From: Robbie Harwood Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2019 21:46:44 +0000 (-0400) Subject: [KDF] Add KBKDF implementation for counter-mode HMAC X-Git-Tag: openssl-3.0.0-alpha1~1265 X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=a39bc4404baa4e065d01efe829a1f26eba737049 [KDF] Add KBKDF implementation for counter-mode HMAC Implement SP800-108 section 5.1 with HMAC intended for use in Kerberos. Add test vectors from RFC 8009. Adds error codes PROV_R_INVALID_MAC and PROV_R_MISSING_MAC. Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood Reviewed-by: Paul Dale Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9924) --- diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt index 284f16418a..c62728b2ea 100644 --- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt +++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt @@ -2688,6 +2688,7 @@ PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH:109:invalid iv length PROV_R_INVALID_KEYLEN:117:invalid keylen PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN:124:invalid key len PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH:105:invalid key length +PROV_R_INVALID_MAC:151:invalid mac PROV_R_INVALID_MODE:125:invalid mode PROV_R_INVALID_MODE_INT:126:invalid mode int PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH:112:invalid salt length @@ -2695,6 +2696,7 @@ PROV_R_INVALID_TAG:110:invalid tag PROV_R_INVALID_TAGLEN:118:invalid taglen PROV_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG:144:missing cek alg PROV_R_MISSING_KEY:128:missing key +PROV_R_MISSING_MAC:150:missing mac PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST:129:missing message digest PROV_R_MISSING_PASS:130:missing pass PROV_R_MISSING_SALT:131:missing salt diff --git a/doc/man7/EVP_KDF-KB.pod b/doc/man7/EVP_KDF-KB.pod new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6fb5415dc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/man7/EVP_KDF-KB.pod @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +EVP_KDF-KB - The Key-Based EVP_KDF implementation + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The EVP_KDF-KB algorithm implements the Key-Based key derivation function +(KBKDF). KBKDF derives a key from repeated application of a keyed MAC to an +input secret (and other optional values). + +=head2 Identity + +"KBKDF" is the name for this implementation; it can be used with the +EVP_KDF_fetch() function. + +=head2 Supported parameters + +The supported parameters are: + +=over 4 + +=item B ("properties") + +=item B ("digest") + +=item B ("mac") + +=item B ("key") + +=item B ("salt") + +=item B ("info") + +=back + +The parameters key, salt, and info correspond to KI, Label, and Context +(respectively) in SP800-108. As in that document, salt and info are optional +and may be omitted. Currently, only HMAC is supported for mac. + +=head1 NOTES + +A context for KBKDF can be obtained by calling: + + EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "KBKDF", NULL); + EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf); + +The output length of an KBKDF is specified via the C +parameter to the L function. + +Note that currently OpenSSL only implements Counter mode with HMAC. Other +variants may be supported in the future. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +This example derives 10 bytes using COUNTER-HMAC-SHA256, with KI "secret", +Label "label", and Context "context". + + EVP_KDF *kdf; + EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx; + unsigned char out[10]; + OSSL_PARAM params[6], *p = params; + + kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "KBKDF", NULL); + kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf); + EVP_KDF_free(kdf); + + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, + "SHA256", 0); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC, + "HMAC", 0); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, + "secret", strlen("secret")) + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, + "context", strlen("context")); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, + "label", strlen("label")); + *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + if (EVP_KDF_CTX_set_params(kctx, params) <= 0) + error("EVP_KDF_CTX_set_params"); + else if (EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, sizeof(out)) <= 0) + error("EVP_KDF_derive"); + + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); + +=head1 CONFORMING TO + +NIST SP800-108, IETF RFC 8009. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L, +L, +L, +L, +L, +L, +L + +=head1 HISTORY + +This functionality was added to OpenSSL 3.0. + +=head1 COPYRIGHT + +Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2019 Red Hat, Inc. + +Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use +this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy +in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at +L. + +=cut diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h index e395ed3b7b..8ca7577867 100644 --- a/include/openssl/core_names.h +++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h @@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ extern "C" { #define OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_PRF "TLS1-PRF" #define OSSL_KDF_NAME_X942KDF "X942KDF" #define OSSL_KDF_NAME_X963KDF "X963KDF" +#define OSSL_KDF_NAME_KBKDF "KBKDF" /* PKEY parameters */ /* Diffie-Hellman/DSA Parameters */ diff --git a/providers/common/include/internal/provider_algs.h b/providers/common/include/internal/provider_algs.h index 4bbbbf61c5..3e23788698 100644 --- a/providers/common/include/internal/provider_algs.h +++ b/providers/common/include/internal/provider_algs.h @@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_hkdf_functions[]; extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_sshkdf_functions[]; extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_sskdf_functions[]; extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_x963_kdf_functions[]; +extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_kbkdf_functions[]; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS extern const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_x942_kdf_functions[]; #endif diff --git a/providers/common/include/internal/providercommonerr.h b/providers/common/include/internal/providercommonerr.h index 81e5931d84..a9f79762b5 100644 --- a/providers/common/include/internal/providercommonerr.h +++ b/providers/common/include/internal/providercommonerr.h @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ int ERR_load_PROV_strings(void); # define PROV_R_INVALID_KEYLEN 117 # define PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN 124 # define PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH 105 +# define PROV_R_INVALID_MAC 151 # define PROV_R_INVALID_MODE 125 # define PROV_R_INVALID_MODE_INT 126 # define PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH 112 @@ -76,6 +77,7 @@ int ERR_load_PROV_strings(void); # define PROV_R_INVALID_TAGLEN 118 # define PROV_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG 144 # define PROV_R_MISSING_KEY 128 +# define PROV_R_MISSING_MAC 150 # define PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST 129 # define PROV_R_MISSING_PASS 130 # define PROV_R_MISSING_SALT 131 diff --git a/providers/common/kdfs/build.info b/providers/common/kdfs/build.info index a881fa00b9..8a723d488d 100644 --- a/providers/common/kdfs/build.info +++ b/providers/common/kdfs/build.info @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -$COMMON=tls1_prf.c hkdf.c pbkdf2.c sskdf.c +$COMMON=tls1_prf.c hkdf.c kbkdf.c pbkdf2.c sskdf.c LIBS=../../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../../libcrypto]=$COMMON diff --git a/providers/common/kdfs/kbkdf.c b/providers/common/kdfs/kbkdf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..77cee258e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/providers/common/kdfs/kbkdf.c @@ -0,0 +1,303 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2019 Red Hat, Inc. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +/* + * This implements https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-108/final + * section 5.1 ("counter mode") in HMAC only. That document does not name the + * KDFs it defines; the name is derived from + * https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/Key-Derivation + * + * Note that sections 5.2 ("feedback mode") and 5.3 ("double-pipeline mode") + * are not implemented, though it would be possible to do so in the future. + * CMAC mode is also not implemented; some plumbing would be required. + * + * These versions all assume the counter is used. It would be relatively + * straightforward to expose a configuration handle should the need arise. + * + * Variable names attempt to match those of SP800-108. + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include "internal/evp_int.h" +#include "internal/numbers.h" +#include "internal/provider_algs.h" +#include "internal/provider_ctx.h" +#include "internal/provider_util.h" +#include "internal/providercommonerr.h" + +#include "e_os.h" + +#define MIN(a, b) ((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b) + +/* Our context structure. */ +typedef struct { + void *provctx; + EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init; + + /* Names are lowercased versions of those found in SP800-108. */ + unsigned char *ki; + size_t ki_len; + unsigned char *label; + size_t label_len; + unsigned char *context; + size_t context_len; +} KBKDF; + +/* Definitions needed for typechecking. */ +static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kbkdf_new; +static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kbkdf_free; +static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kbkdf_reset; +static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kbkdf_derive; +static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kbkdf_settable_ctx_params; +static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kbkdf_set_ctx_params; + +/* Not all platforms have htobe32(). */ +static uint32_t be32(uint32_t host) +{ + uint32_t big = 0; + const union { + long one; + char little; + } is_endian = { 1 }; + + if (!is_endian.little) + return host; + + big |= (host & 0xff000000) >> 24; + big |= (host & 0x00ff0000) >> 8; + big |= (host & 0x0000ff00) << 8; + big |= (host & 0x000000ff) << 24; + return big; +} + +static void *kbkdf_new(void *provctx) +{ + KBKDF *ctx; + + ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); + if (ctx == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + + ctx->provctx = provctx; + return ctx; +} + +static void kbkdf_free(void *vctx) +{ + KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx; + + kbkdf_reset(ctx); + OPENSSL_free(ctx); +} + +static void kbkdf_reset(void *vctx) +{ + KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx; + + EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx_init); + OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->context, ctx->context_len); + OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->label, ctx->label_len); + OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->ki, ctx->ki_len); + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +/* SP800-108 section 5.1. */ +static int kbkdf_derive_counter(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init, + unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + unsigned char *context, size_t context_len, + unsigned char *k_i, size_t h, uint32_t l, + unsigned char *ko, size_t ko_len) +{ + int ret = 0; + EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL; + size_t written = 0, to_write; + const unsigned char zero = 0; + uint32_t counter, i; + + for (counter = 1; written < ko_len; counter++) { + i = be32(counter); + + ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init); + if (ctx == NULL) + goto done; + + if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&i, 4) + || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, label, label_len) + || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, &zero, 1) + || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, context, context_len) + || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&l, 4) + || !EVP_MAC_final(ctx, k_i, NULL, h)) + goto done; + + to_write = ko_len - written; + memcpy(ko + written, k_i, MIN(to_write, h)); + written += h; + + EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx); + ctx = NULL; + } + + ret = 1; +done: + EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx); + return ret; +} + +static int kbkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) +{ + KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx; + int ret = 0; + unsigned char *k_i = NULL; + uint32_t l = be32(keylen * 8); + size_t h = 0; + + /* Label and Context are permitted to be empty. Check everything else. */ + if (ctx->ctx_init == NULL) { + if (ctx->ki_len == 0 || ctx->ki == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NO_KEY_SET); + return 0; + } + /* Could either be missing MAC or missing message digest - + * arbitrarily, I pick this one. */ + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MAC); + return 0; + } + + h = EVP_MAC_size(ctx->ctx_init); + if (h == 0) + goto done; + + k_i = OPENSSL_zalloc(h); + if (k_i == NULL) + goto done; + + ret = kbkdf_derive_counter( + ctx->ctx_init, ctx->label, ctx->label_len, ctx->context, + ctx->context_len, k_i, h, l, key, keylen); +done: + if (ret != 1) + OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen); + OPENSSL_clear_free(k_i, h); + return ret; +} + +static int kbkdf_set_buffer(unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len, + const OSSL_PARAM *p) +{ + if (p->data == NULL || p->data_size == 0) + return 1; + + OPENSSL_clear_free(*out, *out_len); + *out = NULL; + return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)out, 0, out_len); +} + +static int kbkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx; + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx); + const OSSL_PARAM *p; + OSSL_PARAM mparams[2]; + + if (!ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&ctx->ctx_init, params, NULL, + NULL, NULL, libctx)) + return 0; + else if (ctx->ctx_init != NULL + && !EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(ctx->ctx_init), + OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MAC); + return 0; + } + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY); + if (p != NULL && !kbkdf_set_buffer(&ctx->ki, &ctx->ki_len, p)) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT); + if (p != NULL && !kbkdf_set_buffer(&ctx->label, &ctx->label_len, p)) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO); + if (p != NULL && !kbkdf_set_buffer(&ctx->context, &ctx->context_len, p)) + return 0; + + /* Set up digest context, if we can. */ + if (ctx->ctx_init != NULL && ctx->ki_len != 0) { + mparams[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, + ctx->ki, ctx->ki_len); + mparams[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx->ctx_init, mparams) + || !EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx_init)) + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM *kbkdf_settable_ctx_params(void) +{ + static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC, NULL, 0), + + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_END, + }; + return known_settable_ctx_params; +} + +static int kbkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + OSSL_PARAM *p; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE); + if (p == NULL) + return -2; + + /* KBKDF can produce results as large as you like. */ + return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX); +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM *kbkdf_gettable_ctx_params(void) +{ + static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = + { OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL), OSSL_PARAM_END }; + return known_gettable_ctx_params; +} + +const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_kbkdf_functions[] = { + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_new }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_free }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_reset }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_derive }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, + (void(*)(void))kbkdf_settable_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_set_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, + (void(*)(void))kbkdf_gettable_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_get_ctx_params }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; diff --git a/providers/default/defltprov.c b/providers/default/defltprov.c index c3ee99c0a6..7cfec618ce 100644 --- a/providers/default/defltprov.c +++ b/providers/default/defltprov.c @@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM deflt_kdfs[] = { { OSSL_KDF_NAME_SSHKDF, "default=yes", kdf_sshkdf_functions }, { OSSL_KDF_NAME_X963KDF, "default=yes", kdf_x963_kdf_functions }, { OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_PRF, "default=yes", kdf_tls1_prf_functions }, + { OSSL_KDF_NAME_KBKDF, "default=yes", kdf_kbkdf_functions }, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS { OSSL_KDF_NAME_X942KDF, "default=yes", kdf_x942_kdf_functions }, #endif diff --git a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c index a15ba4d788..ce843552d7 100644 --- a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c +++ b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c @@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_kdfs[] = { { OSSL_KDF_NAME_SSKDF, "fips=yes", kdf_sskdf_functions }, { OSSL_KDF_NAME_PBKDF2, "fips=yes", kdf_pbkdf2_functions }, { OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_PRF, "fips=yes", kdf_tls1_prf_functions }, + { OSSL_KDF_NAME_KBKDF, "fips=yes", kdf_kbkdf_functions }, { NULL, NULL, NULL } }; diff --git a/test/evp_kdf_test.c b/test/evp_kdf_test.c index 6d8517ff87..3761dff9fa 100644 --- a/test/evp_kdf_test.c +++ b/test/evp_kdf_test.c @@ -297,6 +297,94 @@ static int test_kdf_x963(void) return ret; } +/* Two test vectors from RFC 8009 (AES Encryption with HMAC-SHA2 for Kerberos + * 5) appendix A. */ +static int test_kdf_kbkdf_8009_prf1(void) +{ + int ret, i = 0; + EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx; + OSSL_PARAM params[6]; + char *label = "prf", *digest = "sha256", *prf_input = "test", + *mac = "HMAC"; + static unsigned char input_key[] = { + 0x37, 0x05, 0xD9, 0x60, 0x80, 0xC1, 0x77, 0x28, + 0xA0, 0xE8, 0x00, 0xEA, 0xB6, 0xE0, 0xD2, 0x3C, + }; + static unsigned char output[] = { + 0x9D, 0x18, 0x86, 0x16, 0xF6, 0x38, 0x52, 0xFE, + 0x86, 0x91, 0x5B, 0xB8, 0x40, 0xB4, 0xA8, 0x86, + 0xFF, 0x3E, 0x6B, 0xB0, 0xF8, 0x19, 0xB4, 0x9B, + 0x89, 0x33, 0x93, 0xD3, 0x93, 0x85, 0x42, 0x95, + }; + unsigned char result[sizeof(output)] = { 0 }; + + params[i++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string( + OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, digest, strlen(digest) + 1); + params[i++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string( + OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC, mac, strlen(mac) + 1); + params[i++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string( + OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, input_key, sizeof(input_key)); + params[i++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string( + OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, label, strlen(label)); + params[i++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string( + OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, prf_input, strlen(prf_input)); + params[i] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + kctx = get_kdfbyname("KBKDF"); + ret = TEST_ptr(kctx) + && TEST_true(EVP_KDF_CTX_set_params(kctx, params)) + && TEST_int_gt(EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, result, sizeof(result)), 0) + && TEST_mem_eq(result, sizeof(result), output, sizeof(output)); + + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); + return ret; +} + +static int test_kdf_kbkdf_8009_prf2(void) +{ + int ret, i = 0; + EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx; + OSSL_PARAM params[6]; + char *label = "prf", *digest = "sha384", *prf_input = "test", + *mac = "HMAC"; + static unsigned char input_key[] = { + 0x6D, 0x40, 0x4D, 0x37, 0xFA, 0xF7, 0x9F, 0x9D, + 0xF0, 0xD3, 0x35, 0x68, 0xD3, 0x20, 0x66, 0x98, + 0x00, 0xEB, 0x48, 0x36, 0x47, 0x2E, 0xA8, 0xA0, + 0x26, 0xD1, 0x6B, 0x71, 0x82, 0x46, 0x0C, 0x52, + }; + static unsigned char output[] = { + 0x98, 0x01, 0xF6, 0x9A, 0x36, 0x8C, 0x2B, 0xF6, + 0x75, 0xE5, 0x95, 0x21, 0xE1, 0x77, 0xD9, 0xA0, + 0x7F, 0x67, 0xEF, 0xE1, 0xCF, 0xDE, 0x8D, 0x3C, + 0x8D, 0x6F, 0x6A, 0x02, 0x56, 0xE3, 0xB1, 0x7D, + 0xB3, 0xC1, 0xB6, 0x2A, 0xD1, 0xB8, 0x55, 0x33, + 0x60, 0xD1, 0x73, 0x67, 0xEB, 0x15, 0x14, 0xD2, + }; + unsigned char result[sizeof(output)] = { 0 }; + + params[i++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string( + OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, digest, strlen(digest) + 1); + params[i++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string( + OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC, mac, strlen(mac) + 1); + params[i++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string( + OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, input_key, sizeof(input_key)); + params[i++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string( + OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, label, strlen(label)); + params[i++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string( + OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, prf_input, strlen(prf_input)); + params[i] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + kctx = get_kdfbyname("KBKDF"); + ret = TEST_ptr(kctx) + && TEST_true(EVP_KDF_CTX_set_params(kctx, params)) + && TEST_int_gt(EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, result, sizeof(result)), 0) + && TEST_mem_eq(result, sizeof(result), output, sizeof(output)); + + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); + return ret; +} + static int test_kdf_ss_hmac(void) { int ret; @@ -521,6 +609,8 @@ static int test_kdf_x942_asn1(void) int setup_tests(void) { + ADD_TEST(test_kdf_kbkdf_8009_prf1); + ADD_TEST(test_kdf_kbkdf_8009_prf2); ADD_TEST(test_kdf_get_kdf); ADD_TEST(test_kdf_tls1_prf); ADD_TEST(test_kdf_hkdf);