL scores

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoRemove some dead code
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 22:53:09 +0000 (23:53 +0100)]
Remove some dead code

The assignment to ret is dead, because ret is assigned again later.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoSanity check an ASN1_object_size result
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 22:41:15 +0000 (23:41 +0100)]
Sanity check an ASN1_object_size result

If it's negative don't try and malloc it.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoCheck for error return from ASN1_object_size
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 22:39:28 +0000 (23:39 +0100)]
Check for error return from ASN1_object_size

Otherwise we try to malloc a -1 size.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoCheck for malloc error in bn_x931p.c
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 22:34:30 +0000 (23:34 +0100)]
Check for malloc error in bn_x931p.c

Ensure BN_CTX_get() has been successful

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix mem leak on error path
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 22:23:31 +0000 (23:23 +0100)]
Fix mem leak on error path

The mem pointed to by cAB can be leaked on an error path.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix mem leak on error path
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 22:20:45 +0000 (23:20 +0100)]
Fix mem leak on error path

The mem pointed to by cAB can be leaked on an error path.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix mem leak on error path
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 22:18:50 +0000 (23:18 +0100)]
Fix mem leak on error path

The mem pointed to by tmp can be leaked on an error path.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoEnsure the mime_hdr_free function can handle NULLs
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 21:27:27 +0000 (22:27 +0100)]
Ensure the mime_hdr_free function can handle NULLs

Sometimes it is called with a NULL pointer

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoEnsure CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free behaves properly with a NULL arg
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 21:21:30 +0000 (22:21 +0100)]
Ensure CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free behaves properly with a NULL arg

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix leak on error in tls_construct_cke_gost
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 21:17:20 +0000 (22:17 +0100)]
Fix leak on error in tls_construct_cke_gost

Don't leak pke_ctx on error.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoTest the support curves in tls
Kurt Roeckx [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 17:51:14 +0000 (19:51 +0200)]
Test the support curves in tls

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
GH: #1472

3 years agoClosing output file from inside the loop who open it
FdaSilvaYY [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 16:31:45 +0000 (18:31 +0200)]
Closing output file from inside the loop who open it

Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
GH: #1471

3 years agoFix no-des
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 15:04:47 +0000 (16:04 +0100)]
Fix no-des

The PKCS12 command line utility is not available if no-des is used.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoRT2676: Reject RSA eponent if even or 1
Rich Salz [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 15:25:12 +0000 (11:25 -0400)]
RT2676: Reject RSA eponent if even or 1

Also, re-organize RSA check to use goto err.
Add a test case.
Try all checks, not just stopping at first (via Richard Levitte)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoConfigure: Properly cache the configured compiler command
Richard Levitte [Wed, 17 Aug 2016 13:39:49 +0000 (15:39 +0200)]
Configure: Properly cache the configured compiler command

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix a memory leak in EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters()
Kazuki Yamaguchi [Sat, 6 Aug 2016 13:24:44 +0000 (22:24 +0900)]
Fix a memory leak in EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters()

The variable 'buffer', allocated by EC_POINT_point2buf(), isn't
free'd on the success path.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoExpose alloc functions for EC{PK,}PARAMETERS
Kazuki Yamaguchi [Tue, 16 Aug 2016 04:55:34 +0000 (13:55 +0900)]
Expose alloc functions for EC{PK,}PARAMETERS

Declare EC{PK,}PARAMETERS_{new,free} functions in public headers. The
free functions are necessary because EC_GROUP_get_ec{pk,}parameters()
was made public by commit 60b350a3ef96 ("RT3676: Expose ECgroup i2d
functions").

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix loopargs_t object duplication into ASYNC context
FdaSilvaYY [Wed, 17 Aug 2016 22:51:20 +0000 (00:51 +0200)]
Fix loopargs_t object duplication into ASYNC context

Code was relying on an implicit data-sharing through duplication of
loopargs_t pointer-members made by ASYNC_start_job().

Now share structure address instead of structure content.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoAvoid more compiler warnings for use of uninitialised variables
Richard Levitte [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 13:25:34 +0000 (15:25 +0200)]
Avoid more compiler warnings for use of uninitialised variables

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
3 years agoMake 'openssl req -x509' more equivalent to 'openssl req -new'
Richard Levitte [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 12:53:53 +0000 (14:53 +0200)]
Make 'openssl req -x509' more equivalent to 'openssl req -new'

The following would fail, or rather, freeze:

    openssl genrsa -out rsa2048.pem 2048
    openssl req -x509 -key rsa2048.pem -keyform PEM -out cert.pem

In that case, the second command wants to read a certificate request
from stdin, because -x509 wasn't fully flagged as being for creating
something new.  This changes makes it fully flagged.

RT#4655

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
3 years agobn/asm/x86[_64]-mont*.pl: implement slightly alternative page-walking.
Andy Polyakov [Wed, 16 Mar 2016 22:33:53 +0000 (23:33 +0100)]
bn/asm/x86[_64]-mont*.pl: implement slightly alternative page-walking.

Original strategy for page-walking was adjust stack pointer and then
touch pages in order. This kind of asks for double-fault, because
if touch fails, then signal will be delivered to frame above adjusted
stack pointer. But touching pages prior adjusting stack pointer would
upset valgrind. As compromise let's adjust stack pointer in pages,
touching top of the stack. This still asks for double-fault, but at
least prevents corruption of neighbour stack if allocation is to
overstep the guard page.

Also omit predict-non-taken hints as they reportedly trigger illegal
instructions in some VM setups.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoChoose a ciphersuite for testing that won't be affected by "no-*" options
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 09:42:08 +0000 (10:42 +0100)]
Choose a ciphersuite for testing that won't be affected by "no-*" options

The previous ciphersuite broke in no-ec builds.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix overflow check in BN_bn2dec()
Kazuki Yamaguchi [Sun, 21 Aug 2016 17:36:36 +0000 (02:36 +0900)]
Fix overflow check in BN_bn2dec()

Fix an off by one error in the overflow check added by 07bed46f332fc
("Check for errors in BN_bn2dec()").

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agossltestlib: Tell compiler we don't care about the value when we don't
Richard Levitte [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 12:02:31 +0000 (14:02 +0200)]
ssltestlib: Tell compiler we don't care about the value when we don't

In mempacket_test_read(), we've already fetched the top value of the
stack, so when we shift the stack, we don't care for the value.  The
compiler needs to be told, or it will complain harshly when we tell it
to be picky.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agocrypto/pkcs12: facilitate accessing data with non-interoperable password.
Andy Polyakov [Tue, 26 Jul 2016 14:42:41 +0000 (16:42 +0200)]
crypto/pkcs12: facilitate accessing data with non-interoperable password.

Originally PKCS#12 subroutines treated password strings as ASCII.
It worked as long as they were pure ASCII, but if there were some
none-ASCII characters result was non-interoperable. But fixing it
poses problem accessing data protected with broken password. In
order to make asscess to old data possible add retry with old-style
password.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agocrypto/pkcs12: default to UTF-8.
Andy Polyakov [Mon, 25 Jul 2016 23:48:01 +0000 (01:48 +0200)]
crypto/pkcs12: default to UTF-8.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd PKCS#12 UTF-8 interoperability test.
Andy Polyakov [Mon, 25 Jul 2016 23:46:03 +0000 (01:46 +0200)]
Add PKCS#12 UTF-8 interoperability test.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agocrypto/pkcs12: add UTF8 support.
Andy Polyakov [Tue, 24 Nov 2015 22:34:51 +0000 (23:34 +0100)]
crypto/pkcs12: add UTF8 support.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoPrevent DTLS Finished message injection
Matt Caswell [Thu, 30 Jun 2016 14:06:27 +0000 (15:06 +0100)]
Prevent DTLS Finished message injection

Follow on from CVE-2016-2179

The investigation and analysis of CVE-2016-2179 highlighted a related flaw.

This commit fixes a security "near miss" in the buffered message handling
code. Ultimately this is not currently believed to be exploitable due to
the reasons outlined below, and therefore there is no CVE for this on its
own.

The issue this commit fixes is a MITM attack where the attacker can inject
a Finished message into the handshake. In the description below it is
assumed that the attacker injects the Finished message for the server to
receive it. The attack could work equally well the other way around (i.e
where the client receives the injected Finished message).

The MITM requires the following capabilities:
- The ability to manipulate the MTU that the client selects such that it
is small enough for the client to fragment Finished messages.
- The ability to selectively drop and modify records sent from the client
- The ability to inject its own records and send them to the server

The MITM forces the client to select a small MTU such that the client
will fragment the Finished message. Ideally for the attacker the first
fragment will contain all but the last byte of the Finished message,
with the second fragment containing the final byte.

During the handshake and prior to the client sending the CCS the MITM
injects a plaintext Finished message fragment to the server containing
all but the final byte of the Finished message. The message sequence
number should be the one expected to be used for the real Finished message.

OpenSSL will recognise that the received fragment is for the future and
will buffer it for later use.

After the client sends the CCS it then sends its own Finished message in
two fragments. The MITM causes the first of these fragments to be
dropped. The OpenSSL server will then receive the second of the fragments
and reassemble the complete Finished message consisting of the MITM
fragment and the final byte from the real client.

The advantage to the attacker in injecting a Finished message is that
this provides the capability to modify other handshake messages (e.g.
the ClientHello) undetected. A difficulty for the attacker is knowing in
advance what impact any of those changes might have on the final byte of
the handshake hash that is going to be sent in the "real" Finished
message. In the worst case for the attacker this means that only 1 in
256 of such injection attempts will succeed.

It may be possible in some situations for the attacker to improve this such
that all attempts succeed. For example if the handshake includes client
authentication then the final message flight sent by the client will
include a Certificate. Certificates are ASN.1 objects where the signed
portion is DER encoded. The non-signed portion could be BER encoded and so
the attacker could re-encode the certificate such that the hash for the
whole handshake comes to a different value. The certificate re-encoding
would not be detectable because only the non-signed portion is changed. As
this is the final flight of messages sent from the client the attacker
knows what the complete hanshake hash value will be that the client will
send - and therefore knows what the final byte will be. Through a process
of trial and error the attacker can re-encode the certificate until the
modified handhshake also has a hash with the same final byte. This means
that when the Finished message is verified by the server it will be
correct in all cases.

In practice the MITM would need to be able to perform the same attack
against both the client and the server. If the attack is only performed
against the server (say) then the server will not detect the modified
handshake, but the client will and will abort the connection.
Fortunately, although OpenSSL is vulnerable to Finished message
injection, it is not vulnerable if *both* client and server are OpenSSL.
The reason is that OpenSSL has a hard "floor" for a minimum MTU size
that it will never go below. This minimum means that a Finished message
will never be sent in a fragmented form and therefore the MITM does not
have one of its pre-requisites. Therefore this could only be exploited
if using OpenSSL and some other DTLS peer that had its own and separate
Finished message injection flaw.

The fix is to ensure buffered messages are cleared on epoch change.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix DTLS buffered message DoS attack
Matt Caswell [Thu, 30 Jun 2016 12:17:08 +0000 (13:17 +0100)]
Fix DTLS buffered message DoS attack

DTLS can handle out of order record delivery. Additionally since
handshake messages can be bigger than will fit into a single packet, the
messages can be fragmented across multiple records (as with normal TLS).
That means that the messages can arrive mixed up, and we have to
reassemble them. We keep a queue of buffered messages that are "from the
future", i.e. messages we're not ready to deal with yet but have arrived
early. The messages held there may not be full yet - they could be one
or more fragments that are still in the process of being reassembled.

The code assumes that we will eventually complete the reassembly and
when that occurs the complete message is removed from the queue at the
point that we need to use it.

However, DTLS is also tolerant of packet loss. To get around that DTLS
messages can be retransmitted. If we receive a full (non-fragmented)
message from the peer after previously having received a fragment of
that message, then we ignore the message in the queue and just use the
non-fragmented version. At that point the queued message will never get
removed.

Additionally the peer could send "future" messages that we never get to
in order to complete the handshake. Each message has a sequence number
(starting from 0). We will accept a message fragment for the current
message sequence number, or for any sequence up to 10 into the future.
However if the Finished message has a sequence number of 2, anything
greater than that in the queue is just left there.

So, in those two ways we can end up with "orphaned" data in the queue
that will never get removed - except when the connection is closed. At
that point all the queues are flushed.

An attacker could seek to exploit this by filling up the queues with
lots of large messages that are never going to be used in order to
attempt a DoS by memory exhaustion.

I will assume that we are only concerned with servers here. It does not
seem reasonable to be concerned about a memory exhaustion attack on a
client. They are unlikely to process enough connections for this to be
an issue.

A "long" handshake with many messages might be 5 messages long (in the
incoming direction), e.g. ClientHello, Certificate, ClientKeyExchange,
CertificateVerify, Finished. So this would be message sequence numbers 0
to 4. Additionally we can buffer up to 10 messages in the future.
Therefore the maximum number of messages that an attacker could send
that could get orphaned would typically be 15.

The maximum size that a DTLS message is allowed to be is defined by
max_cert_list, which by default is 100k. Therefore the maximum amount of
"orphaned" memory per connection is 1500k.

Message sequence numbers get reset after the Finished message, so
renegotiation will not extend the maximum number of messages that can be
orphaned per connection.

As noted above, the queues do get cleared when the connection is closed.
Therefore in order to mount an effective attack, an attacker would have
to open many simultaneous connections.

Issue reported by Quan Luo.

CVE-2016-2179

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix enable-zlib
Matt Caswell [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 23:12:16 +0000 (00:12 +0100)]
Fix enable-zlib

The enable-zlib option was broken by the recent "const" changes.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
3 years agoVMS: Use strict refdef extern model when building library object files
Richard Levitte [Sun, 21 Aug 2016 21:36:49 +0000 (23:36 +0200)]
VMS: Use strict refdef extern model when building library object files

Most of the time, this isn't strictly needed.  However, in the default
extern model (called relaxed refdef), symbols are treated as weak
common objects unless they are initialised.  The librarian doesn't
include weak symbols in the (static) libraries, which renders them
invisible when linking a program with said those libraries, which is a
problem at times.

Using the strict refdef model is much more like standard C on all
other platforms, and thereby avoid the issues that come with the
relaxed refdef model.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd test/bio_enc_test.c.
Andy Polyakov [Sun, 21 Aug 2016 21:31:21 +0000 (23:31 +0200)]
Add test/bio_enc_test.c.

RT#4628

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoevp/bio_enc.c: refine non-overlapping logic.
Andy Polyakov [Sun, 21 Aug 2016 21:30:37 +0000 (23:30 +0200)]
evp/bio_enc.c: refine non-overlapping logic.

RT#4628

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoecp_nistz256.c: get is_one on 32-bit platforms right.
Andy Polyakov [Thu, 18 Aug 2016 11:33:13 +0000 (13:33 +0200)]
ecp_nistz256.c: get is_one on 32-bit platforms right.

Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoMove BIO index lock creation
Rich Salz [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 23:06:43 +0000 (19:06 -0400)]
Move BIO index lock creation

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoupdate ordinals
Dr. Stephen Henson [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 12:07:57 +0000 (13:07 +0100)]
update ordinals

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd X509_getm_notBefore, X509_getm_notAfter
Dr. Stephen Henson [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 12:02:09 +0000 (13:02 +0100)]
Add X509_getm_notBefore, X509_getm_notAfter

Add mutable versions of X509_get0_notBefore and X509_get0_notAfter.

Rename X509_SIG_get0_mutable to X509_SIG_getm.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
3 years agoDuplicate includes
FdaSilvaYY [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 16:47:55 +0000 (18:47 +0200)]
Duplicate includes

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1475)

3 years agoFix off by 1 in ASN1_STRING_set()
Kurt Roeckx [Sat, 6 Aug 2016 17:16:00 +0000 (19:16 +0200)]
Fix off by 1 in ASN1_STRING_set()

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
MR: #3176

3 years agoAdd BIO_get_new_index()
Rich Salz [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 01:04:41 +0000 (21:04 -0400)]
Add BIO_get_new_index()

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
3 years agofix warning about trailing comma
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 18:32:19 +0000 (19:32 +0100)]
fix warning about trailing comma

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agomake update
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 15:51:07 +0000 (16:51 +0100)]
make update

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agorename ordinals
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 14:30:13 +0000 (15:30 +0100)]
rename ordinals

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify certificate and CRL time routines.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 11:39:57 +0000 (12:39 +0100)]
Constify certificate and CRL time routines.

Update certificate and CRL time routines to match new standard.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd -dane_ee_no_namechecks s_client(1) option
Viktor Dukhovni [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 15:59:47 +0000 (11:59 -0400)]
Add -dane_ee_no_namechecks s_client(1) option

The DANE API supports a DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS option, but
there was no way to exercise/enable it via s_client.  This commit
addresses that gap.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoSet certificate times in one function.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 15:21:21 +0000 (16:21 +0100)]
Set certificate times in one function.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoAvoid duplicated code.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 15:12:31 +0000 (16:12 +0100)]
Avoid duplicated code.

The certificate and CRL time setting functions used similar code,
combine into a single utility function.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoRT3940: For now, just document the issue.
Rich Salz [Sat, 13 Aug 2016 14:47:50 +0000 (10:47 -0400)]
RT3940: For now, just document the issue.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoMEMPACKET is typedef'd in ssltestlib.h, don't do so again in ssltestlib.c
Richard Levitte [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 15:14:26 +0000 (17:14 +0200)]
MEMPACKET is typedef'd in ssltestlib.h, don't do so again in ssltestlib.c

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoAllow to run all speed test when async_jobs active
FdaSilvaYY [Thu, 18 Aug 2016 06:44:43 +0000 (08:44 +0200)]
Allow to run all speed test when async_jobs active

... without any interruption.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1468)

3 years agomake update
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 11:59:55 +0000 (12:59 +0100)]
make update

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoConvert PKCS12* functions to use const getters
Matt Caswell [Sat, 13 Aug 2016 11:07:42 +0000 (12:07 +0100)]
Convert PKCS12* functions to use const getters

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
3 years agoUpdate function error code
Matt Caswell [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 12:50:01 +0000 (13:50 +0100)]
Update function error code

A function error code needed updating due to merge issues.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix some clang warnings
Matt Caswell [Tue, 19 Jul 2016 10:34:21 +0000 (11:34 +0100)]
Fix some clang warnings

Clang was complaining about some unused functions. Moving the stack
declaration to the header seems to sort it. Also the certstatus variable
in dtlstest needed to be declared static.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix DTLS replay protection
Matt Caswell [Fri, 1 Jul 2016 14:20:33 +0000 (15:20 +0100)]
Fix DTLS replay protection

The DTLS implementation provides some protection against replay attacks
in accordance with RFC6347 section 4.1.2.6.

A sliding "window" of valid record sequence numbers is maintained with
the "right" hand edge of the window set to the highest sequence number we
have received so far. Records that arrive that are off the "left" hand
edge of the window are rejected. Records within the window are checked
against a list of records received so far. If we already received it then
we also reject the new record.

If we have not already received the record, or the sequence number is off
the right hand edge of the window then we verify the MAC of the record.
If MAC verification fails then we discard the record. Otherwise we mark
the record as received. If the sequence number was off the right hand edge
of the window, then we slide the window along so that the right hand edge
is in line with the newly received sequence number.

Records may arrive for future epochs, i.e. a record from after a CCS being
sent, can arrive before the CCS does if the packets get re-ordered. As we
have not yet received the CCS we are not yet in a position to decrypt or
validate the MAC of those records. OpenSSL places those records on an
unprocessed records queue. It additionally updates the window immediately,
even though we have not yet verified the MAC. This will only occur if
currently in a handshake/renegotiation.

This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next
epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very
large sequence number. This means the right hand edge of the window is
moved very far to the right, and all subsequent legitimate packets are
dropped causing a denial of service.

A similar effect can be achieved during the initial handshake. In this
case there is no MAC key negotiated yet. Therefore an attacker can send a
message for the current epoch with a very large sequence number. The code
will process the record as normal. If the hanshake message sequence number
(as opposed to the record sequence number that we have been talking about
so far) is in the future then the injected message is bufferred to be
handled later, but the window is still updated. Therefore all subsequent
legitimate handshake records are dropped. This aspect is not considered a
security issue because there are many ways for an attacker to disrupt the
initial handshake and prevent it from completing successfully (e.g.
injection of a handshake message will cause the Finished MAC to fail and
the handshake to be aborted). This issue comes about as a result of trying
to do replay protection, but having no integrity mechanism in place yet.
Does it even make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0? That
issue isn't addressed here though.

This addressed an OCAP Audit issue.

CVE-2016-2181

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd DTLS replay protection test
Matt Caswell [Tue, 5 Jul 2016 08:50:55 +0000 (09:50 +0100)]
Add DTLS replay protection test

Injects a record from epoch 1 during epoch 0 handshake, with a record
sequence number in the future, to test that the record replay protection
feature works as expected. This is described more fully in the next commit.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix DTLS unprocessed records bug
Matt Caswell [Tue, 5 Jul 2016 08:51:08 +0000 (09:51 +0100)]
Fix DTLS unprocessed records bug

During a DTLS handshake we may get records destined for the next epoch
arrive before we have processed the CCS. In that case we can't decrypt or
verify the record yet, so we buffer it for later use. When we do receive
the CCS we work through the queue of unprocessed records and process them.

Unfortunately the act of processing wipes out any existing packet data
that we were still working through. This includes any records from the new
epoch that were in the same packet as the CCS. We should only process the
buffered records if we've not got any data left.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd a DTLS unprocesed records test
Matt Caswell [Mon, 4 Jul 2016 13:59:06 +0000 (14:59 +0100)]
Add a DTLS unprocesed records test

Add a test to inject a record from the next epoch during the handshake and
make sure it doesn't get processed immediately.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoSplit create_ssl_connection()
Matt Caswell [Mon, 4 Jul 2016 13:55:50 +0000 (14:55 +0100)]
Split create_ssl_connection()

Split the create_ssl_connection() helper function into two steps: one to
create the SSL objects, and one to actually create the connection. This
provides the ability to make changes to the SSL object before the
connection is actually made.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd a DTLS packet mem BIO
Matt Caswell [Mon, 4 Jul 2016 13:53:28 +0000 (14:53 +0100)]
Add a DTLS packet mem BIO

This adds a BIO similar to a normal mem BIO but with datagram awareness.
It also has the capability to inject additional packets at arbitrary
locations into the BIO, for testing purposes.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd a (D)TLS dumper BIO
Matt Caswell [Mon, 4 Jul 2016 13:51:56 +0000 (14:51 +0100)]
Add a (D)TLS dumper BIO

Dump out the records passed over the BIO. Only works for DTLS at the
moment but could easily be extended to TLS.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd more details on how to add a new SSL test
Emilia Kasper [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 12:19:32 +0000 (14:19 +0200)]
Add more details on how to add a new SSL test

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
3 years agomake update
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 18 Aug 2016 14:26:47 +0000 (15:26 +0100)]
make update

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd X509_get0_serialNumber() and constify OCSP_cert_to_id()
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 18 Aug 2016 14:16:31 +0000 (15:16 +0100)]
Add X509_get0_serialNumber() and constify OCSP_cert_to_id()

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>