CTR, HASH and HMAC DRBGs in provider
authorPauli <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Fri, 8 May 2020 00:25:19 +0000 (10:25 +1000)
committerPauli <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Wed, 24 Jun 2020 10:05:42 +0000 (20:05 +1000)
Move the three different DRBGs to the provider.

As part of the move, the DRBG specific data was pulled out of a common
structure and into their own structures.  Only these smaller structures are
securely allocated.  This saves quite a bit of secure memory:

    +-------------------------------+
    | DRBG         | Bytes | Secure |
    +--------------+-------+--------+
    | HASH         |  376  |   512  |
    | HMAC         |  168  |   256  |
    | CTR          |  176  |   256  |
    | Common (new) |  320  |     0  |
    | Common (old) |  592  |  1024  |
    +--------------+-------+--------+

Bytes is the structure size on the X86/64.
Secure is the number of bytes of secure memory used (power of two allocator).

Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11682)

24 files changed:
crypto/evp/build.info
crypto/evp/evp_local.h
crypto/evp/evp_rand.c [moved from crypto/evp/rand_meth.c with 69% similarity]
crypto/rand/build.info
crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
crypto/rand/rand_local.h
doc/man3/RAND_DRBG_new.pod
doc/man3/RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks.pod
include/openssl/core_names.h
include/openssl/core_numbers.h
include/openssl/evp.h
include/openssl/rand.h
include/openssl/rand_drbg.h
providers/defltprov.c
providers/fips/fipsprov.c
providers/implementations/rands/build.info
providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c
providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c
providers/implementations/rands/drbg_ctr.c
providers/implementations/rands/drbg_hash.c
providers/implementations/rands/drbg_hmac.c
providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h
providers/implementations/rands/test_rng.c

index edef493..ccd8357 100644 (file)
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ LIBS=../../libcrypto
 $COMMON=digest.c evp_enc.c evp_lib.c evp_fetch.c cmeth_lib.c evp_utils.c \
         mac_lib.c mac_meth.c keymgmt_meth.c keymgmt_lib.c kdf_lib.c kdf_meth.c \
         m_sigver.c pmeth_lib.c signature.c p_lib.c pmeth_gn.c exchange.c \
-        pmeth_check.c rand_meth.c
+        pmeth_check.c evp_rand.c
 
 SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON\
         encode.c evp_key.c evp_cnf.c \
index 03a1f36..1325344 100644 (file)
@@ -69,16 +69,18 @@ struct evp_kdf_ctx_st {
 struct evp_rand_ctx_st {
     EVP_RAND *meth;             /* Method structure */
     void *data;                 /* Algorithm-specific data */
-    EVP_RAND_CTX *parent;       /* Parent seed source */
-    size_t max_request;         /* Cached: maximum number of bytes generated */
-    unsigned int strength;      /* Cache: bit strenght of generator */
+    size_t max_request;         /*
+                                 * Cached: maximum number of bytes generated 
+                                 * in a single call to the generate function
+                                 */
+    unsigned int strength;      /* Cached: bit strength of generator */
 } /* EVP_RAND_CTX */ ;
 
 struct evp_rand_st {
     OSSL_PROVIDER *prov;
     int name_id;
     CRYPTO_REF_COUNT refcnt;
-    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *refcnt_lock;
 
     const OSSL_DISPATCH *dispatch;
     OSSL_OP_rand_newctx_fn *newctx;
@@ -88,16 +90,16 @@ struct evp_rand_st {
     OSSL_OP_rand_generate_fn *generate;
     OSSL_OP_rand_reseed_fn *reseed;
     OSSL_OP_rand_nonce_fn *nonce;
-    OSSL_OP_rand_set_callbacks_fn *set_callbacks;
-    OSSL_OP_rand_enable_locking_fn *enable_prov_locking;
-    OSSL_OP_rand_lock_fn *prov_lock;
-    OSSL_OP_rand_unlock_fn *prov_unlock;
+    OSSL_OP_rand_enable_locking_fn *enable_locking;
+    OSSL_OP_rand_lock_fn *lock;
+    OSSL_OP_rand_unlock_fn *unlock;
     OSSL_OP_rand_gettable_params_fn *gettable_params;
     OSSL_OP_rand_gettable_ctx_params_fn *gettable_ctx_params;
     OSSL_OP_rand_settable_ctx_params_fn *settable_ctx_params;
     OSSL_OP_rand_get_params_fn *get_params;
     OSSL_OP_rand_get_ctx_params_fn *get_ctx_params;
     OSSL_OP_rand_set_ctx_params_fn *set_ctx_params;
+    OSSL_OP_rand_set_callbacks_fn *set_callbacks;
     OSSL_OP_rand_verify_zeroization_fn *verify_zeroization;
 } /* EVP_RAND */ ;
 
similarity index 69%
rename from crypto/evp/rand_meth.c
rename to crypto/evp/evp_rand.c
index 0f17454..f7bc321 100644 (file)
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/engine.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
@@ -21,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include "crypto/asn1.h"
 #include "crypto/evp.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include "internal/numbers.h"
 #include "internal/provider.h"
 #include "evp_local.h"
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ static int evp_rand_up_ref(void *vrand)
     int ref = 0;
 
     if (rand != NULL)
-        return CRYPTO_UP_REF(&rand->refcnt, &ref, rand->lock);
+        return CRYPTO_UP_REF(&rand->refcnt, &ref, rand->refcnt_lock);
     return 1;
 }
 
@@ -40,10 +40,10 @@ static void evp_rand_free(void *vrand){
     int ref = 0;
 
     if (rand != NULL) {
-        CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&rand->refcnt, &ref, rand->lock);
+        CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&rand->refcnt, &ref, rand->refcnt_lock);
         if (ref <= 0) {
             ossl_provider_free(rand->prov);
-            CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand->lock);
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand->refcnt_lock);
             OPENSSL_free(rand);
         }
     }
@@ -51,11 +51,11 @@ static void evp_rand_free(void *vrand){
 
 static void *evp_rand_new(void)
 {
-    EVP_RAND *rand = NULL;
+    EVP_RAND *rand = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rand));
 
-    if ((rand = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rand))) == NULL
-        || (rand->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new()) == NULL) {
-        evp_rand_free(rand);
+    if (rand == NULL
+            || (rand->refcnt_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new()) == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(rand);
         return NULL;
     }
     rand->refcnt = 1;
@@ -63,26 +63,27 @@ static void *evp_rand_new(void)
 }
 
 /* Enable locking of the underlying DRBG/RAND if available */
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_enable_locking(EVP_RAND_CTX *rand)
+int EVP_RAND_enable_locking(EVP_RAND_CTX *rand)
 {
-    if (rand->meth->enable_prov_locking != NULL)
-        return rand->meth->enable_prov_locking(rand->data);
-    return 1;
+    if (rand->meth->enable_locking != NULL)
+        return rand->meth->enable_locking(rand->data);
+    EVPerr(0, EVP_R_LOCKING_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+    return 0;
 }
 
 /* Lock the underlying DRBG/RAND if available */
 static int evp_rand_lock(EVP_RAND_CTX *rand)
 {
-    if (rand->meth->prov_lock != NULL)
-        return rand->meth->prov_lock(rand->data);
+    if (rand->meth->lock != NULL)
+        return rand->meth->lock(rand->data);
     return 1;
 }
 
 /* Unlock the underlying DRBG/RAND if available */
 static void evp_rand_unlock(EVP_RAND_CTX *rand)
 {
-    if (rand->meth->prov_unlock != NULL)
-        rand->meth->prov_unlock(rand->data);
+    if (rand->meth->unlock != NULL)
+        rand->meth->unlock(rand->data);
 }
 
 static void *evp_rand_from_dispatch(int name_id,
@@ -90,9 +91,9 @@ static void *evp_rand_from_dispatch(int name_id,
                                     OSSL_PROVIDER *prov)
 {
     EVP_RAND *rand = NULL;
-    int fnrandcnt = 0, fnctxcnt = 0;
+    int fnrandcnt = 0, fnctxcnt = 0, fnlockcnt = 0;
 #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
-    int fnfipscnt = 0;
+    int fnzeroizecnt = 0;
 #endif
 
     if ((rand = evp_rand_new()) == NULL) {
@@ -149,19 +150,22 @@ static void *evp_rand_from_dispatch(int name_id,
             rand->set_callbacks = OSSL_get_OP_rand_set_callbacks(fns);
             break;
         case OSSL_FUNC_RAND_ENABLE_LOCKING:
-            if (rand->enable_prov_locking != NULL)
+            if (rand->enable_locking != NULL)
                 break;
-            rand->enable_prov_locking = OSSL_get_OP_rand_enable_locking(fns);
+            rand->enable_locking = OSSL_get_OP_rand_enable_locking(fns);
+            fnlockcnt++;
             break;
         case OSSL_FUNC_RAND_LOCK:
-            if (rand->prov_lock != NULL)
+            if (rand->lock != NULL)
                 break;
-            rand->prov_lock = OSSL_get_OP_rand_lock(fns);
+            rand->lock = OSSL_get_OP_rand_lock(fns);
+            fnlockcnt++;
             break;
         case OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNLOCK:
-            if (rand->prov_unlock != NULL)
+            if (rand->unlock != NULL)
                 break;
-            rand->prov_unlock = OSSL_get_OP_rand_unlock(fns);
+            rand->unlock = OSSL_get_OP_rand_unlock(fns);
+            fnlockcnt++;
             break;
         case OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GETTABLE_PARAMS:
             if (rand->gettable_params != NULL)
@@ -201,36 +205,44 @@ static void *evp_rand_from_dispatch(int name_id,
                 break;
             rand->verify_zeroization = OSSL_get_OP_rand_verify_zeroization(fns);
 #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
-            fnfipscnt++;
+            fnzeroizecnt++;
 #endif
             break;
         }
     }
+    /*
+     * In order to be a consistent set of functions we must have at least
+     * a complete set of "rand" functions and a complete set of context
+     * management functions.  In FIPS mode, we also require the zeroization
+     * verification function.
+     *
+     * In addition, if locking can be enabled, we need a complete set of
+     * locking functions.
+     */
     if (fnrandcnt != 3
             || fnctxcnt != 2
+            || (fnlockcnt != 0 && fnlockcnt != 3)
 #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
-            || fnfipscnt != 1
+            || fnzeroizecnt != 1
 #endif
        ) {
-        /*
-         * In order to be a consistent set of functions we must have at least
-         * a complete set of "rand" functions and a complete set of context
-         * management functions.  In FIPS mode, we also require the zeroization
-         * verification function.
-         */
         evp_rand_free(rand);
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PROVIDER_FUNCTIONS);
         return NULL;
     }
+
+    if (prov != NULL && !ossl_provider_up_ref(prov)) {
+        evp_rand_free(rand);
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return NULL;
+    }
     rand->prov = prov;
-    if (prov != NULL)
-        ossl_provider_up_ref(prov);
 
     return rand;
 }
 
 EVP_RAND *EVP_RAND_fetch(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const char *algorithm,
-                       const char *properties)
+                         const char *properties)
 {
     return evp_generic_fetch(libctx, OSSL_OP_RAND, algorithm, properties,
                              evp_rand_from_dispatch, evp_rand_up_ref,
@@ -274,25 +286,33 @@ int EVP_RAND_get_params(EVP_RAND *rand, OSSL_PARAM params[])
     return 1;
 }
 
-EVP_RAND_CTX *EVP_RAND_CTX_new(EVP_RAND *rand, int secure, EVP_RAND_CTX *parent)
+EVP_RAND_CTX *EVP_RAND_CTX_new(EVP_RAND *rand, EVP_RAND_CTX *parent)
 {
     EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx;
     void *parent_ctx = NULL;
     const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_dispatch = NULL;
 
-    if (rand == NULL)
+    if (rand == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(0, EVP_R_INVALID_NULL_ALGORITHM);
         return NULL;
+    }
 
-    ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_RAND_CTX));
-    if (ctx == NULL)
+    ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return NULL;
+    }
     if (parent != NULL) {
-        EVP_RAND_CTX_enable_locking(parent);
+        if (!EVP_RAND_enable_locking(parent)) {
+            EVPerr(0, EVP_R_UNABLE_TO_ENABLE_PARENT_LOCKING);
+            OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+            return NULL;
+        }
         parent_ctx = parent->data;
         parent_dispatch = parent->meth->dispatch;
     }
-    if ((ctx->data = rand->newctx(ossl_provider_ctx(rand->prov), secure,
-                                  parent_ctx, parent_dispatch)) == NULL
+    if ((ctx->data = rand->newctx(ossl_provider_ctx(rand->prov), parent_ctx,
+                                  parent_dispatch)) == NULL
             || !EVP_RAND_up_ref(rand)) {
         EVPerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         rand->freectx(ctx->data);
@@ -308,7 +328,6 @@ void EVP_RAND_CTX_free(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
     if (ctx != NULL) {
         ctx->meth->freectx(ctx->data);
         ctx->data = NULL;
-        EVP_RAND_CTX_free(ctx->parent);
         EVP_RAND_free(ctx->meth);
         OPENSSL_free(ctx);
     }
@@ -319,7 +338,7 @@ EVP_RAND *EVP_RAND_CTX_rand(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
     return ctx->meth;
 }
 
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_get_params(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+int EVP_RAND_get_ctx_params(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     int res = 1;
 
@@ -332,7 +351,7 @@ int EVP_RAND_CTX_get_params(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
     return res;
 }
 
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_set_params(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+int EVP_RAND_set_ctx_params(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     int res = 1;
 
@@ -350,23 +369,19 @@ int EVP_RAND_CTX_set_params(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 
 const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_RAND_gettable_params(const EVP_RAND *rand)
 {
-    if (rand->gettable_params == NULL)
-        return NULL;
-    return rand->gettable_params();
+    return rand->gettable_params == NULL ? NULL : rand->gettable_params();
 }
 
 const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_RAND_gettable_ctx_params(const EVP_RAND *rand)
 {
-    if (rand->gettable_ctx_params == NULL)
-        return NULL;
-    return rand->gettable_ctx_params();
+    return rand->gettable_ctx_params == NULL ? NULL
+                                             : rand->gettable_ctx_params();
 }
 
 const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_RAND_settable_ctx_params(const EVP_RAND *rand)
 {
-    if (rand->settable_ctx_params == NULL)
-        return NULL;
-    return rand->settable_ctx_params();
+    return rand->settable_ctx_params == NULL ? NULL
+                                             :rand->settable_ctx_params();
 }
 
 void EVP_RAND_do_all_provided(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx,
@@ -386,9 +401,9 @@ void EVP_RAND_names_do_all(const EVP_RAND *rand,
         evp_names_do_all(rand->prov, rand->name_id, fn, data);
 }
 
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_instantiate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned int strength,
-                             int prediction_resistance,
-                             const unsigned char *pstr, size_t pstr_len)
+int EVP_RAND_instantiate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned int strength,
+                         int prediction_resistance,
+                         const unsigned char *pstr, size_t pstr_len)
 {
     int res;
 
@@ -400,7 +415,7 @@ int EVP_RAND_CTX_instantiate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned int strength,
     return res;
 }
 
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_uninstantiate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
+int EVP_RAND_uninstantiate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
 {
     int res;
 
@@ -411,9 +426,9 @@ int EVP_RAND_CTX_uninstantiate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
     return res;
 }
 
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_generate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
-                          unsigned int strength, int prediction_resistance,
-                          const unsigned char *addin, size_t addin_len)
+int EVP_RAND_generate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+                      unsigned int strength, int prediction_resistance,
+                      const unsigned char *addin, size_t addin_len)
 {
     size_t chunk;
     OSSL_PARAM params[2];
@@ -423,17 +438,26 @@ int EVP_RAND_CTX_generate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
         return 0;
     if (ctx->max_request == 0) {
         params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_REQUEST,
-                                                &ctx->max_request);
+                                                &chunk);
         params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
-        if (!EVP_RAND_CTX_get_params(ctx, params)
-                || ctx->max_request == 0)
+        if (!EVP_RAND_get_ctx_params(ctx, params) || chunk == 0) {
+            EVPerr(0, EVP_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_MAXIMUM_REQUEST_SIZE);
             goto err;
+        }
+        ctx->max_request = chunk;
     }
     for (; outlen > 0; outlen -= chunk, out += chunk) {
         chunk = outlen > ctx->max_request ? ctx->max_request : outlen;
         if (!ctx->meth->generate(ctx->data, out, chunk, strength,
-                                 prediction_resistance, addin, addin_len))
+                                 prediction_resistance, addin, addin_len)) {
+            EVPerr(0, EVP_R_GENERATE_ERROR);
             goto err;
+        }
+        /*
+         * Prediction resistance is only relevant the first time around,
+         * subsequently, the DRBG has already been properly reseeded.
+         */
+        prediction_resistance = 0;
     }
     res = 1;
 err:
@@ -441,9 +465,9 @@ err:
     return res;
 }
 
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_reseed(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, int prediction_resistance,
-                        const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
-                        const unsigned char *addin, size_t addin_len)
+int EVP_RAND_reseed(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, int prediction_resistance,
+                    const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
+                    const unsigned char *addin, size_t addin_len)
 {
     int res = 1;
 
@@ -456,39 +480,41 @@ int EVP_RAND_CTX_reseed(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, int prediction_resistance,
     return res;
 }
 
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_nonce(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+int EVP_RAND_nonce(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
 {
     int res = 1;
+    unsigned int str = EVP_RAND_strength(ctx);
 
     if (!evp_rand_lock(ctx))
         return 0;
     if (ctx->meth->nonce == NULL
-            || !ctx->meth->nonce(ctx->data, out, 0, outlen, outlen))
-        res = ctx->meth->generate(ctx->data, out, outlen, 0, 0, NULL, 0);
+            || !ctx->meth->nonce(ctx->data, out, str, outlen, outlen))
+        res = ctx->meth->generate(ctx->data, out, outlen, str, 0, NULL, 0);
     evp_rand_unlock(ctx);
     return res;
 }
 
-unsigned int EVP_RAND_CTX_strength(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
+unsigned int EVP_RAND_strength(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
 {
     OSSL_PARAM params[2];
+    unsigned int t;
     int res;
 
     if (ctx->strength == 0) {
-        params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_STRENGTH,
-                                              &ctx->strength);
+        params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_STRENGTH, &t);
         params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
         if (!evp_rand_lock(ctx))
             return 0;
-        res = EVP_RAND_CTX_get_params(ctx, params);
+        res = EVP_RAND_get_ctx_params(ctx, params);
         evp_rand_unlock(ctx);
         if (!res)
             return 0;
+        ctx->strength = t;
     }
     return ctx->strength;
 }
 
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_state(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
+int EVP_RAND_state(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
 {
     OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
     int status, res;
@@ -497,14 +523,29 @@ int EVP_RAND_CTX_state(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
                                          &status);
     if (!evp_rand_lock(ctx))
         return 0;
-    res = EVP_RAND_CTX_get_params(ctx, params);
+    res = EVP_RAND_get_ctx_params(ctx, params);
     evp_rand_unlock(ctx);
     if (!res)
         status = EVP_RAND_STATE_ERROR;
     return status;
 }
 
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_verify_zeroization(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
+int EVP_RAND_set_callbacks(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx,
+                           OSSL_INOUT_CALLBACK *get_entropy,
+                           OSSL_CALLBACK *cleanup_entropy,
+                           OSSL_INOUT_CALLBACK *get_nonce,
+                           OSSL_CALLBACK *cleanup_nonce, void *arg)
+{
+    if (ctx->meth->set_callbacks == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(0, EVP_R_UNABLE_TO_SET_CALLBACKS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ctx->meth->set_callbacks(ctx->data, get_entropy, cleanup_entropy,
+                             get_nonce, cleanup_nonce, arg);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_RAND_verify_zeroization(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
 {
     int res = 0;
 
index 7840428..b7a4d59 100644 (file)
@@ -1,16 +1,10 @@
 LIBS=../../libcrypto
 
-$COMMON=rand_pool.c rand_lib.c drbg_lib.c drbg_ctr.c drbg_hash.c drbg_hmac.c
-$CRYPTO=rand_unix.c rand_win.c randfile.c rand_err.c
+$COMMON=drbg_lib.c rand_lib.c
+$CRYPTO=randfile.c rand_err.c
 
 IF[{- !$disabled{'egd'} -}]
-  $CYPTO=$CYPTO rand_egd.c
-ENDIF
-IF[{- $config{target} =~ /vxworks/i -}]
-  $CYPTO=$CYPTO rand_vxworks.c
-ENDIF
-IF[{- $config{target} =~ /vms/i -}]
-  $CYPTO=$CYPTO rand_vms.c
+  $CRYPTO=$CRYPTO rand_egd.c
 ENDIF
 
 
index 94a4e98..80759cb 100644 (file)
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include "rand_local.h"
 #include "internal/thread_once.h"
 #include "crypto/rand.h"
-#include "crypto/rand_pool.h"
 #include "crypto/cryptlib.h"
 
 /*
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ typedef struct drbg_global_st {
      *
      * There are three shared DRBG instances: <master>, <public>, and <private>.
      */
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
 
     /*
      * The <master> DRBG
@@ -70,14 +71,6 @@ typedef struct drbg_global_st {
     CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg;
 } DRBG_GLOBAL;
 
-typedef struct drbg_nonce_global_st {
-    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_nonce_lock;
-    int rand_nonce_count;
-} DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL;
-
-/* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */
-static const char ossl_pers_string[] = DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING;
-
 #define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS    ( \
     RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE )
 
@@ -110,45 +103,76 @@ static const unsigned int rand_drbg_used_flags =
 
 static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type);
 
-static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
-                                int secure,
-                                int type,
-                                unsigned int flags,
-                                RAND_DRBG *parent);
-
-static int rand_drbg_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags);
-static int rand_drbg_init_method(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
-
-static int is_ctr(int type)
+static int get_drbg_params(int type, unsigned int flags, const char **name,
+                           OSSL_PARAM params[3])
 {
+    OSSL_PARAM *p = params;
+
     switch (type) {
-    case NID_aes_128_ctr:
-    case NID_aes_192_ctr:
-    case NID_aes_256_ctr:
+    case 0:
         return 1;
     default:
         return 0;
+
+#define CTR(v)                                                              \
+    *name = "CTR-DRBG";                                                     \
+    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_CIPHER, v, 0)
+
+    case NID_aes_128_ctr:
+        CTR(SN_aes_128_ctr);
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_192_ctr:
+        CTR(SN_aes_192_ctr);
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_256_ctr:
+        CTR(SN_aes_256_ctr);
+        break;
+
+#define DGST(v)                                                             \
+    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_DIGEST, v, 0);  \
+    if ((flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC) == 0) {                               \
+        *name = "HASH-DRBG";                                                \
+    } else {                                                                \
+        *name = "HMAC-DRBG";                                                \
+        *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAC,        \
+                                                SN_hmac, 0);                \
     }
-}
 
-static int is_digest(int type)
-{
-    switch (type) {
     case NID_sha1:
+        DGST(SN_sha1);
+        break;
     case NID_sha224:
+        DGST(SN_sha224);
+        break;
     case NID_sha256:
+        DGST(SN_sha256);
+        break;
     case NID_sha384:
+        DGST(SN_sha384);
+        break;
     case NID_sha512:
+        DGST(SN_sha512);
+        break;
     case NID_sha512_224:
+        DGST(SN_sha512_224);
+        break;
     case NID_sha512_256:
+        DGST(SN_sha512_256);
+        break;
     case NID_sha3_224:
+        DGST(SN_sha3_224);
+        break;
     case NID_sha3_256:
+        DGST(SN_sha3_256);
+        break;
     case NID_sha3_384:
+        DGST(SN_sha3_384);
+        break;
     case NID_sha3_512:
-        return 1;
-    default:
-        return 0;
+        DGST(SN_sha3_512);
     }
+    *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+    return 1;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -170,23 +194,23 @@ static void *drbg_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
      OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL);
 #endif
 
+    dgbl->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (dgbl->lock == NULL)
+        goto err0;
+
     if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, NULL))
         goto err1;
 
     if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, NULL))
         goto err2;
 
-    dgbl->master_drbg = drbg_setup(libctx, NULL, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER);
-    if (dgbl->master_drbg == NULL)
-        goto err3;
-
     return dgbl;
 
- err3:
-    CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
  err2:
     CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
  err1:
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dgbl->lock);
+ err0:
     OPENSSL_free(dgbl);
     return NULL;
 }
@@ -198,6 +222,7 @@ static void drbg_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdgbl)
     if (dgbl == NULL)
         return;
 
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dgbl->lock);
     RAND_DRBG_free(dgbl->master_drbg);
     CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
     CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
@@ -210,104 +235,12 @@ static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD drbg_ossl_ctx_method = {
     drbg_ossl_ctx_free,
 };
 
-/*
- * drbg_ossl_ctx_new() calls drgb_setup() which calls rand_drbg_get_nonce()
- * which needs to get the rand_nonce_lock out of the OPENSSL_CTX...but since
- * drbg_ossl_ctx_new() hasn't finished running yet we need the rand_nonce_lock
- * to be in a different global data object. Otherwise we will go into an
- * infinite recursion loop.
- */
-static void *drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
-{
-    DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dngbl));
-
-    if (dngbl == NULL)
-        return NULL;
-
-    dngbl->rand_nonce_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
-    if (dngbl->rand_nonce_lock == NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_free(dngbl);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-
-    return dngbl;
-}
-
-static void drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdngbl)
-{
-    DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl = vdngbl;
-
-    if (dngbl == NULL)
-        return;
-
-    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dngbl->rand_nonce_lock);
-
-    OPENSSL_free(dngbl);
-}
-
-static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_method = {
-    drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_new,
-    drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_free,
-};
-
 static DRBG_GLOBAL *drbg_get_global(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
 {
     return openssl_ctx_get_data(libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_INDEX,
                                 &drbg_ossl_ctx_method);
 }
 
-/* Implements the get_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks()) */
-size_t rand_drbg_get_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
-                           unsigned char **pout,
-                           int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
-{
-    size_t ret = 0;
-    RAND_POOL *pool;
-    DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl
-        = openssl_ctx_get_data(drbg->libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_NONCE_INDEX,
-                               &drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_method);
-    struct {
-        void *instance;
-        int count;
-    } data;
-
-    if (dngbl == NULL)
-        return 0;
-
-    memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-    pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, min_len, max_len);
-    if (pool == NULL)
-        return 0;
-
-    if (rand_pool_add_nonce_data(pool) == 0)
-        goto err;
-
-    data.instance = drbg;
-    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&dngbl->rand_nonce_count, 1, &data.count,
-                      dngbl->rand_nonce_lock);
-
-    if (rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0) == 0)
-        goto err;
-
-    ret   = rand_pool_length(pool);
-    *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
-
- err:
-    rand_pool_free(pool);
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Implements the cleanup_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
- *
- */
-void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
-                             unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
-{
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(out, outlen);
-}
-
 /*
  * Set the |drbg|'s callback data pointer for the entropy and nonce callbacks
  *
@@ -322,8 +255,8 @@ void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
  */
 int RAND_DRBG_set_callback_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg, void *data)
 {
-    if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED
-        || drbg->parent != NULL)
+    if (EVP_RAND_state(drbg->rand) != EVP_RAND_STATE_UNINITIALISED
+            || drbg->parent != NULL)
         return 0;
 
     drbg->callback_data = data;
@@ -345,68 +278,71 @@ void *RAND_DRBG_get_callback_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
  */
 int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags)
 {
-    return rand_drbg_set(drbg, type, flags) && rand_drbg_init_method(drbg);
-}
+    OSSL_PARAM params[6], *p = params;
+    unsigned int reseed_interval;
+    time_t reseed_time_interval;
+    const char *name = NULL;
+    EVP_RAND *rand;
+    EVP_RAND_CTX *pctx;
+    int use_df;
 
-static int rand_drbg_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags)
-{
     if (type == 0 && flags == 0) {
         type = rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER];
         flags = rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER];
     }
 
-    /* If set is called multiple times - clear the old one */
-    if (drbg->type != 0 && (type != drbg->type || flags != drbg->flags)) {
-        if (drbg->meth != NULL)
-            drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
-        rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool);
-        drbg->adin_pool = NULL;
+    if (drbg->parent == NULL) {
+        reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval;
+        reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval;
+    } else {
+        reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval;
+        reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval;
+    }
+    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS,
+                                     &reseed_interval);
+    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_time_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL,
+                                       &reseed_time_interval);
+    use_df = (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0;
+    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_USE_DF, &use_df);
+
+    if (!get_drbg_params(type, flags, &name, p)) {
+        RANDerr(0, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
+        return 0;
     }
 
-    drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
+    rand = EVP_RAND_fetch(drbg->libctx, name, NULL);
+    if (rand == NULL) {
+        RANDerr(0, RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    EVP_RAND_CTX_free(drbg->rand);
+    drbg->rand = NULL;
+
     drbg->flags = flags;
     drbg->type = type;
-    drbg->meth = NULL;
 
-    if (type == 0 || is_ctr(type) || is_digest(type))
-        return 1;
+    pctx = drbg->parent != NULL ? drbg->parent->rand : NULL;
+    drbg->rand = EVP_RAND_CTX_new(rand, pctx);
+    EVP_RAND_free(rand);
+    if (drbg->rand == NULL) {
+        RANDerr(0, RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
+        goto err;
+    }
 
+    if (!EVP_RAND_set_ctx_params(drbg->rand, params)) {
+        RANDerr(0, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    return 1;
+err:
+    EVP_RAND_CTX_free(drbg->rand);
+    drbg->rand = NULL;
     drbg->type = 0;
     drbg->flags = 0;
-    RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
-
     return 0;
 }
 
-static int rand_drbg_init_method(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
-{
-    int ret;
-
-    if (drbg->meth != NULL)
-        return 1;
-
-    if (is_ctr(drbg->type)) {
-        ret = drbg_ctr_init(drbg);
-    } else if (is_digest(drbg->type)) {
-        if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC)
-            ret = drbg_hmac_init(drbg);
-        else
-            ret = drbg_hash_init(drbg);
-    } else {
-        /* other cases should already be excluded */
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INIT_METHOD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        drbg->type = 0;
-        drbg->flags = 0;
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (ret == 0) {
-        drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INIT_METHOD, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG);
-    }
-    return ret;
-}
-
 /*
  * Set/initialize default |type| and |flag| for new drbg instances.
  *
@@ -415,7 +351,10 @@ static int rand_drbg_init_method(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
 int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags)
 {
     int all;
-    if (!(is_digest(type) || is_ctr(type))) {
+    const char *name;
+    OSSL_PARAM params[3];
+
+    if (!get_drbg_params(type, flags, &name, params)) {
         RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
         return 0;
     }
@@ -443,20 +382,17 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags)
 
 
 /*
- * Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The DRBG is allocated on
- * the secure heap if |secure| is nonzero and the secure heap is enabled.
+ * Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG.
  * The |parent|, if not NULL, will be used as random source for reseeding.
  *
  * Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
  */
 static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
-                                int secure,
                                 int type,
                                 unsigned int flags,
                                 RAND_DRBG *parent)
 {
-    RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ? OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg))
-                             : OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
+    RAND_DRBG *drbg = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
 
     if (drbg == NULL) {
         RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -464,49 +400,11 @@ static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
     }
 
     drbg->libctx = ctx;
-    drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg);
-    drbg->fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id();
     drbg->parent = parent;
 
-    if (parent == NULL) {
-        drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
-        drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
-#ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
-        drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce;
-        drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce;
-#endif
-
-        drbg->reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval;
-        drbg->reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval;
-    } else {
-        drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
-        drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
-        /*
-         * Do not provide nonce callbacks, the child DRBGs will
-         * obtain their nonce using random bits from the parent.
-         */
-
-        drbg->reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval;
-        drbg->reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval;
-    }
-
     if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) == 0)
         goto err;
 
-    if (parent != NULL) {
-        rand_drbg_lock(parent);
-        if (drbg->strength > parent->strength) {
-            /*
-             * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
-             * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
-             */
-            rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
-            RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
-    }
-
     return drbg;
 
  err:
@@ -518,7 +416,7 @@ static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
 RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type, unsigned int flags,
                             RAND_DRBG *parent)
 {
-    return rand_drbg_new(ctx, 0, type, flags, parent);
+    return rand_drbg_new(ctx, type, flags, parent);
 }
 
 RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
@@ -526,16 +424,6 @@ RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
     return RAND_DRBG_new_ex(NULL, type, flags, parent);
 }
 
-RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type,
-                                   unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
-{
-    return rand_drbg_new(ctx, 1, type, flags, parent);
-}
-
-RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
-{
-    return RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(NULL, type, flags, parent);
-}
 /*
  * Uninstantiate |drbg| and free all memory.
  */
@@ -544,18 +432,8 @@ void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
     if (drbg == NULL)
         return;
 
-    if (drbg->meth != NULL)
-        drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
-    rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool);
-    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(drbg->lock);
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
     CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RAND_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data);
-#endif
-
-    if (drbg->secure)
-        OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
-    else
-        OPENSSL_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
+    OPENSSL_free(drbg);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -569,92 +447,8 @@ void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
 int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
                           const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
 {
-    unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL;
-    size_t noncelen = 0, entropylen = 0;
-    size_t min_entropy, min_entropylen, max_entropylen;
-
-    if (drbg->meth == NULL && !rand_drbg_init_method(drbg)) {
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
-                RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
-        goto end;
-    }
-
-    min_entropy = drbg->strength;
-    min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen;
-    max_entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen;
-
-    if (perslen > drbg->max_perslen) {
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
-                RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG);
-        goto end;
-    }
-
-    if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
-        if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR)
-            RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
-        else
-            RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED);
-        goto end;
-    }
-
-    drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
-
-    /*
-     * NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1 says you can combine getting the entropy
-     * and nonce in 1 call by increasing the entropy with 50% and increasing
-     * the minimum length to accommodate the length of the nonce.
-     * We do this in case a nonce is require and get_nonce is NULL.
-     */
-    if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) {
-        min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2;
-        min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen;
-        max_entropylen += drbg->max_noncelen;
-    }
-
-    drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
-    if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) {
-        drbg->reseed_next_counter++;
-        if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter)
-            drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1;
-    }
-
-    if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
-        entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, min_entropy,
-                                       min_entropylen, max_entropylen, 0);
-    if (entropylen < min_entropylen
-            || entropylen > max_entropylen) {
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
-        goto end;
-    }
-
-    if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) {
-        noncelen = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, &nonce, drbg->strength / 2,
-                                   drbg->min_noncelen, drbg->max_noncelen);
-        if (noncelen < drbg->min_noncelen || noncelen > drbg->max_noncelen) {
-            RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE);
-            goto end;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (!drbg->meth->instantiate(drbg, entropy, entropylen,
-                         nonce, noncelen, pers, perslen)) {
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG);
-        goto end;
-    }
-
-    drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
-    drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1;
-    drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
-    tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter);
-
- end:
-    if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
-        drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
-    if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce != NULL)
-        drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, nonce, noncelen);
-    if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
-        return 1;
-    return 0;
+    return EVP_RAND_instantiate(drbg->rand, EVP_RAND_strength(drbg->rand), 0,
+                                pers, perslen);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -667,10 +461,9 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
 int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
 {
     int index = -1, type, flags;
-    if (drbg->meth != NULL) {
-        drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
-        drbg->meth = NULL;
-    }
+
+    if (!EVP_RAND_uninstantiate(drbg->rand))
+        return 0;
 
     /* The reset uses the default values for type and flags */
     if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER)
@@ -687,7 +480,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
         flags = drbg->flags;
         type = drbg->type;
     }
-    return rand_drbg_set(drbg, type, flags);
+    return RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -701,288 +494,152 @@ int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
                      const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen,
                      int prediction_resistance)
 {
-    unsigned char *entropy = NULL;
-    size_t entropylen = 0;
-
-    if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (adin == NULL) {
-        adinlen = 0;
-    } else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
-
-    drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
-    if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) {
-        drbg->reseed_next_counter++;
-        if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter)
-            drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1;
-    }
-
-    if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
-        entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
-                                       drbg->min_entropylen,
-                                       drbg->max_entropylen,
-                                       prediction_resistance);
-    if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen
-            || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) {
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
-        goto end;
-    }
-
-    if (!drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen))
-        goto end;
-
-    drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
-    drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1;
-    drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
-    tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter);
-
- end:
-    if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
-        drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
-    if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
-        return 1;
-    return 0;
+    return EVP_RAND_reseed(drbg->rand, prediction_resistance, NULL, 0,
+                           adin, adinlen);
 }
 
 /*
- * Restart |drbg|, using the specified entropy or additional input
- *
- * Tries its best to get the drbg instantiated by all means,
- * regardless of its current state.
+ * Generate |outlen| bytes into the buffer at |out|.  Reseed if we need
+ * to or if |prediction_resistance| is set.  Additional input can be
+ * sent in |adin| and |adinlen|.
  *
- * Optionally, a |buffer| of |len| random bytes can be passed,
- * which is assumed to contain at least |entropy| bits of entropy.
+ * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
  *
- * If |entropy| > 0, the buffer content is used as entropy input.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
  *
- * If |entropy| == 0, the buffer content is used as additional input
+ */
+int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+                       int prediction_resistance,
+                       const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
+{
+    return EVP_RAND_generate(drbg->rand, out, outlen, 0,
+                             prediction_resistance, adin, adinlen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates |outlen| random bytes and stores them in |out|. It will
+ * using the given |drbg| to generate the bytes.
  *
- * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
  *
- * This function is used internally only.
+ * Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
  */
-int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
-                      const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy)
+int RAND_DRBG_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
 {
-    int reseeded = 0;
-    const unsigned char *adin = NULL;
-    size_t adinlen = 0;
-
-    if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) {
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
-        rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool);
-        drbg->seed_pool = NULL;
+    return EVP_RAND_generate(drbg->rand, out, outlen, 0, 0, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+/* DRBG call back shims */
+static int rand_drbg_get_entroy_cb(const OSSL_PARAM *params, OSSL_PARAM *out,
+                                   void *vdrbg)
+{
+    RAND_DRBG *drbg = (RAND_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+    int entropy = 0, prediction_resistance = 0;
+    size_t min_len = 0, max_len = 2048;
+    const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+    OSSL_PARAM *q;
+
+    if (drbg->get_entropy == NULL)
         return 0;
-    }
 
-    if (buffer != NULL) {
-        if (entropy > 0) {
-            if (drbg->max_entropylen < len) {
-                RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
-                    RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
-                drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
-                return 0;
-            }
-
-            if (entropy > 8 * len) {
-                RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_ENTROPY_OUT_OF_RANGE);
-                drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
-                return 0;
-            }
-
-            /* will be picked up by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback */
-            drbg->seed_pool = rand_pool_attach(buffer, len, entropy);
-            if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
-                return 0;
-        } else {
-            if (drbg->max_adinlen < len) {
-                RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
-                        RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
-                drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
-                return 0;
-            }
-            adin = buffer;
-            adinlen = len;
-        }
-    }
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_ENTROPY_REQUIRED);
+    if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &entropy))
+        return 0;
 
-    /* repair error state */
-    if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR)
-        RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
-
-    /* repair uninitialized state */
-    if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
-        /* reinstantiate drbg */
-        RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg,
-                              (const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string,
-                              sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1);
-        /* already reseeded. prevent second reseeding below */
-        reseeded = (drbg->state == DRBG_READY);
-    }
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE);
+    if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &prediction_resistance))
+        return 0;
 
-    /* refresh current state if entropy or additional input has been provided */
-    if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) {
-        if (adin != NULL) {
-            /*
-             * mix in additional input without reseeding
-             *
-             * Similar to RAND_DRBG_reseed(), but the provided additional
-             * data |adin| is mixed into the current state without pulling
-             * entropy from the trusted entropy source using get_entropy().
-             * This is not a reseeding in the strict sense of NIST SP 800-90A.
-             */
-            drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0);
-        } else if (reseeded == 0) {
-            /* do a full reseeding if it has not been done yet above */
-            RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
-        }
-    }
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_LENGTH);
+    if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &max_len))
+        return 0;
 
-    rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool);
-    drbg->seed_pool = NULL;
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_LENGTH);
+    if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &min_len))
+        return 0;
+
+    q = OSSL_PARAM_locate(out, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RANDOM_DATA);
+    if (q == NULL || q->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR || q->data == NULL)
+        return 0;
 
-    return drbg->state == DRBG_READY;
+    q->return_size = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, (unsigned char **)q->data, entropy,
+                                       min_len, max_len, prediction_resistance);
+    return 1;
 }
 
-/*
- * Generate |outlen| bytes into the buffer at |out|.  Reseed if we need
- * to or if |prediction_resistance| is set.  Additional input can be
- * sent in |adin| and |adinlen|.
- *
- * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
- *
- * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
- *
- */
-int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
-                       int prediction_resistance,
-                       const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
+static int rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy_cb(const OSSL_PARAM *params, void *vdrbg)
 {
-    int fork_id;
-    int reseed_required = 0;
-
-    if (drbg->state != DRBG_READY) {
-        /* try to recover from previous errors */
-        rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
-
-        if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
-            RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
-            RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
+    RAND_DRBG *drbg = (RAND_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+    const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+    size_t sz;
 
-    if (outlen > drbg->max_request) {
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG);
+    if (drbg->cleanup_entropy == NULL)
         return 0;
-    }
-    if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
+
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_SIZE);
+    if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &sz))
         return 0;
-    }
 
-    fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id();
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RANDOM_DATA);
+    if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR)
+        return 0;
 
-    if (drbg->fork_id != fork_id) {
-        drbg->fork_id = fork_id;
-        reseed_required = 1;
-    }
+    drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, p->data, sz);
+    return 1;
+}
 
-    if (drbg->reseed_interval > 0) {
-        if (drbg->reseed_gen_counter > drbg->reseed_interval)
-            reseed_required = 1;
-    }
-    if (drbg->reseed_time_interval > 0) {
-        time_t now = time(NULL);
-        if (now < drbg->reseed_time
-            || now - drbg->reseed_time >= drbg->reseed_time_interval)
-            reseed_required = 1;
-    }
-    if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
-        unsigned int reseed_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
-        if (reseed_counter > 0
-                && tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter)
-                   != reseed_counter)
-            reseed_required = 1;
-    }
+static int rand_drbg_get_nonce_cb(const OSSL_PARAM *params, OSSL_PARAM *out,
+                                  void *vdrbg)
+{
+    RAND_DRBG *drbg = (RAND_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+    int entropy = 0;
+    size_t min_len = 0, max_len = 10240;
+    const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+    OSSL_PARAM *q;
 
-    if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
-        if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, prediction_resistance)) {
-            RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        adin = NULL;
-        adinlen = 0;
-    }
+    if (drbg->get_nonce == NULL)
+        return 0;
 
-    if (!drbg->meth->generate(drbg, out, outlen, adin, adinlen)) {
-        drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_GENERATE_ERROR);
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_ENTROPY_REQUIRED);
+    if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &entropy))
         return 0;
-    }
 
-    drbg->reseed_gen_counter++;
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_LENGTH);
+    if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &max_len))
+        return 0;
+
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_LENGTH);
+    if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &min_len))
+        return 0;
+
+    q = OSSL_PARAM_locate(out, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RANDOM_DATA);
+    if (q == NULL || q->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR || q->data == NULL)
+        return 0;
 
+    q->return_size = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, (unsigned char **)q->data, entropy,
+                                     min_len, max_len);
     return 1;
 }
 
-/*
- * Generates |outlen| random bytes and stores them in |out|. It will
- * using the given |drbg| to generate the bytes.
- *
- * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
- *
- * Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
- */
-int RAND_DRBG_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+static int rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce_cb(const OSSL_PARAM *params, void *vdrbg)
 {
-    unsigned char *additional = NULL;
-    size_t additional_len;
-    size_t chunk;
-    size_t ret = 0;
-
-    if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL) {
-        if (drbg->type == 0)
-            goto err;
-        drbg->adin_pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, 0, drbg->max_adinlen);
-        if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL)
-            goto err;
-    }
+    RAND_DRBG *drbg = (RAND_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+    const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+    size_t sz;
 
-    additional_len = rand_drbg_get_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool,
-                                                   &additional);
+    if (drbg->cleanup_nonce == NULL)
+        return 0;
 
-    for ( ; outlen > 0; outlen -= chunk, out += chunk) {
-        chunk = outlen;
-        if (chunk > drbg->max_request)
-            chunk = drbg->max_request;
-        ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, out, chunk, 0, additional, additional_len);
-        if (!ret)
-            goto err;
-    }
-    ret = 1;
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_SIZE);
+    if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &sz))
+        return 0;
 
- err:
-    if (additional != NULL)
-        rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool, additional);
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RANDOM_DATA);
+    if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR)
+        return 0;
 
-    return ret;
+    drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, p->data, sz);
+    return 1;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -999,13 +656,25 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
                             RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce,
                             RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce)
 {
-    if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED
-            || drbg->parent != NULL)
+    EVP_RAND_CTX *rand = drbg->rand;
+    OSSL_INOUT_CALLBACK *g_ent = NULL, *g_nonce = NULL;
+    OSSL_CALLBACK *c_ent = NULL, *c_nonce = NULL;
+
+    if (get_entropy != NULL) {
+        g_ent = &rand_drbg_get_entroy_cb;
+        c_ent = &rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy_cb;
+    }
+    if (get_nonce != NULL) {
+        g_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce_cb;
+        c_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce_cb;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_RAND_set_callbacks(rand, g_ent, c_ent, g_nonce, c_nonce, drbg))
         return 0;
-    drbg->get_entropy = get_entropy;
-    drbg->cleanup_entropy = cleanup_entropy;
-    drbg->get_nonce = get_nonce;
-    drbg->cleanup_nonce = cleanup_nonce;
+
+    drbg->get_entropy = g_ent != NULL ? get_entropy : NULL;
+    drbg->cleanup_entropy = c_ent != NULL ? cleanup_entropy : NULL;
+    drbg->get_nonce = g_nonce != NULL ? get_nonce : NULL;
+    drbg->cleanup_nonce = c_nonce != NULL ? cleanup_nonce : NULL;
     return 1;
 }
 
@@ -1020,10 +689,13 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
  */
 int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned int interval)
 {
+    OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
+
     if (interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL)
         return 0;
-    drbg->reseed_interval = interval;
-    return 1;
+    params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS,
+                                          &interval);
+    return EVP_RAND_set_ctx_params(drbg->rand, params);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1038,10 +710,14 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned int interval)
  */
 int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_time_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, time_t interval)
 {
+    OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
+
     if (interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL)
         return 0;
-    drbg->reseed_time_interval = interval;
-    return 1;
+    params[0] =
+        OSSL_PARAM_construct_time_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL,
+                                    &interval);
+    return EVP_RAND_set_ctx_params(drbg->rand, params);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1077,69 +753,6 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_defaults(
     return 1;
 }
 
-/*
- * Locks the given drbg. Locking a drbg which does not have locking
- * enabled is considered a successful no-op.
- *
- * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
- */
-int rand_drbg_lock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
-{
-    if (drbg->lock != NULL)
-        return CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock);
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Unlocks the given drbg. Unlocking a drbg which does not have locking
- * enabled is considered a successful no-op.
- *
- * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
- */
-int rand_drbg_unlock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
-{
-    if (drbg->lock != NULL)
-        return CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock);
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Enables locking for the given drbg
- *
- * Locking can only be enabled if the random generator
- * is in the uninitialized state.
- *
- * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
- */
-int rand_drbg_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
-{
-    if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING,
-                RAND_R_DRBG_ALREADY_INITIALIZED);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (drbg->lock == NULL) {
-        if (drbg->parent != NULL && drbg->parent->lock == NULL) {
-            RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING,
-                    RAND_R_PARENT_LOCKING_NOT_ENABLED);
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        drbg->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
-        if (drbg->lock == NULL) {
-            RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING,
-                    RAND_R_FAILED_TO_CREATE_LOCK);
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 /*
  * Get and set the EXDATA
  */
@@ -1152,7 +765,6 @@ void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx)
 {
     return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx);
 }
-#endif
 
 /*
  * The following functions provide a RAND_METHOD that works on the
@@ -1169,27 +781,22 @@ static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type)
 {
     RAND_DRBG *drbg;
 
-    drbg = RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(ctx, rand_drbg_type[drbg_type],
-                                   rand_drbg_flags[drbg_type], parent);
+    drbg = RAND_DRBG_new_ex(ctx, rand_drbg_type[drbg_type],
+                            rand_drbg_flags[drbg_type], parent);
     if (drbg == NULL)
         return NULL;
 
     /* Only the master DRBG needs to have a lock */
-    if (parent == NULL && rand_drbg_enable_locking(drbg) == 0)
+    if (parent == NULL && EVP_RAND_enable_locking(drbg->rand) == 0)
         goto err;
 
-    /* enable seed propagation */
-    tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, 1);
-
     /*
      * Ignore instantiation error to support just-in-time instantiation.
      *
      * The state of the drbg will be checked in RAND_DRBG_generate() and
      * an automatic recovery is attempted.
      */
-    (void)RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg,
-                                (const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string,
-                                sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1);
+    (void)RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, NULL, 0);
     return drbg;
 
 err:
@@ -1228,112 +835,15 @@ static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out, int count)
     return ret;
 }
 
-/*
- * Calculates the minimum length of a full entropy buffer
- * which is necessary to seed (i.e. instantiate) the DRBG
- * successfully.
- */
-size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
-{
-    /*
-     * If no os entropy source is available then RAND_seed(buffer, bufsize)
-     * is expected to succeed if and only if the buffer length satisfies
-     * the following requirements, which follow from the calculations
-     * in RAND_DRBG_instantiate().
-     */
-    size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength;
-    size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen;
-
-    /*
-     * Extra entropy for the random nonce in the absence of a
-     * get_nonce callback, see comment in RAND_DRBG_instantiate().
-     */
-    if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) {
-        min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2;
-        min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Convert entropy requirement from bits to bytes
-     * (dividing by 8 without rounding upwards, because
-     * all entropy requirements are divisible by 8).
-     */
-    min_entropy >>= 3;
-
-    /* Return a value that satisfies both requirements */
-    return min_entropy > min_entropylen ? min_entropy : min_entropylen;
-}
-
 /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_add() method */
 static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
 {
-    int ret = 0;
     RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
-    size_t buflen;
-    size_t seedlen;
 
-    if (drbg == NULL)
+    if (drbg == NULL || num <= 0)
         return 0;
 
-    if (num < 0 || randomness < 0.0)
-        return 0;
-
-    rand_drbg_lock(drbg);
-    seedlen = rand_drbg_seedlen(drbg);
-
-    buflen = (size_t)num;
-
-#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
-    /*
-     * NIST SP-800-90A mandates that entropy *shall not* be provided
-     * by the consuming application. By setting the randomness to zero,
-     * we ensure that the buffer contents will be added to the internal
-     * state of the DRBG only as additional data.
-     *
-     * (NIST SP-800-90Ar1, Sections 9.1 and 9.2)
-     */
-    randomness = 0.0;
-#endif
-    if (buflen < seedlen || randomness < (double) seedlen) {
-#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
-        /*
-         * If no os entropy source is available, a reseeding will fail
-         * inevitably. So we use a trick to mix the buffer contents into
-         * the DRBG state without forcing a reseeding: we generate a
-         * dummy random byte, using the buffer content as additional data.
-         * Note: This won't work with RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF.
-         */
-        unsigned char dummy[1];
-
-        ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, dummy, sizeof(dummy), 0, buf, buflen);
-        rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
-        return ret;
-#else
-        /*
-         * If an os entropy source is available then we declare the buffer content
-         * as additional data by setting randomness to zero and trigger a regular
-         * reseeding.
-         */
-        randomness = 0.0;
-#endif
-    }
-
-    if (randomness > (double)seedlen) {
-        /*
-         * The purpose of this check is to bound |randomness| by a
-         * relatively small value in order to prevent an integer
-         * overflow when multiplying by 8 in the rand_drbg_restart()
-         * call below. Note that randomness is measured in bytes,
-         * not bits, so this value corresponds to eight times the
-         * security strength.
-         */
-        randomness = (double)seedlen;
-    }
-
-    ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, buf, buflen, (size_t)(8 * randomness));
-    rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
-
-    return ret;
+    return EVP_RAND_reseed(drbg->rand, 0, NULL, 0, buf, num);
 }
 
 /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_seed() method */
@@ -1351,12 +861,15 @@ static int drbg_status(void)
     if (drbg == NULL)
         return 0;
 
-    rand_drbg_lock(drbg);
-    ret = drbg->state == DRBG_READY ? 1 : 0;
-    rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
+    ret = EVP_RAND_state(drbg->rand) == EVP_RAND_STATE_READY ? 1 : 0;
     return ret;
 }
 
+int RAND_DRBG_verify_zeroization(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+    return EVP_RAND_verify_zeroization(drbg->rand);
+}
+
 /*
  * Get the master DRBG.
  * Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
@@ -1369,6 +882,13 @@ RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
     if (dgbl == NULL)
         return NULL;
 
+    if (dgbl->master_drbg == NULL) {
+        if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(dgbl->lock))
+            return NULL;
+        if (dgbl->master_drbg == NULL)
+            dgbl->master_drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, NULL, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER);
+        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(dgbl->lock);
+    }
     return dgbl->master_drbg;
 }
 
@@ -1384,13 +904,17 @@ RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void)
 RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
 {
     DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
-    RAND_DRBG *drbg;
+    RAND_DRBG *drbg, *master;
 
     if (dgbl == NULL)
         return NULL;
 
     drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
     if (drbg == NULL) {
+        master = OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(ctx);
+        if (master == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+
         ctx = openssl_ctx_get_concrete(ctx);
         /*
          * If the private_drbg is also NULL then this is the first time we've
@@ -1399,7 +923,7 @@ RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
         if (CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg) == NULL
                 && !ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, drbg_delete_thread_state))
             return NULL;
-        drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, dgbl->master_drbg, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC);
+        drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, master, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC);
         CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, drbg);
     }
     return drbg;
@@ -1417,13 +941,17 @@ RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void)
 RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
 {
     DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
-    RAND_DRBG *drbg;
+    RAND_DRBG *drbg, *master;
 
     if (dgbl == NULL)
         return NULL;
 
     drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
     if (drbg == NULL) {
+        master = OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(ctx);
+        if (master == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+
         ctx = openssl_ctx_get_concrete(ctx);
         /*
          * If the public_drbg is also NULL then this is the first time we've
@@ -1432,7 +960,7 @@ RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
         if (CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg) == NULL
                 && !ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, drbg_delete_thread_state))
             return NULL;
-        drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, dgbl->master_drbg, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE);
+        drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, master, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE);
         CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, drbg);
     }
     return drbg;
index a4c9e69..e7dfb07 100644 (file)
@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@
 #include "e_os.h"
 
 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+# include "prov/rand_pool.h"
+# include "prov/seeding.h"
+
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 /* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */
 static ENGINE *funct_ref;
@@ -28,218 +31,7 @@ static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth;
 static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
 
 static int rand_inited = 0;
-#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
-/*
- * IMPORTANT NOTE:  It is not currently possible to use this code
- * because we are not sure about the amount of randomness it provides.
- * Some SP900 tests have been run, but there is internal skepticism.
- * So for now this code is not used.
- */
-# error "RDTSC enabled?  Should not be possible!"
-
-/*
- * Acquire entropy from high-speed clock
- *
- * Since we get some randomness from the low-order bits of the
- * high-speed clock, it can help.
- *
- * Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested
- * entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0.
- */
-size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-    unsigned char c;
-    int i;
-
-    if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 4)) != 0) {
-        for (i = 0; i < TSC_READ_COUNT; i++) {
-            c = (unsigned char)(OPENSSL_rdtsc() & 0xFF);
-            rand_pool_add(pool, &c, 1, 4);
-        }
-    }
-    return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
-size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
-size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
-
-/*
- * Acquire entropy using Intel-specific cpu instructions
- *
- * Uses the RDSEED instruction if available, otherwise uses
- * RDRAND if available.
- *
- * For the differences between RDSEED and RDRAND, and why RDSEED
- * is the preferred choice, see https://goo.gl/oK3KcN
- *
- * Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested
- * entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0.
- */
-size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-    size_t bytes_needed;
-    unsigned char *buffer;
-
-    bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
-    if (bytes_needed > 0) {
-        buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-
-        if (buffer != NULL) {
-            /* Whichever comes first, use RDSEED, RDRAND or nothing */
-            if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 18)) != 0) {
-                if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
-                    == bytes_needed) {
-                    rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
-                }
-            } else if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))) != 0) {
-                if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
-                    == bytes_needed) {
-                    rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
-                }
-            } else {
-                rand_pool_add_end(pool, 0, 0);
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-#endif
-
-#if 0
-/*
- * Implements the get_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
- *
- * If the DRBG has a parent, then the required amount of entropy input
- * is fetched using the parent's RAND_DRBG_generate().
- *
- * Otherwise, the entropy is polled from the system entropy sources
- * using rand_pool_acquire_entropy().
- *
- * If a random pool has been added to the DRBG using RAND_add(), then
- * its entropy will be used up first.
- */
-size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
-                             unsigned char **pout,
-                             int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
-                             int prediction_resistance)
-{
-    size_t ret = 0;
-    size_t entropy_available = 0;
-    RAND_POOL *pool;
-
-    if (drbg->parent != NULL && drbg->strength > drbg->parent->strength) {
-        /*
-         * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
-         * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
-         */
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GET_ENTROPY, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) {
-        pool = drbg->seed_pool;
-        pool->entropy_requested = entropy;
-    } else {
-        pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, drbg->secure, min_len, max_len);
-        if (pool == NULL)
-            return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
-        size_t bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
-        unsigned char *buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-
-        if (buffer != NULL) {
-            size_t bytes = 0;
-
-            /*
-             * Get random data from parent. Include our address as additional input,
-             * in order to provide some additional distinction between different
-             * DRBG child instances.
-             * Our lock is already held, but we need to lock our parent before
-             * generating bits from it. (Note: taking the lock will be a no-op
-             * if locking if drbg->parent->lock == NULL.)
-             */
-            rand_drbg_lock(drbg->parent);
-            if (RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg->parent,
-                                   buffer, bytes_needed,
-                                   prediction_resistance,
-                                   (unsigned char *)&drbg, sizeof(drbg)) != 0)
-                bytes = bytes_needed;
-            drbg->reseed_next_counter
-                = tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter);
-            rand_drbg_unlock(drbg->parent);
-
-            rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
-            entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-        }
-
-    } else {
-        /* Get entropy by polling system entropy sources. */
-        entropy_available = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
-    }
-
-    if (entropy_available > 0) {
-        ret   = rand_pool_length(pool);
-        *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
-    }
-
-    if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
-        rand_pool_free(pool);
-    return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Implements the cleanup_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
- *
- */
-void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
-                               unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
-{
-    if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL) {
-        if (drbg->secure)
-            OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
-        else
-            OPENSSL_clear_free(out, outlen);
-    }
-}
-
-/*
- * Generate additional data that can be used for the drbg. The data does
- * not need to contain entropy, but it's useful if it contains at least
- * some bits that are unpredictable.
- *
- * Returns 0 on failure.
- *
- * On success it allocates a buffer at |*pout| and returns the length of
- * the data. The buffer should get freed using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free().
- */
-size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char **pout)
-{
-    size_t ret = 0;
-
-    if (rand_pool_add_additional_data(pool) == 0)
-        goto err;
-
-    ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
-    *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
-
- err:
-    return ret;
-}
-
-void rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out)
-{
-    rand_pool_reattach(pool, out);
-}
-#endif
 
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
 {
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
@@ -288,10 +80,10 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void)
     rand_inited = 0;
 }
 
-/* TODO(3.0): Do we need to handle this somehow in the FIPS module? */
 /*
  * RAND_close_seed_files() ensures that any seed file descriptors are
- * closed after use.
+ * closed after use.  This only applies to libcrypto/default provider,
+ * it does not apply to other providers.
  */
 void RAND_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
 {
@@ -308,39 +100,24 @@ void RAND_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
  */
 int RAND_poll(void)
 {
-    int ret = 0;
-
     const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+    int ret = meth == RAND_OpenSSL();
+    RAND_POOL *pool;
 
     if (meth == NULL)
         return 0;
 
-    if (meth == RAND_OpenSSL()) {
-        /* fill random pool and seed the master DRBG */
-        RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
-
-        if (drbg == NULL)
-            return 0;
-
-#if 0
-        ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
-#endif
-
-        return ret;
-
-    } else {
-        RAND_POOL *pool = NULL;
-
+    if (!ret) {
         /* fill random pool and seed the current legacy RNG */
         pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH, 1,
                              (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH + 7) / 8,
                              RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH);
         if (pool == NULL)
             return 0;
-#if 0
-        if (rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0)
+
+        if (prov_pool_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0)
             goto err;
-#endif
+
         if (meth->add == NULL
             || meth->add(rand_pool_buffer(pool),
                          rand_pool_length(pool),
@@ -348,11 +125,9 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
             goto err;
 
         ret = 1;
-
      err:
         rand_pool_free(pool);
     }
-
     return ret;
 }
 
@@ -370,13 +145,9 @@ int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
     CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
     return 1;
 }
-#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
 
 const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
 {
-#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
-    return NULL;
-#else
     const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
 
     if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
@@ -403,10 +174,9 @@ const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
     tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth;
     CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
     return tmp_meth;
-#endif
 }
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE)
 int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
 {
     const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
@@ -430,7 +200,7 @@ int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
     CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_engine_lock);
     return 1;
 }
-#endif
+# endif
 
 void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num)
 {
@@ -448,6 +218,38 @@ void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
         meth->add(buf, num, randomness);
 }
 
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0)
+int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+    const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+
+    if (meth != NULL && meth->pseudorand != NULL)
+        return meth->pseudorand(buf, num);
+    RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+    return -1;
+}
+# endif
+
+int RAND_status(void)
+{
+    RAND_DRBG *drbg;
+    const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+
+    if (meth != NULL && meth != RAND_OpenSSL())
+        return meth->status != NULL ? meth->status() : 0;
+
+    if ((drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master()) == NULL || drbg->rand == NULL)
+        return EVP_RAND_STATE_UNINITIALISED;
+    return EVP_RAND_state(drbg->rand) == EVP_RAND_STATE_READY;
+}
+#else  /* !FIPS_MODULE */
+
+const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
+{
+    return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* !FIPS_MODULE */
+
 /*
  * This function is not part of RAND_METHOD, so if we're not using
  * the default method, then just call RAND_bytes().  Otherwise make
@@ -500,24 +302,3 @@ int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 {
     return RAND_bytes_ex(NULL, buf, num);
 }
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
-int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-{
-    const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
-
-    if (meth != NULL && meth->pseudorand != NULL)
-        return meth->pseudorand(buf, num);
-    RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
-    return -1;
-}
-#endif
-
-int RAND_status(void)
-{
-    const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
-
-    if (meth != NULL && meth->status != NULL)
-        return meth->status();
-    return 0;
-}
index 85158df..e46248c 100644 (file)
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
 # include <openssl/rand_drbg.h>
 # include "internal/tsan_assist.h"
 # include "crypto/rand.h"
-# include "crypto/rand_pool.h"
 
 # include "internal/numbers.h"
 
 # define SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL                   (1 << 16)
 # define MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL             (60 * 60) /* 1 hour */
 # define SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL              (7 * 60)  /* 7 minutes */
-
 /*
- * The number of bytes that constitutes an atomic lump of entropy with respect
- * to the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests.  The size is somewhat
- * arbitrary, the smaller the value, the less entropy is consumed on first
- * read but the higher the probability of the test failing by accident.
- *
- * The value is in bytes.
- */
-#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ    16
-
-/*
- * Maximum input size for the DRBG (entropy, nonce, personalization string)
- *
- * NIST SP800 90Ar1 allows a maximum of (1 << 35) bits i.e., (1 << 32) bytes.
- *
- * We lower it to 'only' INT32_MAX bytes, which is equivalent to 2 gigabytes.
- */
-# define DRBG_MAX_LENGTH                         INT32_MAX
-
-/* DRBG status values */
-typedef enum drbg_status_e {
-    DRBG_UNINITIALISED,
-    DRBG_READY,
-    DRBG_ERROR
-} DRBG_STATUS;
-
-/* instantiate */
-typedef int (*RAND_DRBG_instantiate_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
-                                        const unsigned char *ent,
-                                        size_t entlen,
-                                        const unsigned char *nonce,
-                                        size_t noncelen,
-                                        const unsigned char *pers,
-                                        size_t perslen);
-/* reseed */
-typedef int (*RAND_DRBG_reseed_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
-                                   const unsigned char *ent,
-                                   size_t entlen,
-                                   const unsigned char *adin,
-                                   size_t adinlen);
-/* generate output */
-typedef int (*RAND_DRBG_generate_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
-                                     unsigned char *out,
-                                     size_t outlen,
-                                     const unsigned char *adin,
-                                     size_t adinlen);
-/* uninstantiate */
-typedef int (*RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx);
-
-
-/*
- * The state of all types of DRBGs, even though we only have CTR mode
- * right now.
+ * The state of all types of DRBGs.
  */
 struct rand_drbg_st {
     CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
     /* The library context this DRBG is associated with, if any */
     OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
     RAND_DRBG *parent;
-    int secure; /* 1: allocated on the secure heap, 0: otherwise */
     int type; /* the nid of the underlying algorithm */
     unsigned short flags; /* various external flags */
 
@@ -113,20 +59,4 @@ struct rand_drbg_st {
 /* The global RAND method, and the global buffer and DRBG instance. */
 extern RAND_METHOD rand_meth;
 
-/* DRBG helpers */
-int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
-                      const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy);
-size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
-
-/*
- * Entropy call back for the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests.
- * These need to be exposed for the unit tests.
- */
-int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_POOL *pool,
-                              unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
-                              unsigned int *md_size);
-extern int (*crngt_get_entropy)(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_POOL *pool,
-                                unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
-                                unsigned int *md_size);
-
 #endif
index 3ff98ae..cd770fd 100644 (file)
@@ -35,9 +35,6 @@ RAND_DRBG_free
                                  unsigned int flags,
                                  RAND_DRBG *parent);
 
- int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
-                   int type, unsigned int flags);
-
  int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags);
 
  int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
@@ -47,18 +44,27 @@ RAND_DRBG_free
 
  void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
 
+Deprecated since OpenSSL 3.0, can be hidden entirely by defining
+B<OPENSSL_API_COMPAT> with a suitable version value, see
+L<openssl_user_macros(7)>:
+
+ int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+                   int type, unsigned int flags);
 
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 
-RAND_DRBG_new_ex() and RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex()
-create a new DRBG instance of the given B<type>, allocated from the heap resp.
-the secure heap, for the given OPENSSL_CTX <ctx>
-(using OPENSSL_zalloc() resp. OPENSSL_secure_zalloc()). The <ctx> parameter can
-be NULL in which case the default OPENSSL_CTX is used. RAND_DRBG_new() and
-RAND_DRBG_secure_new() are the same as RAND_DRBG_new_ex() and
-RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex() except that the default OPENSSL_CTX is always used.
+RAND_DRBG_new_ex() and RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex() create a new DRBG instance
+of the given B<type> for the given OPENSSL_CTX <ctx>.
+The <ctx> parameter can be NULL in which case the default OPENSSL_CTX is used.
+RAND_DRBG_new() and RAND_DRBG_secure_new() are the same as RAND_DRBG_new_ex()
+and RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex() except that the default OPENSSL_CTX is always
+used.
+As of OpenSSL 3.0, there is no different between the new and secure_new
+functions.
 
 RAND_DRBG_set() initializes the B<drbg> with the given B<type> and B<flags>.
+This function is deprecated.  Applications should instead use
+RAND_DRBG_new_ex() to create a new DRBG.
 
 RAND_DRBG_set_defaults() sets the default B<type> and B<flags> for new DRBG
 instances.
@@ -124,7 +130,7 @@ uninstantiated state.
 
 RAND_DRBG_new_ex(), RAND_DRBG_new(), RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex() and
 RAND_DRBG_secure_new() return a pointer to a DRBG instance allocated on the
-heap, resp. secure heap.
+heap.
 
 RAND_DRBG_set(),
 RAND_DRBG_instantiate(), and
@@ -149,6 +155,11 @@ To ensure that they are applied to the global and thread-local DRBG instances
 RAND_DRBG_set_defaults() before creating any thread and before calling any
 cryptographic routines that obtain random data directly or indirectly.
 
+As of OpenSSL 3.0, RAND_DRBG_new() and RAND_DRBG_secure_new() are
+functionally identical.  The DRBG is allocated on the normal heap and its
+sensitive state is allocated on the secure heap.  Likewise for,
+RAND_DRBG_new_ex() and RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex().
+
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
 L<OPENSSL_zalloc(3)>,
@@ -158,6 +169,8 @@ L<RAND_DRBG(7)>
 
 =head1 HISTORY
 
+The RAND_DRBG_set() function was deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0.
+
 The RAND_DRBG functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
 
 =head1 COPYRIGHT
index d00397d..0ae3028 100644 (file)
@@ -127,11 +127,12 @@ entropy from a live entropy source (section 5.5.2 of [NIST SP 800-90C]).
 It is up to the user to ensure that a live entropy source is configured
 and is being used.
 
-The derivation function is disabled during initialization by calling the
-RAND_DRBG_set() function with the RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF flag.
-For more information on the derivation function and when it can be omitted,
-see [NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1]. Roughly speaking it can be omitted if the random
-source has "full entropy", i.e., contains 8 bits of entropy per byte.
+The derivation function is disabled by calling the RAND_DRBG_new_ex()
+function with the RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF flag.  For more information on
+the derivation function and when it can be omitted, see [NIST SP 800-90A
+Rev. 1]. Roughly speaking it can be omitted if the random source has "full
+entropy", i.e., contains 8 bits of entropy per byte. In a FIPS context,
+the derivation function can never be omitted.
 
 Even if a nonce is required, the B<get_nonce>() and B<cleanup_nonce>()
 callbacks can be omitted by setting them to NULL.
index e7b522a..fe126cc 100644 (file)
@@ -180,26 +180,38 @@ extern "C" {
 #define OSSL_KDF_NAME_KBKDF         "KBKDF"
 #define OSSL_KDF_NAME_KRB5KDF       "KRB5KDF"
 
-/* Know RAND names */
-#define OSSL_RAND_PARAM_STATUS                  "status"
+/* Known RAND names */
+#define OSSL_RAND_PARAM_STATE                   "state"
 #define OSSL_RAND_PARAM_STRENGTH                "strength"
-#define OSSL_RAND_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS         "reseed_requests"
-#define OSSL_RAND_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL    "reseed_time_interval"
-#define OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MAX_REQUEST             "max_request"
-#define OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MIN_ENTROPYLEN          "min_entropylen"
-#define OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MAX_ENTROPYLEN          "max_entropylen"
-#define OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MIN_NONCELEN            "min_noncelen"
-#define OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MAX_NONCELEN            "max_noncelen"
-#define OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MAX_PERSLEN             "max_perslen"
-#define OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MAX_ADINLEN             "max_adinlen"
-#define OSSL_RAND_PARAM_RESEED_CTR              "reseed_counter"
-#define OSSL_RAND_PARAM_RESEED_PROP_CTR         "reseed_prop_counter"
-#define OSSL_RAND_PARAM_PROPERTIES              OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES
-#define OSSL_RAND_PARAM_DIGEST                  OSSL_ALG_PARAM_DIGEST
-#define OSSL_RAND_PARAM_CIPHER                  OSSL_ALG_PARAM_CIPHER
 #define OSSL_RAND_PARAM_TEST_ENTROPY            "test_entropy"
 #define OSSL_RAND_PARAM_TEST_NONCE              "test_nonce"
 
+/* RAND/DRBG names */
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS         "reseed_requests"
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL    "reseed_time_interval"
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_REQUEST             "max_request"
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_ENTROPYLEN          "min_entropylen"
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_ENTROPYLEN          "max_entropylen"
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_NONCELEN            "min_noncelen"
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_NONCELEN            "max_noncelen"
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_PERSLEN             "max_perslen"
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_ADINLEN             "max_adinlen"
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_CTR              "reseed_counter"
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME             "reseed_time"
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_PROPERTIES              OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_DIGEST                  OSSL_ALG_PARAM_DIGEST
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_CIPHER                  OSSL_ALG_PARAM_CIPHER
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAC                     OSSL_ALG_PARAM_MAC
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_USE_DF                  "use_derivation_function"
+
+/* DRBG call back parameters */
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_ENTROPY_REQUIRED        "entropy_required"
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE   "prediction_resistance"
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_LENGTH              "minium_length"
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_LENGTH              "maxium_length"
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RANDOM_DATA             "random_data"
+#define OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_SIZE                    "size"
+
 /* PKEY parameters */
 /* Common PKEY parameters */
 #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_BITS                "bits" /* integer */
index acc758e..af2a35e 100644 (file)
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, OP_kdf_set_ctx_params,
 # define OSSL_FUNC_RAND_VERIFY_ZEROIZATION           18
 
 OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(void *, OP_rand_newctx,
-                    (void *provctx, int secure, void *parent,
+                    (void *provctx, void *parent,
                     const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_calls))
 OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(void, OP_rand_freectx, (void *vctx))
 OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, OP_rand_instantiate,
@@ -379,12 +379,8 @@ OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, OP_rand_reseed,
                      const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
                      const unsigned char *addin, size_t addin_len))
 OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(size_t, OP_rand_nonce,
-                    (void *vctx, unsigned char *out, int strength,
+                    (void *vctx, unsigned char *out, unsigned int strength,
                      size_t min_noncelen, size_t max_noncelen))
-OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, OP_rand_set_callbacks,
-                    (void *vctx,
-                     OSSL_CALLBACK *get_entropy, OSSL_CALLBACK *cleanup_entropy,
-                     OSSL_CALLBACK *get_nonce, OSSL_CALLBACK *cleanup_nonce))
 OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, OP_rand_enable_locking, (void *vctx))
 OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, OP_rand_lock, (void *vctx))
 OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(void, OP_rand_unlock, (void *vctx))
@@ -396,6 +392,11 @@ OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, OP_rand_get_ctx_params,
                     (void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[]))
 OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, OP_rand_set_ctx_params,
                     (void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]))
+OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(void, OP_rand_set_callbacks,
+                    (void *vctx, OSSL_INOUT_CALLBACK *get_entropy,
+                     OSSL_CALLBACK *cleanup_entropy,
+                     OSSL_INOUT_CALLBACK *get_nonce,
+                     OSSL_CALLBACK *cleanup_nonce, void *arg))
 OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, OP_rand_verify_zeroization,
                     (void *vctx))
 
index 2e6f855..644a214 100644 (file)
@@ -1082,12 +1082,11 @@ int EVP_RAND_is_a(const EVP_RAND *rand, const char *name);
 const OSSL_PROVIDER *EVP_RAND_provider(const EVP_RAND *rand);
 int EVP_RAND_get_params(EVP_RAND *rand, OSSL_PARAM params[]);
 
-EVP_RAND_CTX *EVP_RAND_CTX_new(EVP_RAND *rand, int secure,
-                               EVP_RAND_CTX *parent);
+EVP_RAND_CTX *EVP_RAND_CTX_new(EVP_RAND *rand, EVP_RAND_CTX *parent);
 void EVP_RAND_CTX_free(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx);
 EVP_RAND *EVP_RAND_CTX_rand(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx);
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_get_params(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, OSSL_PARAM params[]);
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_set_params(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
+int EVP_RAND_get_ctx_params(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, OSSL_PARAM params[]);
+int EVP_RAND_set_ctx_params(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
 const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_RAND_gettable_params(const EVP_RAND *rand);
 const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_RAND_gettable_ctx_params(const EVP_RAND *rand);
 const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_RAND_settable_ctx_params(const EVP_RAND *rand);
@@ -1099,26 +1098,27 @@ void EVP_RAND_names_do_all(const EVP_RAND *rand,
                            void (*fn)(const char *name, void *data),
                            void *data);
 
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_instantiate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned int strength,
+__owur int EVP_RAND_instantiate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned int strength,
+                                int prediction_resistance,
+                                const unsigned char *pstr, size_t pstr_len);
+int EVP_RAND_uninstantiate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx);
+__owur int EVP_RAND_generate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                             size_t outlen, unsigned int strength,
                              int prediction_resistance,
-                             const unsigned char *pstr, size_t pstr_len);
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_uninstantiate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx);
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_generate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
-                          unsigned int strength, int prediction_resistance,
-                          const unsigned char *addin, size_t addin_len);
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_reseed(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, int prediction_resistance,
-                        const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
-                        const unsigned char *addin, size_t addin_len);
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_nonce(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_set_callbacks(const EVP_RAND_CTX *rand,
-                               OSSL_CALLBACK *get_entropy,
-                               OSSL_CALLBACK *cleanup_entropy,
-                               OSSL_CALLBACK *get_nonce,
-                               OSSL_CALLBACK *cleanup_nonce);
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_enable_locking(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx);
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_verify_zeroization(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx);
-unsigned int EVP_RAND_CTX_strength(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx);
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_state(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx);
+                             const unsigned char *addin, size_t addin_len);
+int EVP_RAND_reseed(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, int prediction_resistance,
+                    const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
+                    const unsigned char *addin, size_t addin_len);
+__owur int EVP_RAND_nonce(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
+__owur int EVP_RAND_enable_locking(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_RAND_set_callbacks(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx,
+                           OSSL_INOUT_CALLBACK *get_entropy,
+                           OSSL_CALLBACK *cleanup_entropy,
+                           OSSL_INOUT_CALLBACK *get_nonce,
+                           OSSL_CALLBACK *cleanup_nonce, void *arg);
+int EVP_RAND_verify_zeroization(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx);
+unsigned int EVP_RAND_strength(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_RAND_state(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx);
 
 #define EVP_RAND_STATE_UNINITIALISED    0
 #define EVP_RAND_STATE_READY            1
index a95e9d4..d2db26a 100644 (file)
@@ -82,7 +82,6 @@ DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(void RAND_screen(void))
 DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(int RAND_event(UINT, WPARAM, LPARAM))
 # endif
 
-
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 }
 #endif
index c37df34..fd708d3 100644 (file)
@@ -80,11 +80,9 @@ extern "C" {
  */
 RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type, unsigned int flags,
                             RAND_DRBG *parent);
-RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type,
-                                   unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent);
 RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent);
-RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent);
-int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags);
+DEPRECATEDIN_3_0(int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type,
+                                   unsigned int flags))
 int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags);
 int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
                           const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen);
index c68e347..7c1ffc7 100644 (file)
@@ -338,13 +338,10 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM deflt_keyexch[] = {
 };
 
 static const OSSL_ALGORITHM deflt_rands[] = {
-    { "TEST-RAND", "provider=default", test_rng_functions },
+    { "CTR-DRBG", "provider=default", drbg_ctr_functions },
     { "HASH-DRBG", "provider=default", drbg_hash_functions },
-/*
     { "HMAC-DRBG", "provider=default", drbg_hmac_functions },
-    { "CTR-DRBG", "provider=default", drbg_ctr_functions },
-*/
-    { "CRNGT:continuous-rng-test", "provider=default", crngt_functions },
+    { "TEST-RAND", "provider=default", test_rng_functions },
     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
index 5927c9f..6a1b56e 100644 (file)
@@ -470,17 +470,10 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_kdfs[] = {
 };
 
 static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_rands[] = {
-    /*
-     * The TEST RNG must be first, so it can be suppressed after the power up
-     * tests are completed.
-     */
-    { "TEST-RAND", "provider=fips", test_rng_functions },
+    { "CTR-DRBG", "provider=fips", drbg_ctr_functions },
     { "HASH-DRBG", "provider=fips", drbg_hash_functions },
-/*
     { "HMAC-DRBG", "provider=fips", drbg_hmac_functions },
-    { "CTR-DRBG", "provider=fips", drbg_ctr_functions },
-*/
-    { "CRNGT:continuous-rng-test", "provider=fips", crngt_functions },
+    { "TEST-RAND", "provider=fips", test_rng_functions },
     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
index 5d55c27..1e710bb 100644 (file)
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
 SUBDIRS=seeding
 
-# Missing: drbg_ctr.c
-SOURCE[../../libfips.a]=drbg.c
-SOURCE[../../libnonfips.a]=drbg.c
+$COMMON=drbg.c test_rng.c drbg_ctr.c drbg_hash.c drbg_hmac.c crngt.c rand_pool.c
 
-# Missing: drbg_hmac.c
-SOURCE[../../libimplementations.a]=test_rng.c drbg_hash.c crngt.c
+SOURCE[../../libfips.a]=$COMMON
+SOURCE[../../libnonfips.a]=$COMMON
index 2680f7b..1777b33 100644 (file)
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include "prov/rand_pool.h"
 #include "drbg_local.h"
-#include "seeding/seeding.h"
+#include "prov/seeding.h"
 
 typedef struct crng_test_global_st {
     unsigned char crngt_prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
index c9e4cd4..db8fce8 100644 (file)
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include "crypto/rand.h"
 #include "drbg_local.h"
 #include "internal/thread_once.h"
 #include "crypto/cryptlib.h"
-#include "seeding/seeding.h"
-#include "crypto/rand_pool.h"
+#include "prov/seeding.h"
+#include "prov/rand_pool.h"
+#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
 
 /*
  * Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG
  * a much bigger deal than just re-setting an allocated resource.)
  */
 
-#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
-# define get_entropy        prov_crngt_get_entropy
-# define cleanup_entropy    prov_crngt_cleanup_entropy
-#else
-# define get_entropy        prov_drbg_get_entropy
-# define cleanup_entropy    prov_drbg_cleanup_entropy
-#endif
-
 /* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */
 static const char ossl_pers_string[] = DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING;
 
-static unsigned int master_reseed_interval = MASTER_RESEED_INTERVAL;
-static unsigned int slave_reseed_interval  = SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL;
-
-static time_t master_reseed_time_interval = MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL;
-static time_t slave_reseed_time_interval  = SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL;
-
 static const OSSL_DISPATCH *find_call(const OSSL_DISPATCH *dispatch,
                                       int function);
 
+static int rand_drbg_restart(PROV_DRBG *drbg);
+
 int drbg_lock(void *vctx)
 {
     PROV_DRBG *drbg = vctx;
@@ -71,14 +62,12 @@ void drbg_unlock(void *vctx)
 static int drbg_lock_parent(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
 {
     void *parent = drbg->parent;
-    const OSSL_DISPATCH *pfunc;
 
-    if (parent != NULL) {
-        pfunc = find_call(drbg->parent_dispatch, OSSL_FUNC_RAND_LOCK);
-        if (pfunc != NULL && !OSSL_get_OP_rand_lock(pfunc)(parent)) {
-            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, RAND_R_PARENT_LOCKING_NOT_ENABLED);
-            return 0;
-        }
+    if (parent != NULL
+            && drbg->parent_lock != NULL
+            && !drbg->parent_lock(parent)) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PARENT_LOCKING_NOT_ENABLED);
+        return 0;
     }
     return 1;
 }
@@ -86,74 +75,62 @@ static int drbg_lock_parent(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
 static void drbg_unlock_parent(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
 {
     void *parent = drbg->parent;
-    const OSSL_DISPATCH *pfunc;
 
-    if (parent != NULL) {
-        pfunc = find_call(drbg->parent_dispatch, OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNLOCK);
-        if (pfunc != NULL)
-            OSSL_get_OP_rand_unlock(pfunc)(parent);
-    }
+    if (parent != NULL && drbg->parent_unlock != NULL)
+        drbg->parent_unlock(parent);
 }
 
-static int get_parent_strength(PROV_DRBG *drbg, int *str)
+static int get_parent_strength(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned int *str)
 {
     OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
-    const OSSL_DISPATCH *pfunc;
     void *parent = drbg->parent;
+    int res;
 
-    pfunc = find_call(drbg->parent_dispatch, OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GET_CTX_PARAMS);
-    if (pfunc == NULL) {
-        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_PARENT_STRENGTH);
+    if (drbg->parent_get_ctx_params == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_PARENT_STRENGTH);
         return 0;
     }
-    *params = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_STRENGTH, str);
+
+    *params = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_STRENGTH, str);
     if (!drbg_lock_parent(drbg)) {
-        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_LOCK_PARENT);
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_LOCK_PARENT);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (!OSSL_get_OP_rand_get_ctx_params(pfunc)(parent, params)) {
-        drbg_unlock_parent(drbg);
-        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_PARENT_STRENGTH);
+    res = drbg->parent_get_ctx_params(parent, params);
+    drbg_unlock_parent(drbg);
+    if (!res) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_PARENT_STRENGTH);
         return 0;
     }
-    drbg_unlock_parent(drbg);
     return 1;
 }
 
 static unsigned int get_parent_reseed_count(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
 {
     OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
-    const OSSL_DISPATCH *pfunc;
     void *parent = drbg->parent;
     unsigned int r;
 
-    pfunc = find_call(drbg->parent_dispatch, OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GET_CTX_PARAMS);
-    if (pfunc == NULL) {
-        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
-                  RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_PARENT_RESEED_PROP_COUNTER);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    *params = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_RESEED_PROP_CTR, &r);
+    *params = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_CTR, &r);
     if (!drbg_lock_parent(drbg)) {
-        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_LOCK_PARENT);
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_LOCK_PARENT);
         goto err;
     }
-    if (!OSSL_get_OP_rand_get_ctx_params(pfunc)(parent, params)) {
+    if (!drbg->parent_get_ctx_params(parent, params)) {
         drbg_unlock_parent(drbg);
-        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_RESEED_PROP_CTR);
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_RESEED_PROP_CTR);
         goto err;
     }
     drbg_unlock_parent(drbg);
     return r;
 
  err:
-    r = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter) - 2;
+    r = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_counter) - 2;
     if (r == 0)
         r = UINT_MAX;
     return r;
 }
 
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 /*
  * Implements the get_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
  *
@@ -161,20 +138,19 @@ static unsigned int get_parent_reseed_count(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
  * is fetched using the parent's RAND_DRBG_generate().
  *
  * Otherwise, the entropy is polled from the system entropy sources
- * using rand_pool_acquire_entropy().
+ * using prov_pool_acquire_entropy().
  *
  * If a random pool has been added to the DRBG using RAND_add(), then
  * its entropy will be used up first.
  */
 static size_t prov_drbg_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
-                                    int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
-                                    int prediction_resistance)
+                                    int entropy, size_t min_len,
+                                    size_t max_len, int prediction_resistance)
 {
     size_t ret = 0;
     size_t entropy_available = 0;
     RAND_POOL *pool;
-    int p_str;
-    const OSSL_DISPATCH *pfunc;
+    unsigned int p_str;
 
     if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
         if (!get_parent_strength(drbg, &p_str))
@@ -184,7 +160,7 @@ static size_t prov_drbg_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
              * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
              * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
              */
-            RANDerr(0, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
+            RANDerr(0, PROV_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
             return 0;
         }
     }
@@ -193,9 +169,11 @@ static size_t prov_drbg_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
         pool = drbg->seed_pool;
         pool->entropy_requested = entropy;
     } else {
-        pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, drbg->secure, min_len, max_len);
-        if (pool == NULL)
+        pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
+        if (pool == NULL) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
             return 0;
+        }
     }
 
     if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
@@ -213,25 +191,23 @@ static size_t prov_drbg_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
              * generating bits from it. (Note: taking the lock will be a no-op
              * if locking if drbg->parent->lock == NULL.)
              */
-            pfunc = find_call(drbg->parent_dispatch, OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GENERATE);
-            if (pfunc == NULL)
-                return 0;
+            if (drbg->parent_generate == NULL)
+                goto err;
             drbg_lock_parent(drbg);
-            if (OSSL_get_OP_rand_generate(pfunc)(drbg->parent, buffer, bytes_needed,
-                                                 drbg->strength,
-                                                 prediction_resistance,
-                                                 (unsigned char *)&drbg,
-                                                 sizeof(drbg)) != 0)
+            if (drbg->parent_generate(drbg->parent, buffer, bytes_needed,
+                                      drbg->strength, prediction_resistance,
+                                      (unsigned char *)&drbg,
+                                      sizeof(drbg)) != 0)
                 bytes = bytes_needed;
-            drbg->reseed_next_counter = get_parent_reseed_count(drbg);
             drbg_unlock_parent(drbg);
+            drbg->parent_reseed_counter = get_parent_reseed_count(drbg);
 
             rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
             entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
         }
     } else {
         /* Get entropy by polling system entropy sources. */
-        entropy_available = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
+        entropy_available = prov_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
     }
 
     if (entropy_available > 0) {
@@ -239,6 +215,7 @@ static size_t prov_drbg_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
         *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
     }
 
+err:
     if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
         rand_pool_free(pool);
     return ret;
@@ -251,14 +228,68 @@ static size_t prov_drbg_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
 static void prov_drbg_cleanup_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
                                       unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
 {
-    if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL) {
-        if (drbg->secure)
-            OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
-        else
-            OPENSSL_clear_free(out, outlen);
+    OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
+
+    if (drbg->get_entropy_fn != NULL) {
+        if (drbg->cleanup_entropy_fn != NULL) {
+            *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_SIZE,
+                                               &outlen);
+            *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RANDOM_DATA,
+                                                  (void **)&out, 0);
+            *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+            drbg->cleanup_entropy_fn(params, drbg->callback_arg);
+        }
+    } else if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
     }
 }
+
+static size_t get_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout, int entropy,
+                          size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
+                          int prediction_resistance)
+{
+    if (drbg->get_entropy_fn != NULL) {
+        OSSL_PARAM params[6], *p = params;
+        OSSL_PARAM out[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
+
+        *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_ENTROPY_REQUIRED,
+                                        &entropy);
+        *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE,
+                                        &prediction_resistance);
+        *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_LENGTH,
+                                           &min_len);
+        *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_LENGTH,
+                                           &max_len);
+        *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+        *out = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RANDOM_DATA,
+                                              (void **)pout, 0);
+
+        if (drbg->get_entropy_fn(params, out, drbg->callback_arg))
+            return out->return_size;
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_ENTROPY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+    if (drbg->parent == NULL)
+        return prov_crngt_get_entropy(drbg, pout, entropy, min_len, max_len,
+                                      prediction_resistance);
+#endif
+
+    return prov_drbg_get_entropy(drbg, pout, entropy, min_len, max_len,
+                                 prediction_resistance);
+}
+
+static void cleanup_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+{
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+    if (drbg->parent == NULL)
+        prov_crngt_cleanup_entropy(drbg, out, outlen);
+    else
 #endif
+        prov_drbg_cleanup_entropy(drbg, out, outlen);
+}
 
 #ifndef PROV_RAND_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
 typedef struct prov_drbg_nonce_global_st {
@@ -311,26 +342,63 @@ static size_t prov_drbg_get_nonce(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
                                   unsigned char **pout,
                                   int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
 {
-    size_t ret = 0;
+    size_t ret = 0, n;
     RAND_POOL *pool;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+    OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(drbg->provctx);
     PROV_DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl
-        = openssl_ctx_get_data(drbg->libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_NONCE_INDEX,
+        = openssl_ctx_get_data(libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_NONCE_INDEX,
                                &drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_method);
+    OSSL_PARAM params[5], *p = params;
+    OSSL_PARAM out[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
     struct {
         void *instance;
         int count;
     } data;
     
-
     if (dngbl == NULL)
         return 0;
 
+    if (drbg->get_nonce_fn != NULL) {
+        *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_ENTROPY_REQUIRED,
+                                        &entropy);
+        *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_LENGTH,
+                                           &min_len);
+        *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_LENGTH,
+                                           &max_len);
+        *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+        *out = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RANDOM_DATA,
+                                              (void **)pout, 0);
+
+        if (drbg->get_nonce_fn(params, out, drbg->callback_arg))
+            return out->return_size;
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_NONCE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
+        if (drbg->parent_nonce != NULL) {
+            n = drbg->parent_nonce(drbg->parent, NULL, 0, drbg->min_noncelen,
+                                   drbg->max_noncelen);
+            if (n > 0 && (buf = OPENSSL_malloc(n)) != NULL) {
+                ret = drbg->parent_nonce(drbg->parent, buf, 0,
+                                         drbg->min_noncelen,
+                                         drbg->max_noncelen);
+                if (ret == n) {
+                    *pout = buf;
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                OPENSSL_free(buf);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Use the built in nonce source */
     memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
     pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, min_len, max_len);
     if (pool == NULL)
         return 0;
 
-    if (rand_pool_add_nonce_data(pool) == 0)
+    if (prov_pool_add_nonce_data(pool) == 0)
         goto err;
 
     data.instance = drbg;
@@ -348,17 +416,30 @@ static size_t prov_drbg_get_nonce(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
 
     return ret;
 }
-#endif
 
-/*
- * Implements the cleanup_nonce() callback (see PROV_DRBG_set_callbacks())
- *
- */
-static void prov_drbg_cleanup_nonce(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
-                                    unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+static void prov_drbg_clear_nonce(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *nonce,
+                                  size_t noncelen)
 {
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(out, outlen);
+    OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
+
+    if (drbg->get_nonce_fn != NULL) {
+        if (drbg->cleanup_nonce_fn != NULL) {
+            *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_SIZE,
+                                               &noncelen);
+            *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RANDOM_DATA,
+                                                  (void **)&nonce, 0);
+            *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+            drbg->cleanup_nonce_fn(params, drbg->callback_arg);
+        }
+    } else {
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(nonce, noncelen);
+    }
 }
+#else
+# define prov_drbg_clear_nonce(drbg, nonce, len) \
+    OPENSSL_clear_free((nonce), (len))
+#endif /* PROV_RAND_GET_RANDOM_NONCE */
 
 /*
  * Instantiate |drbg|, after it has been initialized.  Use |pers| and
@@ -368,23 +449,16 @@ static void prov_drbg_cleanup_nonce(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
  *
  * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
  */
-int PROV_DRBG_instantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg, int strength,
+int PROV_DRBG_instantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned int strength,
                           int prediction_resistance,
-                          const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen,
-                          int (*ifnc)(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
-                                      const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
-                                      const unsigned char *nonce,
-                                      size_t nonce_len,
-                                      const unsigned char *pstr,
-                                      size_t pstr_len))
+                          const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
 {
     unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL;
     size_t noncelen = 0, entropylen = 0;
     size_t min_entropy, min_entropylen, max_entropylen;
-    const OSSL_DISPATCH *pnonce;
 
     if (strength > drbg->strength) {
-        PROVerr(0, RAND_R_INSUFFICIENT_DRBG_STRENGTH);
+        PROVerr(0, PROV_R_INSUFFICIENT_DRBG_STRENGTH);
         goto end;
     }
     min_entropy = drbg->strength;
@@ -396,50 +470,54 @@ int PROV_DRBG_instantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg, int strength,
         perslen = sizeof(ossl_pers_string);
     }
     if (perslen > drbg->max_perslen) {
-        PROVerr(0, RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG);
+        PROVerr(0, PROV_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG);
         goto end;
     }
 
-    if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
-        if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR)
-            PROVerr(0, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
+    if (drbg->state != EVP_RAND_STATE_UNINITIALISED) {
+        if (drbg->state == EVP_RAND_STATE_ERROR)
+            PROVerr(0, PROV_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
         else
-            PROVerr(0, RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED);
+            PROVerr(0, PROV_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED);
         goto end;
     }
 
-    drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
+    drbg->state = EVP_RAND_STATE_ERROR;
 
     if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0) {
+        if (drbg->parent_nonce != NULL) {
+            noncelen = drbg->parent_nonce(drbg->parent, NULL, drbg->strength,
+                                          drbg->min_noncelen,
+                                          drbg->max_noncelen);
+            if (noncelen == 0) {
+                PROVerr(0, PROV_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            nonce = OPENSSL_malloc(noncelen);
+            if (nonce == NULL) {
+                PROVerr(0, PROV_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE);
+                goto end;
+            }
+            if (noncelen != drbg->parent_nonce(drbg->parent, nonce,
+                                               drbg->strength,
+                                               drbg->min_noncelen,
+                                               drbg->max_noncelen)) {
+                PROVerr(0, PROV_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE);
+                OPENSSL_free(nonce);
+            }
 #ifndef PROV_RAND_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
-        if (drbg->parent != NULL)
+        } else if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
 #endif
-        {
-            pnonce = find_call(drbg->parent_dispatch, OSSL_FUNC_RAND_NONCE);
-            if (pnonce == NULL) {
-                /*
-                 * NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1 says you can combine getting
-                 * the entropy and nonce in 1 call by increasing the entropy
-                 * with 50% and increasing the minimum length to accommodate
-                 * the length of the nonce. We do this in case a nonce is
-                 * required and there is no parental nonce capability.
-                 */
-                min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2;
-                min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen;
-                max_entropylen += drbg->max_noncelen;
-            } else {
-                drbg_lock_parent(drbg);
-                noncelen = OSSL_get_OP_rand_nonce(pnonce)(drbg->parent, &nonce,
-                                                          drbg->strength / 2,
-                                                          drbg->min_noncelen,
-                                                          drbg->max_noncelen);
-                drbg_unlock_parent(drbg);
-                if (noncelen < drbg->min_noncelen
-                        || noncelen > drbg->max_noncelen) {
-                    PROVerr(0, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE);
-                    goto end;
-                }
-            }
+            /*
+             * NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1 says you can combine getting
+             * the entropy and nonce in 1 call by increasing the entropy
+             * with 50% and increasing the minimum length to accommodate
+             * the length of the nonce. We do this in case a nonce is
+             * required and there is no parental nonce capability.
+             */
+            min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2;
+            min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen;
+            max_entropylen += drbg->max_noncelen;
         }
 #ifndef PROV_RAND_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
         else { /* parent == NULL */
@@ -448,17 +526,17 @@ int PROV_DRBG_instantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg, int strength,
                                            drbg->max_noncelen);
             if (noncelen < drbg->min_noncelen
                     || noncelen > drbg->max_noncelen) {
-                PROVerr(0, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE);
+                PROVerr(0, PROV_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE);
                 goto end;
             }
         }
 #endif
     }
 
-    drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
+    drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_counter);
     if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) {
         drbg->reseed_next_counter++;
-        if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter)
+        if (!drbg->reseed_next_counter)
             drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1;
     }
 
@@ -467,30 +545,43 @@ int PROV_DRBG_instantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg, int strength,
                              prediction_resistance);
     if (entropylen < min_entropylen
             || entropylen > max_entropylen) {
-        PROVerr(0, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
+        PROVerr(0, PROV_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
         goto end;
     }
 
-    if (!ifnc(drbg, entropy, entropylen, nonce, noncelen, pers, perslen)) {
-        PROVerr(0, RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG);
+    if (!drbg->instantiate(drbg, entropy, entropylen, nonce, noncelen,
+                           pers, perslen)) {
+        PROVerr(0, PROV_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG);
         goto end;
     }
 
-    drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
+    drbg->state = EVP_RAND_STATE_READY;
     drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1;
     drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
-    tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter);
+    tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter);
 
  end:
     if (entropy != NULL)
         cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
-    if (nonce != NULL)
-        prov_drbg_cleanup_nonce(drbg, nonce, noncelen);
-    if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
+    prov_drbg_clear_nonce(drbg, nonce, noncelen);
+    if (drbg->state == EVP_RAND_STATE_READY)
         return 1;
     return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Uninstantiate |drbg|. Must be instantiated before it can be used.
+ *
+ * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ */
+int PROV_DRBG_uninstantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+    drbg->state = EVP_RAND_STATE_UNINITIALISED;
+    return 1;
+}
+
 /*
  * Reseed |drbg|, mixing in the specified data
  *
@@ -500,60 +591,101 @@ int PROV_DRBG_instantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg, int strength,
  */
 int PROV_DRBG_reseed(PROV_DRBG *drbg, int prediction_resistance,
                      const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
-                     const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen,
-                     int (*reseed)(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
-                                   const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
-                                   const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len))
+                     const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
 {
     unsigned char *entropy = NULL;
     size_t entropylen = 0;
 
-    if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
-        PROVerr(0, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
-        return 0;
+    if (drbg->state != EVP_RAND_STATE_READY) {
+        /* try to recover from previous errors */
+        rand_drbg_restart(drbg);
+
+        if (drbg->state == EVP_RAND_STATE_ERROR) {
+            PROVerr(0, PROV_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (drbg->state == EVP_RAND_STATE_UNINITIALISED) {
+            PROVerr(0, PROV_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
+            return 0;
+        }
     }
-    if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
-        PROVerr(0, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
-        return 0;
+
+    if (ent != NULL) {
+        if (ent_len < drbg->min_entropylen) {
+            RANDerr(0, RAND_R_ENTROPY_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+            drbg->state = EVP_RAND_STATE_ERROR;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (ent_len > drbg->max_entropylen) {
+            RANDerr(0, RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
+            drbg->state = EVP_RAND_STATE_ERROR;
+            return 0;
+        }
     }
 
     if (adin == NULL) {
         adinlen = 0;
     } else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
-        PROVerr(0, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
+        PROVerr(0, PROV_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
         return 0;
     }
 
-    drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
+    drbg->state = EVP_RAND_STATE_ERROR;
 
-    drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
+    drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_counter);
     if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) {
         drbg->reseed_next_counter++;
-        if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter)
+        if (!drbg->reseed_next_counter)
             drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1;
     }
 
+    if (ent != NULL) {
+#ifdef FIP_MODULE
+        /*
+         * NIST SP-800-90A mandates that entropy *shall not* be provided
+         * by the consuming application. Instead the data is added as additional
+         * input.
+         *
+         * (NIST SP-800-90Ar1, Sections 9.1 and 9.2)
+         */
+        if (!drbg->reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, ent, ent_len)) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_RESEED);
+            return 0;
+        }
+#else
+        if (!drbg->reseed(drbg, ent, ent_len, adin, adinlen)) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_RESEED);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        /* There isn't much point adding the same additional input twice */
+        adin = NULL;
+        adinlen = 0;
+#endif
+    }
+
+    /* Reseed using our sources in addition */
     entropylen = get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
                              drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen,
                              prediction_resistance);
     if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen
             || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) {
-        PROVerr(0, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
+        PROVerr(0, PROV_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
         goto end;
     }
 
-    if (!reseed(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen))
+    if (!drbg->reseed(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen))
         goto end;
 
-    drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
+    drbg->state = EVP_RAND_STATE_READY;
     drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1;
     drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
-    tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter);
+    tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter);
+    if (drbg->parent != NULL)
+        drbg->parent_reseed_counter = get_parent_reseed_count(drbg);
 
  end:
-    if (entropy != NULL)
-        OPENSSL_cleanse(entropy, entropylen);
-    if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
+    cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
+    if (drbg->state == EVP_RAND_STATE_READY)
         return 1;
     return 0;
 }
@@ -569,35 +701,36 @@ int PROV_DRBG_reseed(PROV_DRBG *drbg, int prediction_resistance,
  *
  */
 int PROV_DRBG_generate(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
-                       int strength, int prediction_resistance,
-                       const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen,
-                       int (*generate)(PROV_DRBG *, unsigned char *out,
-                                       size_t outlen, const unsigned char *adin,
-                                       size_t adin_len),
-                       int (*reseed)(PROV_DRBG *drbg, const unsigned char *ent,
-                                     size_t ent_len, const unsigned char *adin,
-                                     size_t adin_len))
+                       unsigned int strength, int prediction_resistance,
+                       const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
 {
     int fork_id;
     int reseed_required = 0;
 
-    if (drbg->state != DRBG_READY) {
-        if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
-            PROVerr(0, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
+    if (drbg->state != EVP_RAND_STATE_READY) {
+        /* try to recover from previous errors */
+        rand_drbg_restart(drbg);
+
+        if (drbg->state == EVP_RAND_STATE_ERROR) {
+            PROVerr(0, PROV_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
             return 0;
         }
-        if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
-            PROVerr(0, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
+        if (drbg->state == EVP_RAND_STATE_UNINITIALISED) {
+            PROVerr(0, PROV_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
             return 0;
         }
     }
+    if (strength > drbg->strength) {
+        PROVerr(0, PROV_R_INSUFFICIENT_DRBG_STRENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
 
     if (outlen > drbg->max_request) {
-        PROVerr(0, RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG);
+        PROVerr(0, PROV_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG);
         return 0;
     }
     if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
-        PROVerr(0, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
+        PROVerr(0, PROV_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
         return 0;
     }
 
@@ -618,28 +751,23 @@ int PROV_DRBG_generate(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
             || now - drbg->reseed_time >= drbg->reseed_time_interval)
             reseed_required = 1;
     }
-    if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
-        unsigned int reseed_counter = 0;
-
-        if (reseed_counter > 0
-            && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) !=
-               tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter))
-            reseed_required = 1;
-    }
+    if (drbg->parent != NULL
+            && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) != drbg->parent_reseed_counter)
+        reseed_required = 1;
 
     if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
         if (!PROV_DRBG_reseed(drbg, prediction_resistance, NULL, 0,
-                              adin, adinlen, reseed)) {
-            PROVerr(0, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR);
+                              adin, adinlen)) {
+            PROVerr(0, PROV_R_RESEED_ERROR);
             return 0;
         }
         adin = NULL;
         adinlen = 0;
     }
 
-    if (!generate(drbg, out, outlen, adin, adinlen)) {
-        drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
-        PROVerr(0, RAND_R_GENERATE_ERROR);
+    if (!drbg->generate(drbg, out, outlen, adin, adinlen)) {
+        drbg->state = EVP_RAND_STATE_ERROR;
+        PROVerr(0, PROV_R_GENERATE_ERROR);
         return 0;
     }
 
@@ -648,83 +776,73 @@ int PROV_DRBG_generate(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
     return 1;
 }
 
-#if 0
 /*
- * Calculates the minimum length of a full entropy buffer
- * which is necessary to seed (i.e. instantiate) the DRBG
- * successfully.
+ * Restart |drbg|, using the specified entropy or additional input
+ *
+ * Tries its best to get the drbg instantiated by all means,
+ * regardless of its current state.
+ *
+ * Optionally, a |buffer| of |len| random bytes can be passed,
+ * which is assumed to contain at least |entropy| bits of entropy.
+ *
+ * If |entropy| > 0, the buffer content is used as entropy input.
+ *
+ * If |entropy| == 0, the buffer content is used as additional input
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ *
+ * This function is used internally only.
  */
-size_t prov_drbg_seedlen(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
+static int rand_drbg_restart(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
 {
-    /*
-     * If no os entropy source is available then PROV_seed(buffer, bufsize)
-     * is expected to succeed if and only if the buffer length satisfies
-     * the following requirements, which follow from the calculations
-     * in PROV_DRBG_instantiate().
-     */
-    size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength;
-    size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen;
-
-    /*
-     * Extra entropy for the random nonce in the absence of a
-     * get_nonce callback, see comment in PROV_DRBG_instantiate().
-     */
-    if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0) {
-#ifndef PROV_RAND_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
-        if (drbg->parent != NULL)
-#endif
-            if (find_call(drbg->parent_dispatch,
-                          OSSL_FUNC_RAND_NONCE) == NULL) {
-                min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2;
-                min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen;
-            }
+    if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) {
+        drbg->state = EVP_RAND_STATE_ERROR;
+        rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool);
+        drbg->seed_pool = NULL;
+        RANDerr(0, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
     }
 
-    /*
-     * Convert entropy requirement from bits to bytes
-     * (dividing by 8 without rounding upwards, because
-     * all entropy requirements are divisible by 8).
-     */
-    min_entropy >>= 3;
+    /* repair error state */
+    if (drbg->state == EVP_RAND_STATE_ERROR)
+        drbg->uninstantiate(drbg);
+
+    /* repair uninitialized state */
+    if (drbg->state == EVP_RAND_STATE_UNINITIALISED)
+        /* reinstantiate drbg */
+        PROV_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, drbg->strength, 0, NULL, 0);
 
-    /* Return a value that satisfies both requirements */
-    return min_entropy > min_entropylen ? min_entropy : min_entropylen;
+    rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool);
+    drbg->seed_pool = NULL;
+    return drbg->state == EVP_RAND_STATE_READY;
 }
-#endif
 
 /* Provider support from here down */
 static const OSSL_DISPATCH *find_call(const OSSL_DISPATCH *dispatch,
                                       int function)
 {
     if (dispatch != NULL)
-        while (dispatch->function_id != 0)
+        while (dispatch->function_id != 0) {
             if (dispatch->function_id == function)
                 return dispatch;
+            dispatch++;
+        }
     return NULL;
 }
 
 int drbg_enable_locking(void *vctx)
 {
     PROV_DRBG *drbg = vctx;
-    const OSSL_DISPATCH *pfunc;
 
-    if (drbg == NULL)
-        return 1;
-    if (drbg->lock == NULL) {
-        if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
-            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, RAND_R_DRBG_ALREADY_INITIALIZED);
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        pfunc = find_call(drbg->parent_dispatch, OSSL_FUNC_RAND_ENABLE_LOCKING);
-        if (pfunc != NULL)
-            if (!OSSL_get_OP_rand_enable_locking(pfunc)(drbg->parent)) {
-                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, RAND_R_PARENT_LOCKING_NOT_ENABLED);
+    if (drbg != NULL && drbg->lock == NULL) {
+        if (drbg->parent_enable_locking != NULL)
+            if (!drbg->parent_enable_locking(drbg->parent)) {
+                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PARENT_LOCKING_NOT_ENABLED);
                 return 0;
             }
         drbg->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
         if (drbg->lock == NULL) {
-            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, RAND_R_FAILED_TO_CREATE_LOCK);
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_CREATE_LOCK);
             return 0;
         }
     }
@@ -739,22 +857,49 @@ int drbg_enable_locking(void *vctx)
  *
  * Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
  */
-PROV_DRBG *prov_rand_drbg_new(void *provctx, int secure, void *parent,
-                              const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_dispatch,
-                              int (*dnew)(PROV_DRBG *ctx, int secure))
+PROV_DRBG *prov_rand_drbg_new
+    (void *provctx, void *parent, const OSSL_DISPATCH *p_dispatch,
+     int (*dnew)(PROV_DRBG *ctx),
+     int (*instantiate)(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
+                        const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen,
+                        const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen,
+                        const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen),
+     int (*uninstantiate)(PROV_DRBG *ctx),
+     int (*reseed)(PROV_DRBG *drbg, const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
+                   const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len),
+     int (*generate)(PROV_DRBG *, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+                     const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len))
 {
     PROV_DRBG *drbg = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
-    int p_str;
+    unsigned int p_str;
+    const OSSL_DISPATCH *pfunc;
 
     if (drbg == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return NULL;
     }
 
-    drbg->libctx = provctx;
-    drbg->secure = secure;
+    drbg->provctx = provctx;
+    drbg->instantiate = instantiate;
+    drbg->uninstantiate = uninstantiate;
+    drbg->reseed = reseed;
+    drbg->generate = generate;
+    drbg->fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id();
+
+    /* Extract parent's functions */
     drbg->parent = parent;
-    drbg->parent_dispatch = parent_dispatch;
+    if ((pfunc = find_call(p_dispatch, OSSL_FUNC_RAND_ENABLE_LOCKING)) != NULL)
+        drbg->parent_enable_locking = OSSL_get_OP_rand_enable_locking(pfunc);
+    if ((pfunc = find_call(p_dispatch, OSSL_FUNC_RAND_LOCK)) != NULL)
+        drbg->parent_lock = OSSL_get_OP_rand_lock(pfunc);
+    if ((pfunc = find_call(p_dispatch, OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNLOCK)) != NULL)
+        drbg->parent_unlock = OSSL_get_OP_rand_unlock(pfunc);
+    if ((pfunc = find_call(p_dispatch, OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GET_CTX_PARAMS)) != NULL)
+        drbg->parent_get_ctx_params = OSSL_get_OP_rand_get_ctx_params(pfunc);
+    if ((pfunc = find_call(p_dispatch, OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GENERATE)) != NULL)
+        drbg->parent_generate = OSSL_get_OP_rand_generate(pfunc);
+    if ((pfunc = find_call(p_dispatch, OSSL_FUNC_RAND_NONCE)) != NULL)
+        drbg->parent_nonce = OSSL_get_OP_rand_nonce(pfunc);
 
     /* Set some default maximums up */
     drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
@@ -762,21 +907,11 @@ PROV_DRBG *prov_rand_drbg_new(void *provctx, int secure, void *parent,
     drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
     drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
     drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1;
+    drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
+    drbg->reseed_interval = RESEED_INTERVAL;
+    drbg->reseed_time_interval = TIME_INTERVAL;
 
-    /* TODO(3.0) clean this up */
-    if (parent == NULL) {
-        drbg->reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval;
-        drbg->reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval;
-    } else {
-        /*
-         * Do not provide nonce callbacks, the child DRBGs will
-         * obtain their nonce using random bits from the parent.
-         */
-        drbg->reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval;
-        drbg->reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval;
-    }
-
-    if (!dnew(drbg, secure))
+    if (!dnew(drbg))
         goto err;
 
     if (parent != NULL) {
@@ -787,7 +922,7 @@ PROV_DRBG *prov_rand_drbg_new(void *provctx, int secure, void *parent,
              * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
              * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
              */
-            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
             goto err;
         }
     }
@@ -805,16 +940,14 @@ void prov_rand_drbg_free(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
 
     rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool);
     CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(drbg->lock);
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
-    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RAND_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data);
-#endif
+    OPENSSL_free(drbg);
 }
 
 int drbg_get_ctx_params(PROV_DRBG *drbg, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     OSSL_PARAM *p;
 
-    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_RAND_PARAM_STATUS);
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_RAND_PARAM_STATE);
     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, drbg->state))
         return 0;
 
@@ -822,49 +955,49 @@ int drbg_get_ctx_params(PROV_DRBG *drbg, OSSL_PARAM params[])
     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, drbg->strength))
         return 0;
 
-    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MAX_REQUEST);
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_REQUEST);
     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, drbg->max_request))
         return 0;
 
-    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MIN_ENTROPYLEN);
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_ENTROPYLEN);
     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, drbg->min_entropylen))
         return 0;
 
-    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MAX_ENTROPYLEN);
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_ENTROPYLEN);
     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, drbg->max_entropylen))
         return 0;
 
-    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MIN_NONCELEN);
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_NONCELEN);
     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, drbg->min_noncelen))
         return 0;
 
-    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MAX_NONCELEN);
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_NONCELEN);
     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, drbg->max_noncelen))
         return 0;
 
-    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MAX_PERSLEN);
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_PERSLEN);
     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, drbg->max_perslen))
         return 0;
 
-    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MAX_ADINLEN);
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_ADINLEN);
     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, drbg->max_adinlen))
         return 0;
 
-    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_RAND_PARAM_RESEED_CTR);
-    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, drbg->reseed_gen_counter))
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS);
+    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, drbg->reseed_interval))
         return 0;
 
-    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_RAND_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS);
-    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, drbg->reseed_interval))
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME);
+    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_time_t(p, drbg->reseed_time))
         return 0;
 
-    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_RAND_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL);
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL);
     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_time_t(p, drbg->reseed_time_interval))
         return 0;
 
-    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_RAND_PARAM_RESEED_PROP_CTR);
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_CTR);
     if (p != NULL
-            && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter)))
+            && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_counter)))
         return 0;
     return 1;
 }
@@ -873,12 +1006,31 @@ int drbg_set_ctx_params(PROV_DRBG *drbg, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     const OSSL_PARAM *p;
 
-    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_RAND_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS);
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS);
     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &drbg->reseed_interval))
         return 0;
 
-    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_RAND_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL);
+    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL);
     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_time_t(p, &drbg->reseed_time_interval))
         return 0;
     return 1;
 }
+
+int drbg_set_callbacks(void *vctx, OSSL_INOUT_CALLBACK *get_entropy_fn,
+                       OSSL_CALLBACK *cleanup_entropy_fn,
+                       OSSL_INOUT_CALLBACK *get_nonce_fn,
+                       OSSL_CALLBACK *cleanup_nonce_fn, void *arg)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG *drbg = vctx;
+
+    if (drbg->state != EVP_RAND_STATE_UNINITIALISED
+            || drbg->parent != NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    drbg->get_entropy_fn = get_entropy_fn;
+    drbg->cleanup_entropy_fn = cleanup_entropy_fn;
+    drbg->get_nonce_fn = get_nonce_fn;
+    drbg->cleanup_nonce_fn = cleanup_nonce_fn;
+    drbg->callback_arg = arg;
+    return 1;
+}
index 33e1b32..14f8b9f 100644 (file)
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include "e_os.h" /* strcasecmp */
 #include "crypto/modes.h"
 #include "internal/thread_once.h"
-#include "rand_local.h"
+#include "prov/implementations.h"
+#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "drbg_local.h"
+
+static OSSL_OP_rand_newctx_fn drbg_ctr_new_wrapper;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_freectx_fn drbg_ctr_free;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_instantiate_fn drbg_ctr_instantiate_wrapper;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_uninstantiate_fn drbg_ctr_uninstantiate_wrapper;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_generate_fn drbg_ctr_generate_wrapper;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_reseed_fn drbg_ctr_reseed_wrapper;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_settable_ctx_params_fn drbg_ctr_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_set_ctx_params_fn drbg_ctr_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_gettable_ctx_params_fn drbg_ctr_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_get_ctx_params_fn drbg_ctr_get_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_verify_zeroization_fn drbg_ctr_verify_zeroization;
+
+/*
+ * The state of a DRBG AES-CTR.
+ */
+typedef struct rand_drbg_ctr_st {
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_ecb;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_ctr;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_df;
+    EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ecb;
+    EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ctr;
+    size_t keylen;
+    int use_df;
+    unsigned char K[32];
+    unsigned char V[16];
+    /* Temporary block storage used by ctr_df */
+    unsigned char bltmp[16];
+    size_t bltmp_pos;
+    unsigned char KX[48];
+} PROV_DRBG_CTR;
 
 /*
  * Implementation of NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG.
  */
-static void inc_128(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
+static void inc_128(PROV_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
 {
     unsigned char *p = &ctr->V[0];
     u32 n = 16, c = 1;
@@ -32,7 +68,7 @@ static void inc_128(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
     } while (n);
 }
 
-static void ctr_XOR(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+static void ctr_XOR(PROV_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
 {
     size_t i, n;
 
@@ -61,7 +97,7 @@ static void ctr_XOR(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
 /*
  * Process a complete block using BCC algorithm of SP 800-90A 10.3.3
  */
-__owur static int ctr_BCC_block(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out,
+__owur static int ctr_BCC_block(PROV_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out,
                                 const unsigned char *in, int len)
 {
     int i, outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
@@ -79,7 +115,7 @@ __owur static int ctr_BCC_block(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out,
 /*
  * Handle several BCC operations for as much data as we need for K and X
  */
-__owur static int ctr_BCC_blocks(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in)
+__owur static int ctr_BCC_blocks(PROV_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in)
 {
     unsigned char in_tmp[48];
     unsigned char num_of_blk = 2;
@@ -97,7 +133,7 @@ __owur static int ctr_BCC_blocks(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in)
  * Initialise BCC blocks: these have the value 0,1,2 in leftmost positions:
  * see 10.3.1 stage 7.
  */
-__owur static int ctr_BCC_init(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
+__owur static int ctr_BCC_init(PROV_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
 {
     unsigned char bltmp[48] = {0};
     unsigned char num_of_blk;
@@ -112,7 +148,7 @@ __owur static int ctr_BCC_init(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
 /*
  * Process several blocks into BCC algorithm, some possibly partial
  */
-__owur static int ctr_BCC_update(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
+__owur static int ctr_BCC_update(PROV_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
                                  const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
 {
     if (in == NULL || inlen == 0)
@@ -147,7 +183,7 @@ __owur static int ctr_BCC_update(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
     return 1;
 }
 
-__owur static int ctr_BCC_final(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
+__owur static int ctr_BCC_final(PROV_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
 {
     if (ctr->bltmp_pos) {
         memset(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, 0, 16 - ctr->bltmp_pos);
@@ -157,7 +193,7 @@ __owur static int ctr_BCC_final(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
     return 1;
 }
 
-__owur static int ctr_df(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
+__owur static int ctr_df(PROV_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
                          const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
                          const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
                          const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len)
@@ -220,12 +256,12 @@ __owur static int ctr_df(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
  * zeroes if necessary and have up to two parameters XORed together,
  * so we handle both cases in this function instead.
  */
-__owur static int ctr_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+__owur static int ctr_update(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
                              const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
                              const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
                              const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen)
 {
-    RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
+    PROV_DRBG_CTR *ctr = (PROV_DRBG_CTR *)drbg->data;
     int outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
     unsigned char V_tmp[48], out[48];
     unsigned char len;
@@ -247,7 +283,7 @@ __owur static int ctr_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
     memcpy(ctr->K, out, ctr->keylen);
     memcpy(ctr->V, out + ctr->keylen, 16);
 
-    if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) {
+    if (ctr->use_df) {
         /* If no input reuse existing derived value */
         if (in1 != NULL || nonce != NULL || in2 != NULL)
             if (!ctr_df(ctr, in1, in1len, nonce, noncelen, in2, in2len))
@@ -266,12 +302,12 @@ __owur static int ctr_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
     return 1;
 }
 
-__owur static int drbg_ctr_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
-                                       const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen,
-                                       const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen,
-                                       const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
+static int drbg_ctr_instantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
+                                const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen,
+                                const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen,
+                                const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
 {
-    RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
+    PROV_DRBG_CTR *ctr = (PROV_DRBG_CTR *)drbg->data;
 
     if (entropy == NULL)
         return 0;
@@ -287,11 +323,22 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
     return 1;
 }
 
-__owur static int drbg_ctr_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
-                                  const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen,
-                                  const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
+static int drbg_ctr_instantiate_wrapper(void *vdrbg, unsigned int strength,
+                                        int prediction_resistance,
+                                        const unsigned char *pstr,
+                                        size_t pstr_len)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+
+    return PROV_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, strength, prediction_resistance,
+                                 pstr, pstr_len);
+}
+
+static int drbg_ctr_reseed(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
+                           const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen,
+                           const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
 {
-    RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
+    PROV_DRBG_CTR *ctr = (PROV_DRBG_CTR *)drbg->data;
 
     if (entropy == NULL)
         return 0;
@@ -302,6 +349,16 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
     return 1;
 }
 
+static int drbg_ctr_reseed_wrapper(void *vdrbg, int prediction_resistance,
+                                   const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
+                                   const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+
+    return PROV_DRBG_reseed(drbg, prediction_resistance, ent, ent_len,
+                            adin, adin_len);
+}
+
 static void ctr96_inc(unsigned char *counter)
 {
     u32 n = 12, c = 1;
@@ -314,11 +371,11 @@ static void ctr96_inc(unsigned char *counter)
     } while (n);
 }
 
-__owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
-                                    unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
-                                    const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
+static int drbg_ctr_generate(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
+                             unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+                             const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
 {
-    RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
+    PROV_DRBG_CTR *ctr = (PROV_DRBG_CTR *)drbg->data;
     unsigned int ctr32, blocks;
     int outl, buflen;
 
@@ -328,7 +385,7 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
         if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
             return 0;
         /* This means we reuse derived value */
-        if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) {
+        if (ctr->use_df) {
             adin = NULL;
             adinlen = 1;
         }
@@ -388,116 +445,299 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
     return 1;
 }
 
-static int drbg_ctr_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+static int drbg_ctr_generate_wrapper
+    (void *vdrbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+     unsigned int strength, int prediction_resistance,
+     const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
 {
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ecb);
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ctr);
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_df);
-    EVP_CIPHER_free(drbg->data.ctr.cipher_ecb);
-    EVP_CIPHER_free(drbg->data.ctr.cipher_ctr);
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.ctr, sizeof(drbg->data.ctr));
-    return 1;
+    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+
+    return PROV_DRBG_generate(drbg, out, outlen, strength,
+                              prediction_resistance, adin, adin_len);
 }
 
-static RAND_DRBG_METHOD drbg_ctr_meth = {
-    drbg_ctr_instantiate,
-    drbg_ctr_reseed,
-    drbg_ctr_generate,
-    drbg_ctr_uninstantiate
-};
+static int drbg_ctr_uninstantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG_CTR *ctr = (PROV_DRBG_CTR *)drbg->data;
+
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ctr->K, sizeof(ctr->K));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ctr->V, sizeof(ctr->V));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ctr->bltmp, sizeof(ctr->bltmp));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ctr->KX, sizeof(ctr->KX));
+    ctr->bltmp_pos = 0;
+    return PROV_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
+}
 
-int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+static int drbg_ctr_uninstantiate_wrapper(void *vdrbg)
 {
-    RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
-    size_t keylen;
-    EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ecb = NULL;
-    EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ctr = NULL;
+    return drbg_ctr_uninstantiate((PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg);
+}
 
-    switch (drbg->type) {
-    default:
-        /* This can't happen, but silence the compiler warning. */
+static int drbg_ctr_verify_zeroization(void *vdrbg)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+    PROV_DRBG_CTR *ctr = (PROV_DRBG_CTR *)drbg->data;
+
+    PROV_DRBG_VERYIFY_ZEROIZATION(ctr->K);
+    PROV_DRBG_VERYIFY_ZEROIZATION(ctr->V);
+    PROV_DRBG_VERYIFY_ZEROIZATION(ctr->bltmp);
+    PROV_DRBG_VERYIFY_ZEROIZATION(ctr->KX);
+    if (ctr->bltmp_pos != 0)
         return 0;
-    case NID_aes_128_ctr:
-        keylen = 16;
-        cipher_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-128-ECB", "");
-        cipher_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-128-CTR", "");
-        break;
-    case NID_aes_192_ctr:
-        keylen = 24;
-        cipher_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-192-ECB", "");
-        cipher_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-192-CTR", "");
-        break;
-    case NID_aes_256_ctr:
-        keylen = 32;
-        cipher_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-256-ECB", "");
-        cipher_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-256-CTR", "");
-        break;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int drbg_ctr_init_lengths(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG_CTR *ctr = (PROV_DRBG_CTR *)drbg->data;
+    int res = 1;
+
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+    if (!ctr->use_df) {
+        PROVerr(0, RAND_R_DERIVATION_FUNCTION_MANDATORY_FOR_FIPS);
+        ctr->use_df = 1;
+        res = 0;
     }
-    if (cipher_ecb == NULL || cipher_ctr == NULL)
-        return 0;
+#endif
+    /* Maximum number of bits per request = 2^19  = 2^16 bytes */
+    drbg->max_request = 1 << 16;
+    if (ctr->use_df) {
+        drbg->min_entropylen = 0;
+        drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+        drbg->min_noncelen = 0;
+        drbg->max_noncelen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+        drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+        drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
 
-    EVP_CIPHER_free(ctr->cipher_ecb);
-    ctr->cipher_ecb = cipher_ecb;
-    EVP_CIPHER_free(ctr->cipher_ctr);
-    ctr->cipher_ctr = cipher_ctr;
+        if (ctr->keylen > 0) {
+            drbg->min_entropylen = ctr->keylen;
+            drbg->min_noncelen = drbg->min_entropylen / 2;
+        }
+    } else {
+        const size_t len = ctr->keylen > 0 ? drbg->seedlen : DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+        drbg->min_entropylen = len;
+        drbg->max_entropylen = len;
+        /* Nonce not used */
+        drbg->min_noncelen = 0;
+        drbg->max_noncelen = 0;
+        drbg->max_perslen = len;
+        drbg->max_adinlen = len;
+    }
+    return res;
+}
+
+static int drbg_ctr_init(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG_CTR *ctr = (PROV_DRBG_CTR *)drbg->data;
+    const size_t keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(ctr->cipher_ctr);
 
     ctr->keylen = keylen;
     if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL)
         ctr->ctx_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
     if (ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL)
         ctr->ctx_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
-    if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL || ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL
-        || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb,
-                              ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1)
-        || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr,
-                              ctr->cipher_ctr, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1))
+    if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL || ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (ctr->cipher_ctr != NULL) {
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb,
+                               ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1)
+            || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr,
+                                  ctr->cipher_ctr, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1)) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_INITIALISE_CIPHERS);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        drbg->strength = keylen * 8;
+        drbg->seedlen = keylen + 16;
+
+        if (ctr->use_df) {
+            /* df initialisation */
+            static const unsigned char df_key[32] = {
+                0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+                0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
+                0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
+                0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f
+            };
+
+            if (ctr->ctx_df == NULL)
+                ctr->ctx_df = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+            if (ctr->ctx_df == NULL) {
+                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            /* Set key schedule for df_key */
+            if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_df,
+                                   ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, df_key, NULL, 1)) {
+                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DERIVATION_FUNCTION_INIT_FAILED);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return drbg_ctr_init_lengths(drbg);
+
+err:
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctr->ctx_ecb);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctr->ctx_ctr);
+    ctr->ctx_ecb = ctr->ctx_ctr = NULL;
+    return 0;    
+}
+
+static int drbg_ctr_new(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG_CTR *ctr;
+
+    ctr = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*ctr));
+    if (ctr == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return 0;
+    }
+
+    ctr->use_df = 1;
+    drbg->data = ctr;
+    return drbg_ctr_init_lengths(drbg);
+}
+
+static void *drbg_ctr_new_wrapper(void *provctx, void *parent,
+                                   const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_dispatch)
+{
+    return prov_rand_drbg_new(provctx, parent, parent_dispatch, &drbg_ctr_new,
+                              &drbg_ctr_instantiate, &drbg_ctr_uninstantiate,
+                              &drbg_ctr_reseed, &drbg_ctr_generate);
+}
+
+static void drbg_ctr_free(void *vdrbg)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+    PROV_DRBG_CTR *ctr;
+
+    if (drbg != NULL && (ctr = (PROV_DRBG_CTR *)drbg->data) != NULL) {
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctr->ctx_ecb);
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctr->ctx_ctr);
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctr->ctx_df);
+        EVP_CIPHER_free(ctr->cipher_ecb);
+        EVP_CIPHER_free(ctr->cipher_ctr);
+
+        OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(ctr, sizeof(*ctr));
+    }
+    prov_rand_drbg_free(drbg);
+}
+
+static int drbg_ctr_get_ctx_params(void *vdrbg, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+
+    return drbg_get_ctx_params(drbg, params);
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *drbg_ctr_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_DRBG_GETABLE_CTX_COMMON,
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int drbg_ctr_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+    PROV_DRBG *ctx = (PROV_DRBG *)vctx;
+    PROV_DRBG_CTR *ctr = (PROV_DRBG_CTR *)ctx->data;
+    OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
+    const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+    char *ecb;
+    const char *propquery = NULL;
+    int i, cipher_init = 0;
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_USE_DF)) != NULL
+            && OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &i)) {
+        /* FIPS errors out in the drbg_ctr_init() call later */
+        ctr->use_df = i != 0;
+        cipher_init = 1;
+    }
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
+                                     OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_PROPERTIES)) != NULL) {
+        if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
+            return 0;
+        propquery = (const char *)p->data;
+    }
+
+    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_CIPHER)) != NULL) {
+        const char *base = (const char *)p->data;
 
-    drbg->meth = &drbg_ctr_meth;
-    drbg->strength = keylen * 8;
-    drbg->seedlen = keylen + 16;
-
-    if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) {
-        /* df initialisation */
-        static const unsigned char df_key[32] = {
-            0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
-            0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
-            0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
-            0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f
-        };
-
-        if (ctr->ctx_df == NULL)
-            ctr->ctx_df = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
-        if (ctr->ctx_df == NULL)
+        if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
+                || p->data_size < 3)
             return 0;
-        /* Set key schedule for df_key */
-        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_df,
-                               ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, df_key, NULL, 1))
+        if (strcasecmp("CTR", base + p->data_size - sizeof("CTR")) != 0) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_REQUIRE_CTR_MODE_CIPHER);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if ((ecb = OPENSSL_strdup(base)) == NULL) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
             return 0;
+        }
+        strcpy(ecb + p->data_size - sizeof("ECB"), "ECB");
+        EVP_CIPHER_free(ctr->cipher_ecb);
+        EVP_CIPHER_free(ctr->cipher_ctr);
+        ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(libctx, base, propquery);
+        ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(libctx, ecb, propquery);
+        OPENSSL_free(ecb);
+        if (ctr->cipher_ctr == NULL || ctr->cipher_ecb == NULL) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_CIPHERS);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        cipher_init = 1;
+    }
 
-        drbg->min_entropylen = ctr->keylen;
-        drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
-        drbg->min_noncelen = drbg->min_entropylen / 2;
-        drbg->max_noncelen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
-        drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
-        drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
-    } else {
-#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_DRBG_CTR_INIT,
-                RAND_R_DERIVATION_FUNCTION_MANDATORY_FOR_FIPS);
+    if (cipher_init && !drbg_ctr_init(ctx))
         return 0;
-#else
-        drbg->min_entropylen = drbg->seedlen;
-        drbg->max_entropylen = drbg->seedlen;
-        /* Nonce not used */
-        drbg->min_noncelen = 0;
-        drbg->max_noncelen = 0;
-        drbg->max_perslen = drbg->seedlen;
-        drbg->max_adinlen = drbg->seedlen;
-#endif
-    }
 
-    drbg->max_request = 1 << 16;
+    return drbg_set_ctx_params(ctx, params);
+}
 
-    return 1;
+static const OSSL_PARAM *drbg_ctr_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_CIPHER, NULL, 0),
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+        /*
+         * Don't advertise this for FIPS, it isn't allowed to change.
+         * The parameter can still be passed and will be processed but errors
+         * out.
+         */
+        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_USE_DF, NULL),
+#endif
+        OSSL_PARAM_DRBG_SETABLE_CTX_COMMON,
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_settable_ctx_params;
 }
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH drbg_ctr_functions[] = {
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))drbg_ctr_new_wrapper },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))drbg_ctr_free },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_INSTANTIATE,
+      (void(*)(void))drbg_ctr_instantiate_wrapper },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNINSTANTIATE,
+      (void(*)(void))drbg_ctr_uninstantiate_wrapper },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GENERATE, (void(*)(void))drbg_ctr_generate_wrapper },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_RESEED, (void(*)(void))drbg_ctr_reseed_wrapper },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_ENABLE_LOCKING, (void(*)(void))drbg_enable_locking },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_LOCK, (void(*)(void))drbg_lock },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNLOCK, (void(*)(void))drbg_unlock },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))drbg_ctr_settable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))drbg_ctr_set_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))drbg_ctr_gettable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))drbg_ctr_get_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SET_CALLBACKS, (void(*)(void))drbg_set_callbacks },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_VERIFY_ZEROIZATION,
+      (void(*)(void))drbg_ctr_verify_zeroization },
+    { 0, NULL }
+};
index f087d88..62a9768 100644 (file)
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
 #include "internal/thread_once.h"
 #include "prov/providercommon.h"
-#include "rand_local.h"
+#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "prov/provider_util.h"
+#include "prov/implementations.h"
+#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "drbg_local.h"
+
+static OSSL_OP_rand_newctx_fn drbg_hash_new_wrapper;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_freectx_fn drbg_hash_free;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_instantiate_fn drbg_hash_instantiate_wrapper;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_uninstantiate_fn drbg_hash_uninstantiate_wrapper;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_generate_fn drbg_hash_generate_wrapper;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_reseed_fn drbg_hash_reseed_wrapper;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_settable_ctx_params_fn drbg_hash_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_set_ctx_params_fn drbg_hash_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_gettable_ctx_params_fn drbg_hash_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_get_ctx_params_fn drbg_hash_get_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_verify_zeroization_fn drbg_hash_verify_zeroization;
+
+/* 888 bits from SP800-90Ar1 10.1 table 2 */
+#define HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN    (888/8)
 
 /* 440 bits from SP800-90Ar1 10.1 table 2 */
 #define HASH_PRNG_SMALL_SEEDLEN   (440/8)
+
 /* Determine what seedlen to use based on the block length */
 #define MAX_BLOCKLEN_USING_SMALL_SEEDLEN (256/8)
 #define INBYTE_IGNORE ((unsigned char)0xFF)
 
+typedef struct rand_drbg_hash_st {
+    PROV_DIGEST digest;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
+    size_t blocklen;
+    unsigned char V[HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN];
+    unsigned char C[HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN];
+    /* Temporary value storage: should always exceed max digest length */
+    unsigned char vtmp[HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN];
+} PROV_DRBG_HASH;
 
 /*
  * SP800-90Ar1 10.3.1 Derivation function using a Hash Function (Hash_df).
  *    in3 - optional input string (Can be NULL).
  *    These are concatenated as part of the DigestUpdate process.
  */
-static int hash_df(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out,
+static int hash_df(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out,
                    const unsigned char inbyte,
                    const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
                    const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
                    const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len)
 {
-    RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash;
+    PROV_DRBG_HASH *hash = (PROV_DRBG_HASH *)drbg->data;
     EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = hash->ctx;
     unsigned char *vtmp = hash->vtmp;
     /* tmp = counter || num_bits_returned || [inbyte] */
@@ -69,7 +100,7 @@ static int hash_df(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out,
          * (Step 4.1) out = out || Hash(tmp || in || [in2] || [in3])
          *            (where tmp = counter || num_bits_returned || [inbyte])
          */
-        if (!(EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, hash->md, NULL)
+        if (!(EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, ossl_prov_digest_md(&hash->digest), NULL)
                 && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, tmp, tmp_sz)
                 && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, in, inlen)
                 && (in2 == NULL || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, in2, in2len))
@@ -97,7 +128,7 @@ static int hash_df(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out,
 }
 
 /* Helper function that just passes 2 input parameters to hash_df() */
-static int hash_df1(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out,
+static int hash_df1(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out,
                     const unsigned char in_byte,
                     const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len)
 {
@@ -110,7 +141,7 @@ static int hash_df1(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out,
  * The final carry is ignored i.e: dst =  (dst + in) mod (2^seedlen_bits).
  * where dst size is drbg->seedlen, and inlen <= drbg->seedlen.
  */
-static int add_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *dst,
+static int add_bytes(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *dst,
                      unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
 {
     size_t i;
@@ -141,13 +172,13 @@ static int add_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *dst,
 }
 
 /* V = (V + Hash(inbyte || V  || [additional_input]) mod (2^seedlen) */
-static int add_hash_to_v(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char inbyte,
+static int add_hash_to_v(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char inbyte,
                          const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
 {
-    RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash;
+    PROV_DRBG_HASH *hash = (PROV_DRBG_HASH *)drbg->data;
     EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = hash->ctx;
 
-    return EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, hash->md, NULL)
+    return EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, ossl_prov_digest_md(&hash->digest), NULL)
            && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &inbyte, 1)
            && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, hash->V, drbg->seedlen)
            && (adin == NULL || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, adin, adinlen))
@@ -173,16 +204,17 @@ static int add_hash_to_v(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char inbyte,
  *
  * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
  */
-static int hash_gen(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+static int hash_gen(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
 {
-    RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash;
+    PROV_DRBG_HASH *hash = (PROV_DRBG_HASH *)drbg->data;
     unsigned char one = 1;
 
     if (outlen == 0)
         return 1;
     memcpy(hash->vtmp, hash->V, drbg->seedlen);
     for(;;) {
-        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(hash->ctx, hash->md, NULL)
+        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(hash->ctx, ossl_prov_digest_md(&hash->digest),
+                               NULL)
                 || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hash->ctx, hash->vtmp, drbg->seedlen))
             return 0;
 
@@ -213,20 +245,35 @@ static int hash_gen(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
  *
  * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
  */
-static int drbg_hash_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+static int drbg_hash_instantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
                                  const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
                                  const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
                                  const unsigned char *pstr, size_t pstr_len)
 {
-    RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash;
+    PROV_DRBG_HASH *hash = (PROV_DRBG_HASH *)drbg->data;
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash->ctx);
+    hash->ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
 
     /* (Step 1-3) V = Hash_df(entropy||nonce||pers, seedlen) */
-    return hash_df(drbg, hash->V, INBYTE_IGNORE,
-                   ent, ent_len, nonce, nonce_len, pstr, pstr_len)
+    return hash->ctx != NULL
+           && hash_df(drbg, hash->V, INBYTE_IGNORE,
+                      ent, ent_len, nonce, nonce_len, pstr, pstr_len)
            /* (Step 4) C = Hash_df(0x00||V, seedlen) */
            && hash_df1(drbg, hash->C, 0x00, hash->V, drbg->seedlen);
 }
 
+static int drbg_hash_instantiate_wrapper(void *vdrbg, unsigned int strength,
+                                         int prediction_resistance,
+                                         const unsigned char *pstr,
+                                         size_t pstr_len)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+
+    return PROV_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, strength, prediction_resistance,
+                                 pstr, pstr_len);
+}
+
 /*
  * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.1.3 Hash_DRBG_Reseed_Process:
  *
@@ -235,13 +282,13 @@ static int drbg_hash_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
  *
  * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
  */
-static int drbg_hash_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+static int drbg_hash_reseed(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
                             const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
                             const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
 {
-    RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash;
+    PROV_DRBG_HASH *hash = (PROV_DRBG_HASH *)drbg->data;
 
-    /* (Step 1-2) V = Hash_df(0x01 || V || entropy_input || additional_input)*/
+    /* (Step 1-2) V = Hash_df(0x01 || V || entropy_input || additional_input) */
     /* V about to be updated so use C as output instead */
     if (!hash_df(drbg, hash->C, 0x01, hash->V, drbg->seedlen, ent, ent_len,
                  adin, adin_len))
@@ -251,6 +298,16 @@ static int drbg_hash_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
     return hash_df1(drbg, hash->C, 0x00, hash->V, drbg->seedlen);
 }
 
+static int drbg_hash_reseed_wrapper(void *vdrbg, int prediction_resistance,
+                                    const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
+                                    const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+
+    return PROV_DRBG_reseed(drbg, prediction_resistance, ent, ent_len,
+                            adin, adin_len);
+}
+
 /*
  * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.1.4 Hash_DRBG_Generate_Process:
  *
@@ -260,11 +317,11 @@ static int drbg_hash_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
  *
  * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
  */
-static int drbg_hash_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+static int drbg_hash_generate(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
                               unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
                               const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
 {
-    RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash;
+    PROV_DRBG_HASH *hash = (PROV_DRBG_HASH *)drbg->data;
     unsigned char counter[4];
     int reseed_counter = drbg->reseed_gen_counter;
 
@@ -273,10 +330,11 @@ static int drbg_hash_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
     counter[2] = (unsigned char)((reseed_counter >> 8) & 0xff);
     counter[3] = (unsigned char)(reseed_counter & 0xff);
 
-    return (adin == NULL
+    return hash->ctx != NULL
+           && (adin == NULL
            /* (Step 2) if adin != NULL then V = V + Hash(0x02||V||adin) */
-                || adin_len == 0
-                || add_hash_to_v(drbg, 0x02, adin, adin_len))
+               || adin_len == 0
+               || add_hash_to_v(drbg, 0x02, adin, adin_len))
            /* (Step 3) Hashgen(outlen, V) */
            && hash_gen(drbg, out, outlen)
            /* (Step 4/5) H = V = (V + Hash(0x03||V) mod (2^seedlen_bits) */
@@ -288,73 +346,167 @@ static int drbg_hash_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
            && add_bytes(drbg, hash->V, counter, 4);
 }
 
-static int drbg_hash_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+static int drbg_hash_generate_wrapper
+    (void *vdrbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned int strength,
+     int prediction_resistance, const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
 {
-    EVP_MD_free(drbg->data.hash.md);
-    EVP_MD_CTX_free(drbg->data.hash.ctx);
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.hash, sizeof(drbg->data.hash));
-    return 1;
+    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+
+    return PROV_DRBG_generate(drbg, out, outlen, strength,
+                              prediction_resistance, adin, adin_len);
 }
 
-static RAND_DRBG_METHOD drbg_hash_meth = {
-    drbg_hash_instantiate,
-    drbg_hash_reseed,
-    drbg_hash_generate,
-    drbg_hash_uninstantiate
-};
+static int drbg_hash_uninstantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG_HASH *hash = (PROV_DRBG_HASH *)drbg->data;
 
-int drbg_hash_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(hash->V, sizeof(hash->V));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(hash->C, sizeof(hash->C));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(hash->vtmp, sizeof(hash->vtmp));
+    return PROV_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
+}
+
+static int drbg_hash_uninstantiate_wrapper(void *vdrbg)
 {
-    EVP_MD *md;
-    RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash;
+    return drbg_hash_uninstantiate((PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg);
+}
 
-    /*
-     * Confirm digest is allowed. We allow all digests that are not XOF
-     * (such as SHAKE).  In FIPS mode, the fetch will fail for non-approved
-     * digests.
-     */
-    md = EVP_MD_fetch(drbg->libctx, ossl_prov_util_nid_to_name(drbg->type), "");
-    if (md == NULL)
-        return 0;
+static int drbg_hash_verify_zeroization(void *vdrbg)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+    PROV_DRBG_HASH *hash = (PROV_DRBG_HASH *)drbg->data;
 
-    if ((EVP_MD_flags(md) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) != 0)
+    PROV_DRBG_VERYIFY_ZEROIZATION(hash->V);
+    PROV_DRBG_VERYIFY_ZEROIZATION(hash->C);
+    PROV_DRBG_VERYIFY_ZEROIZATION(hash->vtmp);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int drbg_hash_new(PROV_DRBG *ctx)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG_HASH *hash;
+
+    hash = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*hash));
+    if (hash == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return 0;
+    }
 
-    drbg->meth = &drbg_hash_meth;
+    ctx->data = hash;
+    ctx->seedlen = HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN;
+    ctx->max_entropylen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+    ctx->max_noncelen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+    ctx->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+    ctx->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
 
-    if (hash->ctx == NULL) {
-        hash->ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-        if (hash->ctx == NULL) {
-            EVP_MD_free(md);
-            return 0;
-        }
+    /* Maximum number of bits per request = 2^19  = 2^16 bytes */
+    ctx->max_request = 1 << 16;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void *drbg_hash_new_wrapper(void *provctx, void *parent,
+                                   const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_dispatch)
+{
+    return prov_rand_drbg_new(provctx, parent, parent_dispatch, &drbg_hash_new,
+                              &drbg_hash_instantiate, &drbg_hash_uninstantiate,
+                              &drbg_hash_reseed, &drbg_hash_generate);
+}
+
+static void drbg_hash_free(void *vdrbg)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+    PROV_DRBG_HASH *hash;
+
+    if (drbg != NULL && (hash = (PROV_DRBG_HASH *)drbg->data) != NULL) {
+        EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash->ctx);
+        ossl_prov_digest_reset(&hash->digest);
+        OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(hash, sizeof(*hash));
     }
+    prov_rand_drbg_free(drbg);
+}
+
+static int drbg_hash_get_ctx_params(void *vdrbg, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+
+    return drbg_get_ctx_params(drbg, params);
+}
 
-    EVP_MD_free(hash->md);
-    hash->md = md;
+static const OSSL_PARAM *drbg_hash_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_DRBG_GETABLE_CTX_COMMON,
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
 
-    /* These are taken from SP 800-90 10.1 Table 2 */
-    hash->blocklen = EVP_MD_size(md);
-    /* See SP800-57 Part1 Rev4 5.6.1 Table 3 */
-    drbg->strength = 64 * (hash->blocklen >> 3);
-    if (drbg->strength > 256)
-        drbg->strength = 256;
-    if (hash->blocklen > MAX_BLOCKLEN_USING_SMALL_SEEDLEN)
-        drbg->seedlen = HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN;
-    else
-        drbg->seedlen = HASH_PRNG_SMALL_SEEDLEN;
+static int drbg_hash_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+    PROV_DRBG *ctx = (PROV_DRBG *)vctx;
+    PROV_DRBG_HASH *hash = (PROV_DRBG_HASH *)ctx->data;
+    OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
+    const EVP_MD *md;
 
-    drbg->min_entropylen = drbg->strength / 8;
-    drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+    if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&hash->digest, params, libctx))
+        return 0;
 
-    drbg->min_noncelen = drbg->min_entropylen / 2;
-    drbg->max_noncelen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+    md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&hash->digest);
+    if (md != NULL) {
+        if ((EVP_MD_flags(md) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) != 0) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_XOF_DIGESTS_NOT_ALLOWED);
+            return 0;
+        }
 
-    drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
-    drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+        /* These are taken from SP 800-90 10.1 Table 2 */
+        hash->blocklen = EVP_MD_size(md);
+        /* See SP800-57 Part1 Rev4 5.6.1 Table 3 */
+        ctx->strength = 64 * (hash->blocklen >> 3);
+        if (ctx->strength > 256)
+            ctx->strength = 256;
+        if (hash->blocklen > MAX_BLOCKLEN_USING_SMALL_SEEDLEN)
+            ctx->seedlen = HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN;
+        else
+            ctx->seedlen = HASH_PRNG_SMALL_SEEDLEN;
+
+        ctx->min_entropylen = ctx->strength / 8;
+        ctx->min_noncelen = ctx->min_entropylen / 2;
+    }
 
-    /* Maximum number of bits per request = 2^19  = 2^16 bytes */
-    drbg->max_request = 1 << 16;
+    return drbg_set_ctx_params(ctx, params);
+}
 
-    return 1;
+static const OSSL_PARAM *drbg_hash_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_DRBG_SETABLE_CTX_COMMON,
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_settable_ctx_params;
 }
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH drbg_hash_functions[] = {
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))drbg_hash_new_wrapper },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))drbg_hash_free },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_INSTANTIATE,
+      (void(*)(void))drbg_hash_instantiate_wrapper },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNINSTANTIATE,
+      (void(*)(void))drbg_hash_uninstantiate_wrapper },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GENERATE, (void(*)(void))drbg_hash_generate_wrapper },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_RESEED, (void(*)(void))drbg_hash_reseed_wrapper },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_ENABLE_LOCKING, (void(*)(void))drbg_enable_locking },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_LOCK, (void(*)(void))drbg_lock },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNLOCK, (void(*)(void))drbg_unlock },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))drbg_hash_settable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))drbg_hash_set_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))drbg_hash_gettable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))drbg_hash_get_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SET_CALLBACKS, (void(*)(void))drbg_set_callbacks },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_VERIFY_ZEROIZATION,
+      (void(*)(void))drbg_hash_verify_zeroization },
+    { 0, NULL }
+};
index ea55279..dc19952 100644 (file)
@@ -7,20 +7,38 @@
  * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
  */
 
-/*
- * HMAC low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for internal
- * use.
- */
-#include "internal/deprecated.h"
-
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "prov/provider_util.h"
 #include "internal/thread_once.h"
 #include "prov/providercommon.h"
-#include "rand_local.h"
+#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "prov/implementations.h"
+#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "drbg_local.h"
+
+static OSSL_OP_rand_newctx_fn drbg_hmac_new_wrapper;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_freectx_fn drbg_hmac_free;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_instantiate_fn drbg_hmac_instantiate_wrapper;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_uninstantiate_fn drbg_hmac_uninstantiate_wrapper;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_generate_fn drbg_hmac_generate_wrapper;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_reseed_fn drbg_hmac_reseed_wrapper;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_settable_ctx_params_fn drbg_hmac_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_set_ctx_params_fn drbg_hmac_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_gettable_ctx_params_fn drbg_hmac_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_get_ctx_params_fn drbg_hmac_get_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_rand_verify_zeroization_fn drbg_hmac_verify_zeroization;
+
+typedef struct rand_drbg_hmac_st {
+    EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx;            /* H(x) = HMAC_hash OR H(x) = KMAC */
+    PROV_DIGEST digest;          /* H(x) = hash(x) */
+    size_t blocklen;
+    unsigned char K[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned char V[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+} PROV_DRBG_HMAC;
 
 /*
  * Called twice by SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.2 HMAC_DRBG_Update_Process.
  *
  * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
  */
-static int do_hmac(RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac, unsigned char inbyte,
+static int do_hmac(PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac, unsigned char inbyte,
                    const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
                    const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
                    const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len)
 {
-    HMAC_CTX *ctx = hmac->ctx;
-
-    return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, hmac->K, hmac->blocklen, hmac->md, NULL)
-           /* K = HMAC(K, V || inbyte || [in1] || [in2] || [in3]) */
-           && HMAC_Update(ctx, hmac->V, hmac->blocklen)
-           && HMAC_Update(ctx, &inbyte, 1)
-           && (in1 == NULL || in1len == 0 || HMAC_Update(ctx, in1, in1len))
-           && (in2 == NULL || in2len == 0 || HMAC_Update(ctx, in2, in2len))
-           && (in3 == NULL || in3len == 0 || HMAC_Update(ctx, in3, in3len))
-           && HMAC_Final(ctx, hmac->K, NULL)
-           /* V = HMAC(K, V) */
-           && HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, hmac->K, hmac->blocklen, hmac->md, NULL)
-           && HMAC_Update(ctx, hmac->V, hmac->blocklen)
-           && HMAC_Final(ctx, hmac->V, NULL);
+    EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = hmac->ctx;
+    OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
+
+    *params = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, hmac->K,
+                                                hmac->blocklen);
+    if (!EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx, params)
+            || !EVP_MAC_init(ctx)
+            /* K = HMAC(K, V || inbyte || [in1] || [in2] || [in3]) */
+            || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, hmac->V, hmac->blocklen)
+            || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, &inbyte, 1)
+            || !(in1 == NULL || in1len == 0 || EVP_MAC_update(ctx, in1, in1len))
+            || !(in2 == NULL || in2len == 0 || EVP_MAC_update(ctx, in2, in2len))
+            || !(in3 == NULL || in3len == 0 || EVP_MAC_update(ctx, in3, in3len))
+            || !EVP_MAC_final(ctx, hmac->K, NULL, sizeof(hmac->K)))
+        return 0;
+
+   /* V = HMAC(K, V) */
+    *params = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, hmac->K,
+                                                hmac->blocklen);
+    return EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx, params)
+           && EVP_MAC_init(ctx)
+           && EVP_MAC_update(ctx, hmac->V, hmac->blocklen)
+           && EVP_MAC_final(ctx, hmac->V, NULL, sizeof(hmac->V));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -71,12 +98,12 @@ static int do_hmac(RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac, unsigned char inbyte,
  *
  * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
  */
-static int drbg_hmac_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+static int drbg_hmac_update(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
                             const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
                             const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
                             const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len)
 {
-    RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = &drbg->data.hmac;
+    PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC *)drbg->data;
 
     /* (Steps 1-2) K = HMAC(K, V||0x00||provided_data). V = HMAC(K,V) */
     if (!do_hmac(hmac, 0x00, in1, in1len, in2, in2len, in3, in3len))
@@ -99,12 +126,17 @@ static int drbg_hmac_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
  *
  * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
  */
-static int drbg_hmac_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+static int drbg_hmac_instantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
                                  const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
                                  const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
                                  const unsigned char *pstr, size_t pstr_len)
 {
-    RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = &drbg->data.hmac;
+    PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC *)drbg->data;
+
+    if (hmac->ctx == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MAC);
+        return 0;
+    }
 
     /* (Step 2) Key = 0x00 00...00 */
     memset(hmac->K, 0x00, hmac->blocklen);
@@ -115,6 +147,17 @@ static int drbg_hmac_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
                             pstr_len);
 }
 
+static int drbg_hmac_instantiate_wrapper(void *vdrbg, unsigned int strength,
+                                         int prediction_resistance,
+                                         const unsigned char *pstr,
+                                         size_t pstr_len)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+
+    return PROV_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, strength, prediction_resistance,
+                                 pstr, pstr_len);
+}
+
 /*
  * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.4 HMAC_DRBG_Reseed_Process:
  *
@@ -125,7 +168,7 @@ static int drbg_hmac_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
  *
  * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
  */
-static int drbg_hmac_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+static int drbg_hmac_reseed(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
                             const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
                             const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
 {
@@ -133,6 +176,16 @@ static int drbg_hmac_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
     return drbg_hmac_update(drbg, ent, ent_len, adin, adin_len, NULL, 0);
 }
 
+static int drbg_hmac_reseed_wrapper(void *vdrbg, int prediction_resistance,
+                                    const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
+                                    const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+
+    return PROV_DRBG_reseed(drbg, prediction_resistance, ent, ent_len,
+                            adin, adin_len);
+}
+
 /*
  * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.5 HMAC_DRBG_Generate_Process:
  *
@@ -142,13 +195,14 @@ static int drbg_hmac_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
  *
  * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
  */
-static int drbg_hmac_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+static int drbg_hmac_generate(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
                               unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
                               const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
 {
-    RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = &drbg->data.hmac;
-    HMAC_CTX *ctx = hmac->ctx;
+    PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC *)drbg->data;
+    EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = hmac->ctx;
     const unsigned char *temp = hmac->V;
+    OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
 
     /* (Step 2) if adin != NULL then (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(adin, K, V) */
     if (adin != NULL
@@ -164,16 +218,19 @@ static int drbg_hmac_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
      *             }
      */
     for (;;) {
-        if (!HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, hmac->K, hmac->blocklen, hmac->md, NULL)
-                || !HMAC_Update(ctx, temp, hmac->blocklen))
+        *params = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
+                                                    hmac->K, hmac->blocklen);
+        if (!EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx, params)
+            || !EVP_MAC_init(ctx)
+            || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, temp, hmac->blocklen))
             return 0;
 
         if (outlen > hmac->blocklen) {
-            if (!HMAC_Final(ctx, out, NULL))
+            if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, NULL, outlen))
                 return 0;
             temp = out;
         } else {
-            if (!HMAC_Final(ctx, hmac->V, NULL))
+            if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, hmac->V, NULL, sizeof(hmac->V)))
                 return 0;
             memcpy(out, hmac->V, outlen);
             break;
@@ -188,69 +245,171 @@ static int drbg_hmac_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
     return 1;
 }
 
-static int drbg_hmac_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+static int drbg_hmac_generate_wrapper
+    (void *vdrbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned int strength,
+     int prediction_resistance, const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
 {
-    EVP_MD_free(drbg->data.hmac.md);
-    HMAC_CTX_free(drbg->data.hmac.ctx);
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.hmac, sizeof(drbg->data.hmac));
-    return 1;
+    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+
+    return PROV_DRBG_generate(drbg, out, outlen, strength,
+                              prediction_resistance, adin, adin_len);
 }
 
-static RAND_DRBG_METHOD drbg_hmac_meth = {
-    drbg_hmac_instantiate,
-    drbg_hmac_reseed,
-    drbg_hmac_generate,
-    drbg_hmac_uninstantiate
-};
+static int drbg_hmac_uninstantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC *)drbg->data;
 
-int drbg_hmac_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac->K, sizeof(hmac->K));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac->V, sizeof(hmac->V));
+    return PROV_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
+}
+
+static int drbg_hmac_uninstantiate_wrapper(void *vdrbg)
 {
-    EVP_MD *md = NULL;
-    RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = &drbg->data.hmac;
+    return drbg_hmac_uninstantiate((PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg);
+}
 
-    /*
-     * Confirm digest is allowed. We allow all digests that are not XOF
-     * (such as SHAKE).  In FIPS mode, the fetch will fail for non-approved
-     * digests.
-     */
-    md = EVP_MD_fetch(drbg->libctx, ossl_prov_util_nid_to_name(drbg->type), "");
-    if (md == NULL)
-        return 0;
+static int drbg_hmac_verify_zeroization(void *vdrbg)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+    PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC *)drbg->data;
 
-    if ((EVP_MD_flags(md) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) != 0)
-        return 0;
+    PROV_DRBG_VERYIFY_ZEROIZATION(hmac->K);
+    PROV_DRBG_VERYIFY_ZEROIZATION(hmac->V);
+    return 1;
+}
 
-    drbg->meth = &drbg_hmac_meth;
+static int drbg_hmac_new(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac;
 
-    if (hmac->ctx == NULL) {
-        hmac->ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
-        if (hmac->ctx == NULL) {
-            EVP_MD_free(md);
-            return 0;
-        }
+    hmac = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*hmac));
+    if (hmac == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
     }
 
-    /* These are taken from SP 800-90 10.1 Table 2 */
-    EVP_MD_free(hmac->md);
-    hmac->md = md;
-    hmac->blocklen = EVP_MD_size(md);
+    drbg->data = hmac;
     /* See SP800-57 Part1 Rev4 5.6.1 Table 3 */
-    drbg->strength = 64 * (int)(hmac->blocklen >> 3);
-    if (drbg->strength > 256)
-        drbg->strength = 256;
-    drbg->seedlen = hmac->blocklen;
-
-    drbg->min_entropylen = drbg->strength / 8;
     drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
-
-    drbg->min_noncelen = drbg->min_entropylen / 2;
     drbg->max_noncelen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
-
     drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
     drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
 
-    /* Maximum number of bits per request = 2^19 = 2^16 bytes*/
+    /* Maximum number of bits per request = 2^19  = 2^16 bytes */
     drbg->max_request = 1 << 16;
-
     return 1;
 }
+
+static void *drbg_hmac_new_wrapper(void *provctx, void *parent,
+                                   const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_dispatch)
+{
+    return prov_rand_drbg_new(provctx, parent, parent_dispatch, &drbg_hmac_new,
+                              &drbg_hmac_instantiate, &drbg_hmac_uninstantiate,
+                              &drbg_hmac_reseed, &drbg_hmac_generate);
+}
+
+static void drbg_hmac_free(void *vdrbg)
+{
+    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+    PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac;
+
+    if (drbg != NULL && (hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC *)drbg->data) != NULL) {
+        EVP_MAC_free_ctx(hmac->ctx);
+        ossl_prov_digest_reset(&hmac->digest);
+        OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(hmac, sizeof(*hmac));
+    }
+    prov_rand_drbg_free(drbg);
+}
+
+static int drbg_hmac_get_ctx_params(void *vdrbg, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+
+    return drbg_get_ctx_params(drbg, params);
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *drbg_hmac_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_DRBG_GETABLE_CTX_COMMON,
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int drbg_hmac_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+    PROV_DRBG *ctx = (PROV_DRBG *)vctx;
+    PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC *)ctx->data;
+    OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+
+    if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&hmac->digest, params, libctx))
+        return 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Confirm digest is allowed. We allow all digests that are not XOF
+     * (such as SHAKE).  In FIPS mode, the fetch will fail for non-approved
+     * digests.
+     */
+    md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&hmac->digest);
+    if (md != NULL && (EVP_MD_flags(md) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) != 0) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_XOF_DIGESTS_NOT_ALLOWED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&hmac->ctx, params,
+                                           NULL, NULL, NULL, libctx))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (hmac->ctx != NULL) {
+        /* These are taken from SP 800-90 10.1 Table 2 */
+        hmac->blocklen = EVP_MD_size(md);
+        /* See SP800-57 Part1 Rev4 5.6.1 Table 3 */
+        ctx->strength = 64 * (int)(hmac->blocklen >> 3);
+        if (ctx->strength > 256)
+            ctx->strength = 256;
+        ctx->seedlen = hmac->blocklen;
+        ctx->min_entropylen = ctx->strength / 8;
+        ctx->min_noncelen = ctx->min_entropylen / 2;
+    }
+
+    return drbg_set_ctx_params(ctx, params);
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *drbg_hmac_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+    static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAC, NULL, 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_DRBG_SETABLE_CTX_COMMON,
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH drbg_hmac_functions[] = {
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_new_wrapper },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_free },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_INSTANTIATE,
+      (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_instantiate_wrapper },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNINSTANTIATE,
+      (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_uninstantiate_wrapper },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GENERATE, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_generate_wrapper },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_RESEED, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_reseed_wrapper },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_ENABLE_LOCKING, (void(*)(void))drbg_enable_locking },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_LOCK, (void(*)(void))drbg_lock },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNLOCK, (void(*)(void))drbg_unlock },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_settable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_set_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+      (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_gettable_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_get_ctx_params },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SET_CALLBACKS, (void(*)(void))drbg_set_callbacks },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_VERIFY_ZEROIZATION,
+      (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_verify_zeroization },
+    { 0, NULL }
+};
index a605186..d9a06c7 100644 (file)
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # include <openssl/core_names.h>
 # include <openssl/params.h>
 # include "internal/tsan_assist.h"
-
+# include "internal/nelem.h"
 # include "internal/numbers.h"
 
 /* How many times to read the TSC as a randomness source. */
 # define MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL                (1 << 20) /* approx. 12 days */
 
 /* Default reseed intervals */
-# define MASTER_RESEED_INTERVAL                  (1 << 8)
-# define SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL                   (1 << 16)
-# define MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL             (60*60)   /* 1 hour */
-# define SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL              (7*60)    /* 7 minutes */
+# define RESEED_INTERVAL                         (1 << 8)
+# define TIME_INTERVAL                           (60*60)   /* 1 hour */
 
 /*
  * The number of bytes that constitutes an atomic lump of entropy with respect
@@ -69,47 +67,34 @@ typedef enum drbg_status_e {
 } DRBG_STATUS;
 
 /*
- * The DRBG methods
- */
-
-typedef struct rand_drbg_hmac_st {
-    EVP_MD *md;
-    HMAC_CTX *ctx;
-    size_t blocklen;
-    unsigned char K[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-    unsigned char V[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-} PROV_DRBG_HMAC;
-
-/*
- * The state of a DRBG AES-CTR.
- */
-typedef struct rand_drbg_ctr_st {
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_ecb;
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_ctr;
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_df;
-    EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ecb;
-    EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ctr;
-    size_t keylen;
-    unsigned char K[32];
-    unsigned char V[16];
-    /* Temporary block storage used by ctr_df */
-    unsigned char bltmp[16];
-    size_t bltmp_pos;
-    unsigned char KX[48];
-} PROV_DRBG_CTR;
-
-
-/*
- * The state of all types of DRBGs, even though we only have CTR mode
- * right now.
+ * The state of all types of DRBGs.
  */
 struct prov_drbg_st {
     CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
-    /* The library context this DRBG is associated with, if any */
-    OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
+    void *provctx;
+
+    /* Virtual functions are cache here */
+    int (*instantiate)(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
+                       const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen,
+                       const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen,
+                       const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen);
+    int (*uninstantiate)(PROV_DRBG *ctx);
+    int (*reseed)(PROV_DRBG *drbg, const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
+                  const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len);
+    int (*generate)(PROV_DRBG *, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+                    const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len);
+
+    /* Parent PROV_RAND and its dispatch table functions */
     void *parent;
+    OSSL_OP_rand_enable_locking_fn *parent_enable_locking;
+    OSSL_OP_rand_lock_fn *parent_lock;
+    OSSL_OP_rand_unlock_fn *parent_unlock;
+    OSSL_OP_rand_get_ctx_params_fn *parent_get_ctx_params;
+    OSSL_OP_rand_generate_fn *parent_generate;
+    OSSL_OP_rand_nonce_fn *parent_nonce;
+
     const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_dispatch;
-    int secure; /* 1: allocated on the secure heap, 0: otherwise */
+
     /*
      * Stores the return value of openssl_get_fork_id() as of when we last
      * reseeded.  The DRBG reseeds automatically whenever drbg->fork_id !=
@@ -154,7 +139,7 @@ struct prov_drbg_st {
      * clarification.
      */
 
-    int strength;
+    unsigned int strength;
     size_t max_request;
     size_t min_entropylen, max_entropylen;
     size_t min_noncelen, max_noncelen;
@@ -188,83 +173,100 @@ struct prov_drbg_st {
      * is added by PROV_add() or PROV_seed() will have an immediate effect on
      * the output of PROV_bytes() resp. PROV_priv_bytes().
      */
-    TSAN_QUALIFIER unsigned int reseed_prop_counter;
+    TSAN_QUALIFIER unsigned int reseed_counter;
     unsigned int reseed_next_counter;
+    unsigned int parent_reseed_counter;
 
     size_t seedlen;
     DRBG_STATUS state;
 
+    /* DRBG specific data */
     void *data;
 
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
-    /* Application data, mainly used in the KATs. */
-    CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
-#endif
+    /* Entropy and nonce gathering callbacks */
+    void *callback_arg;
+    OSSL_INOUT_CALLBACK *get_entropy_fn;
+    OSSL_CALLBACK *cleanup_entropy_fn;
+    OSSL_INOUT_CALLBACK *get_nonce_fn;
+    OSSL_CALLBACK *cleanup_nonce_fn;
 };
 
-/* DRBG helpers */
-int rand_drbg_restart(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
-                      const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy);
-size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(PROV_DRBG *drbg);
-
-PROV_DRBG *prov_rand_drbg_new(void *provctx, int secure, void *parent,
-                              const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_dispatch,
-                              int (*dnew)(PROV_DRBG *ctx, int secure));
-void prov_rand_free(PROV_DRBG *drbg);
-
-int PROV_DRBG_instantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg, int strength,
+PROV_DRBG *prov_rand_drbg_new
+    (void *provctx, void *parent, const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_dispatch,
+     int (*dnew)(PROV_DRBG *ctx),
+     int (*instantiate)(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
+                        const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen,
+                        const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen,
+                        const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen),
+     int (*uninstantiate)(PROV_DRBG *ctx),
+     int (*reseed)(PROV_DRBG *drbg, const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
+                   const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len),
+     int (*generate)(PROV_DRBG *, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+                     const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len));
+void prov_rand_drbg_free(PROV_DRBG *drbg);
+
+int PROV_DRBG_instantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned int strength,
                           int prediction_resistance,
-                          const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen,
-                          int (*ifnc)(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
-                                      const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
-                                      const unsigned char *nonce,
-                                      size_t nonce_len,
-                                      const unsigned char *pstr,
-                                      size_t pstr_len));
+                          const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen);
+
+int PROV_DRBG_uninstantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg);
 
 int PROV_DRBG_reseed(PROV_DRBG *drbg, int prediction_resistance,
                      const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
-                     const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen,
-                     int (*reseed)(PROV_DRBG *drbg, const unsigned char *ent,
-                                   size_t ent_len, const unsigned char *adin,
-                                   size_t adin_len));
+                     const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen);
 
 int PROV_DRBG_generate(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
-                       int strength, int prediction_resistance,
-                       const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen,
-                       int (*generate)(PROV_DRBG *, unsigned char *out,
-                                       size_t outlen, const unsigned char *adin,
-                                       size_t adin_len),
-                       int (*reseed)(PROV_DRBG *drbg, const unsigned char *ent,
-                                     size_t ent_len, const unsigned char *adin,
-                                     size_t adin_len));
+                       unsigned int strength, int prediction_resistance,
+                       const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen);
+
+/*
+ * Entropy call back for the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests.
+ * These need to be exposed for the unit tests.
+ */
+int drbg_set_callbacks(void *vctx, OSSL_INOUT_CALLBACK *get_entropy_fn,
+                       OSSL_CALLBACK *cleanup_entropy_fn,
+                       OSSL_INOUT_CALLBACK *get_nonce_fn,
+                       OSSL_CALLBACK *cleanup_nonce_fn, void *arg);
+
+/* Verify that an array of numeric values is all zero */
+#define PROV_DRBG_VERYIFY_ZEROIZATION(v)    \
+    {                                       \
+        size_t i;                           \
+                                            \
+        for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(v); i++) \
+            if ((v)[i] != 0)                \
+                return 0;                   \
+    }
 
 /* locking api */
 OSSL_OP_rand_enable_locking_fn drbg_enable_locking;
 OSSL_OP_rand_lock_fn drbg_lock;
 OSSL_OP_rand_unlock_fn drbg_unlock;
 
+/* Common parameters for all of our DRBGs */
 int drbg_get_ctx_params(PROV_DRBG *drbg, OSSL_PARAM params[]);
 int drbg_set_ctx_params(PROV_DRBG *drbg, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
 
 #define OSSL_PARAM_DRBG_SETABLE_CTX_COMMON                                      \
-    OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS, NULL),             \
-    OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, NULL)
+    OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS, NULL),             \
+    OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, NULL)
 
 #define OSSL_PARAM_DRBG_GETABLE_CTX_COMMON                              \
-    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_STATUS, NULL),                       \
+    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_STATE, NULL),                        \
     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_STRENGTH, NULL),                    \
-    OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MAX_REQUEST, NULL),               \
-    OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MIN_ENTROPYLEN, NULL),            \
-    OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MAX_ENTROPYLEN, NULL),            \
-    OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MIN_NONCELEN, NULL),              \
-    OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MAX_NONCELEN, NULL),              \
-    OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MAX_PERSLEN, NULL),               \
-    OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MAX_ADINLEN, NULL),               \
-    OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_RESEED_CTR, NULL),                  \
-    OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS, NULL),             \
-    OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, NULL)
-
+    OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_REQUEST, NULL),               \
+    OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_ENTROPYLEN, NULL),            \
+    OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_ENTROPYLEN, NULL),            \
+    OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_NONCELEN, NULL),              \
+    OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_NONCELEN, NULL),              \
+    OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_PERSLEN, NULL),               \
+    OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_ADINLEN, NULL),               \
+    OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_CTR, NULL),                  \
+    OSSL_PARAM_time_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME, NULL),               \
+    OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS, NULL),             \
+    OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, NULL)
+
+/* Continuous test "entropy" calls */
 size_t prov_crngt_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
                               unsigned char **pout,
                               int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
@@ -272,16 +274,4 @@ size_t prov_crngt_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
 void prov_crngt_cleanup_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
                                 unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
 
-/*
- * Entropy call back for the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests.
- * These need to be exposed for the unit tests.
- */
-#if 0
-int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, PROV_POOL *pool,
-                              unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
-                              unsigned int *md_size);
-extern int (*crngt_get_entropy)(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, PROV_POOL *pool,
-                                unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
-                                unsigned int *md_size);
-#endif
 #endif
index 41e83ab..86fb979 100644 (file)
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ typedef struct {
     unsigned int strength;
 } PROV_TEST_RNG;
 
-static int test_rng_new(PROV_DRBG *ctx, int secure)
+static int test_rng_new(PROV_DRBG *ctx)
 {
     PROV_TEST_RNG *t;
 
@@ -50,17 +50,9 @@ static int test_rng_new(PROV_DRBG *ctx, int secure)
     ctx->max_perslen = INT_MAX;
     ctx->max_adinlen = INT_MAX;
     ctx->max_request = INT_MAX;
-    ctx->strength = 1024;
     return 1;
 }
 
-static void *test_rng_new_wrapper(void *provctx, int secure, void *parent,
-                                   const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_dispatch)
-{
-    return prov_rand_drbg_new(provctx, secure, parent, parent_dispatch,
-                              &test_rng_new);
-}
-
 static void test_rng_free(void *vdrbg)
 {
     PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
@@ -111,7 +103,7 @@ static int test_rng_uninstantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
     PROV_TEST_RNG *t = (PROV_TEST_RNG *)drbg->data;
 
     t->entropy_pos = 0;
-    return 1;
+    return PROV_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
 }
 
 static int test_rng_uninstantiate_wrapper(void *vdrbg)
@@ -169,15 +161,6 @@ static int test_rng_reseed_wrapper(void *vdrbg, int prediction_resistance,
     return test_rng_reseed((PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg, ent, ent_len, adin, adin_len);
 }
 
-static void *test_rng_new_wrapper(void *provctx, void *parent,
-                                   const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_dispatch)
-{
-    return prov_rand_drbg_new(provctx, parent, parent_dispatch,
-                              &test_rng_new, &test_rng_instantiate,
-                              &test_rng_uninstantiate, &test_rng_reseed,
-                              &test_rng_generate);
-}
-
 static size_t test_rng_nonce(void *vdrbg, unsigned char *out,
                              unsigned int strength, size_t min_noncelen,
                              size_t max_noncelen)
@@ -307,6 +290,15 @@ static int test_rng_verify_zeroization(void *vdrbg)
     return 1;
 }
 
+static void *test_rng_new_wrapper(void *provctx, void *parent,
+                                   const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_dispatch)
+{
+    return prov_rand_drbg_new(provctx, parent, parent_dispatch,
+                              &test_rng_new, &test_rng_instantiate,
+                              &test_rng_uninstantiate, &test_rng_reseed,
+                              &test_rng_generate);
+}
+
 const OSSL_DISPATCH test_rng_functions[] = {
     { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))test_rng_new_wrapper },
     { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))test_rng_free },